Research, part of a special feature on State-Reinforced Transformative and Adaptive Governance of Sustainable Social-Ecological Systems

INTRODUCTION

The self-governance of community commons has emerged as a viable solution to address the inherent dilemmas of resource unit overuse and resource system under-provision, as elucidated by Ostrom’s seminal work (1990). Small-scale irrigation systems (SSISs), which are the specimen of commons, serve a substantial portion of the global irrigated area and are primarily managed by local irrigation communities (Yu et al. 2017). However, under the pressures of globalization and climate change, SSISs are increasingly exposed to large-scale disturbances that exceed the community’s adaptive capacity (Lam and Chiu 2016, Allasiw et al. 2017, Chai and Zeng 2018, Wang et al. 2022). This necessitates intervention by external entities, such as governments, leading to a shift in governance regimes toward state-reinforced adaptive governance (Chaffin et al. 2016, DeCaro et al. 2017).

State-reinforced adaptive governance comprises two distinct features. First, it represents a form of state-reinforced self-governance in which the state provides logistical assistance to communities in terms of financial, technological, statutory, and political support for governing the commons. Importantly, the state refrains from direct intervention in the operation and maintenance (O&M) of the systems, in line with Sarker’s (2013) definition. This approach aligns with the polycentric governance system introduced by Ostrom et al. (1961) and further developed by Ostrom (2010). DeCaro et al. (2017) extended the state’s role through three design principles: legal authorization, legal assignment of responsibility, and tangible support. Second, state-reinforced adaptive governance emphasizes resolving dilemmas arising from disturbances. When confronted with disturbances such as climate change or floods, horizontal coordination within the community, complemented by external state support, enables SSISs to maintain resilience. Japanese irrigation systems managed by local irrigation districts (LIDs) exemplify successful state-reinforced self-governance, facilitating both regular governance issues related to provision and appropriation, as well as adaptive governance in response to disturbances (Sarker et al. 2014).

Existing studies on state-reinforced self-governance and adaptive governance mainly focus on managing disturbances at the community level. Few studies explore the process by which communities transition from self-governance to state-reinforced adaptive governance, especially in response to large-scale disturbances. Additionally, research on the pathways of state-reinforced adaptive governance or the vertical coordination role of the government, beyond logistical assistance, remains limited. Furthermore, previous studies fail to adequately address the success factors driving the dynamic process of state-reinforced adaptive governance. This study aims to fill these gaps.

This study explores SSISs in China’s Yangtze River Basin (YRB) during the 2022 basin-wide drought, focusing on the factors that contributed to the success and evolution of state-reinforced adaptive governance. In China, SSISs are managed through community-led governance, reinforced by the state. The 2016 Regulation on Farmland Water Conservancy, enacted by the State Council, delegated authority for SSIS O&M to irrigation communities, guided by local governments. In compliance with this regulation, governance practices for SSISs have predominantly been led by local communities, including village collectives, water users’ cooperative organizations, and village committees as the primary governing entities. The state supports these community-led governance efforts by providing an institutional framework to reinforce the role of local communities, a system referred to as state-reinforced self-governance. The severe drought of 2022, however, disrupted the functioning of SSISs, intensifying challenges beyond the communities’ capability to manage. In response, various levels of government intervened through adjusting water allocation, enlarging water supply, and funding infrastructure upgrades. These measures effectively mitigated the drought’s impact and reinforced adaptive governance. This case study of China exemplifies a dynamic transition from community-led governance, or state-reinforced self-governance, to state-reinforced adaptive governance, offering valuable insights for scholarly research.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETIC FRAMEWORK

Misfit governance

Coordination is defined as the management of interdependencies between activities undertaken to achieve a goal (Malone and Crowston 1994). In the context of commons governance, coordination can be understood along two dimensions and three types: horizontal coordination (H-coordination), which refers to collaboration at the same level, such as within a community; vertical coordination (V-coordination), which denotes collaboration across different levels; and HV-coordination, which involves both horizontal and vertical collaboration, also referred to as integrative coordination.

Self-governance and adaptive governance of the commons tackle the challenges of overuse and under-provision at the community level primarily through H-coordination, particularly in terms of social capital. Self-governance involves collaborative efforts by commons users to craft rules and coordinate behaviors horizontally, effectively overcoming the dual dilemmas of resource system provision and resource unit appropriation (Ostrom 1990, Villamayor-Tomas 2018). Ostrom’s (1990) eight design principles serve as valuable guidelines for crafting rules that resolve these dilemmas. The process of rule-crafting and enforcement both require H-coordination among resource users. Similarly, in the face of disturbances at the community scale, adaptive governance necessitates H-coordination to change rules and respond to these disruptions (Dietz et al. 2003, Chaffin et al. 2014).

However, H-coordination alone is insufficient in addressing the commons’ dilemmas on a large scale, due to the issue of adaptive environmental governance fit. H-coordination works well when there is a suitable match between the dilemma and the community’s capacity for environmental governance. But when new challenges exceed the community’s boundaries, such as the need to enlarge water sources due to extreme climate change at a basin-wide scale, the community lacks the capacity to address them through H-coordination alone. This capacity limitation creates a scale misfit because the self-governance regime does not align with the environmental conditions (Young 2002). To address this misfit, Chaffin et al. (2016) proposed reforming adaptive governance, suggesting a shift to a more functional governance regime for the endangered commons. Following this logic, Barnes et al. (2017) recommended transitioning from a single entity of adaptive governance to multiple entities, involving the state as an eligible participant to reinforce community-led governance. This results in more complex coordination that is superior to regular coordination in responding to new disturbances (Barnes et al. 2017).

We infer that state-reinforced adaptive governance holds promise for addressing large-scale disturbances. Ensuring the resilience of irrigation systems requires crucial government support for community-led governance. Drawing from Allasiw et al. (2017) and Schlager (2019), the governance regime of the irrigation community transitions when the government shifts from a passive supporter to an active participant, resulting in state-reinforced adaptive governance. Government involvement necessitates sufficient resources to fulfill its authority and responsibilities. As highlighted by Sarker (2013) and further developed by DeCaro et al. (2017), when self-governance incorporates state participation, it creates favorable conditions for adaptation while refraining from intervening in operational matters. In responding to basin-wide disturbances, the government should facilitate V-coordination among multiple entities, supporting the irrigation community in collective actions. Ultimately, institutions crafted with community participation play a crucial role in coordinating resource users, shaping behaviors for commons sustainability, and addressing disturbances, including those related to O&M.

