Research

INTRODUCTION

Small-scale fisheries employ 90% of the world’s fishers and supply almost half of the world’s seafood supply (Andrew et al. 2007, McClanahan et al. 2009, Bennett et al. 2023). Small-scale fisheries generally operate closer to shore, utilize smaller vessels, supply local markets, often target multiple species using multiple fishing gear, and provide food security for some of the most vulnerable people in the world (Andrew et al. 2007, Worm et al. 2009, Pauly and Zeller 2016, Cohen et al. 2019, Smith and Basurto 2019, Hilborn et al. 2020). Most small-scale fisheries remain unassessed, and many suffer from a lack of effective management, threatening food security and ecosystem health in nearshore environments (Worm et al. 2009, Costello et al. 2012). Over-exploitation in small-scale fisheries is often attributed to a host of factors including a lack of management capacity and resources to collect data, perform stock assessment, and implement effective rules and regulations (Hilborn et al. 2020, Dowling et al. 2023). Moreover, small-scale fisheries are often poorly organized with weak governance and poor compliance and enforcement (Andrew et al. 2007, Arias et al. 2016). However, it may be possible for small-scale fisheries to overcome these challenges, especially when coastal communities and government organizations cooperate to form co-management arrangements (Carlsson and Berkes 2005, Basurto and Ostrom 2009, Berkes 2009).

Co-management is defined as the involvement of multiple stakeholders (such as national and regional governments, community organizations, non-governmental organizations, and labor unions) in a management system that shares power in the decision-making and management of natural resources (Plummer and Fitzgibbon 2004, Carlsson and Berkes 2005, Finkbeiner and Basurto 2015). Co-management usually consists of the sharing of certain responsibilities including: policy making and evaluation, monitoring of habitat and stocks, regulating access to the fishery, compliance and enforcement of rules, and managing the supply chain (Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995, Graham et al. 2006).

Co-management between communities and government can make up for the shortcomings of both community-based management, which may lack the capacity or authority to enforce rules, and top-down management by the government, which may have low legitimacy with resource users (Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995, Pomeroy and Berkes 1997, Pomeroy et al. 2001, Hilborn et al. 2005, Pinkerton and John 2008). Co-management of social-ecological systems (SES) take into account important variables such as the boundaries and size of the area of the system (i.e., protected areas). Furthermore, it also considers social variables that affect the system such as the presence of well-respected leaders in the community or leadership, and the capacity of the community to organize and build their own norms. (Ostrom 2009). These variables are important because they contribute in the capacity of communities to form collective action and act as a buffer for the constant changes that are present in these co-managed systems (i.e., institutional changes, climate change, economic and social crises, etc.; Ostrom 2009, Gutiérrez et al. 2011a).

A great deal of insight has been gleaned from numerous studies on the social, economic, governance, and fisheries-science aspects of co-management, particularly as they relate to sustainability (Pomeroy et al. 2001, Dietz et al. 2003, Hilborn et al. 2005, McClanahan et al. 2009, Worm et al. 2009, Costello et al. 2012). However, surprisingly few studies have explored mechanisms such as enforcement and deterrence, and the approaches communities use to implement these strategies to incentivize and ensure compliance with fishing regulations in small-scale fisheries (Arias 2015, Arias et al. 2016, Atuo et al. 2020, Kahler et al. 2021). Enforcement can be defined as the process of making individuals obey a regulation or make a particular situation happen (Akella and Cannon 2004, Piquero et al. 2011, Atuo et al. 2020, Boratto and Gibbs 2021). Deterrence can be explained as the sociological aspect of “why” people commit certain crimes and “how” to prevent them. It can also be thought as of the discouragement of committing illegal activities by the act of enforcing regulations (i.e., having a higher probability of enforcing laws will increase the discouragement of other individuals committing illegal activities), and as all those efforts or actions used to reduce or prevent illegal activities (i.e., preventative measures taken to avoid poaching in protected areas, peer pressure, etc.; Piquero et al. 2011, Chalfin and McCrary 2017, De Geest et al. 2017, 2022, Moreto and Gau 2017, Kahler et al. 2021). These mechanisms can look very different in small-scale fisheries when compared with mechanisms used in large-scale industrialized fisheries. In large-scale fisheries, formal mechanisms for the deterrence and enforcement of fishery regulations are typically employed. For example, the detection of illegal activities is generally undertaken by government-owned patrol vessels, and illegal activity is punished with fines or incarceration within a legal framework (Crawford et al. 2004, Basurto et al. 2013, Finkbeiner and Basurto 2015, Atuo et al. 2020).

