Synthesis, part of a special feature on Deeper Water: Exploring Barriers and Opportunities for the Emergence of Adaptive Water Governance

INTRODUCTION

Adaptive governance is increasingly promoted as a vital mechanism for dealing with the inherent uncertainty and change associated with complex ecosystem service trade-offs (McShane et al. 2011, Gunderson et al. 2016). Chaffin et al. (2014) consider it as an emergent form of environmental governance developing in part to provide for the coordination of governance trade-offs in situations of great complexity, uncertainty, and change. The authors define adaptive governance as “a range of interactions between actors, networks, organizations, and institutions emerging in pursuit of a desired state for social-ecological systems” (Chaffin et al. 2014). For purposes of this article, environmental governance is broadly defined as the continuing process of resolving trade-offs among varying ecosystem services (Boyle et al. 2001, Galafassi et al. 2017). For Rodríguez et al. (2006), trade-offs emerge when the delivery or value of one aquatic ecosystem service is diminished because of increased use of another service. In other words, trade-offs denote the gains for one ecosystem service or group of people that lead to losses for others (Daw et al. 2015). In contrast to top-down, state-based approaches, adaptive governance provides the means for confronting uncertainty and change in contextualized situations through flexible and responsive solutions to complex trade-offs (Baird et al. 2014, Chaffin et al. 2014). In this sense, adaptive water governance denotes the emergence of new modes of governance with advanced capacities for dealing with uncertainty and feedback associated with complex trade-offs in ever changing social-ecological systems (Huitema et al. 2009, Pahl-Wostl et al. 2012, Cosens et al. 2021).

Although adaptive water governance has been conceptually touted as an effective means for governing aquatic ecosystem service trade-offs (Gunderson et al. 2016, Karpouzoglou et al. 2016), most of the relevant literature has largely focused on the effectiveness of this governance approach (Baird et al. 2014). There is an absence of lucid discussion in the literature about the conditions that promote or inhibit the emergence of adaptive forms of governance, including but not limited to the role of accountability. In Southern Africa, for example, the emergence of adaptive water governance is discussed in contexts largely imbued with top-down, state-based governance mechanisms that are typically not developed to provide for purposeful accountability to enable successful adaptation to discontinuous changes and uncertainty (Pollard and Cousins 2008, Falayi et al. 2021). In such contexts, the organic process of adaptive governance faces difficult conditions to emerge mostly because of lack of accountability by decision makers such as government (Pahl-Wostl 2019). The need to better understand the role of accountability in adaptive water governance is therefore cardinal. In addition, more scholarly attention should be directed toward understanding how accountability can stimulate or impede the emergence of adaptive water governance, specifically in terms of governing aquatic ecosystem services.

This article considers and explores the role of accountability in the emergence of adaptive water governance. It specifically focuses on the accountability of governance actors to other stakeholders in the delivery of aquatic ecosystem services. It draws on a case study involving the resolution of aquatic ecosystem services trade-offs on the Pongola Floodplain in South Africa. The analysis of the case study is presented in the context of the shifts in governance that have been observed over specific epochs that reflect the ways in which decision makers have over time accounted for ecosystem service trade-offs on the floodplain. The case study illustrates how lack of accountability over the years inhibited the emergence of adaptive water governance. It demonstrates that in a system where resolving trade-offs is difficult because of loss of democratic accountability, the potential for adaptive water governance to emerge is deeply compromised (see also Huitema et al. 2009). Whereas adaptive governance can offer decision makers such as governance actors the capacity to confront change and uncertainty in complex social-ecological systems (Chaffin and Gunderson 2016), this capacity can be diminished when accountability is lacking or blurred because of complex trade-offs that involve difficult societal choices and conflicting interests. Although adaptive governance usually emerges spontaneously and progressively through multiple nested quasi-autonomous decision-making entities to render capacity to confront uncertainty and change (DeCaro et al. 2017), such emergence may be challenged by lack of accountability (Hahn 2011). Ultimately, accountable entities are required in contextualized situations that can augment the emergent adaptive capacity of vulnerable groups and beneficiaries to promote equitable distribution of the benefits of aquatic ecosystem services (Lebel et al. 2006).

ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE EMERGENCE OF ADAPTIVE WATER GOVERNANCE

Emergence of adaptive water governance

The emergence of adaptive water governance in the delivery of aquatic ecosystem services depends in large part on how the properties of a governance system self-organize over time and scale (Galafassi et al. 2017). Emergence in this context suggests the manifestation of new governance system properties that self-organize from the interactions among the components of the system (Cosens et al. 2021). The emergence of adaptive water governance can be highly unpredictable because of the aspect of self-organization, or the capacity of governance systems to adapt to complex social-ecological contexts (Chaffin and Gunderson 2016). According to Chaffin and Gunderson (2016), such emergence can be influenced by either a crisis, or collapse of a system, or even by the release of social-ecological capital. Thus, for purposes of this article, emergence in the context of adaptive water governance denotes the governance pathways and collective choices among governance actors that arise from self-organization in response to complex trade-offs (Chaffin et al. 2014, Cosens et al. 2021).

Collective choices regarding trade-offs in terms of who gets access to which aquatic ecosystem services and how concomitant rights to access are negotiated always involve complex value judgements that may further affect the emergence of adaptive water governance (Tetlock 2003, Daw et al. 2015). Collective choices around trade-off options frequently lead to decisions that are a source of controversy and conflict. Although some trade-offs may involve hard choices, most trade-offs emerge devoid of any considered, let alone defensible, calculations (Rodríguez et al. 2006). Hard choices may be due to differences in interests and priorities, long-term and short-term time horizons, as well as benefits and costs (McShane et al. 2011). Decision makers usually find it difficult to justify decisions regarding hard choices (Hilliard et al. 2021). The need for accountable entities is extremely important in decision situations involving competing and conflicting interests (Van Kersbergen and Van Waarden (2004), not only so that decisions can be made in a purposeful, consistent, and defensible manner, but also so that adaptive governance can emerge (Boyle et al. 2001, Cosens et al. 2021). In this article I thus argue that making explicit trade-offs and the attendant role of accountability should form part of the analysis of the conditions that promote or inhibit the emergence of adaptive water governance.

Conceptualizing accountability

The common conceptualization of accountability tends to focus more on virtues (such as honesty and integrity), rather than on the reasons for holding decision makers to account through a deliberative process of responsiveness and sanctioning (Bovens 2010, Kraft and Wolf 2018). Such a conceptualization views accountability as a means for holding decision makers true to their virtues. The inherent virtues are designed to force decision makers to adhere to past decision commitments. In this way, accountability is merely conceived as an obligation to explain or give an account of one’s decisions and actions to other stakeholders (Koliba et al. 2011). However, it is important to realize that this simplistic approach to defining accountability does not consider the gap between the virtues of accountability and the desired outcomes of accountability (Kramarz and Park 2016). Often virtues of accountability are merely designed to ensure that decision makers are merely answerable for their decisions (Bäckstrand 2006). As such, the simplistic approach may prevent the procedures and outcomes expected of accountability from emerging (Ratner et al. 2013).

In this article, the term “accountability” refers to “oversight of operations, or accounting for results or impacts” (Davenport and Low 2013:88-89). In this context, an organization is held responsible by stakeholders for its inputs, processes, and outputs (Bäckstrand 2006). In other words, the term “accountability” means accounting for the governance operations and impacts that an organization may have on broad themes or strategies (Davenport and Low 2013). This study was able to derive a set of four key analytical elements related to the topic of accountability: (1) collective-choice arrangements, (2) monitoring, (3) sanctions, and (4) conflict resolution (Ostrom 2005, Kramarz and Park 2016, Cosens et al. 2021). Collective-choice arrangements simply mean that individuals who are affected by operational rules can participate in modifying those rules. Monitoring requires that the individuals who actively monitor the conditions of the resource and the behavior of users are accountable to stakeholders. Sanctioning ensures that individuals who violate operational rules are penalized depending on the seriousness and context of the offense. Conflict-resolution mechanisms ensure that resource users and their officials have easy access to local low-cost conflict resolution mechanisms. Although these four analytical elements were originally developed by Ostrom (1990) as part of eight design principles for common-pool resource institutions, they have since been extended by different authors to other areas of study and analysis (Cosens et al. 2021). For example, Kramarz and Park (2016) considered and conceptualized some of these elements as explicit elements of accountability in global environmental governance.

