Research, part of a special feature on State-Reinforced Transformative and Adaptive Governance of Sustainable Social-Ecological Systems

INTRODUCTION

Community greenspaces (e.g., parks, gardens) provide vital social and environmental benefits, but few cities ensure sufficient access in racially marginalized neighborhoods (Sun et al. 2022). Many factors contribute to this disparity, including industrialization, systemic racism, and deficient greenspace policies (Green et al. 2016, Schell et al. 2020). Cities have addressed this problem using diverse methods (e.g., Parks and People Foundation (PPF) 2000). Successful programs often involve public–private partnerships that decentralize the provision and production of community greenspace (Colding et al. 2013). These solutions enable marginalized communities to collaborate with government agencies, non-profit organizations, and other stakeholders (e.g., schools, businesses) to design and maintain community greenspaces (e.g., Schifman et al. 2017, Mattijssen et al. 2018, Wang and Liang 2024). However, the relative dis/advantages of particular approaches and the design features that enable their success are poorly understood (Stanford et al. 2022), leading to their misapplication and failure (e.g., Dempsey et al. 2011, Boulton et al. 2018; DeCaro et al. 2025a). Many cities are locked into a rigidity trap (Cahn and Segal 2016), unable or unwilling to change clearly deficient governance systems to ensure equitable greenspace access (Smith and Kurtz 2003, Chaffin et al. 2016b).

We address these concerns by analyzing the context and institutional arrangements of a particularly successful solution—Chicago’s NeighborSpace program (Helphand 2015, Ela 2016). NeighborSpace illustrates an institutional archetype (non-profit land trust/trans-governmental partnership) whose core design features may be adaptable to other cities (Cheng 2019, Hsiao and Huang 2024) and dilemmas (Besley and Ghatak 2017, Marx 2019, Fried et al. 2022).

This case study is part of a larger project on State-reinforced self-governance (SRSG) (DeCaro et al. 2017, 2025b). The SRSG Project investigates how governments facilitate (or impede) adaptive/transformative governance (ATG) by enabling (or constraining) self-governance and cooperation among key stakeholders. We therefore investigate broader theoretical questions pertaining to decentralization, State power, public good provision, and metropolitan governance (cf. Oakerson 1999, Ostrom 2000, 2010a, b). Many prior studies do not assess adaptive and transformative capacity (ATC), hindering technical understanding of ATG, social-ecological resilience, and institutional design (Engle 2011, Siders 2019). This case study contributed to the development of the SRSG Framework’s ATC assessment system—enhancing scientific and practical understanding of ATG for the collective provision of environmental goods/services in complex social-ecological systems (SESs).

We first discuss concepts of (co)provision, (co)production, and State power that inform this study. We then describe the historical conditions and technical structure of the greenspace social-ecological dilemma, outlining co-provisional and co-productive challenges that key stakeholders face when addressing the dilemma. This analysis foreshadows ATCs and cooperative self-governance needed to overcome the dilemma. Afterward, we introduce the SRSG Framework, methods, case study, and results, completing our formal analysis. We conclude with conceptual and practical implications and future directions.

CO-PROVISION, CO-PRODUCTION, AND THE METROPOLITAN STATE

(Co)provision and (co)production are widely debated concepts (Ostrom 1996, Voorberg et al. 2014). We adopt conventions presented by Oakerson (1999). Provisioning refers to decision making, rulemaking, and other activities to create the institutions (“rules of the game”) and governance systems that govern social-ecological dilemmas and the production (delivery, implementation, management) of goods/services. According to Ostrom (1990), social-ecological dilemmas have at least three sub-dilemmas: a common-pool resource (CPR) dilemma, a public good (PG) dilemma of creating (provisioning) a governance system, and a PG dilemma of producing/maintaining built, natural, and social/institutional infrastructure(s) (cf. Anderies et al. 2016, DeCaro et al. 2025b).

Provisioning typically involves envisioning governance systems (e.g., deciding/creating rules and regulatory systems). Production takes many forms depending on the technical requirements of a particular dilemma (Oakerson 1999). For example, community greenspace production involves such activities as land acquisition (e.g., titling), financing (e.g., debt removal, property taxes), insurance, long-term protection, and site upkeep (Table 1) (Kirshbaum 2000, PPF 2000). Analyses of ATG often overlook these requirements. However, failure to anticipate specific production requirements is a critical failure point and major reason ATG is needed (e.g., DeCaro et al. 2025a). Delivery of such diverse goods/services requires coordination among diverse public/private stakeholders (Bengston et al. 2004, Schifman et al. 2017). Hence, governance systems that fail to deliver not only lack specific operational capacities, but are often too rigid to correct their deficits.

State power is fundamentally about deciding who provisions and produces particular public goods/services, how, and who benefits (Ostrom 1980, 2010a). Scholars debate the ideal role(s) of State (governmental) and non-State actors in community greenspace provision and production (Foster and Iaone 2016, Wang and Chan 2020, Wang and Liang 2024).

Advocates of Leviathan (Hobbes 1947) envision the State as the ultimate authority. Governments decide the rules (provision) and ensure the management of CPRs and the production of goods/services via direct control or privatization, with strict assignment of responsibilities and enforcement (Ostrom 2010a). Centralization is preferred, and citizens play a minor role in governance (Ostrom 1980). “Decentralization” exists primarily as decentralized production centers subordinated to higher administrative units (Oakerson 1999, Ostrom 2000). For example, a city council—representing city-wide interest—may decide policies governing greenspace. The parks department administers the city’s allotment garden program, where citizens use and maintain individual plots but cannot contribute to decisions governing the allotment program (Colding et al. 2013).

Advocates of societal self-governance, represented by Vincent and Elinor Ostrom’s work on polycentricity, envision a collaborative role for State and non-State actors (e.g., Ostrom 1990, 1994, 2010a, b). Governments are composed of citizens (“citizen sovereigns”), who wield provisioning power with diverse non/government entities in various power-sharing arrangements (Ostrom 2000, 2006). For example, citizens may be sponsored to self-organize gardens on vacant lots or co-design community land trusts and trans-governmental collaboratives (Chaffin et al. 2016b, Foster and Iaone 2016, Schifman et al. 2017, Mattijssen et al. 2018).

For Ostrom political economists, all forms of governance pose distinct dis/advantages for particular social-ecological dilemmas and SESs (Ostrom et al. 2007). The best-fitting solutions emerge from collective choice (societal problem solving) and institutional evolution (Ostrom 1990, 2005a). Analysts, therefore, ask what institutional arrangements (e.g., rules, archetypes, networks) suit particular dilemmas and what institutional capacities enable their evolution (DeCaro et al. 2017, DeCaro et al. 2025b). We begin this analysis by articulating the historical role(s) State actors have played. We then articulate the nested provisioning and production activities (and sub-dilemmas) involved.

CHARACTERIZING THE DILEMMA

Equitable greenspace access involves several sub-dilemmas and action situations, centers of decision making and operational activity (cf. McGinnis 2011). We focus primarily on activities at the city level, whereby city governments and other stakeholders jointly determine how small neighborhood greenspaces are acquired, governed, and maintained. NeighborSpace is a boundary-spanning bridge organization, linking city and neighborhood activities. Therefore, we also focus on this intermediate level.

Historical background

Governments contributed to creation of the community-greenspace dilemma via deliberate State oppression (Cahn and Segal 2016). City governments rarely prioritize greenspace for racially marginalized communities (Rigolon et al. 2018a, b, Sun et al. 2022). Marginalized communities typically inhabit areas of concentrated poverty, limiting revenue generation for goods/services (e.g., Oakerson and Clifton 2017). However, due to heightened land scarcity and population density, city governments typically favor profitable development projects, catering public goods to more affluent (“revenue-producing”) and/or privileged segments of society (e.g., Smiley et al. 2014). In the USA, public goods such as parks occur in predominantly White, affluent neighborhoods, whereas public bads (e.g., industrial facilities) occur in areas populated by Black/African Americans and other minoritized individuals (Bullard and Johnson 2000, Sarr et al. 2021). Rapid urbanization and industrialization, combined with an emphasis on large-scale parks, severely decrease greenspace access—especially in marginalized neighborhoods (Green et al. 2016, Sharifi 2016). Therefore, some scholars conceptualize urban land use and development as a CPR dilemma (Ela 2016, Foster and Iaone 2016).