On the other hand, in small-scale fisheries, it is more common to find informal approaches that are unwritten but broadly agreed upon by members of the community, such as social norms, traditions, and beliefs, which shape how enforcement and deterrence occur (Solomon et al. 2015, Weekers et al. 2019, Kahler et al. 2021). In many cases, the use of traditions and beliefs to deter poaching and to enforce regulations can be more successful than the use of rangers or the presence of authorities (Basurto et al. 2013, Alam and Begum 2017, Atuo et al. 2020, Kahler et al. 2021). These moral norms are often more powerful than financial or instrumental incentives for deterring illegal actions and enforcing fishing regulations (Gneezy and Rustichini 2000, Kroneberg et al. 2010, Maxwell and Maxwell 2022). Because they lack legal instruments and are often more hidden, informal deterrence and enforcement mechanisms are less well-studied than formal fisheries deterrents and enforcement mechanisms.

Understanding the role of informal deterrence and enforcement approaches in small-scale fisheries thus offers the potential to derive key insights into how stakeholders and communities can achieve compliance while reducing costs (Basurto et al. 2013, Kahler et al. 2021). Law and criminology sciences highlight four mechanisms within enforcement, including detection (the ability to monitor violators of fishing regulations), detention, prosecution, and conviction (Akella and Cannon 2004, Arias 2015, Atuo et al. 2020). In systems such as co-managed fisheries and other common-pool resources the usual “crime and punishment” aspects of law and criminology sciences do not capture the entirety of complexities inherent to them, wherein the prevention or deterrence of illegal activity becomes more important (De Geest et al. 2017, 2022). Even though understanding the different strategies used for the deterrence of poaching, and accounting for them in the compliance of regulations is fundamental for the functioning of these systems, there is still little information in the literature (Kuperan and Sutinen 1998, Rodriguez-Jaramillo et al. 2001, De Geest et al. 2017, 2022, Atuo et al. 2020, Kahler et al. 2021).

For this reason, we propose the following modified framework to study the mechanisms that are needed for compliance in co-managed fisheries. The framework consists of the enforcement component, which can be divided into two mechanisms: (1) detection, which is the ability to detect violators of fishing regulations, and (2) detention, which is the means of detaining and prosecuting violators. Linked to the enforcement component is the deterrent component; which is the mechanism that preemptively prevents the breaking of rules (Rodriguez-Jaramillo et al. 2001, Akella and Cannon 2004, Kroneberg et al. 2010, Arias 2015, De Geest et al. 2017, 2022, Atuo et al. 2020). Importantly, these three components that can lead to compliance can include formal and informal arrangements by stakeholders and community members in a fishery. Moreover, because of the complexity of small-scale fisheries regulations, there can often exist a spectrum of compliance and motivations behind compliance (i.e., different levels of compliance) to formal and informal rules, ranging from: absent (does not exist), some compliance to informal regulations, some compliance to formal regulations, and compliance to both formal and informal regulations (or full compliance). We use this spectrum in our study to bring more attention to hidden aspects of compliance, in contrast to “binary” simplifications of compliance usually observed in most of the studies of compliance in social-ecological systems, where the only options are “yes” or “no” (Arias 2015, Arias et al. 2016, Boonstra et al. 2017, Atuo et al. 2020, Oyanedele et al. 2020).

