Research, part of a special feature on State-Reinforced Transformative and Adaptive Governance of Sustainable Social-Ecological Systems

INTRODUCTION

About two billion people globally lack access to safely managed water supply services (clean, on-premises, and on-demand), with nearly one billion residing in urban areas (UNESCO 2023). Water scarcity in cities is projected to worsen as the urban population grows from 4.4 billion in 2020 to an estimated 6.68 billion by 2050 (United Nations [UN] 2018). One way to assess access to water supply is by estimating the number of households connected to piped water services. According to the World Health Organization (WHO/UNICEF 2024), as of 2022, 2.16 billion people globally, including 116.5 million in Pakistan, do not have piped water connected in their homes. This critical lack of safely managed water supplies around the world highlights the urgent need for further research into water scarcity issues.

The UN report “Water for People, Water for Life” was the first to argue at a global level that the water crises facing the world today are primarily due to poor governance (World Water Assessment Programme [WWAP] 2003). The challenges faced by the piped water supply services in the Global South stem from ineffective governance. For example, Bakker et al. (2008), Plummer (2008), and WWAP (2012) highlight that these water supply services are affected by widespread corruption, weak administrative capacity, lack of finance, and insufficient skills to develop effective policies.

To address governance challenges in water service provision, scholars advocate for participatory governance models (Sicilia et al. 2015, Sorrentino et al. 2018, Bruns 2021). Co-production is a prominent model where producers and consumers collaborate to deliver public goods, such as water supply services (Ostrom 1996). Research suggests that co-production initiatives are more successful when government authorities provide financial, legislative, and regulatory support to foster collaboration (Sarker 2013, DeCaro et al. 2017).

Our research focuses on the governance structure that aims to supply and operate water infrastructure using a community-led self-governing approach. We will use design principles of state-reinforced self-governance (SRSG) to identify loopholes in the existing rules and policies blocking successful collaboration among all actors involved in developing a community-led piped water service. SRSG is a recent iteration of co-production that encourages traditional government bodies to utilize their financial, administrative, and technical resources to co-produce public goods and services with relevant actors (Sarker 2013, DeCaro et al. 2017). For our case study, we have selected Shamsabad, a small neighborhood in Faisalabad, Pakistan, with a population of around 25,000 residents, to evaluate the effectiveness of state-reinforced self-governance design principles in the provision and management of a public water utility. Our findings indicate that, in Shamsabad, the government successfully assisted the local community in building water infrastructure; however, it struggled to bring all stakeholders together during the water service operations. As a result, the community-led organization responsible for managing the water service began to deteriorate and ultimately dissolved within just three years.

We systematically analyze the case study using Elinor Ostrom’s three collective action puzzles of public goods: institutional supply, mutual monitoring, and credible commitment. This helps us understand why SRSG design principles were initially successful in building water infrastructure but later struggled to stimulate joint action for operating the water service. The findings indicate that the construction phase was successful because the supply of design principles of SRSG, legally binding authority, legally binding responsibility, and tangible support was complete. However, during the operations stage, an incomplete supply of these design principles led to a failure of collective action, leaving Ostrom’s puzzles unresolved. To improve the prospects of successful water service provision in Shamsabad, we propose three institutional measures: robust monitoring, conflict resolution, and accountability, along with continued administrative and financial support to align the existing water service provision rules as closely as possible to the SRSG design principles.

This study on community-based water utility provision and management is organized as follows: we begin with a discussion of the theoretical foundations used for analysis. Next, we conduct an institutional analysis, which includes a description of the study area, methodology and data collection, identification of main actors, and an analysis of the case using SRSG design principles in conjunction with Ostrom’s three puzzles. The analysis is divided into three parts: the first phase focuses on the construction of water infrastructure in Shamsabad; the second phase examines the activities that unfolded during the operation and maintenance of the water service; and the third phase evaluates the first and the second phases. Finally, we conclude with potential avenues for future research extensions and acknowledge the limitations of the current research.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Urban water supply and its governance is a social dilemma that can only be effectively addressed through collective action (Suhardiman et al. 2017). The collective action problem resembles a version of the prisoner’s dilemma in game theory (Olson 1965). When modeled, rational actors are likely to choose defection rather than cooperation, making it challenging to solve the collective action problem. Yet empirical evidence shows that groups, organizations, and societies historically have succeeded in collaborating to resolve these social dilemmas through collective action (Ostrom 1990).

Ostrom (1990) studied a specific form of social dilemmas known as common-pool resource (CPR) dilemmas. Common-pool resources are characterized by being non-exclusive in consumption (or, as Ostrom describes it, jointly usable) and rival in nature (subtractable, according to Ostrom). The social dilemma arises from the non-exclusivity of these resources, which leads to free-riding. When combined with the rival nature of consumption, this can result in overuse and contribute to what Hardin (1968) famously termed the tragedy of the commons, unless the collective action problem is effectively addressed through the collaboration of all involved actors. Ostrom (1990) outlines eight design principles derived from her empirical research that can facilitate this collaborative process, thereby supporting successful self-governance of common-pool resources.

However, resolving the common-pool resource dilemma is just a first-order social dilemma. There are more complex, preceding social dilemmas that Ostrom (1990) identifies as the three puzzles: (1) institutional supply, (2) making credible commitments, and (3) mutual monitoring. This set of second-order social dilemmas fall under the category of public goods dilemmas. Public goods are non-exclusive, similar to common-pool resources, but they are non-rival, which distinguishes them from common-pool resources. The social dilemma in this case arises from the non-exclusivity trait, but because the goods are non-rival, the free-riding issue pertains more to a lack of contribution to the public good (rather than an overuse of a common-pool resource). What both social dilemmas share is that they can only be overcome by addressing the free-rider issue and solving the collective action problem through collaboration between all involved agents. A free-rider is defined as an agent who prioritizes her own individual benefits while disregarding any costs her actions impose on others, often leading to situations where the costs to others outweigh the benefits to herself. Successful collective action, however, takes care of these negative externalities through collaboration to maximize the joint benefits.

