Research, part of a special feature on State-Reinforced Transformative and Adaptive Governance of Sustainable Social-Ecological Systems

INTRODUCTION

Many cities lack small, community greenspaces for their health, recreation, and ecological benefit (Sun et al. 2022). Racially marginalized neighborhoods suffer most, inhabiting post-industrial areas characterized by concentrated poverty, public bads (e.g., industrial sites), and deficient public goods/services (Bullard and Johnson 2000, Green et al. 2016). This inequality often emerges from historic State oppression or neglect (Rigolon et al. 2018a,b). For example, in the USA, discriminatory federal policies (e.g., 1964 Highways Act) authorized city governments to raze Black neighborhoods for public infrastructure and private investments (e.g., highways, industrial facilities) that ultimately benefitted affluent White citizens. Many marginalized Black residents are trapped in barren industrial areas created by these policies (Gotham 2000, Connolly and Anguelovski 2021).

Many city governments are also trapped in a maladaptive cycle, unable to envision effective governance systems to disrupt strong social, economic, and legal barriers to greenspace transformation (e.g., Smith and Kurtz 2003, Chaffin et al. 2016b). To address this problem, some city governments have created innovative public–private partnerships using complex, polycentric community-based governance arrangements. These partnerships empower local governments and communities to co-provision (e.g., co-design) and co-produce (e.g., implement, maintain) neighborhood greenspace programs (e.g., Mattijssen et al. 2018, Anderson et al. 2019; cf. Colding et al. 2013, Schifman et al. 2017). These systems exhibit evidence of adaptive and transformative governance (ATG) (Garmestani et al. 2019) but are difficult to implement because their design features are poorly understood (Schukoske 2000, DeCaro et al. 2025a).

In the current paper, we analyze a case of maladaptive polycentric greenspace provision and production, using the State-reinforced self-governance (SRSG) framework of ATG (DeCaro et al. 2017, 2025b). The case takes place in Louisville, Kentucky—a post-industrial city in the USA with pronounced racial segregation and greenspace disparity (Gilderbloom 2016, Parks and People Foundation (PPF) 2000). It is especially informative because it features a common solution—partnership with the Cooperative Extension Service (a federal/state program for agricultural outreach) (Diekmann et al. 2017, Ruemenapp 2017)—that failed to ensure positive outcomes. The system exhibits the hallmarks of a classic but poorly understood decentralization failure, dysfunctional cooperation and devolution of responsibility to a capacity-deprived agent (Ribot et al. 2006, Andersson and Ostrom 2008). We explain how the system emerged and why it failed to effectively govern and maintain greenspaces in marginalized neighborhoods from a contextual and institutional design standpoint.

This study is part of a larger project (DeCaro et al. 2025b) examining how governments enable (or constrain) ATG by facilitating (or impeding) diverse forms of self-governance. The SRSG framework posits that governments can facilitate ATG in decentralized systems by supporting dilemma stakeholders’ capacity for independent action, organizational self-governance, and-actor cooperation—creating a polycentric, self-governing system for collective problem solving and institutional innovation. Therefore, we investigate larger theoretical issues relevant to decentralization, polycentricity, State power, and (co)provision/(co)production of environmental public goods in metropolitan systems (cf. Oakerson 1999, Ostrom 2000, Shivakumar 2005, Wang and Liang 2024).

In doing so, we also address three methodological deficits in the assessment of ATG that hinder scientific advancement and undermine policy design (DeCaro et al. 2025b). Scientists and policy makers often focus on a single timeframe (Baldwin et al. 2024). The current study examines a 20-yr time period to better understand institutional emergence, evolution, and resilience over time. Prior research often oversimplifies complex systems, overlooking critical components, processes, and interactions, such as feedback loops between (co)provisioning and (co)production (McGinnis 2011, Baldwin et al. 2024). This study examines these structural and functional connections to better understand how polycentric networks of provision/production (Ostrom 1994, Oakerson 1999) facilitate or impede one another—contributing to system flexibility or rigidity (Barnes et al. 2017, Baldwin et al. 2024). Third, this study helped to develop the SRSG framework’s coding system, contributing to assessment of SRSG and adaptive/transformative capacity (Engle 2011, Siders 2019, Clement et al. 2021). This approach addresses the call for greater scientific rigor in the study of ATG systems (Ostrom 2005a, Cumming et al. 2020, Baldwin et al. 2024, DeCaro et al. 2025b).

We start by describing the historical and technical characteristics of the dilemma. We then overview concepts of co-provision and co-production relevant to this study, especially provision–production feedback loops that influence (mal)adaptation. Afterward, we discuss the SRSG framework, outlining the analytical conventions and hypotheses guiding our work. The methods and results highlight governance structures, processes, and capacities affecting important outcomes—including greenspace access and system resilience. We conclude with scientific and practical implications for SRSG and ATG.

CHARACTERIZING THE DILEMMA

Greenspace access is affected by numerous actors, factors, and processes (Schifman et al. 2017). Greenspace inequality poses several interlocking subdilemmas pertaining to greenspace governance (provision), and resource management/allocation (production) (Sharifi 2016, Foster and Iaone 2016). These dilemmas span institutional, ecological, built, and sociopolitical infrastructures (Chaffin et al. 2016b). This complexity—and structural racism—is why so few cities adequately resolve the problem (Cahn and Segal 2016). This complexity is also why novel research frameworks and methods are needed to gain analytical leverage over such systems (Cumming et al. 2020, Baldwin et al. 2024, DeCaro et al. 2025b).

Historical background

Deficient greenspace in the USA’s marginalized neighborhoods emerged from deliberate State oppression and misguided urban planning that emphasized industrialization, suburbanization, and large central parks that serve predominantly affluent White citizens (Sharifi 2016, Connolly and Anguelovski 2021; for global perspective, Sun et al. 2022). From 1900–1970, minoritized citizens were subjected to federal, state, and local laws that systematically robbed their communities of land and property, and disenfranchised their political and economic rights (e.g., Jim Crow laws). The 1924 National Housing Act, 1954 federal Housing Act, and 1964 Highways Act encouraged so-called “redlining” and “urban renewal.” Local governments, banks, insurance companies, and real-estate agencies conspired to officially designate minority-owned households and neighborhoods as “blighted” (Gotham 2000, Pritchett 2003). This designation authorized businesses to deny essential services (e.g., bank loans), and permitted governments to forcibly take property (seizure by eminent domain). Neighborhoods were razed to install highways and other public works benefiting White residents.

Greenspace inequalities emerged from these and ongoing forms of systemic racism (e.g., Smiley et al. 2014; see Nardone et al. 2021 for review). In Louisville, these factors were compounded by devastating floods in 1937 and 1945, especially in Louisville’s West End. White residents received loans to rebuild or relocate. Black residents did not, worsening neighborhood decline and producing the current greenspace wasteland (Marshall 2017, Mattingly 2021).

Technical characteristics

Equitable greenspace access is a complex social-ecological dilemma, posing several sub-dilemmas and action situations, or centers of decision making and operational activity. Ostrom (1990) suggested that such complex dilemmas typically pose at least one common-pool resource (CPR) dilemma and two associated public good (PG) dilemmas: (1) creating a governance system (provision), and (2) performing technical procedures to deliver and maintain necessary infrastructures, goods, and services (production) (cf. Anderies et al. 2016). The current dilemma exhibits these elements at the city and neighborhood levels (Fig. 1). These aspects of greenspace provision and production are tightly linked and must be addressed simultaneously as a complex sociotechnical network or system to understand the system’s dynamics and performance (e.g., Schifman et al. 2017; cf. Anderies et al. 2016).

We focus primarily on the city-level provisioning dilemma, and secondarily on production activities at intermediate and neighborhood levels. Specifically, we investigate whether and how cities such as Louisville can provision city-wide community-greenspace programs capable of effectively producing community-greenspace access and management services over time. This focus also entails examining the responsiveness of the system to interlocking provision–production crises (Oakerson 1999, Anderies et al. 2016).

At the city level, there is a CPR dilemma regarding land scarcity and allocation (Cahn and Segal 2016, Foster and Iaone 2016). Cities are densely populated hubs of economic activity and development (“land-use”) within a confined geographic location (Grimm et al. 2008). City governments typically prioritize profitable development projects, not community greenspace—especially in marginalized neighborhoods that generate little tax revenue for public works (Smith and Kurtz 2003, Sharifi 2016). City governments must create governance systems to oversee city-wide land use, prioritizing and enabling equitable greenspace (PG dilemma; cf. PPF 2000). These institutional arrangements must codify such aspects as to which lands are eligible, who will produce and govern the sites, and how site management will be enforced. Potential greenspaces must also be acquired and processed into usable form (e.g., clearing deeds/titles, property tax payment) and maintained throughout the city (PG dilemma).