The above four analytical elements of accountability are crucial for adaptive water governance for two main reasons. First, adaptive water governance requires the flexibility and the ability to respond to uncertain and ever-changing social-ecological conditions (Chaffin and Gunderson 2016). In this context, the four analytical elements ensure that decision makers are not only reactive but also proactive in identifying, anticipating, and addressing these systemic changes. Second, these analytical elements do not only ensure that decision makers are accountable for the resolution of trade-offs and continuous learning, but they also serve as supportive mechanisms that stimulate the emergence of adaptive forms of water governance (Gunderson et al. 2016). Thus, the four analytical elements have potential to create and provide the institutional basis for the emergence of adaptive water governance. Hence, it is imperative to go beyond the assessment of virtues or whether decision makers have been answerable for their decisions and actions within their organizations by incorporating in assessments the four key analytical elements (Ostrom 2005, Kramarz and Park 2016, Cosens et al. 2021).

In this article I propose a framing of accountability that would amenably account for the functional resolution of trade-offs and thereby facilitate the emergence of adaptive water governance (Mulgan 2017). This is because failure to take into consideration conflicting interests when addressing trade-offs—a common issue in floodplain governance (Levin et al. 2013, Petsch et al. 2023)—may lead to inappropriate and unfocused attention to the four analytical elements that can promote or inhibit the emergence of adaptive governance (Kramarz and Park 2016). Evidence suggests that in many instances conventional accountability mechanisms do not respond to the expectations of stakeholders (Ratner et al. 2013, Bäckstrand et al. 2018). For example, as Kramarz and Park (2016) observed, the quality of the environment has generally continued to decline across almost all globally agreed indicators regardless of the propagation of global environmental governance and the accompanying conventional accountability mechanisms (Kramarz and Park 2016). The four analytical elements identified in this article must thus be directed at the goals of the multiple stakeholders involved in the delivery of ecosystem services if they are to become a meaningful tool of adaptive governance. Otherwise, decision makers may only be held accountable for their decisions and actions without necessarily interrogating the extent to which stakeholders’ expectations have been met (Bäckstrand et al. 2018). Also, decision makers may only be held accountable for internal organizational goals such as short-term economic gains over the whole suite of ecosystem services (Kramarz and Park 2016).

Through experimentation and ongoing learning, decision makers must be guided by the different goals of the multiple stakeholders that determine to whom and for what to account (Bäckstrand et al. 2018, Ehren and Perryman 2018). This approach in turn could influence the framing of trade-offs and how the elements of accountability are measured thereof (Brooks et al. 2005, Pahl-Wostl 2019, Cosens et al. 2021). Given the support that democratic accountability lends to the attributes of good governance (Huitema et al 2009, Lockwood 2010), this article argues that the four analytical elements of accountability directly affect relationships among stakeholders in a governance system and hence serve to buffer against socially undesirable change in trade-offs that would threaten collective adaptation (Felipe-Lucia et al. 2015).

DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AREA AND METHODS

Study area

The Pongola River is a catchment roughly 7000 km² in extent at the eastern edge of South Africa. It is located on the coastal plain immediately upstream of Mozambique. The river descends steeply from its source at 2200 meters above mean sea level and passes through a narrow gorge between the Lebombo and Ubombo mountains, where the Pongolapoort Dam is now situated. Below the dam the river meanders across a gently sloping floodplain with numerous pans (small lakes associated with the floodplain) that are dependent upon periodic flooding by the river. The floodplain extends for approximately 50 km in length, varying in width between 0.8 and 4.8 km to the confluence of the Pongola and Usutu Rivers on the border with Mozambique.