The three puzzles are nested within one another and must be addressed simultaneously through collaboration. Institutional supply deals with the social dilemma of agents collaborating to establish arrangements and structures needed to govern the common-pool resource through rules and regulations. Because these supplied institutions are both non-exclusive and non-rival, they are considered public goods, and free-riding would be to enjoy these institutions without contributing to them. If nobody wants to put effort into building institutions, then they will not be supplied, leading to a defection outcome similar to that in the prisoner’s dilemma. This is, at its core, the collective action problem. So, now that institutions might be supplied, at least in the short run, the agents also need to make credible commitments so that these institutions last longer; only with long-term commitments can the institutions be supplied in the first place. This again presents a public goods dilemma that can only be resolved through collective action. Finally, mutual monitoring is crucial for enforcing rules and regulations to ensure the longevity of these institutions. Moreover, it is another important requirement that agents are willing to make credible commitments, which introduces yet another public goods dilemma.

It is not easy for participants to work out these three puzzles simultaneously. In fact, the absence of self-governance in managing common-pool resources often stems from a failure to successfully solve one or more of these three puzzles. The concept of state-reinforced self-governance (SRSG) allows the government with its administrative capacity to help address and overcome the public goods dilemmas. This is achieved by co-producing institutions, commitment, and monitoring together with the stakeholders. The aim is to enable stakeholders to collaborate in the self-governance of the common-pool resource (Sarker 2013). DeCaro et al. (2017) lay out three SRSG design principles. These are (1) legally binding authority, which is the recognized authority to make decisions and execute plans; (2) legally binding responsibility, clearly defining which entity is responsible for the resolutions of dilemmas and specific actions; and (3) tangible support, which is to ensure that there exists sufficient material, legal, and financial assistance that allows actors to carry out their duties.

The American tradition of federalism (Ostrom 1994) and in general, the concept of subsidiarity advocate for the devolution of executive power to the most decentralized actors possible (Føllesdal 1998). Following these precepts, state-reinforced self-governance facilitates the transfer of some governmental powers and duties that are better handled by common-pool resource users to self-governed groups and organizations. As such, SRSG design principles support the solution of collective action problems posed in the three puzzles of second order public goods dilemmas.

The first puzzle, concerning the supply of institutions, is aided by the state facilitating institution building through legally binding authority and responsibilities and adequate funding. These three SRSG design principles also help in overcoming the next puzzle by enabling credible commitment, as the state with its legal and financial capacity backs the newly formed institutions. The emphasis lies on “legally binding” that should create trust between all involved actors and confidence in the institutions. The final puzzle, mutual monitoring, is benefited by SRSG through both material support and the legal framework supported by the court system and the rule of law. Above all, there is always the threat (and insurance) that if self-governance fails, the state will step in—this possibility paradoxically encourages the idea of self-governance, just as the threat of nuclear war prevents actual nuclear war.

Nobel prize winner Elinor Ostrom argued that the probability of successfully self-governing a common-pool resource increases when the following design principles are present within its governing institutional framework (Ostrom 1990). These principles include: (1) clearly defined boundaries of both the common-pool resource and the users, (2) rules that fit local conditions, (3) participatory decision-making, (4) monitoring by individuals who are accountable to users, (5) punishment of rule violators based on the seriousness of the offense, (6) access to low-cost conflict resolution mechanisms, (7) minimal rights of users to organize and create their institutions, and (8) governance activities that are organized in multiple layers (Ostrom 1990). There is a theoretical connection between the SRSG design principles, legally binding authority, legally binding responsibility, tangible support, and Ostrom’s design principles. If the SRSG principles incorporate Ostrom’s design principles, for instance by adding who is legally responsible for monitoring (Ostrom’s design principle) in its governance mechanism, then the possibility for successful self-governance of the common-pool resources significantly increases.

In our study, we perform an institutional analysis on the service lines that connect households to the street-level distribution network in Faisalabad, Pakistan (hereafter called “household piped water connections”). Because all households in the Shamsabad neighborhood contributed financially to constructing the street-level distribution network, the household piped water connections are non-exclusive. However, because funds are limited and homes can only be connected one after the other to the street-level distribution network, household piped water connections become rivalrous. As a result, household piped water connections can be classified as a common-pool resource (of course, water delivery service also is CPR; however, in this analysis it is not our focus).

Self-governance could establish rules and regulations determining how and when households get their connections, with state support facilitating the process through legally binding authority and responsibilities, as well as material support. This would have been a good example of state-reinforced self-governance, transforming the common-pool resource into a kind of club good, going from non-exclusive and rivalrous to exclusive and non-rival. Instead, the order of the household piped water connections was determined by bribes paid by the households. This type of corruption only addressed the non-exclusive aspect of the water connections but ignored the rival trait, essentially turning the household piped water connection into a private good. Creating markets where none exist may not be problematic, except that these were not the agreed-upon rules, and furthermore, all households helped finance the street-level water distribution network. Therefore, corruption undermined trust, vitally necessary for self-governance.

INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

We examine the organization of community-based water supply service in a neighborhood of Faisalabad as a case study of state-reinforced self-governance. To explore the institutional factors that contributed to the initial success and subsequent failure of the water supply service in Shamsabad, a neighborhood in Faisalabad, we begin with a section on the study area, followed by a discussion of the methodology and data. We then introduce the key stakeholders and institutions relevant to the provision of water. Finally, we continue this institutional analysis by dividing it into two parts:

• The successful development of the water infrastructure due to the presence of all the state-reinforced self-governance design principles (Phase I);
• The failed community-based operation of the water supply system due to incomplete presence of state-reinforced self-governance design principles (Phase II).