At the neighborhood level, a CPR dilemma occurs when allocating limited room for garden plots and other uses (e.g., recreation) within each greenspace site. Competition among gardeners and/or community members must be addressed, and a governance system created to govern each site (PG), whether community governed or otherwise (Colding et al. 2013, Mattijssen et al. 2018). Finally, each greenspace (and its plots) must be maintained, satisfying landscape and public health requirements (PG) (Kirshbaum 2000).

Governing and maintaining public goods/services such as community greenspaces that are dispersed throughout a city poses significant logistical and financial challenges (see Oakerson 1999, Ostrom 2000 for discussion of scale). Few park departments can address these challenges alone. Bridge organizations and public–private partnership are often needed, enabling government and non-government stakeholders (e.g., non-profit organizations, communities) to co-provision and co-produce necessary goods/services via various polycentric arrangements (Chaffin et al. 2016b, Schifman et al. 2017). We discuss these considerations next, foreshadowing our application of SRSG.

CO-PROVISION, CO-PRODUCTION, AND RESILIENCE

Governance and State power are fundamentally about determining the means of provision (e.g., governance) and production in society (Ostrom 1980, 2010a). The current paper seeks to understand how SRSG is related to such provision–production networks in ATG systems.

(Co)provision and (co)production

The concepts of (co)provision and (co)production are debated (Ostrom 1996, Voorberg et al. 2014). We use terms by Oakerson (1999). “Provisioning” refers to activities to decide and create institutions (“rules of the game”) and governance systems. “Production” refers to technical activities to deliver various goods/services to address particular dilemmas. Co-provision and co-production are collective forms of provision and production. Maladaptive systems emerge from misfit and dysfunction in the design and implementation of these system elements (Anderies et al. 2016, DeCaro et al. 2025b).

Regarding production, scholars and practitioners have identified several critical production activities (i.e., operational capacities) needed for community greenspace (e.g., Kirshbaum 2000, PPF 2000, Schukoske 2000). For example, successful greenspace programs must be designed to effectively and efficiently acquire land (e.g., titling), protect the greenspaces against redevelopment, and ensure site upkeep (see Table 1). Due to the diversity of services and dynamic nature of urban systems, complex multi-stakeholder networks of provisioners and producers are often needed to deliver and maintain these goods.

Provision–production networks

(Co)provision and (co)production are linked by feedback loops (Morgan and England 1988, Barnes et al. 2017). Effective polycentric ATG systems ensure that key stakeholders have sufficient capacity to independently and jointly govern these feedbacks. In these systems, provision and production units fulfill complementary roles—independently and/or collectively altering institutional structures, functions, and/or processes to address shortfalls or crises in performance of their independent and joint duties (Oakerson 1999, Baldwin et al. 2024). This principle implies that key stakeholders in decentralized systems require some degree of independent and joint capacity for self-governance, production, and multi-actor cooperation (McGinnis 2011, Baldwin et al. 2024, DeCaro et al. 2025b). There may also be synergies and trade-offs among these capacities (Oakerson 1999).

For example, consider a case where a critically important production unit (e.g., parks department) lacks necessary production capacities (i.e., Table 1). The unit could resolve these shortfalls through (a) self-governance within its own unit (provisioning its own institutional solutions) or (b) multi-actor cooperation and collective self-governance (co-provisioning and/or co-producing institutional and technical solutions with other stakeholders) (cf. Ostrom 2005a, Morgan and England 1988, McGinnis 2011). If the unit lacks capacity for organizational self-governance, and/or collective self-governance is deficient, then rigidity traps may emerge at organizational and/or system levels—resulting in failed greenspace provision/production. Such traps are common in maladaptive decentralization systems (Andersson and Ostrom 2008, Cumming 2018). The SRSG framework was developed to provide conceptual, analytical, and methodological leverage over these issues.

STATE-REINFORCED SELF-GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK

The SRSG framework examines the role governments play in enabling (or hindering) effective and resilient polycentric, self-governing systems (DeCaro et al. 2017, 2025b). There are many conceptualizations of polycentricity and resilience (Siders 2017, Baldwin et al. 2024). The SRSG framework offers one perspective. It seeks to explain the underlying structural and procedural features of polycentric systems (e.g., design principles, network structures, provision/production processes) that affect ATG and resilience. We begin by defining ATG, followed by adaptive and transformative capacity, and the SRSG perspective.

Adaptive and transformative governance

Within Ostrom political economy, ATG systems are societal problem-solving systems characterized by diverse centers of activity, which share information, experiment, and alter their institutional structures, functions, and processes to jointly address common problems (Ostrom 1994, 2005a,b; see Chaffin et al. 2014, 2016a). Self-organization, adaptive decision making, and multi-actor cooperation are essential features of ATG, enabling diverse stakeholders to understand their dilemma(s), build trust, and problem solve to devise better-fitting solutions to complex and dynamic social-ecological dilemmas (Ostrom 1990, 2005a). These functions emerge from underlying sets of institutional features and capacities.

Adaptive and transformative capacity

From a systems perspective, adaptive and transformative capacities (ATC) refer to properties of social-ecological systems (SESs) that enable them to adjust (adapt) or innovate and replace (transform) existing components (structures, functions, and/or processes) to address stressors or crises (Garmestani et al. 2019). Institutionally, ATCs are properties of governance systems that enable them to adapt or transform institutional arrangements to address feedback loops and emergent needs for (co)provision and (co)production (DeCaro et al. 2025b).

In the SRSG framework, institutional ATCs are embodied by design principles, such as authority for organizational and/or collective self-governance, which give stakeholders the capability to (a) produce various goods/services and (b) make decisions to alter institutional arrangements. State-reinforced self-governance seeks to describe how governments use their legislative, administrative, regulatory, and fiscal powers to in/formally enable (or constrain) these capacities in complex provision–production networks (Sarker 2013, DeCaro et al. 2017, 2025b). The SRSG framework diagnoses and explains the ATC of ATG systems in terms of three core components: design principles, institutional archetypes, and governance networks.

Design principles

The SRSG framework regards institutional design principles (Table 2) as the functional building blocks (“elements”) of institutions, which therefore represent their fundamental ATCs. For example, Ostrom’s (1990, 2005a) design principles for multi-actor cooperation (e.g., shared decision making, enforcement) facilitate information exchange and trust, enabling cooperative problem solving among diverse stakeholders, thereby increasing their collective ATC. Design principles for State-reinforcement (DeCaro et al. 2017, 2025b) refer to authority (powers), responsibilities (duties, constraints), operational resources (e.g., funding), and mechanisms for flexibility/stability (e.g., decision-making discretion, policy sunsets) that are in/formally granted or assigned to particular actors and collective action processes. These authorizations, responsibilities, and resources further enable (or constrain) actors’ independent and collective ATC in the form of enhanced (or diminished) capacity for production of particular goods/services, organizational self-governance, or collective self-governance.

For example, governments may (a) create new organizations, with particular sets of powers and duties, (b) forbid particular organizations from governing themselves, and/or (c) authorize actors to engage in various forms of multi-actor cooperation (e.g., communication, shared decision making), to address particular kinds of social-ecological dilemmas. These State actions enable emergence and resilience of some kinds of provision–production networks, while constraining others (Ostrom 1994, 2010a). These actions fundamentally affect the ATC of individual actors, collectives, and the system as a whole (DeCaro et al. 2017, 2025b).

The effect(s) of design principles are configural and interact with social-ecological context in complex ways (Crawford and Ostrom 2005, McGinnis and Ostrom 2014). The SRSG framework uses the concept of institutional archetypes, organizational self-governance, and governance network structure to account for this complexity.

Institutional archetypes

Institutional archetypes refer to prototypical institutional forms or “entities,” including types of rules (Ostrom and Crawford 2005), particular roles or types of actors (Tarko et al. 2019), common organizations (Carper and Snizek 1980), and governance network structures (Barnes et al. 2017, Schifman et al. 2017). In the current study, we focus primarily on organizational archetypes and their underlying, archetypal capacities. Specifically, various types of organizations possess different configurations of institutional capacities, which enable them to perform particular functions.