Understanding the enforcement and deterrence mechanisms used in community-based co-managed small-scale fisheries and how they relate to compliance and other variables of social-ecological systems is a critical and overlooked component of the management of small-scale fisheries. The objectives of this study are to document and explore the mechanisms communities use to deter poaching and enforce fishing regulations and the implications for compliance, and to determine how compliance, deterrence, and enforcement relate to the variables of social-ecological systems (or co-managed systems). Finally, we elucidate how these dynamics may offer insight into the design and implementation of enhanced enforcement and compliance programs in co-managed small-scale fisheries.

METHODS

We conducted a two-step systematic review of co-managed small-scale fisheries management literature to identify the characteristics of community-based compliance, enforcement, and deterrence in small-scale fisheries across the globe. We identified the social, ecological, governance, economic, and fishery operational characteristics of community-based co-managed fisheries and documented the enforcement and deterrence mechanisms used and how fishers seem to comply with regulations in these fisheries (Davies et al. 2008). The use of literature reviews, especially systematic reviews, is a powerful tool in conservation and environmental sciences because of the power it possesses to critically evaluate and synthesize data to identify knowledge gaps when insufficient data exists (Davies et al. 2008). The systematic review of data for this study was done in the years 2020 and 2021 following the protocol PRISMA (preferred reporting items for systematic reviews and meta-analysis) of scientific literature and gray literature whose main objective is to address the deficient reporting of literature reviews through established guidelines (Moher et al. 2015). For studies prior to 2020, we used two review papers to identify a pool of potentially relevant literature, which we screened for use in this study.

Identification of relevant studies

First, studies that were relevant for our research were identified by reviewing the raw literature used in two highly-cited review papers for co-management and small-scale fisheries: “Leadership, social capital, and incentives promote successful fisheries” (Gutierrez et al. 2011a) and “Defining small-scale fisheries and examining the role of science in shaping perceptions of who and what counts: a systematic review’ (Smith and Basurto 2019). We selected these two papers because they were the most comprehensive review papers of small-scale fisheries co-management that consider the same co-management attributes our study was interested in understanding and that cast a wide enough net to include papers related to compliance. These two review papers had different aims and scope than ours, but we used these to build our literature review because our scope (compliance in small-scale fisheries) was a subset of the scope of these two papers (small-scale fisheries). The advantage of using these papers rather than conducting our own systematic literature search for all years was twofold: these papers identified a larger pool of potentially relevant papers than our search strings that included compliance terms; and this approach allowed us to leverage previous efforts to collect relevant papers, and avoid duplicating effort. Afterwards, studies were also identified by carrying out our own literature review by using Google Scholar and Web of Science as search tools for peer-reviewed literature and Google for gray literature (i.e., reports from fisheries management agencies such as FAO) using the years 2019 to 2021 with the keywords “community-based” or “co-management” or “self-governance” and “fishers.” We chose these keywords instead of words like “enforcement” or “compliance” because many times when using the latter, the results became too narrow and left out studies that indirectly reference compliance and enforcement in co-managed fisheries. We did not separately search for studies before 2019 because the review paper by Smith and Basurto (2019) comprehensively covered relevant literature from the previous years, and thus these papers were included in our search via the raw literature cited section of Smith and Basurto (2019).

A selection criteria examination was used to filter the studies that were useful for our research. The criteria we used was as follows: if the literature was available online (i.e., in some cases books were not available), had sufficient evidence of a co-managed fishery, had information on enforcement and/or deterrence and/or community-based enforcement (i.e., in some occasions the paper barely mentioned patrolling done by the authorities and had no information on the role of the community, and thus they were not used for our study), referred to a case study (i.e., in some cases the referenced literature referred to technical papers and not case studies), and was accessible in English, then it was determined to be useful for our study.