Study area

Shamsabad, a neighborhood in Faisalabad, Pakistan, has over 25,000 residents (Government of Punjab [GoP] 2014). Once on the city’s outskirts, it is now part of the expanding metropolitan area (Javed and Qureshi 2019). The municipal water supply agency in Faisalabad struggles to meet the demands of its residents. The water supply system was designed with a capacity of 110 million gallons per day (MGD), but the current demand is significantly higher (Respondent-W1). The city lacks adequate water infrastructure, resulting in residents pumping groundwater. Currently, the water network covers only 60 percent of the urban area (WASA-F 2015), and none of the households in Shamsabad are connected to the municipal water system. As a result, residents have to rely on groundwater, which is contaminated by industrial pollution (Respondents–R1, R2, and R3). Given that more than 80 percent of Shamsabad’s residents are poor (Respondent-W4), the government has failed to prioritize new infrastructure projects, including water projects, in this neighborhood (Ahmad et al. 2017).

Methodology and data

We employ an institutional analysis approach to investigate the governance structure of community-based water supply service in Faisalabad. Using Ostrom’s three puzzles of collective action (institutional supply, commitment, and monitoring) alongside the design principles of state-reinforced self-governance (legally binding authority, legally binding responsibility, and tangible support) as an analytical framework contributing to the success or failure of collective action. We view these concepts as analytical rather than normative, helping to evaluate self-governance efforts in our study, and better understand successes and failures. We do not intend to imply that the application of missing design principles would have led to guaranteed positive outcomes.

To perform an institutional analysis, we conduct a document analysis and several semi-structured interviews, following Sarr et al. (2021), Sarker (2013), and DeCaro et al. (2017), who have employed similar methodologies in their research. For the document analysis, we utilize direct content analysis, a technique that utilizes existing theories or prior research to identify initial variables and relevant themes in the literature (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). Our aim was to identify themes related to Ostrom’s three puzzles and the design principles of state-reinforced self-governance. The documents analyzed included the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed by the stakeholders involved in providing piped water in Shamsabad, the Changa Pani Program (Good Water Program) developed by Anjuman Samajhi Behbood (ASB), five volumes of the Water and Sanitation Master Plan of Faisalabad produced by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA 2019a, 2019b, 2019c, 2019d), relevant laws and policies on urban water supply governance (e.g., Water Supply Faisalabad Regulations [2015], The Punjab Development of Cities Act [1976], The Punjab Local Government Act [2013]), a piped water supply network map, newspaper articles, and previous scientific studies.

Subsequently, we conducted 10 open-ended semi-structured interviews with various stakeholders. Four of these interviews were with officials from the local municipal water agency (labeled as Respondent-W1, Respondent-W2, Respondent-W3, and Respondent-W4). We also interviewed the head of ASB, a non-profit organization (labeled Respondent-Na and Respondent-Nb), one member from the Water and Sanitation Committee Organization (WASCO) (labeled Respondent-WO), and three residents of Shamsabad (labeled Respondent-R1, Respondent-R2, and Respondent-R3). A complete list of interviewees is provided in Appendix A.

In 2021, we conducted our first three interviews with Respondent-W1, Respondent-W4, and Respondent-Na (see Altaf 2021). The remaining seven interviews with Respondent-W2, Respondent-W3, Respondent-Nb, Respondent-WO, Respondent-R1, Respondent-R2, and Respondent-R3 took place in 2023. The first respondents were selected through personal contacts, whereas the subsequent ones were identified by using a snowball sampling technique. Each interview lasted between 15 and 30 min, and notes were taken during the discussions. Appendix B contains a list of the topics covered and the questions posed to the respondents.

Actors and institutions

Three different types of actors played an essential role in building and managing the piped water supply service in Shamsabad: (1) state institutions responsible for water governance, (2) participants in community-led water governance, and (3) an organization that serves as a liaison between the community and the state. Starting with the latter, Anjuman Samajhi Behbood (ASB), a non-profit organization, initiated the entire process by creating the Changa Pani Program (CPP). The CPP is a collaborative governance arrangement for domestic water provision. Then, there were three formal government institutions: the provincial government, the city administration, and the local water agency. Additionally, community members were vital stakeholders, with some participating in WASCO, which contributed to the construction and operation of the piped water system. The negotiation and cooperation among these actors resulted in the creation and signing of the MoU on 12 December 2012. This core document established the institutional framework for water provision and operations by adopting the CPP and clearly defining the authorities and responsibilities of all stakeholders, along with the tangible support it aimed to provide them.

ASB as a bridging organization

The Anjuman Samajhi Behbood (ASB) served as a bridging organization that connected various stakeholders to improve coordination, share information, and resolve differences among them (Cash et al. 2006). Founded in 1964, ASB is a non-profit, non-governmental organization based in Faisalabad. Its founder acts as both president and sole permanent staff member. When ASB undertakes a project, it temporarily hires additional staff and recruits volunteers (Respondent-Nb). ASB operates on the principle that for a public water utility to be effective and sustainable, the community must play a significant role, and its users should invest both time and money in the project (Respondent-Na).