Systemic, State-sanctioned racism has disenfranchised marginalized communities, hindering their self-governance (Looker 2012, Adusei 2024) and engagement in local governance to rectify these issues (Arnstein 1969, Sarr et al. 2021). Before the civil rights movement in the 1960s, federal, state, and local governments implemented “Jim Crow” laws and discriminatory neighborhood “revitalization” programs targeting Black communities (Gotham 2000, Pritchett 2003, Rigolon et al. 2018a). These actions (e.g., redlining: 1924 National Housing Act; “blight removal”: 1954 federal Housing Act, 1964 Highways Act), solidified the vicious cycle of political marginalization, neighborhood disinvestment and decline, and deficient public good provision/production that characterizes marginalized neighborhoods (Edwards and Thompson 2010). Inequitable greenspace is therefore a manifestation of market forces and State oppression (Connolly and Anguelovski 2021, Nardone et al. 2021), requiring transformative solutions that alter existing power dynamics and market activities (Foster and Iaione 2016).

Technical features

Figure 1 illustrates the interdependent dilemmas and action situations involved in equitable greenspace. We focus primarily at the city level, and secondarily on the neighborhood level, because city-wide provision is the entry point for policy analysts and city planners—although any solution must also ensure effective management (production) of neighborhood-level community greenspace.

Some scholars conceptualize urban land use as a CPR dilemma characterized by rivalrous land ownership and competition for scarce urban resources, typically favoring affluent citizens, developers, and business interests (Cahn and Segal 2016, Foster and Iaione 2016). City governments—influenced by federal and state policies—oversee city-wide land-use allocation, creating policies (e.g., zoning) that affect land use, including community greenspace (Chaffin et al. 2016b, Harrington and Hsu 2018). Effective greenspace programs must therefore include governance systems (provisions) for allocating such land use equitably (PG). Eligible properties (e.g., vacant lots) are often poorly documented, with uncertain or complicated public/private ownership, creating fragmented (uncoordinated) landholdings and property rights (Mendes et al. 2008). Hence, a city-wide greenspace plan with community greenspace provisions and clearly identified property inventories is essential (e.g., PPF 2000). These provisions must address production and maintenance issues (PG), such as land acquisition procedures, site upkeep, and regulation (Table 1). These tasks are exponentially more difficult when spread across hundreds of greenspaces in diverse neighborhoods (Ela 2016; see Oakerson 1999 for scale issues).

At the neighborhood level, each greenspace consists of scarce space for garden plots and other uses (e.g., recreation, trees); these resources must be allocated (CPR). The greenspace sites and garden plots within them must be maintained (PG), and a governance system must be created for each greenspace (PG) (e.g., Mattijssen et al. 2018, Beavin 2021; cf. Schukoske 2000).

Parks departments are often poorly equipped to handle the nested dilemmas associated with city-wide greenspace provisioning and neighborhood-level management. Therefore, effective community-greenspace programs typically rely on public–private partnerships, enabling diverse government and non-government stakeholders (e.g., non-profit organizations, communities) to collectively (co)provision and (co)produce essential goods/services (Chaffin et al. 2016b, Schifman et al. 2017). These systems often feature bridge organizations, which collaborate with governments, individual communities, and landholders to acquire properties and co-provision for local governance and production. Finally, many programs use a local stewardship model, in which communities govern and maintain each site, with partnership and/or oversight by a bridge organization (e.g., Mattijssen et al. 2018, Wires and LaRose 2019, Wang and Liang 2024). We use the SRSG Framework to examine how such solutions function.

STATE-REINFORCED SELF-GOVERNANCE (SRSG) FRAMEWORK

Within the Ostrom tradition, ATG systems are societal problem-solving systems characterized by networked centers of activity that share information, experiment, and flexibly evolve their rule systems and institutional structures, processes, and functions to address emergent crises and dilemmas (Ostrom 1994, 2005a, b). Self-organization, adaptive decision making, and cooperation are essential to ATG, facilitating problem solving and enabling diverse stakeholders to build trust, ensure accountability, and devise better-fitting solutions (Ostrom 1990). State-reinforced self-governance describes how governments facilitate (or hinder) ATG by using their legislative, administrative, regulatory, and fiscal powers to in/formally enable (or constrain) dilemma stakeholders’ capacities for self-organization, self-governance, and cooperation (i.e., co-provisioning and co-production) (Sarker 2013, DeCaro et al. 2017, 2025b).

Institutionally, ATCs are properties of governance systems that allow them to adjust (adapt) or innovate and replace (transform) institutional components to support ATG (DeCaro et al. 2025b) and social-ecological resilience (Chaffin et al. 2016a, Garmestani et al. 2019). The SRSG Framework diagnoses and explains the ATC of ATG systems in terms of design principles, institutional archetypes, and governance networks (DeCaro et al. 2017, 2025b).

Design principles

Institutional design principles (Table 2) are functional building blocks of institutions and, therefore, embody basic institutional ATCs. Ostrom’s (1990, 2005a) design principles for multi-actor cooperation (e.g., shared decision making, enforcement) facilitate trust and enable cooperative problem solving among diverse stakeholders, increasing their ATC. Design principles for State reinforcement (DeCaro et al. 2017, 2025b) refer to authority (powers), responsibilities (duties), operational resources, and mechanisms for flexibility/stability (e.g., decision-making discretion, policy sunsets) formally (or informally) granted or assigned to particular actors and collective action processes, enabling (or constraining) ATC.

Governments may in/formally reinforce stakeholder cooperation. For example, laws may formally authorize, require, and/or fund stakeholders to communicate, share decisions, etc. Governments may also reinforce actors to perform essential functions (e.g., land acquisition and management). Finally, governments may alter power relationships by reinforcing (or constraining) co-provision and/or co-production among particular actors and collectives, fundamentally affecting ATC. Design principles are configural and their effects depend on institutional and social-ecological context (Crawford and Ostrom 2005, McGinnis 2011, 2017). The SRSG Framework uses institutional archetypes and analyzes governance network structure to simplify analyses of these configural and contextual effects.

Institutional archetypes

Institutional archetypes represent basic configurations of institutional capacities that serve particular functions, such as non-profit organizations (NPOs). The ATC of particular archetypes can be conceptualized as archetypal configurations of authority, responsibility, and operational resources (Base 3 Typology of ATC) (DeCaro et al. 2025b) and degree of organizational self-governance (Ostrom 1992, McGinnis 2017).

Self-organized entities (A^-R^-) lack formal authority and responsibility but act informally, such as informal community gardens on vacant lots. They lack State support and protection (Smith and Kurtz 2003) but can possess considerable informal ATC (Ostrom 1990). Authorized entities (A⁺R^-) are formally authorized but lack responsibility and, therefore, often shirk responsibility. Many government agencies are authorized entities. For example, pollution control districts often fail to sanction industrial polluters in marginalized neighborhoods (Sarr et al. 2021). Responsibility-heavy entities (A^-R⁺) have formal responsibility but insufficient authority to act—characteristic of many dysfunctional decentralization programs and government agencies (Ribot et al. 2006). Reinforced entities (A⁺R⁺) have formal authority and responsibility, enabling and compelling action. This archetype may be advantageous for ATG, especially when it possesses sufficient external resources (E⁺) and self-sufficiency (SS⁺) to ensure fiscal autonomy and resilience (Kemper et al. 2007, Andersson and Ostrom 2008).