Integrative coordination

Integrative coordination entails the combination of both V-coordination, implemented by the government in a top-down manner, and H-coordination, facilitated by the community in a bottom-up approach. In this study, integrative coordination aligns with the principles of state-reinforced self-governance proposed by DeCaro et al. (2017). Both the government and the irrigation community hold decision-making authority, reflecting the features of polycentric governance. During disturbances, they co-produce solutions to address the challenges faced by fragile SSISs and maintain resilience, leveraging the government’s extensive resource mobilization and the irrigation community’s social capital. The government also upholds internal accountability mechanisms to fulfill its responsibility. Additionally, integrative coordination offers flexibility, enabling both parties to adapt to disturbances by focusing on the expected consequences of their actions (Boamah and Nyamekye 2021).

In contrast to H-coordination, V-coordination, which is often associated with hierarchy, involves the government extending its management of water resources to irrigation communities under its jurisdiction through the implementation of laws and policies. V-coordination exists between government authorities and the community, as well as between local governments and higher-level authorities. For instance, a basin authority, possessing greater administrative power, can engage in V-coordination to adjust water allocation from water-abundant regions to water-scarce regions. Similarly, local governments can coordinate vertically to adjust water allocation between communities. An illustration of V-coordination is the South-to-North Water Diversion Project in China, in which multiple government agencies at different levels are involved in governing transboundary water issues (Heikkila et al. 2011). Consequently, to effectively address transboundary water problems and adapt to large-scale disturbances, irrigation communities require integrative coordination (see Fig.1).

V-coordination differs significantly from H-coordination at the community scale. First, V-coordination involves the application of general, standardized, and engineering-based measures. The extent of government involvement is determined by the severity of the disturbance, resulting in the issuance of more generalized measures and policies. Policy tools in V-coordination encompass defining risk and disaster levels, developing unified water allocation programs, and providing standardized engineering-based support, such as constructing new infrastructure and upgrading irrigation technologies. Second, V-coordination operates through policy enforcement and legislation between different levels of governments or between local government and the community. Upper-level entities issue formal documents, such as policies, plans, and laws, which serve as institutional guidelines for lower-level entities to address specific needs. Third, from the government’s perspective, V-coordination offers additional advantages, such as access to scientific knowledge and information, including meteorological forecasts, which may surpass those available to the community. Hence, V-coordination facilitates both proactive prediction and subsequent adaptation measures.

In cases of large-scale disturbances, the governance of irrigation communities often lacks coordination, resulting in a no-coordination regime. However, depending on the presence of vertical and/or horizontal coordination, state-reinforced adaptive governance regimes can be classified into three types. The first type, HV-coordination or integrative coordination, involves both horizontal and vertical aspects. H-coordination occurs within the community, addressing the disturbance, while V-coordination happens at the upper levels, aligning with directives from higher authorities. The second and third types, termed partial coordination, involve either H-coordination or V-coordination measures. In these cases, the community focuses on either H-coordination within its boundaries or V-coordination with upper-level government, but not both simultaneously. It is important to note that HV-coordination represents an integrative approach in which the community and the government collaborate across different scales to respond effectively to disturbances.

Considering the dynamic perspective of state-reinforced adaptive governance, we view the no-coordination type as the foundational governance regime for an irrigation system. From this baseline, three potential transition pathways can be identified:

1. Shift to HV-coordination regime governance. This pathway involves transitioning toward both horizontal and vertical coordination, necessitating additional resources from both the community and the government. Despite the higher costs associated with institutional change and production, this approach is expected to minimize the impact of disturbances and yield the most effective governance.
2. Shift to H-coordination regime governance. This pathway focuses on H-coordination within the community, requiring some adjustments. While the costs of institutional change and production may be lower compared to the HV-coordination, the effectiveness of state-reinforced adaptive governance in responding to disturbances may be moderate due to scale misfit.
3. Shift to V-coordination regime governance. This pathway involves V-coordination with upper-level government, with the community adapting its governance structure and processes accordingly. Although the costs of institutional change and production could be lower than those in HV- coordination, the effectiveness of the governance response to disturbances may also be less optimal.

Additionally, it is possible for the baseline regime to remain unchanged, meaning the community continues to operate under the existing governance framework without actively pursuing transition changes. Based on these considerations, we infer that the HV-coordination transition pathway requires the highest investment of resources from both the community and the government. However, it may result in the least disruption from disturbances and exhibit the most favorable performance in terms of state-reinforced adaptive governance.

State-reinforced adaptive governance

State-reinforced adaptive governance involves a shift in governance regimes, a concept elucidated by North’s theory of institutional change (1990). The primary catalyst for such change lies in changes in relative prices, which can significantly influence stakeholders’ perceptions and prompt the initiation of institutional transitions. This process typically unfolds in three key steps. Initially, a primary action group emerges, proposing a blueprint for institutional change in response to the altered relative prices. Subsequently, a secondary action group, often referred to as the subordinate group, forms to advocate for the institutional change. Finally, these two groups collaborate in pursuit of achieving the desired institutional change (Davis and North 1971).

In the context of irrigation system governance, external disturbances such as extreme droughts can lead to changes in the prices of water and food. As water becomes scarcer, the price of both water resources and food increases. To prioritize food security, a joint responsibility between the government and the farming community, both parties collaborate to facilitate a regime shift. In terms of vertical (V) and horizontal (H) coordination, the government and the community are key actors, each initiating distinct transitions.

In V-coordination, the government, acting as the primary action group, focuses on food security. It promotes institutional change by transitioning from community-led-governance (or state-reinforced self-governance) to state-reinforced adaptive governance through anti-drought policies. The local government, as the secondary action group, enforces these changes under the directives of higher-level authorities. This regime shift is rationalized when the benefits outweigh the costs.

For H-coordination, the farming community leads efforts in ensuring a sufficient water supply. The community promotes institutional change through adaptive measures such as seeking new water sources, reducing water demand through practices such as water rotation, and changing crop mixes (Chai and Zeng 2012). The farmers themselves act as the subordinate action group, implementing and enforcing these changes. If the costs of institutional change outweigh the benefits, the community may choose to endure the drought under the existing governance structure or seek assistance from the local government for resources, technology, and additional support in V-coordination.