The SRSG framework developed a Base 3 Typology of ATC to enable analysts to classify the basic ATCs associated with particular institutional entities (DeCaro et al. 2025b). For example, what ATCs does a typical (or specific) non-profit organization, parks department, or extension office possess? What capacities do particular types of multi-actor cooperatives (e.g., partnerships), or collective action processes possess? These underlying capacities are conceptualized by examining prototypical configurations of authority, responsibility, and operational resources. The SRSG framework also considers a focal actor’s degree of organizational self-governance, which is a subset of an organization’s archetypal capacities (Ostrom 1992, McGinnis 2017). Generally speaking, particular actors in a decentralized network need particular capacities for organizational self-governance, collective self-governance (e.g., multi-actor cooperation), and the provision and/or production of specific goods/services.

The SRSG framework (DeCaro et al. 2025b) identifies four basic archetypes in terms of ATC. Two are especially informative for the current study. The Reinforced (A⁺R⁺) archetype refers to entities that have sufficient formal (legally binding) authority and responsibility to perform necessary provision and/or production activities, for their role(s) in a particular dilemma. For example, non-profit organizations (NPOs) are a common organizational archetype, with particular capacities. Non-profit organizations are typically authorized to perform a variety of operational functions relevant to particular service mission(s) (Lane 1980), like public education, environmental protection, or community greenspace (DeCaro et al. 2025a). Many NPOs act as bridge organizations, with authority to engage in multi-actor cooperation (e.g., communication, shared decision making) with diverse stakeholders. Non-profit organizations have formal mandates (responsibilities) that compel them to fulfill their mission(s) and prohibit them from engaging in activities that may undermine their mission for public service (e.g., political lobbying, profit seeking). Reinforced entities are thought to facilitate effective operations, especially when they have sufficient external resources (E⁺) and self-sufficiency (SS⁺) to ensure fiscal autonomy and resilience (cf. Kemper et al. 2007, Andersson and Ostrom 2008).

In contrast, Responsibility-heavy entities (A^-R⁺) have formal responsibility to perform particular functions but insufficient authority. For example, a decentralized administrative office may be formally required to acquire and promote community-governed greenspace but lack the necessary administrative or operational capacities (authority). DeCaro and colleagues (2017, 2025b) suggest this type of deficiency is common in maladaptive decentralization systems (cf. Ribot et al. 2006). Such arrangements may be especially dysfunctional when the focal actor (e.g., decentralized unit) is a subordinate actor (e.g., agency, office) that receives orders and most of its funding from a higher, supervisory agent (cf. Kemper et al. 2007). Such archetypes are classified as an A^-R⁺EE⁺SS^- subtype: a responsibility-heavy entity with high external resource dependency (EE⁺) and low self-sufficiency (SS^-). Such entities generally have low fiscal and decision-making autonomy, greatly reducing their ATC. DeCaro et al. (2025b) suggest that this archetypal configuration of ATCs may be especially problematic when the focal actor needs to perform diverse provision and/or production functions in a complex, dynamic SES or dilemma (cf. Anderies et al. 2016).

Organizational self-governance

The SRSG framework distinguishes organizational self-governance from multi-actor cooperation (e.g. collective self-governance) and (co)production (DeCaro et al. 2025b). Whereas capacities for multi-actor cooperation (Table 2) facilitate cooperative modes of self-governance (and ATC), organizational self-governance facilitates independent (organizational) forms of self-governance (and ATC). Specifically, actors with greater constitutive, constitutional decision-making, rule-making, administrative, self-regulatory, and fiscal authority (Table 3) typically have greater discretion, and therefore ATC (Ostrom 1992, McGinnis 2017). Non-profit organizations typically possess these capacities, allowing them to adopt or reconfigure their organizational structures, missions, functions, and processes to better address changing conditions (Lane 1980, Singh et al. 2022). This adaptability is why NPOs are prominent figures in ATG systems.

Synergies and trade-offs

Synergic relationships among actors’ positions and capacities generally improve a system’s ATC, with different functional nodes enhancing the strengths, and compensating for the deficiencies, of others (Oakerson 1999, Baldwin et al. 2024). Maladaptive governance systems typically feature (a) contextually inappropriate organizational and/or ATC archetypes that lack necessary production capacities (Table 1), (b) deficient multi-actor cooperation (Table 2), and/or (c) hierarchical governance arrangements that overly restrict the focal decentralized actor’s capacity for organizational self-governance (Table 3) (DeCaro et al. 2025a,b). As shown later, the current case exhibits deficiencies in all three dimensions.

Formality

The ATC of governance systems is affected by both formal (de jure) “rules on paper” and informal (de facto) “rules in use” (Crawford and Ostrom 2005). Formal and informal institutional arrangements may mis/align in complementary or contradictory ways. For example, informally granted decision-making authority could enable an actor to overcome deficits in formal authority. Alternatively, informal State-imposed restrictions on decision-making authority could prevent an actor from operating as formally intended (Hosseinioon 2019, Jaffe and Koster 2019). Either situation could yield dis/advantageous outcomes (Garmestani et al. 2019). The effects of in/formality depends on context. DeCaro et al. (2025b) therefore advise analysts to examine formal and informal institutional arrangements to understand their potential consequences for ATG—especially when informal arrangements are prominent in a particular system. As described later, the current case involves many critical informal components. We therefore analyze both the formal and informal arrangements structuring the case.

Governance network and institutional fit

The SRSG framework uses an updated version of McGinnis and Ostrom’s (2014) SES framework to understand how context influences the fit (adequacy, appropriateness) and performance of particular network configurations. An important factor to consider is whether key actors possess synergistic roles and capacities within the decentralized system. For example, many ATG systems feature a bridge organization, which serves as a center for collective decision making, coordination, and multi-stakeholder cooperation (e.g., co-provision, co-production) (Garmestani and Benson 2013, Barnes et al. 2017). Such entities presumably need sufficient authority, responsibility, and operational resources for multi-actor cooperation. Adaptive and transformative governance systems also feature rule makers and regulators, which benefit from specific capacities (Epstein 2017). The SRSG framework asks how the State facilitates emergence and coordination of these centers and modes of activity for particular SESs and dilemmas. We used the SRSG-SES framework to contextualize the case-study system and subsequent analyses.

CASE STUDY SYSTEM

This study examines a failed community-greenspace system, involving a multi-level, multi-stakeholder partnership among Louisville Metro Government (LMG), the University of Kentucky’s (UK) state Extension Service, the local office of Louisville/Jefferson County’s Cooperative Extension Service (JCCE Office), and local communities. The JCCE Office is a bridge organization sponsored by LMG (and UK) to coordinate key stakeholders and administer LMG’s community-greenspace program. Thus, JCCE Office is the primary decentralized unit responsible for the program’s core functions.

To facilitate contextual understanding and ground our formal analyses, we first provide a narrative description of the system. This description includes the context and major governance arrangements, events, and outcomes. Afterward, we report our methods and formal analysis, explaining the factors, technical design features, and interactions driving the case.

Louisville

Louisville, Kentucky is a moderately sized, post-industrial metropolitan region in the USA. Its historical, economic, and racial characteristics resemble other midwestern cities facing similar greenspace dilemmas (e.g., Smiley et al. 2014, Green et al. 2016). The Louisville Metro Area ranks 27th in the nation by population (633,000; 67% White/Caucasian, 24% Black/African American) (U.S. Census Bureau 2021). Median household income is $58,000 (16% poverty rate).

Louisville is among the USA’s most segregated cities (Acs et al. 2017, Mattingly 2021). Approximately 77% of Black residents inhabit Louisville’s West End (median household income: $24,000). This area experiences greater exposure to public bads (e.g. brownfields, air pollution; Sarr et al. 2021), decreased lifespans (Gilderbloom et al. 2016), and greater income, housing, and public infrastructure disparity (Croutcher 2017, Marshall 2017). During the study period, there were 6000–7000 vacant properties. Most (60%) were in the West End (Nelson 2017, Vacant and Abandoned Property Administration (VPPA) 2018). Vacant properties decreased to approximately 2000 units recently, but the majority remain concentrated in the West End. Louisville prioritizes large parks and therefore lacks a comprehensive greenspace plan for small, neighborhood greenspaces. Thus, only about 37% of Louisville’s population can access a recreational area or greenspace within a 10-min (0.8 km) walk from their residence (Trust for Public Land (TPL) 2023).

Extension service

Cooperative Extension Service is a federal program created in 1862 (Morrill Act), and updated in 1914 (Smith-Lever Act), to support agricultural production via agricultural research and development, education, partnership, and outreach (Diekmann et al. 2017, Ruemenapp 2017). It provides federal funds and land for states to establish “land-grant universities,” which implement a state’s extension programs. Kentucky’s Extension Service is organized by county/district. Each of Kentucky’s 120 counties may create an Extension District, with an office for service delivery. Offices are governed by a county Extension Council and Board of Directors.