DeCaro et al. (2025b) propose that actors with greater constitutive, constitutional decision-making, rule-making, administrative, self-regulatory, and fiscal authority have greater discretion, and therefore greater ATC (Table 3; cf. Ostrom 1992, McGinnis 2017). For example, NPOs typically possess these capacities, allowing them to decide their mission and function(s), create roles (officers) with particular powers, and devise and administer rules to govern themselves; they can regulate their members, receive external funding, and accept donations. They can also collaborate (e.g., communicate and share decisions) to co-provision governance systems and co-produce various goods/services (Lane 1980, Singh et al. 2022). We therefore hypothesize that NPOs are robust A⁺R⁺ archetypes, possessing considerable capacity for organizational self-governance and ATC. This configuration of capacities may be why NPOs such as NeighborSpace feature prominently in ATG systems.

Governance network

The SRSG Framework updates McGinnis and Ostrom’s (2014) SES framework to understand how context influences the fit (adequacy, appropriateness) of institutional archetypes and design principles (ATCs) within particular network structures. Generally, ATG systems enable advantageous configurations of (co)provision and (co)production (cf. Oakerson 1999). Many network structures are possible. However, ATG systems often benefit from a central actor (or collective action process) serving as a bridge to unite key stakeholders (Barnes et al. 2017, Schifman et al. 2017). Ideally, this entity possesses sufficient capacity for multi-actor cooperation, helping to facilitate coordination and mitigate conflict, transaction costs, and defection (Ostrom 1990, 2005b). We therefore examine the NeighborSpace partnership system in terms of its fundamental archetype(s), ATCs, and network structure.

CASE STUDY SYSTEM

Chicago

Chicago, Illinois, is the third largest U.S. city by population (2.7 million; U.S. Census Bureau 2021) and economy (GDP: $690 million; U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 2022). Median household income is approximately $65,781 (17% poverty rate). The population is approximately 45% White/Caucasian, 29% Black/African American, and 28% Hispanic. Chicago’s Black communities experience greater economic and public infrastructure disparity, predominantly inhabiting 22 disinvested post-industrial areas (Chicago Department of Public Health 2021) that historically lack greenspace (Chicago et al. 1998).

Chicago is a home-rule unit (per the Illinois Constitution), granting it broad powers to govern its affairs, including to create rules and governance entities (County Clerk 2024). It is governed by an executive (e.g., Mayor’s Office) and legislative branch, the Chicago City Council. The Council consists of the Mayor, County/municipal agents (e.g., Treasurer), and 50 representatives (Alderpersons), elected from the city’s 50 wards (districts). Wards facilitate local public goods/services and are centers of civic agency (Chicago 2024). Chicago has a strong mayoral system and a vibrant history of political and civic organizing via diverse government departments, NPOs, and citizen groups. The city’s accomplishments and ills are attributed to these structures and dynamics, including complex state and regional politics (Hamilton 2002, Sternberg and Anderson 2014)—setting the broader context for NeighborSpace’s emergence (Helphand 2015, Ela 2016).

NeighborSpace

In addition to various departments (e.g., Planning and Development), three government entities are responsible for greenspace in Chicago: Mayor’s Office, Chicago Park District (PD), and Forest Preserve District of Cook County (FD). NeighborSpace emerged in 1996 after civil lawsuits (e.g., Alexander v. Chicago Park District:548 F., Supp. 277, N.D., Ill. 1982) alleged that the PD failed to provide equitable greenspace access in predominantly Black neighborhoods—violating the federal 1974 Housing and Community Development Act (PPF 2000). In 1982, the U.S. Department of Justice sued the District (New York Times 1982), resulting in a 1983 consent decree to rectify the problem. The City of Chicago (Mayor Daley’s Office), PD, and FD commissioned a multi-year study, identifying that 61% of Chicago’s population lacked sufficient access, especially Black and Hispanic neighborhoods.

In 1998, the study produced CitySpace, a comprehensive park plan with priorities for neighborhood greenspace (Chicago et al. 1998). It proposed that the city create NeighborSpace, a non-profit land trust designed to ensure marginalized residents are within a 10-min. walk (0.8 km) from an open/greenspace. The Mayor’s Office, PD, and FD pilot-tested the project via a temporary intergovernmental agreement. They codified the agreement in 1998 via a special 20-yr ordinance, establishing NeighborSpace as an independent but jointly governed (semi-autonomous) land trust. Its mission was to transfer available public/private lots to neighborhoods for community-based governance (Helphand 2015), “since such openspace projects can be more efficiently managed by local groups than by governmental agencies” (Chicago 1996: §5:l132-135). There are now approximately 120 NeighborSpace sites, and 98% of Chicago’s population is within a 10-min. walk of an open/greenspace (Trust for Public Land 2022). The partners recently (2019) renewed the agreement for an additional 20 yr.

Figure 2 illustrates the system’s primary elements. The partnership’s primary collective action processes occur within NeighborSpace, via its Board of Directors. The NeighborSpace Agreement is not merely a service contract: it codifies NeighborSpace with a particular collaborative governance structure. NeighborSpace’s Board of Directors is the principal provisioning unit (and decision arena) by which the Mayor’s Office, PD, FD, and NeighborSpace make constitutional and administrative decisions to govern the partnership, coordinate city-wide stakeholders, and oversee greenspace allocation for the program.

NeighborSpace’s officers (e.g., Executive Director, clerk/treasurer) oversee the organization’s daily administration and greenspace program. NeighborSpace completes (produces) the formal legal and financial steps to acquire greenspaces (e.g., obtain title/deed). NeighborSpace also co-provisions governance of each greenspace through a multi-year Community Partnership Agreement process, whereby NeighborSpace and community members co-design a governance and maintenance plan. Community members govern and upkeep each site with NeighborSpace’s technical support and regulatory oversight.

The NeighborSpace partnership is a complex, polycentric system that appears to function on principles of SRSG. Our goal is to understand the institutional foundations underlying this partnership to inform theory and practical application.

METHODS

Design

During Phase 1 (January–July 2017), we collected initial policy documents, websites, and an initial interview with NeighborSpace’s Executive Director—followed by preliminary analysis (2018–2019). During Phase 2, we collected additional policy documents and interviews (December 2019–October 2020). We acquired policy and organizational documents from online sources in the public domain (e.g., government databases, websites) and requests. During Phase 3, we developed our analysis procedures and analyzed the data.

Codes derived from these data and excerpted (anonymized) interview data for the study are openly available in OSF at https://osf.io/bwxtp/?view_only=7f73aa99acb14cbfb4953990e6b263c7. Ethical approval for this study was granted by the principal investigator’s university human subjects institutional review board (IRB 17.0723, 19.0588). All research staff were trained and certified for adherence to ethical standards to protect human data. All interviewees participated voluntarily, with informed consent.

Policy documents

We collected the following policy documents: 26 U.S. Internal Revenue Code §501(c)3 (governing tax-exempt corporations); Illinois General Not for Profit Corporation Act, Illinois Open Land Trust Act, Land Trust Recordation and Transfer Tax Act; 1996/1998 Intergovernmental (NeighborSpace) Agreement; and NeighborSpace’s bylaws. We also collected Art XI:§1-2 (“environmental bill of rights”) of the Illinois Constitution, Chicago greenspace policy/program briefs, and NeighborSpace policies (e.g., new site application, community partnership agreement, conflict resolution guidelines).

Participants

We interviewed seven informants directly involved in the partnership: NeighborSpace President, Executive Director, and Community Stewardship Coordinator; NeighborSpace Board representatives for PD, FD, City (Mayor’s representative), and communities (Alderperson); and a senior administrator in Chicago’s Open Space program within the Department of Planning. This sample size is sufficient to achieve informational saturation, given the scope of the partnership and specialized positions of the actors/informants (Bernard 2011).

Interviews

Two trained researchers interviewed participants by telephone. The interviews took 1-2 hours, were audio-recorded for coding/information retention, and semi-structured to cover key topics while enabling exploration of emergent topics (Bernard 2011).