As a dominant feature of the riverine landscape including floodplain lakes and temporarily flooded areas, the floodplain was a catalyst for human settlement offering access to diverse ecosystem services that sustained livelihoods. Between 1973 and 2005, the population on the floodplain and surrounding areas in Ingwavuma and Ubombo districts increased from 39,715 to 70,000 (Heeg and Breen 1982, unpublished manuscript). These communities have developed a system of recession floodplain agriculture in which cattle rearing has been particularly important (Buchan 1989). Heeg and Breen (1982, unpublished manuscript) reported that in 1988 about 2970 cattle owners received annual returns worth approximately 100% of the asset value of their 19,300 cattle that were reliant on floodplain grazing.

Methods

Using a qualitative approach (Patton 2005), this study employed documentary analysis as the main data collection method. A major advantage of this approach was that it allowed the examination of documents that were generated contemporaneously with the events they referred to (Karppinen and Moe 2012). As such, the documents that were used in this study were less likely to be subject to memory decay or memory distortion compared with data obtained using other methods such as interviews (Peil et al. 1982). However, an important disadvantage was that the same documents may have been subjected to selective-deposit or selective-survival (Peil et al. 1982). The documentary analysis employed in this study facilitated the examination of a wide range of textual records, which included official publications, such as peer-reviewed works as well as grey literature that included technical reports and papers from various governmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

For peer-reviewed publications, a search was conducted in Web of Science (WoS) and the Scopus databases for keywords: “Accountability,” “Adaptive Water Governance,” “Ecosystem Services Tradeoffs,” “Emergence,” “Pongola River Floodplain,” and “South Africa.” Only peer-reviewed journal articles in the English language were searched, with no restrictions set for the period of review study. The initial WoS and Scopus searches resulted in 332 documents. Following removal of duplicate documents, 72 journal articles and book chapters were used for further analyses.

The documentary analysis included grey literature such as archival records, government documents, national policy and legislative documents, minutes or records of meetings, and conference or workshop proceedings (Table 1). Only documents that referred to or connoted the delivery of floodplain ecosystem services on the Pongola River Floodplain were selected. The aim was not to conduct a comprehensive review of ecosystem services, but rather to cover a wide range of scenarios and situations involving trade-offs between ecosystem services at points in the history of the floodplain. The study assessed the four analytical elements of accountability from case study reports based on three governance epochs that reflected the ways in which decision makers have over time articulated and executed accountability in the delivery of ecosystem service trade-offs on the Pongola River Floodplain. Fifteen case study reports were selected in line with the above presented selection criteria. The case study reports represented a range of ecosystem service trade-offs at different temporal scales. A detailed content analysis was applied to each selected case study report to determine how they addressed the theme of accountability. Given the relevance of the topic of governance to legal documents, the study also included Acts of Parliaments as part of the grey literature. Two legislative documents were added to the grey literature to broaden the scope of the analysis.

The study compiled prescriptions for accountability from different peer-reviewed sources. The peer-reviewed “definition” of accountability based on the four analytical elements was used to deductively review the myriad documents that described case study details (e.g., previous peer-reviewed papers, government documents, NGO documents, Acts of Parliament, policies, etc.) to find examples/evidence of accountability and adaptive governance or lack thereof. Following the approach taken by Kramarz and Park (2016), this study used the four analytical elements as part of a framework to analyze the shifts in governance on the Pongola River floodplain. Based on the application of the four analytical elements, the documentary analysis methodically identified key events and episodes within textual records that were then used to make replicable and valid inferences about the data. The directed documentary analysis used the framework to determine the initial phasing scheme as well as to explore the data deductively. The textual records were read and re-read and categorized into three main governance epochs: traditional water governance, foundations for adaptive water governance, and toward adaptive water governance. In the end, the directed documentary analysis was able to generate a summary description of the shifts in governance on the floodplain.