University of Kentucky is Kentucky’s flagship land-grant university. It is located approximately 113 km east of Louisville/Jefferson County. University of Kentucky’s Extension Director is therefore the state director, planning and overseeing state-wide extension activities under supervision of Kentucky’s Secretary of Agriculture, in collaboration with local/county extension offices (Cooperative Extension Services (CES) 2024). University of Kentucky’s Extension Director is also advised by a state-level Extension Advisory council, consisting of representatives from major regions in Kentucky. University of Kentucky’s Extension Director wields executive (e.g., constitutional, regulatory) powers over extension offices and programs. Thus, county extension services and their offices are semi-autonomous: they operate within the constitutional constraints (rules, regulations) determined by UK’s Extension Director and federal, state, and local laws.

Extension Services are intended to be decentralized, self-governing entities to enable (a) local implementation of state-wide initiatives and (b) locally adaptive decision making, to create programs and solutions that are responsive to local needs (Franz and Townson 2008). Extension offices often play a supportive role in urban agriculture/community greenspace, providing agricultural training, technological expertise, equipment, and supplies (e.g., raised garden beds). They may also help coordinate various non/government stakeholders for particular projects (Reynolds 2011, Ruemenapp 2017). However, they typically do not serve as the principal agent (decentralized unit) responsible for administering a city’s greenspace program(s). The Louisville case exhibits several features that depart substantially from this norm.

Louisville/Jefferson County extension

The greenspace partnership system is complex, involving many loosely coordinated actors and poorly specified governance roles and processes (Fig. 2). It is complex partly because the stakeholders failed to devise a cohesive and efficient solution that supports an effective network for co-provision and co-production of critical goods/services.

Unlike other extension offices, JCCE Office is a direct satellite of UK’s Extension Service. The Office operates in Louisville but is staffed by UK employees. It has a local administrative Director but is governed by UK’s Director and the JCCE District Board (Fig. 2a-b), which is this Extension District’s governing body. The Board has seven members: Louisville’s Mayor and six local “citizens” appointed by the Mayor, representing public agricultural, economic, and community interests. The Board is advised by a Council of at least 15 additional citizens (Fig. 2c). However, UK’s Extension Director can override decisions made by any district, board/council, or office.

Kentucky’s Extension Service is therefore structurally decentralized, with opportunity for public advisory input, but is governed hierarchically. The JCCE Office is a subordinate administrative unit within this system. The Office implements programmatic decisions made by its governing bodies, JCCE District (Board, Council), UK, and UK’s Extension Director.

In 2003, LMG and Jefferson County merged into a larger metro region. Louisville Metro Government and UK entered an official agreement (memorandum of agreement (MOA)) at this time. The MOA established JCCE Office’s modern operations, which officially pertain to standard extension services (agriculture research/development, education, outreach). Louisville Metro Government also became a supervisory agent (Fig. 2d) for the Office, and officially agreed to provide JCCE Office $350,000 annually for its general operations. University of Kentucky and UK’s Extension Director agreed to provide staff salary support, training, equipment, and primary administrative oversight.

Community-greenspace partnership

The greenspace partnership/community-greenspace program formed around 2005. The precise date cannot be determined because the partnership was created by an informal verbal agreement among unknown agents (Fig. 2e). There are no records of the agreement or who formed it. As will become clear later, this informality misaligns problematically with Extension’s formal federal, state, and local mandates, detrimentally affecting the greenspace program.

Interviews with key stakeholders indicate that JCCE Office was asked to oversee 11 (now 10) community greenspaces, sponsored by LMG’s allotment garden program (Fig. 2f). The greenspaces are primarily food-producing gardens, dispersed throughout Louisville/Jefferson County. Gardeners pay a small annual fee (e.g., $20) to use a private garden plot. The JCCE Office was informally authorized to use $50,000 of its annual funding for the program. Louisville Metro Government (i.e., the Mayor’s legal council) created a Community Garden Agreement delineating gardeners’ rights and responsibilities toward greenspace management. The JCCE Office is charged with the responsibility to convey and enforce the garden agreement.

Importantly, the official MOA among LMG, UK, and JCCE Office does not mention the greenspace partnership or community-greenspace program (JCCE Office Director). This informality makes the program’s institutional arrangements and operations uncertain:

[W]e have a...verbally grandfathered agreement to operate in those [green]spaces. [B]ut we do not have anything legally binding or current.... [W]e have a system of quiet anarchy where people—because there’s so much that is nebulous in this system—that folks have learned to operate on a basic level, and just do things that generally fall within what has been culturally deemed acceptable. (JCCE Office Horticulture Agent)

To ensure efficient site management, JCCE Office was asked to sponsor local communities to govern and maintain the greenspaces via a community-based approach (Fig. 2g). Specifically, JCCE Office would provide technical and educational support, like leadership training and occasional supplies. In 2013—several years into the partnership—JCCE Office helped a transgovernmental collaborative create a flagship demonstration garden, Parkland Community Garden, which was envisioned as the template for future sites (Department of Economic Growth and Innovation (DEGI) 2013). A LMG staff member described the project’s purpose:

Parkland Community Garden was...a Metro owned lot. It had been vacant for 20 or 30 years.... [S]ome neighbors in Parkland had talked to [their Councilperson] and had wanted a garden.... [University of Louisville’s Center for Environmental Policy and Management] negotiated with [a Senior Policy staff member in LMG], who was doing the local food at that time—[this person] helped to get the lot secured. JCCE provided...soil, they provided cedar logs for the actual beds, and the mulch.... [B]ut the idea with any garden that we [LMG] support...there’s got to be enough local support that it’s self-sustaining. So we don’t really want to need to be involved to keep it going. The idea is that the neighborhood has ownership of it, and they kind of keep things running.... So JCCE helps, you know, with just basic management...keeping the water turned on and all that sort of thing.

Interviews indicate that JCCE Office was initially supportive of local community governance and management. However, JCCE struggled to maintain community stewardship, resulting in poor site upkeep and neighborhood complaints for some greenspaces, triggering external enforcement by local district councilpersons, LMG, and UK’s Extension Director. The JCCE Office eventually took control of site governance and maintenance to guarantee their upkeep. The JCCE Office’s Director said the following about Parkland:

[T]he Parkland Community Garden ended up being via [local Councilperson], the community that developed their own core group. [T]hey wanted control over the community garden, and because of our investment, we couldn’t let them have full control. We said, “Let’s partner on this.” [B]ecause of our liability in the [lease] agreement that we signed, we have to make [sure] that at least that part of the agreement is maintained.

The JCCE Office’s Horticultural Agent, who became responsible for directly maintaining (e.g., mowing) each greenspace site, confirmed similar arrangements for the other sites:

[T]he community does not have any agency in determining structure and management. It’s all very hierarchical...there’s not a lot of agency or role for gardeners in decision making... It’s kind of a landlord/tenant relationship, where we become the landlords.

The JCCE Office’s decision to take over site management strained its financial and operational capacities, preventing it from acquiring new sites.

Greenspace equity

To understand the implications of this decision for greenspace equity, we conducted a spatial analysis assessing the program’s greenspace access for marginalized communities (see Appendix 1 for details). We examined 2010 (5-yr) demographic estimates from the U.S. Census’s American Community Survey database, determining the percentage of Black, White, and other individuals of low vs. high income status living within a 0.8 km radius (10-min walk) from each sponsored site. Most (40%) of the sites (n = 4) serve majority White high-income areas (Fig. 3). An additional 20% (n = 2) serve White low-income communities in the West End. Only 30% (n = 3) serve majority Black low-income areas (10%, n = 1, serve Black high-income areas). Thus, few of the sponsored greenspaces serve marginalized Black communities.

In nearly 20 yrs, the greenspace program did not expand beyond 10 sites or robustly address inequitable access. Stakeholder interviews indicate that most of the greenspaces are fenced and closed to the community, usable only by fee-paying gardeners. Moreover, the greenspaces are not community governed or maintained. In May 2024, the Mayor’s Office issued a proposal to defund JCCE Office (minus $300,000), with $50,000 remaining to support the existing greenspaces until an alternative solution is developed. Interviews identified several contributing factors, including financial constraints, lack of community governance to enable cost-efficient site management, and various capacity limitations of JCCE Office and the partnership. Interviews also revealed that JCCE Office was not only heavily dependent on LMG and UK for its funding, but also administratively subordinated to LMG and UK.