During significant disturbances, when the community’s H-coordination alone is inadequate to address the dilemmas associated with governing irrigation systems, V-coordination by the government can combine with the community’s H-coordination to form integrative coordination. However, it is essential to note that if the local government fails to effectively enforce the policies set by higher authorities, achieving V-coordination becomes challenging. This failure may lead to a regime shift toward either H-coordination or no coordination.

In cases where H-coordination is absent at the community level and only V-coordination by the government exists, the transition can be considered an imposed regime shift, akin to V-coordination. Conversely, when H-coordination is present, the transition resembles an induced regime shift, such as HV-coordination or H-coordination. The pathway of institutional change for both types follows a bottom-up approach. However, only HV-coordination can be characterized as polycentric governance because both the community and the government serve as primary action groups.

CASE STUDY

Data source

The data for this case were sourced from various channels, including statistical materials, official documents, media reports, interviews, and participant observations. Policy documents were primarily obtained from the digital archives on relevant government websites, where the most recent policies addressing the YRB-related drought are issued. Researchers can access and cite these digital sources.

We selected representative SSISs based on several criteria: geographic location, with systems situated within the YRB, particularly in areas most affected by the 2022 drought; scale, defined by irrigation systems covering an area of less than 667 hectares; performance metrics, reflecting diverse capabilities in water resource governance, particularly during the drought; and data availability. Regarding the interview participants, we first identified them through reports by local official media, then selected representative interviewees to gather in-depth data. The interview questions are provided as a supplementary document.

Table 1 provides an overview of the data collected at different scales. At the basin scale, aggregate data on meteorology, rainfall, water demand, irrigation governance, and anti-drought measures were sourced from official documents and media reports pertaining to the YRB. Information at the provincial and local levels includes data on water shortage, the impact of drought on agricultural production, and government relief measures, primarily obtained from statistical data, documents, and interviews conducted with hydrology departments. At the community scale, specific data were primarily gathered through interviews with community leaders and farmers. The governance level of the entity determined the nature of the data, with higher levels providing more aggregated, official, and general information.

In this study, we employed a bottom-up approach to analyze how SSISs respond to changes in climate variables, particularly within the context of water governance. As noted by Culley et al. (2016), this method provides a comprehensive understanding of local dynamics, while Zscheischler et al. (2018) highlighted its effectiveness in identifying key drivers of significant impacts. By starting with a specific system or impact, this approach allows for the identification of all the underlying variables, processes, and phenomena shaping the outcome.

This analysis focuses on the co-production of governance at the basin scale in which multiple entities collaboratively influence governance structures and outcomes in response to drought. This study integrates both regular and adaptive governance measures, reflecting the dynamic nature of water governance. Such an analysis aligns well with the principles of the bottom-up approach, ensuring that local-level practices are incorporated into broader governance changes. The analysis is structured into three key steps.

• Step 1: Our bottom-up analysis is guided by North’s (1990) theory of institutional change, which helps examine the transition process, focusing on the regime shift from community-led governance to state-reinforced adaptive governance in response to drought. Additionally, we draw on Ostrom’s (1990) design principles to understand the dynamics of rule changes, particularly at the community level. These guiding theories informed our identification of key themes related to governance evolution and the adaptation of local institutions to environmental stressors.
• Step 2: To ensure consistency in our bottom-up analysis, we adopted a consensus-based approach for theme identification as recommended by Ratacyzk et al. (2016). In practice, this involved independent coding by our team members, followed by structured discussions to resolve any discrepancies. This iterative process was essential for ensuring the reliability and validity of our findings, allowing us to finalize the observed themes collaboratively.
• Step 3: Guided by bottom-up approach, our analysis explored the overall regime evolution, focusing on identifying three distinct pathways of governance change. These pathways reflect the dynamic nature of governance transitions in which operational rules and regulations evolve in response to shifting environmental and institutional conditions. In line with Culley et al. (2016), we emphasize that regime shifts are not static; rather, they are fluid, reflecting the changing adaptive capacities of the system over time.

Extreme drought in the YRB during the summer of 2022

The drought event

The YRB in China experienced an extreme drought during the summer of 2022 (July to September). The meteorological drought composite (MCI) index from the National Climate Center indicated the extreme drought from July, affecting Sichuan, Chongqing, Hubei, Hunan, Anhui, Shannanxi, Guizhou, Henan, and Jiangxi provinces (see Fig. 2). By September, approximately 92% of the basin faced varying degrees of drought. High temperatures persisted, exceeding 35°C for over 10 days, with some regions reaching above 40°C for more than 40 days. Rainfall was significantly reduced, ranging from 45% to 70% less than average for the period. Agricultural drought followed in August. The extreme drought was the worst since 1961, affecting over 100 million people (Qu et al. 2023). The Ministry of Water Resources classified it as a level four meteorological disaster, with regions such as Chongqing, Sichuan, and Hunan receiving a level three rating. Water levels in major sources, including Dongting Lake and Poyang Lake, were three-quarters lower than in May. In Chongqing, 66 rivers were cut off and 25 reservoirs dried up. The prolonged heatwave, the most intense since 1961, further exacerbated the drought’s effects. Some regions experienced up to 40 days without rain.

The YRB, which typically experiences heavy summer rainfall, faced an unusual drought. Annual rainfall in the basin ranges from 1000 mm to 1600 mm, with floods common in the middle and lower regions, making droughts rare. Due to reduced rainfall in the upper basin, water supply for the middle and lower areas was insufficient, and many reservoirs were critically low, compromising irrigation systems.

The drought’s intensity, wide coverage, and prolonged duration caused severe agricultural damage, especially in the agriculture sector, which is the largest water consumer. Over 2 million hectares of crops were affected, with paddy rice, the basin’s main crop, experiencing a 70% water shortage. This led to significant reductions in rice production and the depletion of irrigation infrastructure, increasing the risk of crop failure. Other crops, such as corn, soybeans, and vegetables also suffered, threatening China’s food security because the YRB supplies approximately 40% of the country’s food.

State-reinforced adaptive governance of the SSISs

The YRB is endowed with abundant water resources, totaling approximately 995 billion cubic meters, which represents one-third of the China’s total water supply. However, the distribution of these resources is uneven. Irrigated agriculture is concentrated in the middle and lower reaches of the Yangtze River, as well as in the areas surrounding Dongting Lake, Poyang Lake, and the Min River. These regions account for 33%, 21%, 12.4%, 8%, and 9.2% of the total irrigated area within the basin, respectively.