In 1994, ASB launched the Changa Pani Program (CPP) aimed at improving Pakistan’s water and sanitation sector. ASB placed co-production at the core of CPP, believing that the collaboration of local residents with the government in providing water services would enhance overall performance. Residents not only impart local knowledge but also have a real stake in the service (Business Recorder 2015). ASB emphasizes the importance of user participation in all three stages of the program: (1) pre-utility, (2) infrastructure construction, and (3) post-construction governance (Urban Unit 2010). In 2009, ASB implemented the CPP program in a small community in Lahore with the goal of providing residents with uninterrupted water supply. ASB successfully executed all three stages of the CPP in Lahore (Carr 2011). Following this success, the provincial government decided to expand the CPP to other cities within the province (Respondent-Nb).

State actors

Pakistan’s political-administrative structure is both centralized and hierarchical. Cities do not operate independently, as the provincial administration retains financial and decision-making authority. The provincial chief minister, along with the cabinet of ministers, utilizes the municipal bureaucracy to influence policies, appoint personnel, and fund infrastructure at the city level (Cheema et al. 2006, Malik and Rana 2019). In Faisalabad, the municipal administration implements and supervises provincial policies, except water provision for residents (GoP 2016). The province directly manages this task through the water agency (WASA-F 2020). The following paragraphs will explore the roles of these three state institutions, the provincial government, city administration, and the water agency.

Provincial government of Punjab. The Housing Urban Development and Public Health Engineering Department (HUD & PHED) serves as the administrative arm of the provincial government, overseeing the water and sanitation sector. The provincial government maintains direct control over Faisalabad’s water agency, effectively bypassing the city government and relegating the municipality to an advisory role. HUD & PHED provides financial support to the local water agency and has the authority to appoint or remove its managing director. It also develops collective choice rules (which determine who can change operational rules and how) and, at times, operational rules (which directly impact the day-to-day decision-making of actors, specifying permitted or prohibited actions). It also has the power to override any policy or operational rule enacted by the water agency (GoP 2024). Thus, although the water agency is responsible for implementing the provincial government’s rules and policies, it must operate within the framework established by the provincial authorities (WASA-F 2015).

City government. The city government of Faisalabad comprises a mayor, a city administration, and a city council. However, they do not possess decision-making authority over the water agency. Although the democratically elected mayor is the formal head of the city, his role is primarily ceremonial and lacks substantive rule-making authority. The deputy commissioner, appointed by the chief minister of the provincial government, heads the city administration. The city council acts as a local parliament with 220 elected councilors (Provincial Assembly of the Punjab 2013). Neither the mayor nor the city council alter the budget, and the deputy commissioner has limited authority to enforce laws, except in matters related to water and sanitation (Salman 2012). Both the mayor and deputy commissioner are involved in the water agency’s governing board, primarily in an advisory capacity (Faisalabad Development Authority [FDA] 2024).

Water and sanitation agency. The water and sanitation agency (referred to as the “water agency” in this paper) was established in 1978 to provide water, sewage, and drainage services to the residents of Faisalabad, following the rules and policies developed under the provincial government (WASA-F 2020). It is managed by a managing director, who has been appointed by the HUD & PHED and supported by a governing board. The managing director is responsible for the operational management of the water agency, limited by the above-described constraints imposed by HUD & PHED, which can overturn rules or policies put in place by them (GoP 2024). The governing board consists of eight members, including the mayor, who represents the city, and the deputy commissioner, who represents the province, but they primarily serve in an advisory capacity. Notably, the board lacks authority to sanction non-compliance with HUD & PHED or water agency rules and policies (FDA 2024).

Community actors

Residents of Shamsabad collaborated with ASB from the beginning of the Changa Pani Program. CPP required all potential participants to finance the water infrastructure and thereafter create and engage with WASCO.

Residents of Shamsabad. Many older residents of Shamsabad lack formal education. Consequently, a significant number of community representatives were illiterate, creating a power imbalance in which literate members dominated and ultimately secured administrative positions within WASCO (Respondent-Nb). In terms of employment, most residents work in low-paying service jobs, such as sanitation workers, security guards, and domestic workers (Respondent-Na). The limited income hinders households’ ability to meet their water demands, particularly when relying on expensive water provided by tankers or even more costly bottled water. As a more affordable alternative, residents often use readily available but increasingly contaminated shallow groundwater.

WASCO. WASCO was established in 2012 through a collaboration between ASB and the community of Shamsabad following the signing of the MoU, which emerged from the CPP implementation negotiated by ASB and the provincial government. During Phase I, which focused on developing the main water infrastructure, WASCO consisted solely of a president selected from community elders to represent residents at decision-making meetings with ASB, the provincial government, and the water agency. In Phase II, which involved the operation of the water supply service, WASCO’s governing body expanded to 11 members: eight officers, selected from a pool of elders, and three additional members: one each from ASB, the city administration, and the water agency. However, only the first eight officers held full decision-making authority, whereas the three external members were limited to advisory roles (Respondent-Na and Respondent-Nb).

The eight officer positions included: (1) the president, (2) the manager of operations and maintenance, (3) the procurement and construction officer, (4) the accountant, (5) the meter reader/bill collector, (6) the customer service representative, (7) the data manager, and (8) the liaison officer. In Phase II, WASCO was responsible for supervising the construction work connecting homes to the street-level water pipes through service lines, as well as managing meter installation, bill collection, and the operation and maintenance of the entire water service (Respondent-W3). For WASCO to fully self-govern the community-based water supply system, it was crucial for the organization to be financially self-sufficient and independent of the provincial government, the city, and the water agency. Consequently, it relied entirely on funds from water users’ utility bills for its day-to-day operations (JICA, 2019a). A summary of the actors and relevant documents described above is provided in Table 1.

Analysis

In this section, we narrate and analyze the interactions among actors involved in Phases I and II of the community-based water supply service in Shamsabad, examining the institutions and outcomes that emerged. We employ two frameworks: Ostrom’s three puzzles (institutional supply, monitoring, and commitment), and the design principles of state-reinforced self-governance (legally binding authority, legally binding responsibility, and tangible support). Our study explores the conditions that initially facilitated cooperation to build the water supply infrastructure but later led to ineffective governance of the water supply service.