Background information

Interviews clarified background information about the case system, actors, NeighborSpace, and partnership (Append. 1). This information provided triangulating evidence regarding formal rules and informal practices (e.g., norms). The interview questions examined both institutional structures and processes. For example, questions about shared decision making asked about formal rules and informal norms governing governance and administrative decisions, and actual decision-making processes and outcomes.

Design principles

Interview questions also targeted (a) the core principles of State reinforcement (e.g., authority, responsibility) and multi-actor cooperation (e.g., communication, enforcement) listed in Table 2 and (b) the operational capacities essential for greenspace acquisition and management in Table 1. To assess the operational and organizational self-governance capacities (Table 3) of the focal institutional archetype, NeighborSpace, we asked questions about NeighborSpace’s constitutive, constitutional, administrative, and fiscal capacities.

Data preparation

We archived and numbered each line of the policy documents. Trained research assistants transcribed each interview verbatim, with line numbers and timestamps. The principal investigator (PI) resolved unknown terms and indiscernible statements.

Coding and analysis

Development of the coding system occurred iteratively and concurrently with data analyses and development of the SRSG Framework, following conventions by Ratajczyk et al. (2016). During Phase 1, the senior PI created initial operational definitions for each design principle, using DeCaro et al.’s (2017, 2025b) conceptual definitions. The PI trained several advanced graduate/undergraduate students with domain knowledge as coders. The PI and a senior coding assistant oversaw weekly meetings to revise the system. The team reached consensus on code definitions and example entries before finalizing the data, with standardized codesheets.

To facilitate in-depth understanding, archival of institutional archetypes, and future large-N quantitative comparative case studies (cf. DeCaro et al. 2025b), we conducted descriptive analyses using qualitative and quantitative codes (see Baggio et al. 2016, Cumming et al. 2020 for broader discussion). During Phase 2, the PI and senior coding assistant consolidated every coded entry relevant to particular design principles. The PI descriptively summarized this information for each principle and compared the described capacities with the criteria listed for each dimension in Tables 1–3, rating each dimension on a five-point scale: -2 (definitely lacks), -1 (may lack), 0 (not mentioned, mixed), +1 (may possess), +2 (definitely possesses). “Definitely” scores (±2) were assigned when there was obvious (e.g., direct, explicit) and consistent evidence in the policy documents and interviews; “may” scores (±1) for less obvious evidence; “0” scores when not mentioned or mixed (e.g., policies contradict).

We followed several recommendations for coding reliability and validity (Ratajczyk et al. 2016, Seelandt 2018). The PI has several years of domain-relevant experience. The PI, senior coding assistant, and co-authors reviewed and reached consensus on the final codes, and our data and codesheets are available open access for transparency.

RESULTS

We first report the latent aspects of ATC that enabled NeighborSpace to emerge, then NeighborSpace’s archetypal capacities as a non-profit land trust, and finally, the partnership’s capacities for multi-actor cooperation. We use descriptive tables with quantitative scores to summarize the results (see referenced codesheets for details).

Emergence

Before NeighborSpace, community greenspaces in marginalized neighborhoods were few and primarily informal, self-organized sites (A^-R^- archetypes) on vacant lots (Helphand 2015). The city’s co-provisional/co-productive orientation was neglect, discrimination, and exploitation. Greenspace policy was incomplete, and governmental stakeholders were uncoordinated (Chicago et al. 1998, Ela 2016).

These arrangements transformed after the U.S. Department of Justice’s federal lawsuit and consent decree compelled the Mayor, PD, and FD to reform. They responded by entering a long-term collaborative agreement and creating NeighorSpace to coordinate key stakeholders and formally acquire and protect neighborhood greenspaces for community governance. The city’s orientation transformed to enable local self-governance (A⁺R⁺ archetype), seeking to co-provision and co-produce greenspace with formerly disenfranchised communities.

Several aspects of ATG inherent to the U.S. federalized system of self-governance enabled this solution to emerge (see Schukoske 2000, Craig et al. 2017 generally). At the national level, laws protecting civil rights (e.g., 14th Amendment, 42 U.S.C.§:1983), and allowing individual states to govern themselves and create NPOs with federally recognized powers (e.g., U.S. Code 501(c)3), jointly compelled (e.g., consent decree) and enabled the City of Chicago to reform. At the state (Illinois) level, several provisions were formative. First, Illinois’s constitution contains an “environmental bill of rights” (Art XI:§2), which enables governmental accountability and grassroots environmental organizing (Miller 2018):

Each person has the right to a healthful environment. Each person may enforce this right against any party, governmental or private, through appropriate legal proceedings subject to reasonable limitation and regulation as the General Assembly may provide by law (State of Illinois 1970).

Second, Illinois’s “General Not For Profit Corporation Act” (GNP Act) and “Open Land Trust Act” (IL-OLT Act) authorize citizens, collectives, and non/government corporations to create NPOs, like NeighborSpace, with necessary operational capacities to address diverse social-ecological dilemmas.

Third, Illinois’s status as a home-rule state enabled the city to create NeighborSpace:

The City of Chicago (“city”) is a home-rule unit by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution of the State of Illinois of 1970 and, as such, may exercise any powers and perform and function pertaining to its government and affairs (NeighborSpace Agreement: lines 26–28).

Fourth, Chicago had strong Mayoral leadership (Mayor Daly) and a history of civic self-organizing and engagement via its ward system, alderpersons, political block clubs, and public/private coalitions (Sternberg and Anderson 2014). This leadership and civic structure may have facilitated NeighborSpace’s formation (Helphand 2015, Ela 2016).

In short, the U.S. system of federalized self-governance is conceptualized as a broadly ATG system (Ostrom 1994, Craig et al. 2017). The key stakeholders in Chicago harnessed the system’s latent capacities, enabling them to co-provision NeighborSpace.

NeighborSpace’s capacities

Organizational self-governance

When dilemma stakeholders recognize a sustained need for collective action, they may create a collaborative organization or institutional archetype (Ostrom 1992, McGinnis and Ostrom 2014). NeighborSpace serves several critical functions: (a) primary decision arena for city-wide provisioning of community greenspace, (b) mechanism to hold key city partners accountable, (c) constitutional and administrative decision-making center for NeighborSpace and its programs, (d) administrative regulator of the community greenspace groups and sites, and (e) producer of goods/services necessary for efficient greenspace acquisition and management.

NeighborSpace’s position in the governance system as a bridge organization, and its diverse role(s) in co-provision and co-production (Fig. 3), make it structurally and functionally central to the greenspace governance system. NeighborSpace is exposed to many SES stressors and demands. Thus, it must be resilient (flexible and transformative). A Reinforced (A⁺R⁺) archetype with robust self-governance should be well suited for this position.

Non-profit organizations are self-governing organizations (Lane 1980, Singh et al. 2022). Therefore, NeighborSpace should possess substantial ATC. Its additional incorporation as a land trust should enhance these capacities. Our analyses confirm this idea (Table 4; Codesheet 1).

NeighborSpace derives its capacities for self-governance from many sources, most notably: federal and state laws governing NPOs (U.S. Code 501(c)3, IL-GNP Act:§102.10(b)1, §103.05(a)), state laws governing land trusts (e.g., OLT Act:§20), the 1996/1998 NeighborSpace Agreement, and NeighborSpace’s bylaws. Non-profit organization laws authorize NPOs to compose a self-governing board of directors to (a) create an organizational structure and roles (e.g., officers), (b) decide the organization’s fundamental mission, (c) create and amend rules to govern the organization, and (c) make decisions to govern the organization’s affairs. The NeighborSpace Agreement (§4c, §3C1-4) and bylaws (Art. III:§2) further authorize (and require) the Board to be collaboratively governed by the three city partners (two members each), NeighborSpace (e.g., President), and alderperson. Hence, key stakeholders are reinforced to jointly govern NeighborSpace with NeighborSpace’s principal administrators. Interviews confirmed the Board meets monthly to govern NeighborSpace and coordinate its greenspace program. Board decision making also improved partner–organization connectivity beyond the monthly meetings, facilitating broader, system-wide cooperation.