In the YRB, there are approximately 1000 small-scale irrigation districts, each covering about 667 hectares. These districts collectively account for about 50% of the entire basin (Luo et al. 2019). These SSISs are governed by local communities, which were among the most heavily affected by the 2022 the drought (Zhang 2022). Due to their limited physical infrastructure, technology, and water resources, SSISs are more vulnerable to drought impacts compared to large-scale systems. To address drought impacts, small-scale irrigation districts implemented two main relief approaches: state-reinforced self-governance with H-coordination within the local irrigation community and co-production with the CWRC through V-coordination. Figure 3 provides an illustrated overview of the multi-level actors and their respective adaptive activities.

State-reinforced self-governance (community-led governance) of the SSISs

The governance of SSISs typically involves village collectives, village committees, agricultural associations, or water user associations. These systems include small reservoirs, hilly ponds, minor distributary canals, and field canals. This study identifies the characteristics of regular governance from two key sources: the first being previous studies by Wang et al. (2022) and Chai and Zeng (2018), which have generalized the regular governance practices of irrigation systems related to the YRB; and the second being practical observations within the YRB itself. Drawing on Ostrom’s (1990) eight design principles, the governance of SSISs exhibits the following characteristics.

1. Clear boundary: SSISs have well-defined boundaries for both infrastructure and water resources, which are considered collective property owned and managed by the community under the regulation on farmland water conservancy. Similarly, farmlands within the village are owned by the village collective, which holds ownership and operational rights. Both water and farmland are regarded as collective assets, with water use rights akin to riparian rights in nature. According to the classification standard of common property resources proposed by Sarker et al. (2014), the property rights associated with these irrigation systems fall under the category of closed access, indicating a clear and well-defined ownership structure.
2. Governance fit: The irrigation community leverages its social capital to facilitate H-coordination and ensure effective governance in addressing challenges related to infrastructure maintenance and water allocation. They mobilize resources such as labor, cash, and materials to support these efforts. Water for irrigation is regulated through administrative pricing, typically ranging from US$0.007 to US$0.02 per cubic meter. This pricing structure is relatively inexpensive, resembling almost free water usage.
3. Participatory decision making: The leaders of the irrigation community act as representatives of the farmers, ensuring the development and enforcement of rules and regulations with active farmer participation. The relevant rules now include participation in elections, the assembly of villagers’ representatives, and the “one case, one meeting” approach.
4. Commons must be monitored: Irrigation systems are prominently situated alongside farmlands, making them easily visible and facilitating monitoring by the community. All farmer water users act as monitors, a rule that also enhances the rigor of its implementation.
5. Graduated sanctions: Violators of the established rules may face sanctions, typically in the form of exclusion, leading to a lack of assistance or support from other community members. Rule violators would be spotted by their neighbors, and the severity of penalties increases with repeated violations. For the first offense, the violator is reprimanded by their neighbors. A second offense results in negative gossip spreading throughout the village, and a third offense leads to social exclusion by other villagers.
6. Conflict resolution: Conflict resolution within the irrigation community typically involves internal coordination by the community leader, as well as external coordination mediated by village leaders or local government representatives. Most conflicts are resolved within the community, which is highly efficient and cost-effective.
7. Organization right recognition: The irrigation community holds legal property certificates that protect their rights, a practice implemented since 2014. Over the past 10 years, although the government does not directly interfere with community-level O&M, this represents a state-reinforced form of self-governance.
8. Nested within larger networks: The YRB is a large basin, where SSISs are physically located at its lower end. These systems share common water sources, such as reservoirs and lakes, and are nested under the V-coordination of higher-level management entities, such as the hydrological agencies of the local government. These networks provide oversight and support to ensure the efficient functioning of the irrigation systems.

Although large-scale irrigation systems are typically managed through a hierarchical structure by hydrology departments at corresponding administrative levels, these systems encompass significant infrastructure such as large reservoirs, dams, main canals, and branch canals, all owned by the respective government entities. In the YRB, the highest administrative agency is the Changjiang Water Resources Commission (CWRC), which functions as a river basin authority under the Ministry of Water Resources. The CWRC assumes responsibility for water administration, law enforcement, integrated water resources management, flood and drought disaster prevention, as well as the construction and management of key hydraulic projects. The CWRC exercises its hierarchical authority by horizontally coordinating with the hydrology departments of provincial governments, instead of through direct administration (Li and Jin 2023). At the provincial, city, county, and town levels, hydrological departments manage large-scale irrigation systems within their jurisdictions.

State-reinforced co-production

The CWRC aims to maintain the autonomy and resilience of the irrigation community and SSISs, leading to a state-reinforced adaptive governance approach that transitions from community-led governance. Community-led governance encompasses both the water supply and demand sides. When faced with a lack of water in community-scale storage, farmers seek external assistance. Farmers reported drought disasters and water demand information to the local government, which adjusted water allocations, facilitated artificial precipitation, provided water pumping machines for farms located at higher elevations, and constructed new canals to bring in water from alternative sources, as reported by rice farmers, a farm leader, and a metrological officer. On the water demand side, the local government implemented strict water management practices, assigned staff to oversee water adjustment, minimized water wastage, and supported the adoption or upgrading of water conservation technologies within the community. However, it is important to note that the local government’s involvement in drought relief efforts was primarily passive and faced limitations in expanding water supply and reducing water consumption through external support.

Co-production involved the collaboration of three entities: the CWRC, regional governments, and irrigation communities. The co-production occurred at the collective choice level, as classified by Shivakumar (2005) and Barnes et al. (2017), in which all three entities interacted and cooperated to address the drought shock.

Changjiang Water Resources Commission (CWRC)

The CWRC did not alter the rules at the constitutional level; rather, it played a leading role in adjusting water distribution to the drought-affected regions and in supporting local communities in their response to the drought. When provincial reservoirs experienced water shortages, the irrigation communities sought water adjustments from upper-level sources in the Yangtze River. Recognizing the importance of food security and development, the CWRC took comprehensive actions to address the drought, spanning from basin-wide initiatives to community-scale interventions. Given that fall grain production accounts for 75% of the annual food output, and timing is critical for agricultural irrigation, September becomes a critical period for water usage, particularly for paddy rice cultivation. The drought’s impact posed a significant threat to national food security. To mitigate this, the CWRC initiated the “Specially Combining Action to Relieve Drought by Replenishing the Water Supply from Surrounding Reservoirs” in August 2022, which had the following characteristics.