Phase I: the successful development of the water supply infrastructure

This part focuses on the Changa Pani Program (CPP), initiated by ASB, which culminated in the signing of a MoU in 2012. The CPP was implemented through open communication, grassroots mobilization of stakeholders, and strategic negotiations with the provincial government. By adhering to state-reinforced self-governance principles, the MoU institutionalized the governance of the water supply service in Phase I, enabling effective collective action and resolving Ostrom’s three puzzles: institutional supply, monitoring, and commitment. This collaborative endeavor was triggered by a tragic event in 2010, when hundreds of residents in Shamsabad fell ill, and some died, from consumption of polluted groundwater (Respondent-W4).

Following this incident, ASB launched a community campaign, reaching out to elders in the affected area. Around 50 individuals were selected—one from each street—to form a committee. The committee elected a president to represent them in negotiations with other actors, including the provincial government. To secure financial and technical assistance for the implementation of CPP, ASB approached the provincial government, the legally recognized authority responsible for providing water to the households in Shamsabad. The HUD & PHED, the administrative arm of the provincial government, welcomed ASB’s proposal for new infrastructure that would be partially funded by future users and self-governed by the community. The local water agency, which operates under the supervision of HUD & PHED, also joined the initiative. Ultimately, ASB succeeded in uniting all of the actors and signed the MoU on 12 December 2012 (see Appendix C). The agreement established a collaborative, community-led approach to the Changa Pani Program. The agreement established a collaborative, community-led approach to CPP, with the provincial government financing 80 percent of the infrastructure, including transmission lines, water mains, and pumping stations, while users contribute 20 percent as matching funds for the street-level distribution network (MoU, section 6.1).

After the new water infrastructure was completed, a community-based self-governing organization called WASCO was established (Respondent-Nb). This organization received the legal responsibility to maintain the street-level water distribution network and to pay for and build the service lines that connect the water main to households (MoU, section 7). The MoU assigned to ASB the legal responsibility for collecting matching funds from the residents of Shamsabad (MoU, section 6.1), whereas the water agency retained the legal obligation to construct the water infrastructure (MoU, section 5.9). To collect these matching funds, ASB, along with 50 selected community members, initiated a fundraising effort. Initially, they were only able to raise half of the total amount (20 percent) required for the street-level water distribution network. Each household contributed 4500 PKR (approx. $22), which was about 20 percent of the average monthly salary in 2012. Construction commenced once contributions were collected from at least half of the 3000 households. To ensure transparency and accountability, ASB shared regular updates of the account balance with the public, fostering trust within the community and increasing residents’ commitment to making voluntary payments. By late 2016, ASB successfully handed over the completed and fully functional water infrastructure, with a capacity to serve 1500 users, to WASCO (Respondent-Na, Respondent-Nb, Business Recorder 2015).

Government and community actors effectively collaborated to agree on the MoU and successfully develop the water infrastructure in Shamsabad because they were able to solve Ostrom’s three puzzles (institutional supply, monitoring, and commitment) with the help of state-reinforced self-governance principles (legally binding authority, legally binding responsibility, and tangible support). This was done by transferring some legal responsibilities first to ASB and then, later, to WASCO and the community itself. However, the legal responsibility for constructing the physical infrastructure remained with the water agency, the provincial government’s administrative arm, which also provided tangible support in terms of financial backing and technical expertise. These shared legal responsibilities, outlined in a legally binding MoU, together with the significant tangible support, made it possible to overcome the collective action problem and address the institutional supply puzzle of as expressed in the MoU.

The other two puzzles (monitoring and commitment) pertain to ensuring adherence to the agreed-upon terms of the MoU. First, the fact that the MoU is a legally binding document, backed by the provincial government, which is the heart of SRSG, cannot be emphasized enough. The responsibility to monitor the collection of matching funds was given to ASB, a trusted community organization, which still operated under the auspices of the provincial government’s legal authority. Furthermore, legal responsibility for monitoring was shared; the water agency gave tangible support in the form of technical expertise and supervision over the water infrastructure construction. Effective institutional supply together with robust monitoring helped to solve the commitment puzzle. Here, it is important to highlight the provincial government’s legal participation in this project and its commitment to covering 80 percent of the construction costs. Solving the collective action problems of Ostrom’s three puzzles often fails because the expected cost of engagement is higher than the benefit, especially if you price in the transaction cost of organizing, plus the uncertainty of failure. Involving the state in this process enhances the likelihood of success, especially with government funding. This not only assists in the supply of institutions but also, along with monitoring, fosters commitment to the newly supplied institution. Table 2 presents a summary analysis of the entire Phase I, detailing how the design principles of SRSG and Ostrom’s three puzzles are related.

Phase II: the failed community-based operation of the water supply system because of incomplete state-reinforced self-governance

In Phase I, we identified all the SRSG design principles in the institutional mechanisms that facilitated successful community fundraising for the street-level distribution network and the MoU’s signing. In Phase II, we analyzed WASCO’s establishment, initially supervised by ASB, and the subsequent management of the water infrastructure by WASCO. However, the MoU and CPP failed to create an institutional structure incorporating all SRSG design principles necessary for self-governing household piped water connections, leading to the failure of water supply service in Phase II. The incomplete presence of SRSG principles could not spur collective action and failed to resolve Ostrom’s three puzzles (institutional supply, monitoring, and credible commitment). Resolving these dilemmas is essential for self-governance of common-pool resources like household piped water connections. In Shamsabad, unresolved puzzles led to corrupt practices within WASCO. We view WASCO’s corrupt practices as akin to privatization, with bribes acting as a market price for connections, resembling “efficient” corruption (Aidt, 2003). These practices redistributed wealth from poor residents to privileged WASCO officers, undermining consumers’ trust in the water utility and confidence in the community’s ability to self-govern.