These patterns suggest potential involvement of a maladaptive, resource-dependent responsibility-heavy (A^-R⁺EE⁺SS^-) governance regime, with a lack of organizational self-governance by the focal actor JCCE Office, and deficient multi-actor cooperation. To determine whether and how these features contributed, we conducted a technical analysis of the institutional arrangements and design features structuring the system. This analysis reveals precise mechanisms by which this attempted polycentric ATG system failed, providing insight into SRSG and ATG of complex social-ecological dilemmas.

METHODS

The current case system sought to facilitate equitable greenspace via decentralized public–private partnership. The local Extension office (JCCE Office), served as the focal decentralization unit and bridge organization. This actor (JCCE Office) was also given primary (co)provision and (co)production responsibilities. Therefore, we focus our analysis primarily on this actor, asking the extent to which it has sufficient capacity for greenspace production, organizational self-governance, and multi-actor cooperation to co-provision and co-produce equitable greenspace with its partners in this complex provision–production network.

Design

We examined the time period 2005–2020, with some recent observations from 2024. This period spans the greenspace program’s formation and collapse. During Phase 1 (July–November 2017), we collected initial policy documents, websites, news articles, and interviews to develop a preliminary understanding of the case. During Phase 2 (June 2019–January 2020), we collected additional interviews and policy documents. We acquired policy and organizational documents from the public domain (e.g., government databases, websites) and requested others.

Codes derived from these data, and anonymized interview data that support the findings of this study, are openly available in OSF [https://osf.io/7t4am/?view_only=2d716009d89b4282b9758ee3ebac3f39]. Ethical approval for this research study was granted by the principal investigator’s university human subjects institutional review board (IRB 17.0723, 19.0588). All interviewers and data analysts were certified for adherence to ethical standards to protect human data. The interviewees participated voluntarily, with informed consent.

Policy documents

We collected the following policy documents: Morrill Act 1862/1980 (establishing the federally sponsored Land Grant/Agricultural Research program), Smith-Lever Act 1914/2008 (establishing the Cooperative Extension Service); Kentucky Revised Statues (KRS) 164 (establishing Kentucky’s Extension Service and University of Kentucky as its primary administrative center); Ordinance 36-2002/119-2007 (establishing the modern Extension Service in Louisville/Jefferson County); MOA (formal partnership agreement between Louisville Metro Government, the University of Kentucky, and the local extension service); University of Kentucky’s Extension bylaws; and the greenspace program’s Community Garden Agreement (governing garden-user rights and responsibilities). We also examined Kentucky’s state constitution for an environmental bill of rights that may support greenspace rights (non-existent); Louisville’s sustainability plans; and information about greenspace programs that facilitate purchase/stewardship of vacant lots for community greenspace.

Participants

We interviewed 11 informants familiar with the creation and/or administration of the greenspace partnership and its community-greenspace program: Louisville’s Extension Office Director (JCCE1), horticulture-garden agent (JCCE2), and an Extension Councilperson who was also familiar with Louisville’s first market garden (LOF1); two senior personnel (LF1, LF2) in LMG’s economic and community development agency, Louisville Forward, who were involved in urban agriculture policy; a senior personnel (OCD1) in Louisville’s Land Bank Authority (overseeing city-owned vacant lots) and LMG’s Office of Community Development (formerly Vacant/Public Properties Administration); and two senior personnel of the Metropolitan Sewer District (MSD1, MSD2), a prominent land-owner.

Three additional interviews provided background information about community greenspace, political economy, and stewardship in Louisville: a senior personnel of the Louisville-Jefferson County Environmental Land Trust (LJCELT1), a governmental land trust that preserves large-scale rural/agricultural sites; Director of a NPO specializing in urban greening, volunteer coordination, and some community-greenspace management (LG1); and Program Director (CEG1) for a church-based, charitable organization overseeing some community-greenspace programs. This sample provides sufficient informational saturation, given the scope of the system and informants’ specialized roles (Bernard 2011).

Interviews

The interviews took approximately 1–2 h and were conducted in person or by telephone by two trained interviewers. Interviews were audio-recorded for transcription and semi-structured to ensure adequate coverage of targeted and emergent topics (Bernard 2011). Interviews provided background information, information about formal rules and informal practices (norms), and triangulating evidence regarding governance structures, processes, and outcomes. They also provided insight into key stakeholders’ reasoning and decision making. For example, questions about multi-actor cooperation asked when, why, and how particular stakeholder communicate and share important decisions—in addition to questions about enforcement and other design principles (see Appendix for sample questions).

Data preparation

We archived and numbered each line of the policy documents. Trained research assistants transcribed each interview verbatim, with line numbers and timestamps. The principal investigator (PI) resolved unknown terms and indiscernible statements.

Coding and analysis

Development of the coding system occurred iteratively, alongside the SRSG framework’s development. We followed conventions outlined by Ratajczyk et al. (2016). During Phase 1, the PIs used DeCaro et al.’s (2017, 2025b) conceptual definitions to create operational definitions for each design principle. We trained several advanced under/graduate students with domain knowledge as coders. The PIs and a senior coding assistant oversaw weekly coding meetings to revise the coding system. The team reached consensus on code definitions and examples before finalizing the data, using standardized codesheets.

During Phase 2, the PIs and senior coding assistant consolidated the coded entries for each design principle (i.e., capacity). We then descriptively summarized this information and compared the described capacities to the criteria listed in Tables 1–3. For example, when evaluating design principles for multi-actor cooperation (e.g., communication), we compared the partnership’s observed communication policies and practices with the criteria in Table 2. We rated each dimension on a five-point descriptive scale: - 2 (definitely lacks), -1 (may lack), 0 (not mentioned or mixed), +1 (may possess), +2 (definitely possesses). We assigned “definitely” scores (±2) when there was obvious (e.g., direct, explicit) and consistent evidence. We assigned “may” scores (±1) when the evidence was less obvious or strong, and “0” scores when a dimension was not mentioned or the evidence was mixed.

When formal policies (“rules on paper”) and informal institutional arrangements (“rules in use”) did not match, we coded the arrangements separately. Contradictory information was treated as directly informative. Thus, if interviewed participants reported different information or perspectives on an issue, then this information pinpointed areas of mixed institutional arrangements, poor communication, and/or deviation from formal policies. Coding formal and informal arrangements separately allowed us to investigate their potential interactions. We discuss especially important misalignments in the upcoming analyses.

We followed several recommendations to ensure coding reliability and validity (Ratajczyk et al. 2016, Seelandt 2018). First, the PIs have several years of domain-relevant experience. Second, the team collaborated to reach consensus. Finally, we provide our codesheets in open-access repositories to facilitate transparency and replicability.

RESULTS

As detailed in the following sections, we identified four interlocking system deficiencies. First, by selecting JCCE Office—a local administrative unit—as the primary (co)producer of community-governed greenspace, LMG and UK’s Extension Service failed to provision a viable solution for greenspace production (e.g., acquisition and management). This misfit severely crippled greenspace production, creating an unanticipated crisis. Second, the greenspace partners—primarily LMG, UK’s Extension Director, and JCCE Office—lacked sufficient, State-reinforced arrangements for multi-actor cooperation. This deficit decreased trust and collective problem solving, decreasing the partnership’s collective ATC to collaboratively resolve the aforementioned production crisis. Third, JCCE Office’s status as a subordinate administrative unit—without robust capacity for organizational self-governance—prevented it from altering its own capacities, or taking transformative action, to improve the situation. Finally, excessive reliance on informal arrangements created systemic confusion and failed to reinforce broad-scale polycentric self-governance or local community-level governance.

These institutional deficiencies were interdependent and robust, strengthening a maladaptive cycle of dysfunctional co-provision and co-production, which locked the stakeholders into a rigidity trap. Each deficiency undermined the system’s ATC, preventing it from correcting itself via transformation of the provision–production network.

We use descriptive tables with quantitative scores to summarize and explain these key findings (see referenced Tables and codesheets for details). We start with the focal archetype’s (JCCE Office’s) greenspace production to highlight its institutional misfit and the production crisis this created. We then report the features underlying JCCE Office’s diminished organizational self-governance, explaining its internal provisioning crisis. We conclude by reporting the design features of the partnership’s dysfunctional multi-actor cooperation, explaining the system’s collective provisioning crisis. The latter two analyses highlight how both severe constraint of the decentralized unit (JCCE Office) and poor collective problem solving prevented the stakeholders from (co)provisioning better solutions.