1. Replenishing water sources: This initiative identified three types of reservoirs located in the upper reaches of the Yangtze River and around the major lakes of Poyang and Dongting in the YRB basin as primary sources for water replenishment. Approximately 6.2 billion cubic meters of water were released from these major reservoirs, securing the water supply for irrigated areas of rice and other grains, covering 2 million hectares of land.
2. Water adjustment in drought-affected regions: The CWRC, in collaboration with regional governments, implemented measures based on calculations of water demand, local water flow, water levels, and simulations to respond effectively to the drought conditions.
3. Drought alert and warning: The CWRC proactively issued early drought alerts in March and warned regional governments in the middle and lower reaches of the basin to store water. From June onward, the CWRC consistently provided reports on weather forecasts, rainfall, and water conditions. These efforts aimed to continuously alleviate the impact of the drought by closely monitoring and assessing drought and flood conditions, accurately adjusting water allocations and storage from surrounding reservoirs, and by guiding regional governments in implementing contingency measures for water adjustment.
4. Collaborative water adjustment: The CWRC initiated a multi-entity approach to adjust water from the upper reaches of the Yangtze River. The first step involved diverting water into the Three Gorges, enabling the adjusted water to flow to the middle and lower reaches. This collaborative effort involved the CWRC, the management department of the Three Gorges, hydrology departments of the provinces, and the irrigation communities. The CWRC effectively leveraged the administrative advantages of the Chinese system through vertically integrating the management of both the upper and lower levels of the basin.
5. Scientific judgement: The CWRC faced two significant challenges in making accurate decisions regarding the amount of water to be adjusted. First, the drought’s impact extended across a wide area in the basin, encompassing multiple locations rather than being limited to the regions along the river. Gathering precise water demand information from these diverse areas proved to be a monumental task. Second, the CWRC had to strike a delicate balance between the necessary water adjustment and the potential for rainfall, considering the risk of triggering flooding, another significant water-related disaster.

Central government departments

In addition to the CWRC, various central government departments played crucial roles in drought relief efforts. The Ministry of Finance allocated approximately 6.5 billion yuan (about US$1 billion) from central reserve funds to support drought relief work, enabling regional governments to invest in constructing and renovating drought relief infrastructure. The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs dispatched 25 groups of scientists and 22 groups of technologists, totaling 160,000 individuals, to provide guidance on drought relief measures and technologies in the affected regions. These experts were readily available for assistance in the affected farmlands with a single phone call. Furthermore, the Emergency Management Department initiated a level-IV response plan, deploying firefighting and rescue personnel to deliver 2,890,000 tonnes of water to farmlands.

Provincial governments

Provincial governments played a crucial role in implementing the drought relief measures recommended by the CWRC. One important decision involved water storage, determining when and how much water to store. In response to the CWRC’s early drought warning, proactive measures were taken by provinces such as Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, and Anhui, which stored 30% more water than in previous years during the same time period. This strategic water storage helped to secure water sources for drought relief efforts. Given the uncertainty of future rainfall, provincial governments had to make challenging decisions about water storage in advance. For instance, Hunan province treated each rainfall event as potentially the last one and adjusted reservoir operations to maximize water storage starting in June. By July, reservoirs across the province had stored approximately 10% more water than in previous years during the same period.

Provincial governments developed emergency response plans specifically tailored to the small-scale irrigation communities by closely assessing their water demand requirements. For instance, in Jiangxi province, a total of 2.2 billion cubic meters of water was adjusted from the Liaofang and Daduan reservoirs to small reservoirs within the irrigation communities, benefiting approximately 0.7 million hectares of irrigated land (reported by a leader of the Jiangxi hydrology department at a press conference by the Ministry of Water Resources). To strike a balance between agricultural irrigation and power generation, the province imposed restrictions on power generation activities of major reservoirs, ensuring a sufficient water supply for agricultural needs. Additionally, the province efficiently coordinated the water adjustments made by the CWRC through the implementation of an emergency water supply plan and by designating staff members to oversee the responsibility of water diversion, thereby maximizing the use of available water resources.

Provincial governments’ hydrology departments shifted their focus from routine flood control infrastructure to drought relief. Instead of solely preparing for potential floods in July and August, they adjusted their plans to address the ongoing drought. Some infrastructure projects were repurposed to facilitate the conveyance and distribution of water adjusted by the CWRC. For example, in Jiangxi province, efforts were made to ensure a water supply by constructing 76,200 electric wells, 23,500 pump stations, and 472,600 machinery facilities for drought relief purposes. The hydrology department also allocated 0.225 billion cubic meters of replenished water from the CWRC to small-scale irrigation districts in need (as reported by JINGJIRIBAO, from an interview with the leader of the department of hydrology, Hunan Province).

Communities

The irrigation community implemented measures to connect with the water adjusted by the CWRC. These included desilting dried water storage and distribution facilities, such as river and canals, to prepare for receiving the adjusted water. They procured new water pumping machines and ensured a steady fuel supply for continuous pumping (as reported by BJNEWS during an interview with village leader from the Hunan Province). In Jiangxi, agricultural scientists guided farmers on optimizing water allocation for rice cultivation, considering different growth stages and mitigating water loss due to high temperatures and evaporation (as reported by FARMER during an interview with a rice farmer in Jiangxi Province). These efforts aimed to maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of water use in the irrigation community.

As depicted in Figure 3, the irrigation communities were the first to observe and respond to agricultural drought. From July onward, they became aware of dwindling or complete depletion of water sources. In response, the communities took various local-level measures, such as digging wells, diverting water, and borrowing water from neighboring sources to alleviate the impact of the drought. In Gaoshan village, Hunan, more than 40 farmers organized themselves, using five dredging machines to clean the Ouchihe River, which was subsequently replenished by water from the Yangtze River (as reported by IFENG in an interview with a village leader from the Hunan Province). Communities mobilized farmers for multiple water pumping activities, raising water levels to enable its flow into farmlands (as reported by Xinhua NEWS when interviewing an agricultural association leader in the Anhui Province).

Simultaneously, they appealed to the local government for assistance in adjusting water allocations and replenishing their storage facilities. Recognizing the widespread nature of the drought, local and regional governments also faced water scarcity issues and turned to the CWRC for support. In August, the CWRC issued a water adjustment document to replenish water across all levels of irrigation districts, aided by other central government departments.