To establish WASCO, the provincial government first delegated the legal authority to ASB (MoU, section 6.3). It began establishing WASCO as soon as the water supply infrastructure was completed and functional. Later, WASCO was allowed to operate and maintain the water infrastructure in Shamsabad (MoU, sections 7.4 and 7.5). ASB asked the 50-member committee of residents selected during Phase I to appoint eight individuals from among themselves to fill officer positions in the WASCO administration. Three additional external members joined the WASCO administration as required by the CPP. These external members were from ASB, a local water agency, and a local councilman. However, these non-elected members held only advisory roles within WASCO and had no additional powers. Moreover, the MoU made ASB and the local water agency legally responsible for training officers (MoU, sections 6.3, 5.1, 5.6, and 5.9). The water agency helped ASB provide technical support to WASCO for activities such as meter installation, connecting, and disconnecting households from the trunk line, and maintaining the piped water supply service (Respondent-Na).

CPP granted ASB the right to create operational rules for WASCO, later transferring rule-making authority to WASCO per the CPP adoption process. Therefore, once all WASCO officers were trained, ASB collaborated with them to develop operational rules for the piped water supply service (Urban Unit 2010). Unfortunately, these rules were not documented; they were verbally communicated to residents (Respondent-Na). The rules addressed various issues, including bill collection, water system monitoring, hiring and firing staff, conflict resolution, setting tariffs, and drafting or amending rules (JICA 2019a; MoU, section 7.6).

As soon as ASB completed its development of operational rules, the authority to operate the water service was transferred to WASCO (as outlined in MoU, section 7.4). The ASB informed WASCO that it would be legally responsible for minor repair work (MoU, section 7.4), whereas the water agency retained the legal responsibility for undertaking major maintenance work upon payment (MoU, section 5.9). Then WASCO asked residents to submit formal applications for new household water connections and to pay the associated fees (Respondent-WO). In its first year, the system performed well, with only a few minor complaints about connection delays (Respondents W4).

However, during the second and third years, the number of applicants for water connections remained high, as WASCO deliberately slowed down the provision of new water connections, leading to an ever-growing backlog (Respondent-W4). Residents reported officials tampering with meters for bribes, with households paying bribes receiving lower bills and those who did not pay, paying higher bills (Respondents R3). Despite residents’ efforts to address issues of corruption and bias with WASCO officials, no resolutions were found (Respondent-W4 and Respondent-R3).

The customer service officer position of the WASCO administration, which would have been responsible for addressing these complaints, was never filled (Respondent-WO). As a result, WASCO could not satisfactorily respond to residents’ concerns. At this time, ASB should have intervened, as it was legally responsible for monitoring WASCO’s operations (MoU, section 6.3), and it also held an advisory position in WASCO administration. Instead, ASB decided not to intervene. Residents expressed that ASB had already provided an internal conflict resolution mechanism for WASCO and should actively utilize this system rather than seeking external intervention that could jeopardize its self-governance (Respondent-Nb). Another potential pathway for conflict resolution could have involved the Director General of the Faisalabad Development Authority (DG-FDA), who could have been consulted if the internal mechanism failed, but this avenue was overlooked by residents (MoU, section 9).

As the problems remained unresolved, frustrated residents approached the Deputy Commissioner of Faisalabad in 2019. The Deputy Commissioner is the bureaucratic head of the city administration and also a member of the water agency’s governing board. Residents complained about WASCO’s discriminatory, corrupt, and non-transparent practices, demanding accountability for the misconduct of WASCO officials (Respondent-W2). Without any consultation, the Deputy Commissioner decided that the best solution was to dissolve WASCO altogether. He also suspended development plans to extend infrastructure to the remaining 1500 households until further notice (Respondent-W2). The unilateral decision to dissolve WASCO was not legitimate, as the MoU did not grant the city government such authority. Following the collapse of WASCO, the local water distribution network was merged into the water agency as part of Faisalabad city’s piped water supply system (Randhawa 2020).

WASCO remained partially functional for three years (2016–2019) before the city government illegally dissolved it due to failed institutional supply. Analysis of the institutional processes establishing WASCO and its operational rules shows that, despite some adherence to SRSG design principles, these were insufficient to anticipate and address future institutional challenges of the community-based water supply service. For instance, the MoU did not specify who had the legal authority to dissolve WASCO. Additionally, although the provincial government transferred legal authority to ASB to create rules, it did so without oversight, trusting ASB to follow the CPP without supervision. This lack of oversight was a significant shortcoming, as the document failed to establish an institutional mechanism for consumers to monitor WASCO officials. Furthermore, once the water service was handed over to WASCO, ASB was supposed to oversee their activities (MoU, section 6.3). However, ASB stopped receiving its monthly stipend of 50,000 PKR (approx. $250) when WASCO took over (MoU, section 5.8). This meant that ASB, a one-member organization, lacked funds to hire someone to perform these monitoring duties. In effect, ASB, a single-member organization, became a liability within the governance structure, rather than a supportive actor.

The absence of monitoring within WASCO undermined credible commitment. Moreover, neither ASB nor WASCO developed a clear policy regarding who would receive their water connection first and in what order (Urban Unit 2010, Business Recorder 2015), whether as a lottery system, first-come first-served, or an additional fee structure. This missing policy rendered household water connections a common-pool resource—both a rival and non-exclusive good—creating an environment ripe for consumer discrimination. Thus, WASCO officials could easily defect from the collective action arrangement and engage in corrupt practices. To exacerbate matters, some WASCO officials purposefully slowed down operations for their own benefit, accepting bribes from residents in exchange for expedited service (Respondent-R3, Respondent-W2).