Greenspace production

The first dimension discussed is the (co)productive capacity of JCCE Office (Tables 4–5). This section highlights archetypal misfit and institutional deficits in greenspace production, in terms of both organization type and underlying ATCs. The section demonstrates the primary production failure(s) and crises that the governance system created and ultimately failed to respond to adaptively/transformatively.

Jefferson County Cooperative Extension Office is an inadequate community-greenspace producer for several reasons. First, Kentucky’s extension service is formally designed (authorized, required) to support agricultural research and outreach—not small neighborhood greenspace (KRS:§164.100, §164.125(2), MOA). Federal and state laws (Morrill Act:§2, Smith-Lever Act:§5, KRS:§164.110) forbid extension offices from purchasing, renting, or maintaining land/property for any purpose except Land Grant universities, offices, or agricultural research (Table 4; Codesheet 3):

[T]he land management part is definitely not a part of our [JCCE Office’s] mission, and...per KRS Statute, [we] are not allowed to own additional property other than property that our office building is physically located on. [W]e have had a couple private landowners from community gardens offer to sell us their land, which we cannot legally, um, do. (JCCE2: Horticultural Agent)

Because JCCE Office cannot acquire greenspaces long term, it relies on a disparate collection of informal land-use agreements and formal lease agreements. These agreements have widely varying tenure lengths (typically 1–5 yrs), terms, and user rights.

Second, JCCE Office’s inability to own community greenspace hindered its greenspace protection. For example, a senior LMG staff member said the following about the partnership’s flagship demonstration site, Parkland Community Garden:

[T]here was a grocery across the street, which closed long ago that Louisville Metro has recently purchased.... So you know, 10 years from now, that might be better served as part of that commercial district. ...We could terminate that lease if we had somebody who says, “Look, I’m gonna build a grocery store on this lot if you’ll sell it to me.” In that case, we would end the lease and, you know, try to help them find another location for that garden.

Some JCCE Office staff informally advocated for longer (5−10 yr) leases. However, this advocacy was largely unsuccessful. Communities struggled to commit to greenspace stewardship because of these short and informal (i.e., insecure) tenure rights (LG1, LOF1, JCCE2).

Third, JCCE Office was not formally authorized (or required) to transfer governance rights to local communities (Table 5; Codesheet 4). This institutional gap disempowered local communities, further eroding their stewardship and undermining the efficiency of site governance and maintenance (JCCE2).

Fourth, extension offices are not regulatory agencies and, therefore, lack formal mechanisms to regulate community members. The JCCE Office struggled to maintain regulatory oversight in the greenspaces:

[A]ll that we have is this Community Garden Agreement that exists but is not really enforceable because of the length of it and the disconnect between Cooperative Extension as the manager and Louisville Metro as the property owner and facilitator of the space. So that it makes—from a legal standpoint—it makes managing it kind of a very subjective situation, where you can wave a piece of paper and say, “this is what it says,” but if folks choose to not follow that, there’s no really good way to handle situations. (JCCE2: Horticultural Agent)

Interviews (JCCE1, JCCE2) indicated the Office had to wait for greenspace violations to become a law enforcement issue, or manage the sites itself. The JCCE Office decided to take control, further disempowering community-based governance.

Finally, $50,000 was not enough to administer the greenspace program, and the Office’s potential means to fund itself were deficient. Basic site upkeep cost approximately $60,000 annually and did not cover all sites (JCCE 2). The Office was formally authorized to collect “service fee compensations” (garden user fees), which generated approximately $10,000 during productive years (KRS 164:§655). However, this funding did not account for other expenses (e.g., water installation). Extension Districts are authorized to collected taxes to support their operations. However, JCCE was denied (KRS 164:§670). Therefore, JCCE Office’s greenspace program typically operated at a substantial deficit.

Summary

A particular type of organization (extension office) was given a critical role for which it was fundamentally poorly suited. Archetypal misalignment in underlying operational capacities (e.g., land acquisition, greenspace management, and funding), combined with misaligned in/formal arrangements, severely hindered JCCE Office’s ability to efficiently (co)produce community greenspaces. Weak reinforcement of community stewardship, combined with excessive external regulatory pressure from LMG and UK, ultimately compelled JCCE Office to take control of the greenspaces—increasing its operating costs. This strain prevented JCCE Office from acquiring new greenspaces, creating an unanticipated production crisis that perpetuated greenspace inequality the program was intended to fix.

Organizational self-governance

In this section, we report the focal decentralized unit’s capacity for organizational self-governance. If JCCE Office was self-governing, it could potentially alter its mission, organizational structure, rules, or norms to address its capacity limitations for greenspace (co)production (Tables 4–5). Organizational self-governance could also give JCCE Office bargaining power to reconfigure the partnership and/or program, transforming the provision–production network. Our analysis confirmed JCCE Office lacked organizational self-governance, consistent with a responsibility-heavy archetype (Table 6; Codesheet 1). The current analysis illustrates precisely how this critical aspect of State-reinforcement failed.

Constitutive and constitutional authority

Extension Offices typically have some authority to make decisions to govern themselves. However, JCCE Office is unique because it is a direct satellite of UK’s (i.e., Kentucky’s) Extension Service, the principal constitutional agent in this system (Smith-Lever Act:§2,§9, KRS 164:§125(2),625(1), Ordinance:§1,§4). The JCCE Office’s staff and local director are UK employees selected and supervised by UK’s Extension Director (MOA:§1(1,2), §4(4)). The JCCE Office, therefore, fundamentally lacks constitutive and constitutional decision-making authority (Table 6), undermining its organizational self-governance. It also lacks rule-making authority to govern itself. These restrictions severely limited JCCE Office’s ATC.

Administrative authority

As an administrative unit, JCCE Office is formally authorized to make administrative decisions to regulate its staff members, execute extension programs, and handle routine business operations (KRS:§164.125(2), §164.655(1)). However, the MOA among JCCE Office, LMG, and UK/UK’s Extension Director severely limited this authority (MOA:§1(2), §4(4)) (Table 6). In practice, LMG and UK/UK’s Extension Director intervened on JCCE Office’s internal affairs, further undermining its organizational self-governance. For example, UK’s Extension Director once intervened to resolve a dispute about chain of command (i.e., administrative authority) within JCCE Office triggered by an internal disagreement about administration of the greenspace program. Such oversight restricted the Office’s self-regulation and ability to adjust routine business operations to improve greenspace program performance.

Fiscal capacities

Finally, as previously noted JCCE Office received $350,000 annually for its general operations, with $50,000 allocated for the greenspace program. Our interviews with JCCE Office staff indicated that $350,000 was sufficient for the Office’s general operations. However, this money comes exclusively from external sources, greatly affecting the Office’s fiscal autonomy. Extension districts are typically authorized to collect taxes for local extension offices and programs (KRS:§164.665(8-17)), providing a degree of fiscal self-sufficiency, resilience, and autonomy. However, JCCE was denied this capacity (LOF1).

Several informants mentioned that threats to revoke JCCE Office’s annual stipend were used to compel the Office to comply with LMG and UK/UK Extension Director’s orders. This existential threat and JCCE Office’s lack of fiscal self-sufficiency severely constrained its constitutional and administrative decisions—further undermining its ability to operate independently and adaptively to address known problems.

Multi-actor cooperation

This section analyzes design principles underlying the partnership’s capacity for multi-actor cooperation (e.g., collective self-governance)—a critical source for institutional adaptation and transformation via collective problem solving (co-provisioning). Weak State-reinforcement and dysfunctional implementation of multi-actor cooperation was an important aspect of the system’s diminished ATC (Table 7; Codesheet 5).

Communication and shared decision making

Federal, state, and local laws governing Cooperative Extension give JCCE Office authority (and responsibility) to communicate with diverse stakeholders for agricultural outreach and development (e.g., Smith-Lever Act:§1-2, KRS 164:§125,§610, Ordinance:§31.331). However, these powers/duties are not specific to community greenspace, and the partners (e.g., MOA) did not formalize any such arrangements—making such activities voluntary.

Interviews revealed the partners did not routinely or comprehensively communicate about the program. They primarily communicated to address specific problems, like property maintenance (e.g., complaints, code violations), on an as-needed basis. Additionally, formal communication with gardeners and communities was largely unilateral: administrators (e.g., LMG, JCCE Office) communicated responsibilities (e.g., Garden Agreement rules) to gardeners, and they were expected to obey. Gardeners informally voiced their needs to JCCE Office staff, especially the horticulture agent. However, JCCE Office staff acknowledged that current communication was insufficient to address critical governance issues.