Data extraction and creation of database

A qualitative database (the complete database is available in Appendix 2) was created using a set of 43 characteristics or variables (divided into ecological, fishery operational, economic, governance, enforcement, and compliance characteristics). The information for these variables were obtained from reading the selected case studies in detail. Similarly for the enforcement and deterrence characteristics, we reviewed each study, determined what component of enforcement and deterrence was being mentioned in the case study and what mechanism of enforcement and deterrence was being used and incorporated it into our database. In some cases, there were no exact references for detection (i.e., as detection is usually understood to be the sole act of patrolling, not accounting for other types of detection), detention, and deterrence. When this occurred, we determined what mechanisms of enforcement and deterrence were being used by reading each study in detail and describing the enforcement and deterrence mechanisms using our understanding of the concepts. Likewise, each selected case study was read thoroughly looking for information regarding the compliance to different types of regulations; if there was no mention of any sort of compliance then it was introduced to the database as “NA.” If there were certain case studies where the variables were not entirely defined, a discursive alignment of interpretation was done through a process of triangulation among the researchers, where two interns with the lead author would agree or disagree on the interpretation of the variables (i.e., enforcement mechanisms, co-management attributes, compliance, etc.; Brandenburg 2012, Seuring and Gold 2012). In instances of disagreement over a case study, an in-depth discussion would follow with the rest of the research team until an agreement was reached. We are aware that categorizing the different enforcement and deterrence mechanisms found in the case studies can generate some bias, however we do not assume our categorization is exclusive of other interpretations the readers might have. Rather, with our study we want to demonstrate how we can start to think differently about the role of enforcement and deterrence in these systems, specifically the deterrence component. Our aim with providing the database results in an open-access document is to generate debate, discussions, and dialogue among researchers and practitioners who are interested in the enforcement and deterrence components of co-managed systems.

Analysis of data

We counted the number of case studies that had certain enforcement and deterrence mechanisms, and compliance levels and proceeded to obtain the percentages from the total useful case studies with the purpose of shedding light on understanding the most used enforcement mechanisms and compliance types in each case study (Fig. 1). To reveal the relations between the different enforcement and deterrence mechanisms, the studied co-management attributes, and the compliance with regulations found in the literature; we counted the number of studies that had certain enforcement and deterrence mechanisms, with certain types of compliance levels, and with the co-management attributes that were present in the case study (i.e., presence of community leaders, strong social capital, and the presence of protected areas). We proceeded to obtain clustered bar charts to compare the information obtained for the different categories (Fig. 2).

RESULTS

We reviewed 819 studies, where 149 of the studies (18%) mentioned compliance, enforcement, and deterrence, but just 83 (10%) passed the pre-established selection criteria (these studies discussed enforcement and deterrence mechanisms and how communities complied with the regulations) and were used for this study. Figure 3 demonstrates the geographic distribution of the 38 different countries of the studies that were considered for this research. For a better understanding, the results will be divided into the following sections: characterization of the case studies we used; enforcement and deterrence; compliance; and the interactions between enforcement, deterrence, compliance, and attributes deemed to be important for co-management.

Characterization of the fisheries where the different community enforcement and deterrence mechanisms are being used

The systems where most of the fisheries took place were coastal areas with reefs (48%). Most of the case studies presented multispecies fisheries (86%) targeting species of which some had high mobility and some were sedentary (45%). The use of multiple types of gear (i.e., a combination of nets, hook and line, traps, etc.) and nets were the most reported gear in the case studies with 57% (multiple types of gear) and 23% (nets), and 44% of the case studies reported utilizing informal co-management (46%), which involves shared fisher and government responsibility in the management of the resources, but without a legal framework or established formal agreement.

Enforcement and deterrence

When we used the framework described above, we were able to identify and categorize a broad array of mechanisms that are being used for enforcement and deterrence in the studies we reviewed (Fig. 4 and Table 1). This was done to ease interpretation and to avoid the misconception that the mechanisms/strategies we found in the literature are the only ones that might exist. The complete list of mechanisms can be seen in the complete database provided in the supplementary materials (Appendix 3). Furthermore, the explanation of the components and mechanisms/strategies used for enforcement and deterrence found in the literature can be found in Appendix 1.