Residents affected by this corruption should have had access to a conflict resolution system and a customer service representative; however, this position was never filled. Although ASB is not legally responsible for conflict resolution, it could have intervened in its advisory role if it had received financial support from the provincial government. The water agency, in its advisory capacity, considered itself responsible for major maintenance work and water quality checks (MoU, sections 5.9 and 7.9) but not for conflict resolution. The public lacked trust in the DG-FDA, the actor legally responsible for conflict resolution (MoU, section 9), due to her association with the provincial government, a key stakeholder in the water service provision. Instead, residents chose to approach the more neutral city government, outside the officially established conflict resolution mechanisms. In summary, the combination of incomplete legally binding authority, incomplete legally binding responsibilities, and the lack of tangible support contributed to the faulty institutional supply (WASCO), which consequently led to failures in monitoring and commitment puzzles.

To prevent the collapse of the water system, akin to the tragedy of the commons, the government took control of the water system, just as Hardin (1968) prescribed. However, Ostrom always believed that with a well-designed institutional arrangement, self-governance is possible. The basic idea of ASB in its CPP was also self-governance, where self-governing institution could and should have been WASCO. Below, we explore policies that could have improved institutional conditions crucial for self-governance. Table 2 summarizes the analysis, detailing the relationship between Ostrom’s collective action puzzles and SRSG design principles in Phase II.

Evaluation

The institutional analysis of the community-led water supply service in Shamsabad shows that the incomplete application of the SRSG design principles reduces the probability of successfully resolving Ostrom’s three puzzles: institutional supply, mutual monitoring, and credible commitment. In Phase I, the analysis detected all SRSG design principles in the MoU and CPP: legally binding authority (provincial government), legally binding responsibility (ASB and the Water Agency), as well as tangible support (construction funds, administrative and technical help). These principles fostered an environment conducive to Phase I, enabling the development of water supply infrastructure. As a bridging organization, ASB spearheaded the efforts, facilitating negotiations, signing the MoU, and successfully collecting matching funds from the residents. To ensure that all actors, especially residents, remained committed to the agreed-upon rules, ASB involved the public throughout the process and maintained transparency by keeping all stakeholders informed. As a consequence, collaboration among actors flourished and the water infrastructure was built in Shamsabad.

Phase II was marked by the incomplete application of the SRSG design principles, which hindered the successful self-governance of household piped water connections—a common-pool resource. Although the provincial government granted ASB the authority to establish WASCO, it did not provide rules regarding its dissolution. CPP empowered WASCO to develop and amend rules for the water supply service, yet it lacked institutional mechanisms for collective choice arrangements, monitoring, sanctioning, and conflict resolution. Additionally, while the water agency promised technical support to WASCO upon payment, there was inadequate tangible support, particularly in the form of funding for monitoring and conflict resolution. The Director General of the Faisalabad Development Authority was designated as the authority for conflict resolution, but this role was not backed by any financial support. These institutional limitations, examined through the lens of SRSG design principles, show incomplete application of these principles. That made it easy for the actors to defect from the collective choice arrangements aimed at resolving Ostrom’s three puzzles. Consequently, the resulting corrupt operations of WASCO could not overcome the rival nature of the household piped water connections; given the limited resources, houses could only be connected sequentially. In turn, bribes became the unfair means of connecting households to the water network, rather than creating and following a mutually agreed upon policy. Ultimately, growing mistrust among consumers and WASCO officials led to the dissolution of the community-led piped water supply service.

Elinor Ostrom’s (1990) design principles can help stakeholders revise the MoU, enable ASB to adjust its CPP, and guide WASCO to operate in accordance with SRSG principles. Incorporating Ostrom’s design principles into the institutional framework increases the likelihood of successfully managing a common-pool resource. Thus, the inadequacies identified in Phase II, stemming from incomplete presence of SRSG design principles (legally binding authority, legally binding responsibility, and tangible support), can be addressed using Ostrom’s design principles as a blueprint. We believe the four principles, collective choice arrangements, monitoring, sanctioning, and conflict resolution (Ostrom 1990), could enhance self-governance of household piped water connections and the community-led water service. Below, we discuss these design principles in relation to SRSG design principles.

Collective choice arrangements

Ostrom’s (1990) third design principle emphasizes involving all stakeholders in the decision-making and rule-making processes. The actors are more likely to follow rules and policies if they themselves have a hand in creating them. In Shamsabad, residents did not have a voice in Phase II when WASCO took over the water infrastructure. There was no formal written mechanism for their involvement in rule-making or changing processes. To adopt Ostrom’s third design principle, the provincial government should establish a legal authority to ensure citizen participation in WASCO’s operation and codify this authority in the MoU. In addition, both the ASB and WASCO should have legal responsibility to facilitate citizen participation during the operations stage. For example, while developing the operational rules for WASCO, ASB only consulted WASCO officials. They should also engage other residents in this process and subsequently share the operational rules with them in writing. Furthermore, WASCO should establish a governing board responsible for making significant decisions about water service. Willing connection holders should be allowed to join this board for a specified limited term, with new members selected through an open and transparent process. Therefore, in addition to providing technical support, the provincial government must also be prepared to offer administrative or financial assistance to ASB and WASCO to help them carry out these tasks effectively during the operational stage.