These policies also grant NeighborSpace administrative authority to manage/regulate its staff and operations (e.g., IL-GNP:§102.10(b)1, §102.25, Bylaws Art VI:§1). NeighborSpace’s president and executive director operate independently from the city partners. Interviews indicated that the city partners respect NeighborSpace’s autonomous operations and value the efficiencies NeighborSpace provides for community greenspace administration.

The provisions governing NeighborSpace provide complementary external support and resource self-sufficiency, ensuring its fiscal viability. The NeighborSpace Agreement (§3b/4) authorizes NeighborSpace to receive US$300,000 annually from the city partners, in addition to “open-space impact fees” collected from developers to fund greenspace. As a NPO, federal and state law (e.g., U.S. Code 501(c)3, IL-GNP Act Art III:§103.05(32)(d)) authorize NeighborSpace to receive property tax exemptions, tax-exempt financial donations, and in-kind donations (e.g., land, equipment, volunteer labor)—greatly reducing its operating costs compared with a traditional administrative government unit. NeighborSpace typically secures US$200–$400,000 annually from these sources, increasing its fiscal self-sufficiency and resilience. Interviews noted that NeighborSpace has grown its operations despite periods of financial crisis in the city. This balance of external sponsorship and internal self-sufficiency safeguards NeighborSpace’s fiscal autonomy while ensuring it remains responsive to its three city sponsors.

NeighborSpace’s powers come with commensurate responsibilities, ensuring that it obeys prevailing federal, state, and local laws (e.g., NPO law; IL-GNP:§102.10(b)1) and fulfills its primary mission (e.g., NeighborSpace Agreement, Bylaws Art. I:§1). For example, NPOs are forbidden to seek profit or engage in political lobbying (U.S. Code 501(c)3). As an Illinois non-profit land trust, NeighborSpace’s greenspaces must serve public benefit and conservation (IL-OLT:§20). Finally, the NeighborSpace Agreement stipulates that NeighborSpace’s Board members must be greenspace experts, and the city partners must provide promised funds.

In summary (Table 4), NeighborSpace meets the criteria for a Reinforced archetype, with balanced external resources and self-sufficiency (i.e., A⁺R⁺E⁺SS⁺)—affording considerable capacity for self-governance. However, NeighborSpace also requires capacities for greenspace acquisition and management.

Greenspace acquisition and management

Non-profit organizations are multi-purpose archetypes, designed to adopt diverse public service missions with various operational powers (Lane 1980, Singh et al. 2022). NeighborSpace was created to ensure effective greenspace acquisition and management via formalized (State-enabled) community-based governance (Chicago et al. 1998, Helphand 2015):

The Department of Planning and Development (“Department”) has recommended the formation of a not-for-profit corporation to be known as “NeighborSpace” to own, lease, manage, or hold easements to typically small, open spaces in the city for development and maintenance by neighborhood community and business groups.... (NeighborSpace Agreement).

In this section, we analyze whether NeighborSpace possesses these capacities (Table 5; Codesheets 2 and 3).

Land acquisition

Interviews indicated that NeighborSpace’s Board and staff collaborate with community members, alderpersons, landowners, and government divisions to acquire land for community greenspace. Coordination routinely occurs in Board meetings and community meetings/outreach, enabled (authorized, required) by the NeighborSpace Agreement (§5(2,4)), bylaws (Art. III-IV), and laws governing NPOs and land trusts. For example, Illinois’s NPO laws (e.g., IL-GNP Act: Art. III:§103.10(h)) and open land trust laws (e.g., IL-OLT Act:§5e,§15g) explicitly authorize government entities and NPOs/land trusts to partner for this purpose (e.g., contracts, agreements). Leaders of informal greenspaces typically approach NeighborSpace and their ward Alderperson for sponsorship by NeighborSpace, or the city partners approach NeighborSpace with a specific request. Either path typically involves several months of multi-lateral communication, deliberation, and planning (see “Land Management” (below) for more details).

NeighborSpace’s authorization (and responsibility) to acquire, protect, and insure eligible sites for community greenspace stems from its status as a NPO land trust. Its fiscal efficiency is also enabled by these statuses. Laws governing NPOs and land trusts enable NeighborSpace to acquire land via various means, including purchase, donation, and easement (e.g., U.S. Code 501(c)3, IL-GNP Act:§103.10(d), IL Transfer/Recordation Act:§2). Interviews confirmed the majority of NeighborSpace’s greenspaces were acquired at nominal cost by discounted purchase, donation, or openspace impact fees. Governmental landowners are incentivized to donate land, because it facilitates debt removal and transfers maintenance costs to NeighborSpace. NeighborSpace’s status authorizes property tax exemptions, further facilitating fiscal efficiency. The properties are transferred to trust, formally set aside as public open/greenspace, “in perpetuity” protecting them from development (IL-OLT:§20, Bylaws:Art I:§1-2).

Interviews mentioned cases where protection was vital. By law, these spaces are designated for public edification and ecological conservation. The ability to insure property and acquire liabilities are also basic powers of NPOs (IL-GNP Act: Art III:§103.10(d,g-h)), enabling NeighborSpace (e.g., Bylaws: Art I:§1) to alleviate the city partners, landowners, and communities of this burden. Few solutions provide such robust protection and efficiency (Chicago et al. 1998, Helphand 2015).

The only significant capacity limitation we identified is pollution remediation. Soil pollution is a significant practical, legal, and financial barrier to land acquisition. A few interviews (e.g., PD, Alderperson) mentioned that pollution—often higher in post-industrial marginalized neighborhoods—impedes new land acquisition because less-polluted sites have already been acquired. As a NPO, NeighborSpace has the capacity (authority) to adopt an additional mission of soil remediation if desired (IL-GNP Art III §103.05). However, NeighborSpace was not conceived to do so.

In summary, NeighborSpace’s formal, state-sanctioned status as a non-profit land trust bestows considerable powers and responsibilities to efficiently acquire land for community greenspace, solving many logistical barriers. However, NeighborSpace currently lacks the capacity for pollution remediation, hindering some acquisitions.

Land management

The NeighborSpace Agreement and NeighborSpace’s bylaws convey additional provisions for efficient greenspace management via community-based governance.

The Agreement (§5:l132-135, l142-143) and bylaws explicitly authorize and require that NeighborSpace transfer rights and responsibility of greenspace “management” (i.e., governance and upkeep) to local communities:

NeighborSpace accepts the premise that open spaces such as community gardens... can effectively be managed by people that live and work nearby. Therefore, all NeighborSpace sites are to be maintained and managed by a local block club, organization, business or other group (Bylaws: Art I:§1:lines 12-15).

Interviews among the partners unanimously confirmed the sites were governed and maintained by the community—creating rules and procedures without intervention by NeighborSpace, except in extreme crises (e.g., site damage, leadership training). NeighborSpace maintains conflict resolution policies (available online), which advise community stewards on resolving conflicts. Interviews stressed that with approximately 120 sites, the NeighborSpace program would fail if the sites were not self-governing.

Nevertheless, no greenspace program is perfect. The interviewed Board Alderperson, Community Stewardship Coordinator, and Executive Director indicated that communities sometimes struggle with management. NeighborSpace therefore recently (past 4–5 yr) created a new officer—Community Stewardship Coordinator—to liaise with community stewards to provide leadership training, facilitate startup, and assist during crises. The Coordinator called NeighborSpace a “practice in democracy,” discussing how NeighborSpace staff, local community groups, and government officials (e.g., alderpersons) collaborate to envision, create, and maintain each greenspace.

NeighborSpace’s Board of Directors is also selective when accepting new greenspaces to ensure success. Its directors carefully balance greenspace needs against other economic development needs. For example:

Alderperson: [T]here’s some instances in the community where we have the potential for development to happen, and folks want to put the gardens. Some folks want them to be permanent, but there’s development...coming that way, where they need development. So you know, that’s where you have the contention there, right? (lines 91-95).