When we applied the framework to the case studies in our literature review, we found that 81% of the cases utilized at least one mechanism for enforcement (detection and detention), and deterrence. Prominently, the use of informal community-based mechanisms was more common than the use of formal mechanisms for enforcement and deterrence. A full list of the case studies with their enforcement and deterrence mechanisms can be found in Appendix 2.

For Figures 5–8, the labels “informal strategies” represent solely informal strategies used for enforcement and deterrence, “formal strategies” represent formal strategies used for enforcement and deterrence, and “mixed strategies” is a combination of both informal and formal strategies used for enforcement and deterrence. The enforcement component with the highest representation in the reviewed literature was detection with 94%, followed by detention with 87%, and deterrence accounted for 90% of the cases (Fig. 5).

Detection

Within the detection component, community patrolling was observed in 30% of the cases, where the most common strategies were fishers/community members patrolling without the support of formal authorities. This strategy consisted of community members patrolling alongside the beach, shore, and fishing areas (the complete list of strategies can be found in Appendix 2). This was followed by a combination of patrolling by authorities and community patrolling in 19% of the case studies. The use of patrolling by authorities was present in 14% of case studies. The use of community patrolling and community communication systems, in which fishers and members of the community patrolled the beach, shore, and fishing areas while also using communication channels such as WhatsApp to communicate where they detected illegal fishing was present in 15% of the studies (Fig. 6). Our results further reveal that communities were involved in detection 78% of the time, the government was involved 52% of the time, and non-governmental organizations were involved in 37% of the cases.

Detention

For detention, the most commonly observed strategy was detention by authorities combined with detention based on community governance/traditions. In 30% of the studies, detainment by a village elder for a first infraction was noted, followed by police detainment (Fig. 7). In 23% of the studies, detention was based on community governance/traditions (such as the village elder detaining an infractor). In 19% of the studies, detention occurred solely by authorities, and in 11% of the studies, detention was carried out coercively by vigilantes, such as communities using force, aggression, and violence to detain an illegal fisher. Community and government involvement occurred in 72% and 63% of the cases, respectively, and non-governmental organizations were involved in 7%.

Deterrence

The mechanisms used for deterrence are shown in Figure 8. The empowerment or education of fishers by the government and NGOs had the highest representation, present in 16% of the cases, followed by the use of traditions and beliefs to deter illegal fishing (such as religious beliefs, magic, and rituals) in 14% of the cases. The community was involved in 84% of the studies reviewed, followed by the involvement of non-governmental organizations in 56%, and the government in 54% of the cases.

Compliance

We divided compliance into four categories, depending on the level of compliance and the type of regulations the fishers comply to: (1) compliance does not exist (the community members and fishers were not complying at all with the established regulations), (2) some compliance to formal and informal regulations (the community members and fishers were complying at some level with both the formal and informal established regulations), (3) some compliance to formal regulations (the community members and fishers were complying at some level exclusively to the established formal regulations), and (4) some compliance to informal regulations (the community members and fishers were complying exclusively at some level to the established informal regulations). Figure 9 shows the distribution of the levels of compliance found in the literature review we performed. In most of the case studies, there was some compliance with formal and informal regulations (35%). Additionally, 8% of the studies reviewed showed non-compliance to any type of established regulations.

Enforcement, deterrence, compliance, and their relationship to co-management and social-ecological system variables

Enforcement can be thought of as a tool to promote compliance with the established regulations (either formal or informal regulations) in a fishery. Therefore, for compliance to exist, there has to be some degree of enforcement and/or deterrence present (Arias 2015, Arias et al. 2016). Furthermore, important attributes such as community leadership, strong social capital, and the presence of protected areas have been shown to be important for the success of co-management (Gutiérrez et al. 2011a). In the following section, we describe the enforcement and deterrence mechanisms with the level of compliance found in the different case studies, and how they relate to co-management and social-ecological system attributes that have been determined to be important for co-managed systems.