Monitoring

Ostrom’s (1990) fourth design principle is monitoring by monitors who are accountable to the CPR users. In Shamsabad, the water supply service lacked a robust monitoring system across multiple levels of governance. To follow Ostrom’s fourth principle, we recommend that the provincial government should specify who monitors ASB during WASCO’s establishment and preparation of operational rules. We believe provincial government should have assumed legal responsibility for monitoring ASB and codified that role in the MoU. Moreover, three external members of WASCO (ASB, the water agency, and the local councilman) who played only an advisory role should have been tasked with monitoring WASCO’s operations. Ideally, the local councilman could be replaced by a representative from the community. This community representative would likely have a stronger vested interest in the success of the water service than the councilman and better advocate for residents’ interests. This representative should be elected by all consumers who have contributed to funding the main water infrastructure. This new arrangement outlining the legal responsibilities for monitoring the WASCO officers should be included in the CPP, including mandating annual reports from the external WASCO members to the provincial government. These measures would deter corrupt behavior by WASCO officers, who are self-interested in maintaining their positions. Finally, the provincial government must be willing to provide administrative and financial assistance to ASB or other relevant actors to perform their monitoring duties.

Sanctioning and conflict resolution

Ostrom’s (1990) fifth design principle calls for graduated sanctions against resource users and other stakeholders who violate agreed-upon rules, and her sixth design principle ensures that they have access to a rapid and low-cost conflict resolution system. However, in Shamsabad, WASCO lacked both an internal conflict resolution mechanism and a system for sanctioning offenders. To clarify, the position of the customer service representative, the WASCO officer responsible for conflict resolution, was never filled. As a result, frustrated consumers had no avenue to address their concerns, and the process of sanctioning corrupt WASCO officers was never initiated. Additionally, there were no written rules outlining punishments for WASCO officials or its external members. To improve the conflict resolution system and sanctioning mechanisms as described by Ostrom, we believe that both the city and ASB would have been ideally positioned to fill these roles. The city has no formal role in WASCO’s governance structure, but it still has a vested interest in a functional water service, and ASB also sought project success. Additionally, the city, together with ASB, could have been given the legal authority to dissolve WASCO and transfer management back to the water agency if necessary. Thus, the two organizations would have assumed the following responsibilities: conflict resolution, determining penalties for offenders, and power to dissolve WASCO, thereby supplanting the existing dispute settlement mechanism (MoU, section 9).

Critically, ASB should be legally responsible for a clear order in which households would be connected to the water supply service and incorporating it into its CPP. A lottery system would have been the fairest approach to eliminate conflict over who gets the connection first. ASB could have conducted a public lottery to ensure transparency, and the resulting connection list would have been shared with the community. Alternatively, if preferred by the community, a fee system could have been devised, allowing for earlier connections at a higher cost. This method is structurally similar to a bribe and less equitable for poorer households; however, no one benefits privately, and it does not destroy trust. WASCO would benefit collectively, redistributing additional income to all consumers. Overall, this would have reduced many conflicts and the need for sanctions.

CONCLUSION

In this study, we used the design principles of state-reinforced self-governance (SRSG; legally binding authority, legally binding responsibility, and tangible support) to analyze the community-led piped water supply service in general and specifically the process of connecting households to a street-level water distribution network. We examined whether the institutional mechanisms in place for providing and operating the water service actually helped producers, consumers, and other stakeholders to collaborate and solve Ostrom’s three collective action puzzles (institutional supply, monitoring, and credible commitment). As previously discussed, these puzzles are second-order public goods dilemmas, and their resolution is critical for addressing the first-order common-pool resource dilemma (i.e., household piped water connections). Our results showed that all relevant actors cooperated to solve Ostrom’s three puzzles, and the water infrastructure was successfully provided. However, later, when the community-based organization (WASCO) was created with incomplete SRSG design principles, Ostrom’s three puzzles remained unresolved, and WASCO developed corrupt practices. The corruption could not solve the rival nature of the household piped water connections that created mistrust between consumers and the provider (WASCO). Thus, protecting the water service in the long term requires reviving the trust lost during Phase II. We recommended creating robust monitoring, sanctioning, and conflict resolution mechanisms, including the continued administrative and financial support from the provincial government, to fill in the gaps observed in the governance structure of the community-led water service provision.

Our findings have major implications for participatory utility governance models in countries, such as Pakistan, where government and communities are often corrupt and inexperienced in adopting and practicing collaborative self-governance utility management strategies. In such an environment, governments and bridging organizations must abstain from discontinuing administrative, technical, and financial support for the community-based organizations once the projects are handed over to them. This is crucial in addressing challenges such as weak conflict resolution, absent sanctioning mechanisms, and corruption during the operations stage. Moreover, our study is also unique in that it considered piped water connections as CPR, a great addition to the CPR literature. However, if existing participatory governance models are not overhauled, then the potential for cash-starved and weak state institutions to provide water services to everyone in the rapidly developing Global South cities will be severely compromised.

One major limitation of this study is the sparse information given by ASB. As previously discussed, ASB currently has only one remaining permanent employee, who is also the founder of the organization. Over the years, this founder has single-handedly managed the organization and controlled the information flowing in and out of this organization. The problem is that he is over 80 years old and sometimes struggles with memory and communication. In addition, during telephone and in-person meetings, he appeared to be less forthcoming when probed about the collapse of WASCO in Faisalabad, as he was more concerned about protecting his legacy and the image of ASB. Future studies on state-reinforced self-governance may explore a successful CPP implemented in Younus Park, Lahore, in 2009 (Urban Unit 2010). This new research could explore how the supply of all of the SRSG design principles was complete to solve Ostrom’s three puzzles, particularly during the operations phase, which might have rescued WASCO for an extended period. It would be further interesting to examine the literature on impartiality and corruption literature in the tradition of Rothstein (Rothstein and Varraich 2017), as there appears to be a connection between this literature and SRSG design principles, which could be further developed.

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