ASSESSING THE ROLE OF ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE GOVERNANCE SHIFTS ON THE PONGOLA RIVER FLOODPLAIN

Although the Pongola River Floodplain has for thousands of years experienced many cycles of ecosystem and human adaptation (Heeg and Breen 1979, unpublished manuscript), there is one prominent intervention worth exploring that transformed the nature and substance of governance on this floodplain. In 1973, the construction of the Pongolapoort Dam was completed to regulate the flow of the Pongola River (Basson, G. R., F. J. M. Denys, and J. S. Beck. 2006, unpublished report: Pongolapoort Dam Flood Release Operational Analysis - Socio-hydrological Investigation, Historical Flood Releases and Mathematical Modelling. Project No.: 2003-321, ASP Technology (Pty) Ltd and Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, Directorate: Water Resource Planning Systems, Pretoria). This development was part of a suite of active human interventions that marked the beginning of recorded water governance on the floodplain (Buchan 1989). Although the features of the water governance system that accompanied this intervention could be viewed from many different perspectives, one would argue that over time these features evidenced protracted societal efforts to stimulate and promote the emergence of adaptive water governance on the floodplain (Brown et al. 2018). In this section, the extent to which these efforts evolved is encapsulated in the different governance epochs that reflect the ways in which decision makers have over time accounted for ecosystem service trade-offs on the floodplain.

Traditional water governance (pre-1973)

This epoch dated from the pre-colonial period (1650s) to the time (1963) when construction of the Pongolapoort Dam started. Several authors including Heeg and Breen (1979, unpublished manuscript), Torres (1980), Buchan (1989), and Jaganyi et al. (2009) have presented records that suggest that by the 1650s the Thonga people had made the floodplain their home, which was governed through five traditional authorities. These traditional authorities included the Mashabane (Inkosi Gumede), Tembe (Inkosi Tembe), Nyawo (Inkosi Nyawo), Mathenjwa (Inkosi Mathenjwa), and Siqakatha (Inkosi Nxumalo). Worth noting from the records presented is that prior to the construction of the Pongolapoort Dam, the Thonga people enjoyed the full bundles of ecosystem services associated with the floodplain (Torres 1980). Based on the description provided by Lankford et al. (2010) of the impacts of ecosystem services and environmental governance on human well-being in the Pongola Region, it is indicative that the gains from the ecosystem services by any group of people could not necessarily have led to noticeable losses for others. This suggests that probably the traditional authorities did not have to contend with any significant trade-offs during this epoch.

This observation is consistent with the historical accounts of different authors such as Heeg and Breen (1979, unpublished manuscript) who have attempted to describe the way ecosystem services were delivered through traditional authorities during this epoch. During this governance epoch, according to Heeg and Breen (1979, unpublished manuscript), short floods annually overlapped with the main rainy season to deposit alluvial sediments that re-enriched the soils and supported recession agriculture. This flooding regime supported livestock husbandry, fishing, and various other activities such as harvesting of fruits, wild vegetables, wood and poles, and grasses and reeds. Fish was an important source of food for people of the floodplain (Heeg and Breen 1979, unpublished manuscript). Traditionally, fish were caught using weaved baskets known as isifonyo. The summer floods replenished water in the floodplain pans and stimulated fish migration for breeding, which enabled local communities to capture the fish in mono-baskets set at the inlets to the floodplain pans. As water receded, small fish could be captured by young women using cloth seine nets. With lower water levels, new grass growth became available for grazing livestock, and reeds could be harvested for construction. Overall, these different ecosystem services played a major role in the socioeconomic development of the communities on the floodplain in the pre-1973 epoch (Lankford et al. 2010).

In terms of collective-choice arrangements, Schreiner (2006) noted that during this epoch the delivery of ecosystem services was structured through implicit community norms and standards. She explained that local user groups were included in the decision processes of the traditional authorities. Multiple livelihood strategies were governed by implicit norms and standards that were embodied in the collective assumptions held by all community members regarding the common interest of the Thonga people (Torres 1980). According to Jaganyi et al. (2009), the traditional rights to exploit floodplain ecosystem services were regulated on behalf of the five traditional authorities by the local iZinduna (Headmen). Jaganyi et al. (2009) further noted that the floodplain during this epoch had clearly defined administrative boundaries and the individuals or households who had rights and responsibilities to use and manage the flood-based ecosystem services were clearly identifiable through the five traditional authorities. Buchan (1989) observed that traditional authorities such as the chief or local iNduna (Headman) would periodically arrange for a traditional fishing ritual (isifonya), which was a major cultural occasion on the floodplain. During this cultural event, residents would congregate in large numbers to drive fish into shallow waters where they were captured using thrust baskets.