Enforcement, deterrence, and compliance: indigenous fisheries in co-managed fisheries

Indigenous fisheries are often managed through tribes or clans, and each group may be led by a highly respected individual or leader. These individuals are highly respected in the communities for their knowledge, and capacity to transmit knowledge to the community (Atlas et al. 2021). To assess how the presence of indigenous fisheries and leaders interact with enforcement and, compliance we used the variable “presence of indigenous fisheries.” As seen in Figure 10, the majority of case studies that were considered indigenous fisheries had high compliance to formal and informal regulations (24%), followed by some compliance to informal regulations (20%). The enforcement mechanisms found to be used the most in cases with compliance with informal regulations were: community patrolling and community communication systems for detection; detention done by authorities together with detention based on community governance/traditions; and the use of traditions and beliefs for deterrence. On the other hand, for those cases that did not report indigenous fisheries, the majority of the cases reported having some compliance with formal and informal regulations (8%). The detection mechanisms used the most were: community patrolling; detention done by authorities together with detention based on community governance/traditions; and the use of empowering fishers through education together with coercion for deterrence.

Enforcement, deterrence, and compliance: strong social capital in co-managed fisheries

The majority of case studies that had strong organization among the fishers and community members reported having some compliance with both formal and informal established regulations (29%) as seen in Figure 11. In these cases, the most used enforcement mechanisms for detection were patrolling undertaken by authorities and community patrolling; for detention, the most used mechanisms were community governance and traditions; and for deterrence, the most used mechanisms were the empowering/education of fishers and the use of coercion. The majority of case studies that did not have a strong social organization reported having some compliance to formal and informal regulations (6%). For these cases, the most used enforcement mechanisms were community patrolling, detention based on community governance/traditions, and the deterrence of illegal fishing through the empowering and education of fishers together with coercion.

Enforcement, deterrence, and compliance: marine protected areas in co-managed fisheries

As seen in Figure 12, the case studies that reported having protected areas complied the most with both formal and informal regulations (19%). The enforcement mechanisms used the most for these case studies were patrolling done together by communities and authorities, detention based on community governance and traditions, and deterring illegal fishing was done by empowering and educating the community.

DISCUSSION

Co-management can alleviate respective shortcomings of top-down and bottom-up management for small-scale fisheries (Kearney 2002, Chuenpagdee and Jentoft 2007, Wilson et al. 2007, Berkes 2009). Co-managed fisheries have received significant attention in the literature for their ability to improve outcomes for people and fish, yet some of the most important components of the management system, enforcement, deterrence, and their relationship to compliance, has received relatively little attention. When we consider enforcement and deterrence with a broader perspective it reveals many dimensions in small scale co-managed fisheries, including formal and informal mechanisms and the significant role that communities play in achieving compliance.

This study allowed us to identify mechanisms for informal enforcement and deterrence used by communities, and the importance these informal mechanisms have for the compliance of regulations even when they are not part of a legal framework. Informal mechanisms, in combination with formal enforcement and deterrence mechanisms, were present in 100% of the 29 case studies that reported having compliance to both formal and informal regulations, and thus they prove to be a critical factor to consider for the co-management of small-scale fisheries where informal institutions are present. Additionally, if we consider these informal enforcement and deterrence mechanisms and their interaction with compliance, we find that the presence of strong leadership, social capital, and protected areas suggested for successful co-management generally aligned with the aspects that were important for effective compliance (Akella and Cannon 2004, Gutiérrez et al. 2011a).