As previously noted, Extension Services in Kentucky are governed hierarchically. UK’s Extension Director is the principal decision-making agent, followed by counties, districts (e.g., Extension Board), local governments, and advisory councils (e.g., Smith-Lever Act:§1,9; KRS 164:§110, §625(2), §655(2,4)). These constitutional and administrative agents can make decisions collaboratively to govern extension services. However, the formal requirements (MOA) governing JCCE Office do not provide this authorization generally, or for community greenspace. And the partners did not create a formal multi-stakeholder decision-making body (e.g., greenspace committee) to share governance decisions. The partners rarely, if ever, convened collaborative decisions. Finally, when major governance issues arose, JCCE Office was often excluded or marginalized. The JCCE Office’s Director has no representation on the Extension District Board, or any other decision body. Requests by JCCE Office to change known problems with the Community Garden Agreement and the official MOA (to better reflect community-greenspace activities) were strictly denied.

Enforcement

Enforcement mechanisms within the partnership were complicated by weak formal arrangements. Direct enforcement via fines or lawsuit were weak because critical aspects of the partnership and community-greenspace program were governed by poorly specified, informal verbal agreements. Therefore, the stakeholders relied on indirect enforcement, like neighborhood complaints, code violations, financial threats, and gardener eviction (LF1-2, JCCE1-2). Interviews revealed evidence of poorly managed regulatory disputes within JCCE Office and among community members at particular sites. These disputes emerged from previously mentioned deficient communication and shared decision making, but also ill-defined sociopolitical boundaries, especially regarding roles and duties.

Sociopolitical and ecological boundaries

Ecological boundaries were well defined (Table 7). However, important roles, duties, and jurisdictions were informal and poorly defined. For example, interviews revealed disagreement (misconceptions) between LMG and JCCE Office about who governs and maintains the greenspaces—community members or Office staff. Ownership of some greenspaces was also unclear, because of poorly documented property titles/deeds. Finally, it was unclear who was responsible for water fees at some sites, LMG or JCCE Office.

Equity

Equity applies to multiple dimensions. As previously noted, existing policies governing JCCE Office do not ensure its or community-members’ equitable decision-making inclusion (see “Communication and shared decision making” above). However, the MOA governing JCCE Office’s (and the partnership’s) general operations do contain some cost- and labor-sharing provisions. Louisville Metro Government pays $350,000 annually, and UK covers salaries, equipment, training, and administrative supervision of JCCE Office. But these provisions do not pertain to the community-greenspace partnership.

Interviews with LMG and JCCE Office indicated the Office provides labor to regulate the gardeners and manage the greenspaces—yet lacks necessary funds and staff. Moreover, although some community members benefit from garden access, they must pay garden fees, and some greenspaces are not open to the entire community (JCCE1-2). Finally, communities were originally expected to govern and maintain the greenspaces but this failed—increasing JCCE Office’s operational costs. Altogether, JCCE Office carried the greatest burdens, while LMG and a few community members reaped the benefits.

Accountability

Accountability is a function of communication, shared decision making, and enforcement. The previously noted deficiencies in these dimensions (Table 7) translated into deficient accountability among key stakeholders. Horizontal and downward accountability were especially weak. The partners lacked robust methods to formally and informally hold each other accountable (horizontal accountability). Without formal rights to self-governance or equitable access, community members could not strictly hold higher agents (e.g., JCCE Office, LMG) accountable to these objectives (downward accountability). The JCCE Office was likewise unable to hold LMG, or UK’s Extension Director accountable to its needs (downward accountability) as the partnership’s de facto community-greenspace producer/provider.

However, this hierarchic system did authorize the higher administrative agents (e.g., LMG, UK’s Extension Director) to hold JCCE Office accountable (upward accountability). This disparity ensured that JCCE Office complied with higher administrators’ decisions, despite obvious operational deficiencies and institutional misalignments.

Summary

State (government) policies and actions did not robustly reinforce (e.g., authorize, require) effective multi-actor cooperation for this dilemma. And the stakeholders did not establish their own, informal mechanisms for effective cooperation. These deficiencies hindered collective problem solving, undermining the partnership’s ATC—preventing the partners from collectively devising (co-provisioning) better solutions to known production crises.

Results summary

Rather than create a polycentric system of SRSG to enable ATG based on principles of shared power (“power with”; Ostrom 1994), LMG and UK/UK’s Extension Director inadvertently created a multi-centered and increasingly hierarchic system, based on exerting “power over” subordinate actors and restricting their individual and collective innovation. Constitutional decision making, rule making, administrative, regulatory, and fiscal authority were monopolized by a few stakeholders. The focal decentralized unit (JCCE Office) lacked necessary capacities to efficiently produce greenspace (Tables 4–5), or govern itself (Table 6). Finally, multi-actor cooperation was not reinforced or practiced (Table 7). This rigid power system stifled the stakeholders’ independent and collective ATC—severely constraining institutional transformation. These conditions created a rigidity trap, eventually broken by LMG’s decision to abolish the partnership in 2024, after decades of mediocre performance.

DISCUSSION

Scholars argue that government-sponsored public–private partnerships can enable ATG and thereby improve the (co)provision (and production) of environmental public goods in response to social-ecological stressors (Folke et al. 2005, Chaffin et al. 2016a). However, maladaptive systems based on flawed concepts and/or implementation of State authority, de/centralization, polycentricity, self-governance, and resilience dominate many SESs (Andersson and Ostrom 2008, Ostrom 2010a,b, Clement et al. 2021). DeCaro et al. (2017, 2025b) argue this problem will persist until the fundamental building blocks—design principles, institutional archetypes, and governance network structures—associated with ATG become common knowledge and their mechanisms are adequately explained. This understanding requires rigorous diagnosis of institutional successes and failures (Baldwin et al. 2024).

We contributed to this goal by using the concept of State-reinforced self-governance (SRSG) (Sarker 2013) and DeCaro et al.’s (2017, 2025b) SRSG framework to analyze the design features underlying a case of failed polycentric ATG. The SRSG framework builds on Elinor and Vincent Ostrom’s prior work (e.g., Ostrom 1994, 2005a,b, 2010a,b), positing that governments can facilitate ATG by supporting dilemma stakeholders’ capacity for (co)production, independent action (organizational self-governance), and multi-actor cooperation (collective self-governance)—creating a polycentric, self-governing system for collective problem solving and institutional innovation (cf. Shivakumar 2005).

There are no simple solutions to complex social-ecological dilemmas (Ostrom et al. 2007). Key actors (institutional archetypes), rules, governance systems, and provision–production networks must be tailored the context, possessing adequate and appropriate (“fitting”) configurations of powers, duties, and operational resources (Ostrom 2010b, McGinnis 2011). The SRSG framework (DeCaro et al. 2017, 2025b) argues that institutional fit emerges from collective self-organization and adaptive decision making, as stakeholders share information and collectively construct potential solutions (cf. Ostrom 1990, 2005a). SRSG is therefore about providing stakeholders capacities (e.g., authority, responsibility, operational resources) to engage in social-learning and co-provisioning (e.g., co-governance and design), to collectively identify effective means of (co)production for particular public goods/services and dilemmas within complex provision–production networks (cf. Oakerson 1999, Anderies et al. 2004, 2016).

The current case exhibited several interlocking misspecifications that can inform SRSG and ATG. First, government sponsors (e.g., LMG) selected an inappropriate institutional archetype—a local, administrative Extension Office that lacked essential greenspace production capacities—as the primary greenspace producer. This organizational misalignment, and misalignment of underlying capacities, created an unanticipated production crisis in greenspace acquisition and management.

Second, the government sponsors also (informally) assigned this local administrative unit (JCCE Office) primary responsibility for community greenspace (co)provision, but did not grant the Office constitutional (or administrative) decision-making and rule-making authority to govern itself or the greenspace program and its dilemma(s). The JCCE Office’s lack of organizational self-governance created an internal provisioning crisis, preventing it from devising its own solutions to known governance and greenspace management challenges.

Third, the public–private community-greenspace partnership lacked critical capacities for multi-actor cooperation (e.g., shared decision making, enforcement, equity), preventing the partners from collectively addressing known provision and production shortfalls. More specifically, the federal, state, and local laws (e.g., official MOA) did not sufficiently reinforce (authorize, require, or fund) the partners to collaborate, primarily because of archetypal misfit and excessive and disjointed informality. Critical aspects of the greenspace program were in disarray, making it unclear who was authorized or required to govern the community greenspaces, pay for water access, and regulate garden users.