Executive Director: [Community members put in] thousands of hours and resources, so you don’t just want to bulldoze it [greenspace]. Um, you also don’t want to have community gardens everywhere. Um, that would be too much, you know? We get requests all the time for, you know, “Here’s a vacant lot I saw, let’s make a community garden.” And I’ll be like, “What? There’s another one down the block. You know? Maybe... you should garden there” (lines 257-261).

NeighborSpace uses a rigorous 1- to 2-yr vetting process and formal Community Partnership Agreement to ensure community leadership in governance. Communities identify a leadership (governance) team, dedicated community members (i.e., users), a local community sponsor (e.g., church), and develop a governance plan, which is reviewed annually by NeighborSpace. When asked what makes “a good site,” the Executive Director corrected:

[T]he most important thing is that there’s actually a community, you know? We get a lot of applications where there’s really not a lot of community support. ...those things are-, are doomed. [W]ell, we don’t go ahead with them (lines 264-266).

This approach is critically important. Community governance greatly reduces maintenance costs for NeighborSpace and the city. Compared with a typical administrative government unit (e.g., Parks department), NeighborSpace is especially well positioned as a NPO to catalyze donated labor, equipment, facilities, and knowledge. NeighborSpace also provides social capital, trust, and accountability—something cities commonly desire when taking the risk of transferring valuable land to communities for self-governance.

Executive Director: [I]f anything, the biggest thing we have is trust. So, the government knows who we are, and they know if we are taking in a property that it’s going to be taken care of, and if it’s not, then they can hold us accountable. I mean, you gotta put yourself in the government’s shoes: if some, uh, unknown community gardening group comes to them and says, “Give us this land,” there’s often very little reason for them to trust them. Um, so there is a strong case to have kind of a third party that can take on that responsibility (lines 233-239).

Finally, NeighborSpace contributes volunteer work. NeighborSpace is not formally required to provide water or other services (e.g., education, leadership training) for greenspaces. However, NeighborSpace voluntarily chooses to leverage its production capacities as a NPO to offer these services because it (e.g., Executive Director, Community Stewardship Coordinator) recognizes their importance for each site’s viability. The city also created several policies and programs to facilitate water access.

In summary, NeighborSpace’s formal status as a trans-governmental non-profit land trust and collaborative decision arena enables it to effectively and efficiently ensure land acquisition and management. We now discuss mechanisms for multi-actor cooperation.

Multi-actor cooperation

Interviews revealed the partnership stakeholders have complementary but distinct interests. The PD prioritizes large-scale parks and environmental education; FD desires urban canopy preservation and expansion beyond the city’s inner limits; ward Alderpersons prioritize public goods/services in their districts; the Mayor’s Office’s interests span the entirety of the city’s needs. These stakeholders need effective institutional arrangements to facilitate amicable interactions, build trust, and enable adaptive decision making (i.e., problem solving) to maintain the partnership and overcome emergent challenges (Ostrom 1990, 2010b). We examine both de jure (formal, legal) and de facto (actual) design principles (Codesheet 4). Our results suggest that the Partnership has robustly reinforced provisions for multi-actor cooperation, helping the partners navigate cooperative challenges for 20+ yr (Table 6).

Communication and shared decision making

Non-profit organizations are authorized to communicate and share decisions with diverse collaborators and stakeholders (e.g., U.S. Code 501(c)3, IL-GNP Act:§103.10(q,r)). Illinois’s open land trust laws (e.g., IL-OLT Act:§5(3),§15(f-g)) authorize these activities specifically for public greenspace. NeighborSpace’s constitutional provisions formally authorize and require stakeholder communication and shared decision making via stipulations for Board composition, collective choice rules and procedures, and community partnership agreements.

First, the NeighborSpace Agreement (§4c,§C1-4) and bylaws (Art III:§2) specify that NeighborSpace’s Board must include seven governmental representatives: two per partner (Mayor’s Office, PD, FD), plus one jointly nominated representative. NeighborSpace’s President (or Executive Director) is the Board Chair, with at least four other “non-government” representatives, who are typically ward Alderpersons and individuals that represent community greenspace interests (e.g., other NPOs). The Board is the central communication and decision-making hub, enabling routine coordination and problem solving. Second, the Board must meet at least once per month. Our interviewees indicated that the Board members and their respective organizations (e.g., Planning and Development, Ward councils) communicate frequently to discuss complementary city affairs and projects. Interviews mentioned this extra communication as a distinct benefit, boosting comradery and efficiency. Third, collective choice rules state that each representative’s preferences carry equal weight in formal decisions (e.g., votes), with special provisions to ensure NeighborSpace’s equal influence (e.g., greater Board representation commensurate with NeighborSpace’s acquisition of self-sufficient funding sources).

Several interviewees stated that these arrangements helped them learn about and internalize the partner organizations’ interests and concerns, while balancing them against NeighborSpace’s mission. For example, the FD representative convinced Neighborspace to provide environmental education on its sponsored sites to facilitate FD’s mission. Alternatively, the Executive Director conveyed to the FD that NeighborSpace should not expand its operations to the suburbs (the FD’s larger jurisdiction), because expansion would violate its mandate and capacity limitations. Finally, NeighborSpace shares important decisions with community greenspace stewards via the Community Partnership Agreement, and through the Community Stewardship Coordinator (e.g., events, consultation).

Enforcement

The NeighborSpace partnership’s enforcement involves numerous regulators and regulated activities at federal, state, and local levels. We discuss highlights. First, NeighborSpace’s NPO status is regulated by Illinois’s Secretary of State (IL-GNP Act:§102.15), ensuring compliance with federal and state laws. Second, the Mayor’s Office and NeighborSpace’s Board collectively enforce the NeighborSpace Agreement, holding one another accountable while ensuring NeighborSpace fulfills its duties (NeighborSpace Agreement:§3(C), Bylaws Art III). Interviews indicated that failure to comply would warrant warnings, potential funding revocation, and other corrective measures. However, actions beyond warnings have not been needed. NeighborSpace’s President and Executive Director regulate NeighborSpace’s staff and operational affairs (Bylaws Art IV:§1,6). Third, NeighborSpace regulates the greenspace stewards via several mechanisms (e.g., Community Partnership Agreement, annual review), and the stewards regulate themselves. According to the Executive Director and Community Stewardship Coordinator, community stewards typically manage their affairs without NeighborSpace’s intervention. However, NeighborSpace occasionally intervenes to arbitrate extreme conflicts and/or enforce site upkeep. The Stewardship Coordinator also facilitates transitions in site leadership (e.g., retirement and burnout) when needed.

Boundaries

Before NeighborSpace, community greenspaces were largely undocumented, and the city partners’ formal role(s) in greenspace provision and production was unclear. Now, these boundaries are well defined formally and in practice. The NeighborSpace Agreement (§5(1-4)), bylaws, and federal/state laws governing non-profit land trusts explicitly define and assign the roles, powers, and duties of NeighborSpace, the city partners, and communities. Our interviews confirmed the key parties understand these arrangements well. Interviews stated that this clarity is why the Partnership operates smoothly—the provisions for communication, shared decision making, and clearly defined roles/duties reduce confusion, preventing major conflicts. Finally, title/deed for each site is officially recorded, and the physical address of each NeighborSpace greenspace is well documented and posted online for public knowledge. Sites are also clearly marked, typically by fences and signs. The NeighborSpace Agreement and bylaws (Art I:§1) clearly state the geospatial boundaries of NeighborSpace’s operations. Interviews indicated that these boundaries help the stakeholders to coordinate and respect each other’s position in the governance network.