Even though informal enforcement and deterrence mechanisms are critical for co-managed fisheries to function, there is a gap in the existence of monitoring frameworks that help document these mechanisms and their interaction with formal mechanisms. More specifically, there is a huge gap in understanding how communities prevent illegal poaching or deter it in these systems. This study demonstrates that our proposed enforcement and deterrence mechanisms framework could be a useful tool for better documentation of informal and formal enforcement and deterrence mechanisms for the broader scientific community. In terms of compliance outcomes, our study suggests that the combination of informal deterrence and enforcement mechanisms and formal enforcement mechanisms could be as important to co-managed fisheries as other key features often associated with success like leadership, social capital, and marine reserves (Gutiérrez et al. 2011b).

Leadership

The presence of leadership in some case studies that had indigenous fisheries was reported in tandem with high compliance with formal and informal regulations. Such is the case of the fishers from the different indigenous fishing communities of Phang-nga Bay in Thailand, who show a strong respect for their leaders (Nickerson-Tietze 2000). These community members developed a co-management system with the government, local non-governmental agencies, and academia to manage their declining fishery resources (Nickerson-Tietze 2000). The management approach was considered a “bottom-up approach,” where the government recommended the formal implementation of a ban on all fishing nets to recover the overexploited fishery resources, and they worked closely with the communities before it was formally implemented. The combination of the formal patrolling activities and detainment of illegal fishers done by the police, together with the strong education carried out by the local non-governmental organization and academia, alongside the village members and village leaders who encouraged the community members to comply to the regulations, seem to have contributed to the compliance of the established regulations (Nickerson-Tietze, 2000).

On the other hand, the indigenous fishers of San Miguel Bay in the Philippines, who have respected village and tribal leaders and use their strong cultural beliefs such as not fishing on certain holidays and participate in the detection of illegal fishing through community patrolling, show that even with strong leadership, compliance with regulations is not guaranteed. In these fisheries formal enforcement mechanisms exist such as government patrolling and detainment of illegal fishers. These formal mechanisms operate in combination with informal enforcement mechanisms undertaken by the communities. However, there seems to be no compliance with the established regulations (Pomeroy and Pido 1995) resulting in resource depletion in the area.

Strong social organization

A high level of social capital exists in the Kwirikwidge fishing community of Mozambique, where they have a traditional structure including a chief and various religious leaders. This community has deep cultural and religious beliefs that they have relied on to manage their fishery resources through generations, such as the belief that their ancestors determine the production levels of the fishery. As a result, they have weekly rituals using magic in honor of their ancestors to ensure that production levels are not declining. If someone decides to not participate in these rituals, they are considered to be disrespecting their ancestors and are expelled from the fishing areas. The government and local non-governmental organizations included this traditional structure, culture, and the beliefs of this fishing village when designing management plans. Consequently, the fishery officials are in charge of patrolling the fishery areas together with community members, and the non-governmental organizations allocate their efforts to the education of the community.

On the contrary, in the fishing community of Los Lagos in Chile, fishers have a high organization but they do not receive adequate support from the authorities for the enforcement of fishing regulations, and thus do not trust them. Consequently, to deter illegal fishing, fishers have to use force and threats to discourage poaching. Even though the community is organized, because of the lack of trust occurring between the fishers and the authorities, the fishers continue to fish illegally (Albornoz and Glückler 2020). These two case studies show that a strong social organization in the community is important for enforcement, deterrence, and compliance to occur. However, if there is a lack of legitimacy among the stakeholders and fishers (like the fishery of Los Lagos in Chile), even if there are informal and formal enforcement mechanisms being used, compliance will be low. On the other hand, a fishery with a strong social organization and high legitimacy, where the local stakeholders take into account the informal enforcement mechanisms that exist, might lead to fishers complying more with the established regulations (like the case of the Kwirikwidge fishing community of Mozambique).