In terms of monitoring, Torres (1980) noted that local users were subject to traditional authority and were largely isolated from the influences of central government and the mainstream economy. He contended that users were involved in monitoring the biophysical conditions of the floodplain as well as user behavior. Given that the flow of the Pongola River was not artificially regulated during this epoch, Lankford et al. (2010) contended that the monitoring of the use of ecosystem services during this epoch was largely influenced by informal rules of governance. Many other writers (such as Jaganyi et al. 2009; Heeg and Breen 1979, unpublished manuscript) have observed that the communal tenure system enabled local communities to successfully self-organize in the face of multiple ecosystem service challenges. As such, decisions around the monitoring of delivery of ecosystem services could be revised to adjust their effects on human well-being.

According to Heeg and Breen (1979, unpublished manuscript), because the communal tenure system did not involve full ownership, sanctioning decisions were accounted for mainly through traditional rules, norms, and values that were shaped by local experiences and knowledge of how the system was structured and functioned. Local user groups who were affected by communal tenure rules were appropriately included in sanctioning decisions that affected the behavior of users of ecosystem services. Heeg and Breen (1979, unpublished manuscript) contend that the traditional authorities ensured access to local low-cost resolution mechanisms when conflicts ensued. Appropriate sanctions, as a dimension of accountability, were imposed by traditional authorities on users that violated traditional fishing rules. Although not all the key analytical elements of accountability or even features of adaptive governance could be inferred from the historical accounts provided by the different authors, it can be argued that through these traditional governance mechanisms the community was able to reasonably account for complex decisions involving multiple ecosystem services.

Foundations for adaptive water governance (1973–1994)

This epoch dated from 1973 when the construction of the Pongolapoort dam was completed to the onset of democratic governance in 1994 (Heeg and Breen 1982, unpublished manuscript). Based on extrapolation from the case study reports, it is suggestive that it is during this epoch that the foundations for adaptive governance on the floodplain began to emerge. The dam was built during the apartheid period to provide water for white farmer upliftment. Although it was envisaged that the primary purpose of the dam was to provide an assured supply of water for a single use (sugar cane irrigation) of ecosystem services, the events that followed clearly demonstrated that this single use was in contestation with other uses of ecosystem services such as grazing and fishing.

After completion of the construction of the dam, van Vuuren (2009) observed that several voices were heard from the scientific research community advocating for releases from the dam to simulate the natural flow regime of the floodplain to maintain its ecological integrity. In the late 1970s, a multidisciplinary research team was formed led by Charles Breen and Jan Heeg of the University of Natal to determine the environmental flows of the Pongola River (Heeg and Breen 1982, unpublished manuscript). The environmental flows were specifically designed to ensure maintenance of a sustained supply of floodplain ecosystem services considering the competing water uses and the regulated flows. The research team was able to establish that without the flow of water onto the floodplain at particular times of the year and for particular durations to achieve a certain level of flooding, the floodplain system would collapse. Heeg and Breen (1982, unpublished manuscript) argued that if the flow of the river was to be artificially regulated, this would lead to major changes in the structure and functioning of the floodplain. For example, they contended that the quality of water would decline, organisms would not complete their lifecycles, and flood-dependent livelihoods would be in peril as delivery of ecosystem services would have been disrupted. It is for this reason that Heeg and Breen (1982, unpublished manuscript) proposed a flow regime that would maintain the integrity of the ecosystem to maintain multiple ecosystem services.