Finally, by the end of August, the water adjusted by the CWRC reached the irrigation communities, who established connecting canals and employed lifting and pumping techniques to access and distribute the water. To manage increased water-use conflicts during the drought, communities implemented rules for equitable water distribution. In the town of Tandu, Hunan, the “one hoe” rule for water allocation was implemented. All 26 town reservoirs were assigned water guards, respected Communist Party members with the necessary qualifications, who managed water resources comprehensively to ensure access for all farmlands (as reported by Xuhua News).

CASE ANALYSIS

Regime shift through state-reinforced governance

Drought mitigation outcomes

The state-reinforced adaptive governance approach successfully mitigated agricultural production losses in drought-affected irrigation districts. Although there was a slight decrease in total food production and production per unit area, particularly a 2% reduction in rice production (equivalent to 44 billion kg compared to 2021), total food production in 2022 reached 787 trillion kg, surpassing 2021 by 27 billion kg. This governance transition can be considered a success.

Compared to previous years, the drought-affected regions experienced a 50% water deficiency for irrigation. Without external water adjustment from the CWRC, agricultural production would have suffered at least a 50% loss, using the 2021 production levels as a baseline. However, the CWRC’s assistance, which adjusted the water supply by 6.2 billion cubic meters, effectively mitigated this impact. Most of the adjusted water was allocated to five provinces: Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, Anhui, and Jiangsu. For instance, Anhui diverted water from the Yangtze River through the Simajiang project, replenishing the Dafangcheng reservoir and distributing water through field canals to irrigate the small-scale irrigation districts. Similarly, Jiangsu diverted from the Yangtze River through the Taihu major irrigation project within the province.

Regime shift

The small-scale irrigation districts have successfully transitioned from community-led governance to state-reinforced adaptive governance during the severe and basin-wide drought. While previously focusing on flood response measures during the summer, they efficiently adapted and managed the drought in the summer of 2022. This transition, completed in just one irrigation season, involved limited government involvement, primarily providing external support in the form of free water supplies. Operational management remained under the purview of the irrigation communities, which independently devised water use plans for drought relief, submitted them to local governments, which then collected and forwarded the plans to higher-level authorities.

The Process of transition

The basin authority implemented state-reinforced adaptive governance through integrative coordination and through fostering H-coordination among village governance and V-coordination with provincial governance. The transition process comprises three stages: first, a motivation phase driven by changes in agricultural production price and revenue; second, the emergence of the first actors who recognized the benefits of expanding water supply for the irrigation community and ensuring food security; and third, institutional suppliers responding to the first actors by establishing rules to address drought.

1. Motivation phase: The drought triggered a relative change in food production prices, manifesting in two ways. First, at the farmer and irrigation community level when access to water became more expensive due to a significant shortfall in water supply compared to demand. In 2021, the total food production of these six affected provinces was approximately 170 million tonnes, accounting for about 25% of the national total. The 2022 drought in the YRB had a severe impact on national food security. Farmer representatives reported that the drought increased water demand on farmland, resulting in a 30% to 40% rise in water pumping costs for irrigation, from US$15 per hectare to US$23. This increase resulted in reduced or no agricultural output and lower incomes, prompting a strong motivation to redirect water from external sources to offset losses. Second, at the national level, decreased agricultural production, particularly in rice, failed to meet the country’s food demands, posing a threat to food security. Consequently, the central government was strongly motivated to adjust water allocation in the drought-affected regions. Recognizing their limited capacity for basin-wide drought management, irrigation communities transitioned their governance structures to a state-reinforced model with assistance from the central government, represented by the CWRC.
2. Role of key actors: The first actors required integrative coordination, with the CWRC, the sole entity capable of V-coordination, playing a crucial role in adjusting water allocation from upper-level sources to replenish the middle and lower reaches. This coordination followed a top-down command and control approach. Initially, the CWRC prioritized agricultural irrigation, allocating water from the upper level of the Yangtze River even at the expense of power generation and other purposes. Subsequently, the CWRC balanced water levels at the Three Gorges for both flood control and drought relief. Lastly, the CWRC facilitated the allocation of adjusted water among the drought-affected provinces through collected water use plans. Meanwhile, irrigation communities necessitated H-coordination to link the adjusted water supply with other measures aimed at increasing water availability. These irrigation systems did not operate as isolated entities but instead collaborated with the government in response to the drought. Overall, this transition involved coordination across different levels of governance, requiring provincial governments to establish connections between the basin authority and irrigation communities.
3. Institutional response: The institutional suppliers, encompassing the CWRC, implemented the “Exclusive Action on Drought Relief and Water Supply Guarantee by the Reservoirs of the YRB” rule to regulate water adjustments. This rule, enforced through centralized command and unified arrangements, involved V-coordination in which all relevant hydrological departments collaborated to mitigate drought impacts, while considering local contexts in unified planning of water supply and demand. Simultaneously, irrigation communities introduced informal rules for connecting water adjusted by the CWRC for drought relief. Originating from the community in a bottom-up approach, these rules were implemented through mutual monitoring within the community. The state-reinforced adaptive governance induced a shift within the SSISs from a cooperative governance regime to one that incorporated hierarchy in water allocation and infrastructure provision when addressing basin-scale drought.

Ideally, as depicted in Figure 4b, these two types of rules seamlessly integrated into the same governance regime at both regional and community levels. All regions operated a governance regime shift, represented by the green in the middle, indicating coordinated planning to connect water adjusted by the CWRC and divert it to small-scale irrigation communities. Similarly, all irrigation communities adhered to the governance regime shift, represented by the blue color in the outer layer, signifying the implementation of community-level adaptive measures and comprehensive rules to effectively use water adjusted by the regional government. This integrated approach ensured optimal water use adjusted by the CWRC and minimized agricultural losses. The idealized scenario of state-reinforced adaptive governance depicted in Figure 4b illustrates general consistency, which involved shifts in both dimensions: vertically, in which drought-affected regions coordinated planning to connect water resources adjusted by the CWRC, and horizontally, in which irrigation communities adopted adaptive measures. However, the specific forms of these shifts vary due to different governance rules of irrigation systems.

Indeed, the initial regime of the irrigation communities exhibited a diverse array of collaboratively developed rules, as depicted in Figure 4a. These rules are represented by moderately different colors distributed within the same layer. The actual regime shifts within state-reinforced adaptive governance, specifically at the irrigation community level, are characterized by a diverse landscape, as illustrated in Figure 4c. Some communities successfully transitioned into the ideal status, while others underwent unexpected changes, deviating from the anticipated outcome. Additionally, certain communities remained in their original state. Similarly, the diversification of governance regimes also emerged at the regional level.