Protected areas

The presence of protected areas was reported in some case studies in which there was compliance with both formal and informal regulations, as well as cases in which there was no compliance. In the hilsa shad fishery in Bangladesh, certain parts of the river are closed to fishing to protect the species during the reproductive season. In this fishery, there is a combination of different stakeholders and community members working together in a committee to manage the protected areas. The authorities and community members patrol these protected areas, and the authorities are in charge of detaining any illegal fishers they find in the area. They deter any illegal activity by having fishers educate other fishers, and rely on the passing of information through strong family bonds (McClanahan et al. 1997). In contrast, in the reef fisheries in southern Kenya there exists a marine protected area with a variety of informal enforcement mechanisms. These mechanisms are based heavily on people’s beliefs and traditions such as the use of religion to deter illegal fishing, and village elders prohibiting the exchange of information regarding fishing areas to illegal fishers. Adding to this, the community members are in charge of patrolling the fishing areas, detaining illegal fishers by force, and bringing them to the village elders for punishment. Even though the community has a lot of power in the decision making and enforcement of regulations, there is no compliance with formal and informal regulations (Islam et al. 2020). These case studies demonstrate that the presence of protected areas can benefit enforcement (it is easier to monitor a delimited area, detain any infractors in the area, and prevent illegal fishing) efforts (informal and formal) and thus enhance the compliance of regulations in a fishery. However, similar to the cases described above, there may need to be a combination of legitimate informal mechanisms and formal mechanisms (besides the existence of a protected area), for compliance to occur.

These case studies, and our literature review reveal that attributes such as the presence of leadership, strong social organization, and the presence of protected areas that are suggested for successful co-management systems to exist, might also be important for successful enforcement mechanisms, and compliance as well. But in some instances, this is not the case, and further analysis of enforcement and deterrence with its different mechanisms should be undertaken in these systems to understand whether other aspects of the system are important. Our review is limited in its ability to statistically assess the relationships between attributes of co-management, deterrence, and enforcement mechanisms. Therefore, we urge the scientific community and stakeholders to prioritize empirical research to collect information on both formal and especially informal mechanisms of enforcement and deterrence (focusing more than just on the patrolling component of enforcement and including the strategies communities are using for the deterrence of poaching, and the motivations behind them) and the co-management characteristics that are related to these mechanisms (Kuperan and Sutinen 1998, Ramcilovic-Suominen and Epstein 2015, Crookes 2016, Dobson et al. 2019). We hope that this study demonstrates that for these systems, the deterrence component needs to be further studied and that it demonstrates that it is more nuanced and context-dependent than assuming that the probability of getting detained will be enough to prevent poaching (Kuperan and Sutinen 1998, Ramcilovic-Suominen and Epstein 2015, Crookes 2016, Dobson et al. 2019).

The collected information should include the different enforcement and deterrence mechanisms as described by the framework (informal and formal enforcement and deterrence mechanisms) being used around the world, with different socioeconomic characteristics (i.e., leadership, organization, protected areas), and their compliance with regulations. Consistent documentation of such information will be critical to further understand if the attributes proposed for successful co-management are the same for successful enforcement and compliance, or if there are other more important attributes we should consider (such as the combination of legitimate informal and formal enforcement mechanisms). Such documentation will also provide an ability to explore how the different informal institutions and enforcement mechanisms interact with the rest of the co-management components, and the implications for other co-managed systems.

Though this review is just a starting point, it reveals that compliance with multiple rules and multiple enforcement and deterrence mechanisms (a network of informal and formal regulations, deterrence, and enforcement mechanisms) is poorly studied and understood. Furthermore, our review demonstrates the importance of studying compliance as more than just a binary aspect focusing on formal regulations. Rather we suggest more attention be placed on the different levels of compliance with formal and informal regulations occurring in fishery communities, and the motivations of community members to decide to comply or not comply with certain rules (Oyanedele et al. 2020). Further research is needed in these areas to understand moral/legitimacy-based norms that might be more important levers for governing human behavior than the rules typically considered (i.e., formal, top-down rules). This review demonstrates the importance of community-based enforcement and compliance in small-scale fishery management and provides the first step toward understanding enforcement and compliance through a more holistic lens.

LITERATURE CITED

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