Equity

First, as previously noted, the NeighborSpace Agreement and bylaws have provisions for equitable Board representation and collective choice (i.e., decision making). Each city partner is guaranteed two Board representatives, with an additional jointly appointed representative. NeighborSpace’s President (or Executive Director) is the Board Chair, with at least four non-government representatives (and more depending on fiscal self-sufficiency). Furthermore, board members have equal voting rights. Additionally, NeighborSpace is required to share greenspace governance decisions with community groups (NeighborSpace Agreement:§5), which it does via its Community Partnership Agreement process. Second, the NeighborSpace Agreement (§5(2)) authorizes and requires the city partners to each contribute land to the program. NeighborSpace is obligated to consider sponsoring those sites. Third, NeighborSpace’s role as a non-profit land trust and bridge organization greatly reduces financial and other transaction costs (e.g., labor, time) associated with community greenspace access and management—benefitting the city partners and local communities. In exchange, the city partners collaborate and provide fiscal support, and the communities steward the sites—benefitting NeighborSpace. The interviewees expressed satisfaction with the partnership, stating that the benefits of the partnership easily exceed the costs, and that each partner’s contributions are fair, all things considered.

Accountability

Accountability is a function of several dimensions (e.g., communication, shared decision making, enforcement), embodying upward, downward, and horizontal arrangements (DeCaro et al. 2025b). Briefly, NeighborSpace is formally accountable to its governmental partners (upward) via the aforementioned provisions for Board representation, regulation, annual reporting, and its 20-yr renewal cycle. Board members hold each other accountable (horizontal) via balanced representation. NeighborSpace’s President serves as Board Chair, enabling NeighborSpace to hold its partners accountable. NeighborSpace holds community groups accountable (upward) via regulatory provisions tied to the Community Partnership Agreement. Communities hold NeighborSpace accountable (downward) via (a) the agreement, which formally grants communities shared decision-making authority to govern the greenspaces, (b) basic political rights, and (c) indirectly via the Board’s alderperson representative, who represents community interests. Taken together, these arrangements create a fairly robust system of mutual accountability. Our interviews confirmed these arrangements in practice, as well as the Partnership’s high perceived trust and accountability.

In summary, our analyses indicate key stakeholders in the NeighborSpace Partnership have sufficient capacity for communication, shared decision making, enforcement, well-defined boundaries, equity, and accountability to support robust cooperation. We now discuss how NeighborSpace’s capacities facilitate adaptation and transformation.

Adaptation and transformation

The previous analyses can be conceptualized in terms of mechanisms for flexibility and stability, which enable ATG. The creation of the NeighborSpace partnership represents transformation. The city partners utilized general transformative capacities within the U.S. federal, state, and local governance systems (cf. Ostrom 1994, Craig et al. 2017) to create a new actor and institutional archetype (Neighborspace), governance network, and trans-governmental partnership with advantageous capabilities for the social-ecological dilemma.

NeighborSpace has also changed to remain resilient against stressors. NeighborSpace originally oversaw six to eight greenspaces. Now, it oversees approximately 120. NeighborSpace’s leaders (e.g., Executive Director) realized they needed more capacity to train and supervise community stewards. Therefore, NeighborSpace used its self-governing (i.e., constitutive, constitutional decision making) powers to create a Greenspace Stewardship Coordinator, transforming itself to better facilitate community governance. NeighborSpace also modified (adapted) its Community Partnership Agreement process from a 5-yr review to an annual review to increase monitoring, communication, and assistance. NeighborSpace also started providing environmental education, satisfying a new request by the FD.

NeighborSpace’s institutional flexibility also enables it to steward atypical greenspace projects other NPOs or government organizations cannot. For example, NeighborSpace arranged insurance and community stewardship for a unique hybrid riverfront greenspace–boardwalk project on a human-made island in a marginalized area, when the PD and other NPOs could not. The Executive Director also discussed instances where community greenspace sites were relocated because of unavoidable development projects. NeighborSpace’s status as a non-profit land trust, and close relationship with city departments and Alderpersons, enabled these transitions without permanent loss, which is a rare feat (cf. Smith and Kurtz 2003).

Finally, interviews indicate that NeighborSpace’s relative autonomy as a high-functioning Reinforced (A⁺R⁺E⁺SS⁺) archetype enabled it to resist co-optation by its city sponsors. NeighborSpace was not designed for greenspaces outside the city limits (e.g., suburbs) or soil pollution remediation. However, some Board members (e.g., FD, Alderperson) want NeighborSpace to adopt these missions. Under typical conditions of a decentralized subordinated administrative unit or contractor, NeighborSpace may be forced to comply (Ribot et al. 2006). However, due to its relative autonomy and fiscal self-sufficiency, NeighborSpace has resisted these changes, which could exceed its capacity limitations and result in failure.

Equitable greenspace access

We now ask whether these capacities translate into equitable greenspace access. We use this metric for two reasons. First, the public good dilemma of ensuring city-wide access for marginalized neighborhoods is the focal dilemma cities face. Second, our interviews indicated that access and efficient management are the city partners’ primary concern and own metric of success (see also, Chicago et al. 1998). Specifically, they deem the solution successful if it improves access without burdening the partners.

To investigate whether NeighborSpace’s greenspaces served marginalized communities as intended during the study timeframe, we used 2010 (5-yr) demographic estimates from the U.S. Census’s American Community Survey database to determine the percentage of Black, White, and other individuals of low- vs. high-income status that lived within a 0.8 km (10-min) radius of each greenspace (Fig. 3; Appendix 1). Most greenspaces (n = 58, 51%) served majority Black low-income communities. Another 12% (n = 14) and 7% (n = 8) served majority White or Hispanic low-income communities, respectively. Thus, a total of 70–80% serve low-income Black, White, or Hispanic communities.

Our data collection cannot speak directly about the quality of management or amenities at each greenspace site. However, these data strongly indicate that NeighborSpace enables equitable greenspace access in marginalized neighborhoods.

DISCUSSION

Many cities struggle to ensure equitable greenspace access in racially marginalized neighborhoods. This deficit arises from failed societal provision and production, with city governments lacking the will, knowledge, and/or capacity to devise viable solutions to the nested dilemmas this problem poses. Science may inform solutions to such problems by identifying viable institutional archetypes and governance network structures—and explaining principles of ATG. This requires a firm understanding of design principles and potential roles of non/government entities in the co-provision and co-production of public goods/services—including the organizational structure of government (e.g., centralized, polycentric).

We informed these issues by using the SRSG Framework (DeCaro et al. 2017, 2025b) to examine the institutional foundations of a successful solution. NeighborSpace was conceived as a “practice in democracy,” whereby governments collaborate via principles of polycentric self-governance to reinforce one another and local communities, previously disenfranchised by these same governments decades before. NeighborSpace exhibits the hallmarks of SRSG: polycentric, State-enabled co-provision and co-production via organizational self-governance, adaptive decision making, and multi-actor cooperation (cf. Shivakumar 2005, Frimpong Boamah 2024).

Pressured by federal intervention (lawsuit, consent decree), the City of Chicago—Mayor’s Office, Park District (PD), and Forest Preserve District (FD)—created an innovative solution for equitable greenspace access and management. They used their existing capacities for self-governance (e.g., home rule; federal/state policies governing NPOs) to create a formal partnership, centered around an institutional archetype—NeighborSpace—with ideal capacities for the focal dilemma. First, as a federally and state-recognized NPO, NeighborSpace has a generalized capacity for organizational self-governance (e.g., constitutional and administrative decision making), enabling it to be agile and resilient in its roles as a decision arena, co-producer, and co-provisioner for city-wide greenspace access (cf. Lane 1980, Singh et al. 2022 generally). Second, its status as a land trust grants NeighborSpace special operational capacities (e.g., property tax exemption, land “in trust”) that enable it to efficiently acquire, manage, and protect otherwise difficult-to-secure land—solving legal and logistical barriers many entities and solutions fail to solve. Third, formal provisions (i.e., authorizations and requirements) for multi-actor cooperation in the NeighborSpace Agreement and bylaws enable key stakeholders to build trust and maintain cooperative relationships—facilitating adaptive decision making (cf. Ostrom 1990, 2005a). These provisions are essential because NeighborSpace is the bridge organization uniting the stakeholders at city and neighborhood levels.