The diverse regimes observed initially encompass various conditions, such as adaptive capability, resource foundation, irrigation system structure, decision-making processes involving local knowledge and meteorological information, cooperation with the government, and governance based on the eight design principles. The proximity of a community to transitioning into the ideal regime status depends on the number of conditions fulfilled and the degree to which they are met. As depicted in the top and left sections of Figure 4c, the initially dark blue and lighter blue sections have successfully changed into the same shade of blue in Figure 4b. Conversely, communities with fewer fulfilled conditions and lower degrees of variation are more likely to shift into a different regime or maintain their original status. This is evident in the bottom section of Figure 4c in which the initial light blue areas have transitioned into blue sections with dots inside, while the left section remains unchanged from its initial status.

Three distinct pathways

The “no shift” pattern refers to a situation in which no transition occurs in the governance regime at either the provincial or village scale. This pattern serves as a baseline, depicted at the bottom of Figure 4 and indicated by the absence of a red tick in Figure 5.

The governance transition process encompasses three types of coordination regime changes. Based on shifts in both V-coordination at the provincial scale and H-coordination at the village scale, we classified the transition process into three types. The first type includes double regime shifts, indicating both horizontal and vertical coordination. This type is termed integrative coordination or HV-coordination, signifying simultaneous governance regime shifts at both the provincial and village scales (see the top part of Fig. 4). In Figure 5, this is represented by two red ticks for Type 1. The next two types of regime shifts involve changes only in one dimension of governance, either horizontal or vertical. The second (third) type is characterized by a horizontal (vertical) shift, denoted as H-coordination (V-coordination). In these cases, only the governance regime at the village (province) scale transitions into an adaptive pattern (see the left or right part of Fig. 4). Figure 5 represents these as one red tick for Types 2 and 3.

Based on the arrangement of the three layers of squares depicted in Figure 4 (bottom, top, right, and left), we have classified the governance categories at both the community and provincial levels into four types, presented as four columns in Figure 5. Notably, no region exclusively falls under column one, which represents the absence of a regime shift. Considering the significant impact of drought on food production and agricultural income, a crucial driver for transition, both the government and farmers have a motivation to ensure a resilient water supply through the regime shift of SSISs, as reflected in relative price changes.

Type 1 state-reinforced adaptive-governance exemplifies the ideal regime shift at both the community and provincial scales, marked by two red ticks. This type involves integrative coordination, combining V-coordination with the government and H-coordination within the irrigation community. Provinces such as Anhui, Shaanxi, Guizhou, Henan, and Jiangsu serve as representatives of Type 1. In these provinces, the government responded to early drought warnings from the CWRC by storing water instead of releasing it for flood control. They adjusted regional reservoirs to replenish local water sources and provided subsidies to irrigation communities for connecting the adjusted water supply. Simultaneously, irrigation communities took proactive measures to increase water supply, reduce water demand, and design rules for water reallocation. As a result, the impact of drought on food production in these provinces was minimal. In 2022, food production increased by 0.3% to 3.7% compared to 2021, with Anhui producing 4.1 million tonnes, Shaanxi producing 1.29 million tonnes, Guizhou producing 1.14 million tonnes, Henan producing 6.79 million tonnes, and Jiangsu producing 3.77 million tonnes. Over half of the drought-affected provinces (five out of nine) successfully maintained resilient irrigation governance by transition efforts.

The hydrology agencies of local governments and irrigation communities have the autonomy to manage water and respond to drought. Their decisions, whether to adapt or transform, depend on their governance capabilities, i.e., irrigation technology, organizational ability, financial resources, and more. The remaining regions, namely Sichuan, Chongqing, Hunan, and Hubei exhibited regime shift patterns, categorized as Type 2 (horizontal shift) and Type 3 (vertical shift). Sichuan and Chongqing primarily underwent transitions in their SSISs through H-coordination, relying on the adaptation efforts of irrigation communities to cope with the drought. Because these regions are located in upper reaches of the YRB, more extensive measures were required to adjust water from the basin to replenish their water sources. The irrigation communities collaborated and modified water use rules by implementing twice-daily watering schedules (morning and night) using sprinkler irrigation techniques, which promoted water conservation through a foggy effect.

In contrast, Hunan and Hubei primarily experienced transition patterns characterized by V-coordination led by the government. The hydrological departments played a significant role in water storage, adjustment, and diversion into the irrigation communities. Overall, due to the absence of either vertical or horizontal coordination, both Type 2 and Type 3 regime shifts resulted in a slight loss of agricultural production during the drought relief process. Food production in 2022 increased by 0.8% to 2% compared to 2021, with Sichuan producing 3.51 million tonnes, Chongqing producing 1.07 million tonnes, Hunan producing 3.02 million tonnes, and Hubei producing 2.74 million tonnes. There was no significant difference in the loss observed between these two types of regime shifts.

In achieving state-reinforced adaptive governance, the following practice exemplifies the ideal status:

The implementation of a five-level water lifting approach. In this case, a hilly-pond irrigation system faced a water shortage, necessitating the diversion of adjusted water from Huanggai Lake, located 3 km away and 60 meters higher than the hill-pond. With assistance from government hydrological technologists, the community employed over 30 pumps for the five-level water lifting process. This involved moving water through Huanggai Lake, Piehong Canal, a drought relief pump station, a reservoir, and eventually reaching the hilly-pond area, effectively irrigating 253 hectares of rice farmland. The five-level water lifting method enabled water flow from a lower location to a higher one, ensuring the irrigation of the rice farmlands. From an agricultural association leader, Hunan province, as reported by Xinhua NEWS.

In the case of an irrigation community undergoing partial transition, challenges arose due to a lack of adaptive capacity in governance when facing external disturbances.

Previously engaged in flood control projects organized by the local government, the community encountered water scarcity during this instance. With no rainfall for over a month, their primary water source, the Wucha River, was depleted. In such circumstances, the community relied on the government to divert water into the Wucha River. Unfortunately, even after the water was adjusted and made accessible, the quantity provided fell far short of meeting the irrigation requirements for the respondent’s 3-hectare farmland. Consequently, crop production suffered a significant reduction, amounting to only half of the usual yield. Words of a rice farmer, Shagang town, Jiangling county, Hubei province, as reported by INEWSWEEK.

In the case of the non-transitioned irrigation community, the situation was particularly challenging.