Poultney and Bruwer (2002, unpublished manuscript) provided a detailed account of the flow requirements of the Pongola River to maintain the integrity of the floodplain. However, the failure to maintain the desired environmental flow regime was evidenced through the trends of flood releases, which proved to be inconsistent toward the end of this epoch, leading to heightened unpredictability in the delivery of ecosystem services (Poultney and Bruwer 2002, unpublished manuscript). This accountability failure was attributed to lack of appropriate monitoring mechanisms that resulted in unstructured releases that disregarded the flow regime recommended by the research team (Heeg and Breen 1982, unpublished manuscript). According to McCartney et al. (2004), the consequences of accountability failure were compounded by the fact that local users were no longer involved in monitoring the biophysical conditions of the floodplain as well as user behavior as government was largely accountable to itself. The accountability failure did not only ignore the requirements of the recommended flow regime, but also overlooked the stated purpose of delivering multiple ecosystem services (Brown et al. 2018).

In terms of collective-choice arrangements, it was clear from van Vuuren’s (2009) assessment that local user groups, particularly the African black communities, were no longer included in critical decision processes that were largely dominated by government during this epoch. Notably, the Thonga people were divested of their full bundle of property rights to remain with only limited access and withdrawal rights (Torres 1980). The transfer of exclusion and alienation rights from the local people to the then Department of Water Affairs was particularly decisive in transforming the collective-choice arrangements on the Pongola Floodplain (McCartney et al. 2004). Buchan (1989) observed that the agriculture potential of the floodplain drew more attention from the then government than the values of the multiple floodplain ecosystem services. According to Buchan (1989), the completion of the dam introduced government-led accountability procedures in respect of the flow of the river to the floodplain. This shift in accountability procedures generated tensions between trade-offs that ended up in loss of noneconomic values such as the cultural identity, local employment, and general well-being of the poor of the Thonga people.

The timing of the releases proved to be sporadic and unpredictable, resulting in conflicts between agriculturists, grazers, and fishermen (Basson et al. 2006, unpublished report). The prevailing accountability system did not provide for effective access to local low-cost conflict resolution mechanisms (Heeg and Breen 1982, unpublished manuscript). And it became increasingly difficult for the authorities to exercise control over trade-offs in part because of the absence of mechanisms for effecting appropriate sanctions to law breakers. For McCartney et al. (2004), this situation meant that the gains that could be obtained from use of any one of the ecosystem services by the different groups of people on the floodplain could potentially lead to losses for others, thereby creating tensions between trade-offs. As a result, the trade-off choices between different flood releases became entirely distorted during this epoch (Buchan 1989). Although several other factors could have affected decisions around trade-offs, van Vuuren (2009) suggested that many scientists attributed the trade-off gridlock to the confusion between whether flow releases from the dam should be for the delivery of ecosystem services or solely for crop production. Accordingly, Nkhata et al. (2017) argued that although some important governance outcomes were achieved during this epoch as a foundation for adaptive water governance, these outcomes were negated by the weak elements of accountability that led to governance “fuzziness.”

Toward the emergence of adaptive water governance (post-1994)

The onset of a democratic government in 1994 marked the start of an abrupt reversal of water governance in South Africa (Kemerink et al. 2011). This transformation was reflected in the country’s constitution, which states that “everyone has the right to sufficient food and water” (Republic of South Africa [RSA] 1996). The new South African government reviewed and revised all water laws in South Africa, resulting in the promulgation of the landmark National Water Act in 1998 (RSA 1998). The National Water Act recognized the dynamics of the hydrological cycle and the need to manage water under conditions of uncertainty and change (RSA 1998), thereby promoting the philosophy of adaptive water governance.

In a sense, the National Water Act transformed water governance from a system of rights based on land ownership along rivers to a system that allocated water equitably through collective-choice arrangements. The National Water Act encouraged all stakeholders in South Africa to hold decision makers to account for delivery of aquatic ecosystem services that would strengthen the socioeconomic status of previously disadvantaged local communities (RSA 1998). It provided for a phased setup of new institutions to support collective-choice arrangements at the catchment level. This was to be achieved through the creation of catchment management agencies (CMAs) and water user associations (WUAs) designed to transfer authority and responsibilities for water governance to local scales. It was envisaged that such collective-choice arrangements would strengthen accountability in water governance.