Archetypes

The NeighborSpace solution is consistent with the Reinforced (A⁺R⁺E⁺SS⁺) archetype identified by the SRSG Framework’s Base 3 Typology of ATC. This archetype is hypothesized to be well suited to address complex social-ecological dilemmas because of its synergistic configuration of decision making and operational authorities (A⁺), responsibilities (R⁺), external resources (E⁺), and resource self-sufficiency (SS⁺). To better articulate the importance of this distinction, we briefly discuss the contrasting Responsibility-Heavy (A^-R⁺) archetype.

Many decentralization programs fall into a common trap, divesting responsibility to a capacity-deprived administrative unit, within a hierarchically governed system (Ribot et al. 2006, Andersson and Ostrom 2008). Such regimes exhibit hallmarks of the Responsibility-Heavy archetype, especially those in which the decentralized administrative unit is funded primarily (E⁺) or exclusively (SS^-) by supervisory government sponsors (i.e., A^-R⁺E⁺SS^-), undermining its fiscal and administrative autonomy. For example, DeCaro et al. (2025a) report a case in which a government-sponsored community-greenspace program failed to improve greenspace access and eventually collapsed because the government sponsor dominated the decentralized unit’s decision-making authority, severely limiting its transformative capacity. It is unclear under what conditions a Responsibility-Heavy regime facilitates ATG (e.g., Gunderson et al. 2015; cf. Turner 2002). In theory, the governmental supervisor(s) or sponsor(s) would need to engage in effective multi-actor cooperation with the decentralized, Responsibility-Heavy unit and be responsive to its performance needs, in order to compensate for its capacity limitations (Andersson and Ostrom 2008). This discussion raises important theoretical questions about potential manifestations of SRSG.

Manifestations of State-reinforced self-governance

There are many solutions for dilemmas like neighborhood greenspace (e.g., Colding et al. 2013, Anderson et al. 2019). Many are arguably forms of SRSG that pose different dis/advantages for ATG. However, these relationships are poorly understood (cf. Schukoske 2000, Chapa et al. 2023, Wang and Liang 2024). What, then, is SRSG and which mode(s) are best suited to particular dilemmas?

In Sarker’s (2013) original presentation, Japanese governments created laws enabling citizens (farmers) to govern local, state, and national irrigation systems in increasingly complex arrangements: farmers govern local irrigation systems and elect district, prefectural, and national representatives for council bodies. However, according to Sarker, these entities operate parallel to formal governments without direct collaboration or intervention. In Chicago, federal and state governments remained distant, but local governments directly reinforce and collaborate with NeighborSpace, which collaborates with communities. Alternatively, governments may provide funding, remove legal barriers, or form temporary coalitions to deliver specific projects (e.g., Chaffin et al. 2016b, Garmestani et al. 2019).

These solutions represent different ways to organize State/non-State relationships to co-provision and/or co-produce public goods/services. The proper role(s) for State and non-State actors, and the structural organization of municipal governance (e.g., centralized vs. polycentric), are debated (e.g., Oakerson 1999, Ostrom 2000, 2010a). It is an empirical question which institutional regimes and structures best serve particular situations. The current study provides another data point wherein a polycentric, self-governing solution provided more effective and efficient service delivery than a centralized State actor (e.g., park department).

Future directions

This analysis prompts additional considerations regarding scale, context, and political will.

First, we focused on the city-wide dilemma of greenspace access. We did not examine the specific governance systems local communities created at individual greenspaces. The nature and quality of these governance systems likely vary, affecting the operation of the NeighborSpace partnership. In the Cooperative Extension Office case (DeCaro et al. 2025a), the partnership failed with comparable funding and only 11 sites because local self-governance failed. Site management became overwhelming and extremely costly. Future research should examine such contingencies to develop better understanding of cross-scale interactions.

Second, organizational scalability: other successful cases in this special issue feature prominent bridge organizations with analogous characteristics (i.e., A⁺R⁺E⁺SS⁺), serving similar roles as NeighborSpace. For example, New York City’s drinking water arrangement features a central watershed corporation (Hanlon et al. 2017). This observation suggests a potential archetypal network structure that warrants further investigation (cf. Barnes et al. 2017).

Third, several contextual factors likely contribute to the success of solutions like NeighborSpace. Cities sometimes encounter legal and political pushback for inequitable greenspace access (e.g., Smith and Kurtz 2003). However, solutions as progressive as NeighborSpace appear rare. One reason may be lack of political will. Few cities regard community greenspace as useful (i.e., profitable; Cahn and Segal 2016). Powerholders in society, including governments, are often reluctant to enable community governance of greenspaces and other public goods/services because it requires transformation in power (i.e., authorities, responsibility, operational resources) city administrators often fear (e.g., Hassanein 2003, Levkoe 2011; cf. Arnstein 1969). Moreover, principles of polycentric, societal self-governance are poorly understood. Many public administrators do not know why or how to implement SRSG (e.g., Horst et al. 2017; cf. Ostrom 1998, 2000). In such cases, dysfunctional forms of divested responsibility and deconcentration of production activities, rather than robust SRSG, are likely (Ribot et al. 2006, Kemper et al. 2007). Lack of political will seems to encourage the least effortful and costly adaptations, without transformation of power structures or institutions.

It is unclear why NeighborSpace’s framers created this progressive solution. However, Chicago’s mayor likely played a role. Innovative, collaborative solutions are more likely with a favorable mayor and engaged citizens pushing a shared vision (e.g., Wheeler 2000, Smiley et al. 2014). Interviews and historical documents frequently mentioned that Mayor Daly commissioned Chicago’s CitySpace Plan and supported NeighborSpace’s creation (Chicago et al. 1998, Helphand 2015). A former Commissioner for the Department of Planning—and former Chair of OpenLands (a local NPO for large-scale nature reserves)—also contributed. Chicago also has a robust history of neighborhood governance via its ward system (cf. Mladenka 1980). Interviews also mentioned the beneficial role the ward system may have played in the emergence and success of NeighborSpace. Finally, Illinois’s progressive Environmental Bill of Rights contributed generally. Social-ecological systems may have other cultural, economic, and/or legal characteristics that influence emergence of SRSG. Such factors warrant further attention.

NeighborSpace is not perfect. It does not resolve the common barrier of soil pollution remediation, which is extremely costly and requires specialized operational capacities (Felton 2006, Siikamäki and Wernstedt 2008). It may be advantageous—from a political economic (e.g., ecology of games; Lubell 2013) perspective—for the city to sponsor an additional NPO with this mission (Strum 2000, Wernstedt and Hanson 2009). This would fill a gap in the governance network, potentially enhancing the partnership’s ATC without over-burdening NeighborSpace.

More critically, inequitable greenspace provision arises from a deeper social-ecological dilemma—State racial oppression and neighborhood decline (Oakerson and Clifton 2017, Connolly and Anguelovski 2021, Adusei 2024). In the USA, federal, state, and local governments used diverse methods to forcibly take land, property, and political rights from Black communities (Gotham 2000). NeighborSpace does not solve this problem. However, other types of land trusts and institutional arrangements (e.g., community cooperatives) are designed to restore ownership and political rights (Foster 2011, Wires et al. 2019). These institutional archetypes could be examined, using the SRSG Framework. Neighborhood sovereignty and self-governance may also warrant attention for a neighborhood revitalization standpoint (Somerville 2005, Looker 2012, Adusei 2024).

CONCLUSION

The global greenspace crisis in racially marginalized neighborhoods requires innovative solutions. Governments possess considerable authority and responsibility to ensure citizens receive these vital public goods/services. We used the SRSG Framework to understand the institutional archetype, design principles, and governance network structure underlying a promising solution—a trans-governmental, non-profit land trust and partnership, organized on principles of polycentric self-governance. We hope this example inspires others to study additional solutions, informing institutional design and social-ecological resilience.

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