By mid-September, all small reservoirs and hilly ponds within the village had dried up, and no water was being diverted from external sources. Consequently, the 2000 hectares of rice farmlands faced severe water scarcity, leading to a complete lack of output. The farmers, relying on the belief that this period was the rainy season, were left waiting for rainfall. However, besides the water shortage, the emergence of insects further exaggerated the situation. These pests had consumed a significant portion of the rice stems, amplifying the production losses faced by the community. The words of a rice farmer of Laoshan village Duchang county, Jiangxi province, as reported by Nandu NEWS.

Despite the CWRC initiating the governance transition and providing the same planning framework, the outcomes of governance by the irrigation communities showed a lot of variation. The closer the transition aligned with the ideal governance structure, the more successful the outcomes tended to be.

DISCUSSION

First, our findings align with previous studies (Sarker et al. 2014, DeCaro et al. 2017) emphasizing that successful state-reinforced adaptive governance of irrigation systems requires minimal government intervention at the operational level of adaptive measures. In the context of a basin-wide drought, community-led governance proves critical for the survival of irrigation communities. The unique aspect lies in the complex government involvement, which requires coordination across provinces and multiple administrative levels. Although the central government-initiated drought relief through water adjustments, the enforcement of command and control mechanisms primarily occurred at the regional government level. This approach allowed irrigation communities the autonomy to make decisions regarding water reallocation and the use of alternative sources. Furthermore, a strong foundation of good governance for community-managed commons establishes a vital base for a smoother transition process. Additionally, the role of provincial governments in facilitating communication between the community and upper-level authorities can alleviate the transaction costs associated with institutional change.

Second, the differences in governance patterns between Japanese irrigation systems and those in the YRB primarily manifest at the basic governance level. In Japan, autonomy in irrigation systems is broader in scope, ranging from the village to the regional scale, meaning that both large-scale and small-scale irrigation systems are managed by water users. In contrast, in China, autonomy is typically confined to the village level, with small-scale irrigation systems governed by local communities, while large-scale systems at the regional scale are managed by local government authorities. Hence, state-reinforced adaptive governance in the YRB primarily reinforces governance at the village scale. Furthermore, a key similarity between the two countries is that both governance structures are legally recognized, meaning their governance rights are protected by law. In Japan, this is ensured by the “Land Improvement Law,” while in China, it is upheld through irrigation systems titling certificates. Regarding the temporal dimension, state-reinforced self-governance in the Japanese case has a long 50-years history, whereas in the YRB, it is a form of responsive governance primarily targeting the 2022 drought event.

Third, our study emphasizes that government support, comprising financial and technological resources, is insufficient on its own. The government’s role must extend beyond resource provision to include authority, responsibility, tangible resources, and flexibility. Unlike prior research on state-reinforced self-governance that often focused on irrigation communities with passive government participation and raised concerns about integrative coordination issues (Fedele et al. 2020), our adaptive governance model features dual decision-making centers. Both the government and the irrigation community exercise authority, with government intervention primarily centering on water supply for drought-affected irrigation communities, while the irrigation community addresses infrastructure upgrades and water allocation. Governments at various levels provided resources through emergency measures, water gap planning, meteorological information, funding infrastructure upgrades, water adjustments, and expert dispatch. This top-down and bottom-up approach facilitated integrative coordination, adapting as the drought subsided, and demonstrating the flexibility of state-reinforced adaptive governance.

Fourth, our findings extend previous studies by identifying key driving factors that contribute to state-reinforced adaptive governance. In contrast to prior research that mainly focused on governance outcomes, our case provides insights into the dynamic process of state-reinforced adaptive governance, offering a more comprehensive understanding in a specific context, as suggested by Asadzadeh et al. (2022). We highlight three critical driving factors for initiating state-reinforced adaptive governance: (1) changes in relative prices, (2) the roles of primary and secondary action movers, and (3) the presence of institutional suppliers. These factors play a pivotal role in triggering regime shifts. Faced with a drought that threatened national food security and agricultural production, both the central government and irrigation communities were motivated to change the governance regime through integrative coordination. Our findings reveal diverse patterns of regime shifts, classified based on two dimensions of coordination. Additionally, the implementation of these three driving factors determines which specific coordination dimensions are involved, whether vertical, horizontal, both, or neither.

CONCLUSIONS

This study contributes to the academic understanding of commons governance in three key ways. First, our empirical case provides evidence that community-led governance of SSISs can effectively respond to and maintain resilience in the face of large-scale disturbances, as demonstrated by the Chinese experience of SSISs’ basin-wide drought relief in the YRB. This highlights the ability of community-managed commons to withstand broader disturbances, such as basin-scale droughts, through state-reinforced adaptive governance.

Second, our research reveals the regime shift mechanism of state-reinforced adaptive governance, which is characterized by integrative coordination. This involves H-coordination at the community level and V-coordination among multiple levels of government and the community. By proposing this theoretical mechanism and presenting a practical case of state-reinforced adaptive governance at the basin scale, we contribute valuable insights into sustaining commons and managing their resilience.

Third, our study identifies several factors that facilitate integrative coordination and state-reinforced adaptive governance. These factors include access to meteorological information for drought prediction, good governance of SSISs, alignment between local institutions and scientific knowledge, and substantial capital investment for infrastructure upgrades (see Fig. 6). Addressing these factors can help overcome barriers that impede the transition process in SSISs that have not yet experienced an effective transition.

Overall, this study emphasizes the importance of co-production efforts and institutional change in effectively managing commons and ensuring their robustness in the face of disturbances.

This study holds significant implications for policymakers involved in governing SSISs, particularly in the context of climate change. With the increasing frequency and severity of climate change events, especially in developing countries, it is essential for governments to provide increased support. A nuanced policy design that strikes a balance between governmental authority and irrigation community involvement can effectively strengthen the governance of SSISs, thereby enhancing their resilience in the face of large-scale disturbances. Crucial to this approach is the allocation of adequate resources, including funding, technology, and expertise, allowing governments to exercise their authority and fulfill their responsibilities. Equally important is the non-intervention government in the operational management of irrigation communities, which preserves their capacity of governance.

While applying the findings of this study, it is important to consider its limitations. One key aspect is the V-coordination enforced by the Chinese government, which relies on the unique unification capacity to China, making it challenging to replicate in other countries. Additionally, basin-wide droughts, like the one studied here, are infrequent events and may not occur under similar contexts elsewhere. Hence, governments must learn from this experience and strive to find a balanced approach in its involvement with irrigation communities.

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