In addition, the National Water Act prescribed an “ecological reserve” to maintain basic ecological functions, while meeting basic human needs (le Maitre 2014). The “reserve” represented a monitoring system for delivery of aquatic ecosystems services specified as a right under the constitution (RSA 1996). According to the principle of the “reserve,” it is only after the needs of ecological functions and human beings had been met that water could be allocated to other productive uses (le Maitre 2014). Although the local monitoring of flow releases improved to some extent during this epoch, the monitoring of user behaviors remained deficient (Eastern Cluster 2005, personal communication by Department of Water Affairs Chief Director: Compiled by J. C. Perkins and D. Everitt, Department of Water Affairs, Durban, South Africa). The further weakening of traditional authority probably also decreased the relevance and influence of local sanctioning and could have contributed to lack of effective conflict resolution mechanisms (Heeg and Breen 1994). The local water committees, which were largely directed by self-interest, were weak and not able to facilitate a system for effecting appropriate sanctions to law breakers (Basson et al. 2006, unpublished report). Worse still, the local water committees did not provide for effective access to local low-cost conflict resolution mechanisms (Schreiner 2006).

Arguably, it is during this epoch that some significant signs of the emergence of adaptive water governance were observed (Heeg and Breen 1994). Especially in terms of collective-choice arrangements, Jaganyi et al. (2009) observed that the epoch witnessed the beginning of the establishment of several water committees on the floodplain with representation from a range of water users such as stock owners, women, and traditional healers. Although the introduction of water committees somewhat signified the emergence of some form of accountable entities (Heeg and Breen 1994), it is important to note that these local water committees did not completely ensure that all local user groups were included in decision processes, which were still largely dominated by government (Schreiner 2006). Nevertheless, signs of adaptive governance were evidenced in the ability of local authorities to reduce and manage certain risks associated with undesirable changes in trade-offs (Brown et al. 2018). For example, the decisions of water committees led to greatly reduced risks associated with the dominance of floodplain crop production (Eastern Cluster 2005, personal communication).

CONCLUSION

In this article I set out to consider and explore the role of accountability in the emergence of adaptive water governance. This was premised on the realization that not much scholarly attention had been directed toward understanding the conditions that promote or inhibit the emergence of adaptive forms of governance. Using a case study of the Pongola Floodplain in South Africa, the article examined the accountability of governance actors to other stakeholders by probing for evidence of collective-choice arrangements, monitoring, sanctions, and conflict resolution. These four analytical elements of accountability do not only represent the supportive mechanisms of adaptive water governance, but they can also be a catalyst for its emergence and development. The case study has illustrated how deficiencies in the four key analytical elements of accountability inhibited the emergence of adaptive water governance on the floodplain.

The case study was presented in the context of the shifts in governance that had been observed on the floodplain over specific epochs. It has demonstrated that in a system where resolving trade-offs is difficult because of loss of democratic accountability, the potential for adaptive water governance to emerge is severely compromised. An important lesson to be drawn from the case study is that although adaptive governance can offer decision makers the capacity to confront change and uncertainty, this capacity is usually diminished in practice when key elements of accountability are lacking or blurred because of conflicting interests. The identified key analytical elements of accountability are designed to drive the need for adaptation and innovation practices by requiring decision makers to justify their actions and outcomes. This requirement for justification promotes the exploration of new governance modes that can better meet the demands placed on aquatic ecosystem services.

The article clearly exemplifies why accountable governance actors are required in contextualized situations to augment the emergence of adaptive water governance. Importantly, it demonstrates how the emergence of adaptive water governance in part depends on the capacity of other stakeholders to hold decision makers accountable for the consideration and resolution of trade-offs. Thus, understanding how these values change over time is essential to understanding the nature and type of governance needed to influence the coordination and resolution of trade-offs under conditions of great uncertainty. In this way, the role of accountability in the emergence of adaptive water governance is broadly based on the need to sustain delivery of aquatic ecosystem services so that generations can continue to enjoy them in the present and into the future.

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