Finally, the governance system was decentralized in structural form—with multiple centers of activity—but centralized in terms of decision-making power. Hierarchic decision structures and governance processes undermined the potential benefits of polycentric decentralization for collective provisioning (Andersson and Ostrom 2008). The system became fixated on principle-agent problems. Louisville Metro Government, UK’s Extension Director, and JCCE Office struggled to maintain basic compliance and, therefore, oriented increasingly toward regulatory actions rather than collaborative problem solving.

Therefore, we conclude that the Louisville case illustrates a failed attempt at SRSG. Such failures are commonplace in decentralization programs (DeCaro et al. 2025b). For example, with “deconcentration,” higher governments physically decentralize production operations to other units but retain centralized provisioning control (cf. Ribot et al. 2006). This approach has proliferated (e.g., Frimpong Boamah et al. 2025), because policy makers and scholars fail to distinguish design principles for (co)provisioning (constitutional authority) from (co)production (administrative/operational authority) (see Ostrom et al. 1993, Dardanelli 2021 for discussion). Our analysis demonstrates how to carefully distinguish these regimes.

Deconcentration undermines social-ecological resilience

By analyzing the current case in terms of failed SRSG, we provide insight into the long-standing debate regarding the optimality of various governance structures (e.g., centralized vs. decentralized) for delivery of public goods/services and social-ecological resilience, including “deconcentration” (see Oakerson 1999, Ostrom 2000).

In Louisville, the partnership attempted to enable resilient and efficient community-greenspace provision and production via a decentralized SRSG system, but ultimately created a system of deconcentrated (co)production, with hierarchic oversight. In short, LMG resorted to a commonly seen deconcentrated regime, contracting a service provider (JCCE Office), rather than empowering SRSG (cf. Oakerson 1999). When is deconcentration a viable solution to public good provision/production and resilience? What role does SRSG potentially play?

Prior research suggests that deconcentration is effective when (a) supervisory agents maintain effective regulatory control over the service provider, (b) performance quality is relatively easy and accurate to evaluate, and (c) a single, specific service is produced in a relatively predictable environment (Ostrom et al. 1993, Agrawal and Ribot 1999, Ostrom and Ostrom 2017). These conditions were not satisfied in Louisville. Louisville’s greenspace system was dynamic, exposed to many stressors, required diverse provision/production activities, was poorly regulated, and featured difficult-to-evaluate performance (e.g., community self-governance). According to the SRSG framework, deconcentrated systems cannot address these challenges well because key actors lack sufficient organizational self-governance and/or multi-actor cooperation to enable necessary transformation, or resilience (DeCaro et al. 2017, 2025b).

Another way to characterize this situation is in terms of engineered resilience vs. social-ecological resilience (Garmestani and Benson 2013). Like so many other failed decentralized programs, Louisville’s greenspace program was oriented toward engineered resilience—the ability to reliably deliver a narrow set of tightly calibrated goods/services—in a dilemma that required social-ecological resilience—the ability to adapt or transform structures, functions, and processes to deliver a wider array of goods/services in a complex and dynamic environment (Chaffin et al. 2016a, Clement et al. 2021).

Polycentric systems with multiple centers of organizational self-governance, constitutional decision-making authority, and robust mechanisms for multi-actor cooperation are thought to better enable such social-ecological resilience, because they facilitate co-provisioning and co-production by diverse stakeholders (Ostrom 2005a,b). Polycentric systems support “public entrepreneurship,” creating a political regime that encourages diverse stakeholders to independently and jointly innovate institutional arrangements (cf. Oakerson 1999). Such institutional innovation appears foundational to ATG. State-reinforced self-governance is a conceptualization of such polycentric, adaptive and transformative systems (DeCaro et al. 2025b).

Thus, the fundamental challenge when designing provision–production networks in ATG systems may be determining when to emphasize (a) (co)provisioning capacity and social-ecological resilience vs. (b) (co)production capacity and engineered resilience (e.g., Garmestani et al. 2019; cf. Oakerson 1999). Many decentralization programs appear to fall into a particular trap, failing to recognize that (co)provisioning capacity, although complex, can facilitate long-term (co)production capacity via enhanced social-ecological resilience (see Shivakumar 2005, Kemper et al. 2007, Andersson and Ostrom 2008 for review).

Future directions

The resilient governance of social-ecological dilemmas can be informed by additional lessons learned from our analysis of the Louisville case. Many factors affect institutional innovation and resilience (Ostrom 2005a, Kemper et al. 2007, Schifman et al. 2017, Stanford et al. 2022). Several illustrative factors stood out in the current case.

First, racial marginalization in environmental public good provision typically coincides with State oppression and neglect (e.g., Connolly and Anguelovksi 2021). State-reinforced self-governance implies reversal of oppression via community empowerment, in terms of increased community engagement and control of decision making (i.e., constitutional choice) (cf. Arnstein 1969). Louisville Metro Government has not embraced community empowerment in air pollution control (Sarr et al. 2021), policing (Department of Justice (DOJ) 2023), development (Storey et al. 2023), or greenspace—indicating a general orientation against SRSG. Research in other domains suggests that governments must regard community empowerment as a good in itself to enable robust forms of SRSG (e.g., Kemper et al. 2007).

Second, successful decentralization programs are often supported by complementary federal, state, and local policies (Craig et al. 2017, Bengston et al. 2004). For example, in a prominent greenspace case (Chicago’s NeighborSpace partnership), the state constitution included an environmental bill of rights establishing citizen rights to healthy ecological environments, and the city created a comprehensive greenspace plan and ordinances to support community greenspace. Additional supports for SRSG can come in such forms as removing legal barriers, providing funding, and coordinating specific policies (Cosens et al. 2017). However, specifying these elements is a fundamental challenge of ATG, and poorly understood. Such factors, therefore, warrant more research attention (DeCaro et al. 2025b).

Third, there are many potential institutional archetypes (e.g. organizations, configurations of ATC) for addressing environmental public good provision (Ostrom et al. 2007). We can learn some general strategies from the current case. Foster (2011) discusses several strategies, such as special districts (see also, Oakerson 1999). From a SRSG standpoint, special districts offer operational advantages fitting the “reinforced” (A⁺R⁺E⁺SS⁺) archetype. Districts typically possess constitutional and administrative powers to decide and implement programs for local development, may be governed collaboratively (depending on board composition and collective choice rules), and can collect taxes to fund programs/operations (cf. Hankerson 1957, Brooks 2008). Thus, like NPOs, special districts feature prominently in many State-reinforced ATG systems (e.g., Sarker 2013), including community greenspace (e.g., Foster 2011). Public–private partnership with NPOs illustrate another commonly used “reinforced” solution (e.g., DeCaro et al. 2025a). The critical issue for any governance regime is to ensure advantageously selected organizational archetypes, rules, partnerships, and governance networks for the self-organization of provision/production (cf. Oakerson 1999).

This discussion illustrates an important future research area. It is unclear what types and constellations of institutional archetypes, capacities, and network structures are particularly well-suited for particular kinds of social-ecological dilemmas and SESs (McGinnis and Ostrom 2014). We are only beginning to understand these contingencies in research and practice.

CONCLUSION

Elinor Ostrom (1998) remarked that civilizations would not exist if our ancestors had not learned to create systems of governance from trial-and-error experimentation. Ostrom (2005a) later concluded that humans create governance systems via basic knowledge of design principles for multi-actor cooperation (e.g., collective self-governance), which facilitate ATG via enhanced societal problem solving and social learning. Vincent Ostrom (1994) further introduced concepts of polycentricity, shared power, and interdependent but flexible provision–production networks as the basis for societal adaptation and transformation (Baldwin et al. 2024). Many policy makers and decision makers struggle to understand this institutional diversity, especially the State’s potential role(s) in facilitating ATG (cf. Oakerson 1999, Ostrom 2010a). The SRSG framework provides additional leverage over this problem in two ways. First, it supplies additional methods to identify design principles that embody State involvement in self-governance. Second, it provides methods to analyze archetypal configurations of ATCs associated with particular types of organizations and governance network structures. This approach enables analysts to understand which State actions and institutional design features facilitate (or hinder) polycentric forms of ATG. We applied this perspective to the current study, seeking to illuminate institutional foundations of State-reinforced ATG by examining a failed decentralization program. We discovered that institutional misfit in the form of poor-fitting organizations, and archetypal capacities for (co)production, as well as deficient provisions for organizational self-governance and multi-actor cooperation severely undermine the ATC of a governance system. These deficiencies prevent dilemma stakeholders from independently and jointly provisioning better solutions to complex production problems.

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