Research

INTRODUCTION

Building social equity into environment, climate, and development policies requires understanding how different actors experience exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity in the face of global change hazards (Adger 2006). To date, scholars have illuminated the importance of social marginalization as it manifests across gender, ethnicity, age, ability, and income (Clark, et al. 1998, Denton 2002, Rygel et al. 2006), as well as resource access (Liverman 1990a, b, Ribot and Peluso 2003, Ribot 2014). Yet, previous research on fisheries, in particular, is silent about the potential mediating effects of different forms of fisher organization on individual fishers’ vulnerability and adaptation to external drivers of livelihood change. It is implicitly assumed that all fishers organize the same way and that self-governance form therefore has a constant and not a variable effect on fisher vulnerability and adaptation. We empirically examine this implicit assumption to reveal key mechanisms by which different self-governance forms shape fisher vulnerability and adaptation.

In Mexico, self-governance forms include cooperative and non-cooperative arrangements (Basurto et al. 2013) among fishers and fish buyers at the first point of sale that serve to structure resource access and govern decisions over fishing activity, commercialization, and distribution of profits (Cinti et al. 2010, Basurto et al. 2020, Elsler et al. 2021). When fisheries vulnerability studies have paid attention to self-governance forms, they have mainly considered fishing cooperatives as the baseline governance unit (Finkbeiner 2015, Finkbeiner et al. 2018), excluding other forms of organization and their effects for associated individual fishers. Moreover, literature considering the mediating effect of local self-governance institutions has largely focused on exploring single exposures (e.g., overfishing pressures in Bennett and Basurto 2018), leaving a lack of understanding of how self-governance mediates multiple exposures that might be interacting to shape individual livelihoods. Documented links between local fisheries governance and vulnerability to exogenous drivers of livelihood change are limited, with formal cooperation among fishers perceived to enhance livelihood resilience, both through sustainable resource management and increased capacity for collective action (Bennett and Basurto 2018, McCay et al. 2014, Wintergalen et al. 2022). However, other factors merit consideration, including how self-governance forms interact with the laws, regulations, and practices of the State, how self-governance forms interact with patterns of opportunity for alternative livelihoods (i.e., ranching or tourism services) that may buffer fishers from economic shocks and stressors, and how self-governance forms influence fisher agency over their livelihoods, including over decisions about how to respond to exogenous drivers of change.

Here, we investigate how the different forms of self-governance that structure and organize small-scale fishing activity in Baja California Sur, Mexico, function to shape individual livelihood vulnerability and responses to multiple, interacting drivers of livelihood change (Fig. 1). Across Baja California Sur, multi-species and multi-gear small-scale fishing activities using ca. 7.5 m, open-hulled, outboard-motorized fiberglass boats (pangas) contribute to livelihoods and food security for tens of thousands of people. Fishing effort is legalized through a limited entry permit system, mandating that any fisher hold a permit, authorization, or concession before harvesting from a specified area (Leslie et al. 2015). Fishing permits can be granted to collective or individual actors, and a range of cooperative and non-cooperative self-governance forms structure fishing effort and access to fishing resources (Cinti et al. 2010, Basurto et al. 2020). This social-ecological system (Leslie et al. 2015, Frawley et al. 2024) is susceptible to a range of global change drivers, including climatic, political, and economic instabilities (Frawley et al. 2019b, 2024, Micheli et al. 2024) compounding decades of overexploitation (Cisneros-Mata 2010).

Our research focuses on fishers’ and their households’ vulnerabilities and responses to multiple external drivers of change from 2018–2023, a period of time encompassing a global pandemic and a major political transformation in Mexico. We ask, how do different self-governance forms influence fisher livelihood vulnerability and response to exogenous drivers of livelihood change? We examine this overarching question through three focused sub-questions: How do different self-governance forms influence:

1. the adaptive capacity of small-scale fishers?
2. fisher exposure, sensitivity, and response to external drivers of livelihood change? and
3. fisher perceptions of their well-being trajectories?

We hypothesize that (a) self-governance structurally mediates the connections that individuals and households have with local marine resources and environments, and accordingly, with distal forces including changes in global economic markets, state subsidies, and climatic variability; and (b) the varying degree to which individual fishers hold agency in diverse self-governance forms influences their vulnerability and adaptation. In these ways, we imagine self-governance form as a critical social structure that differentially shapes fishers’ vulnerability and responses to exogenous change drivers (Fig. 1).

To test these hypotheses, we examine fisher livelihood vulnerability, adaptation, and well-being before, during, and after a period of significant exogenous change in Baja California Sur: 2018–2023. We first analyze 2018 survey data to examine the influence of self-governance forms on baseline adaptive capacity. We then use semi-structured follow-up interviews with a sub-sample of the previously surveyed fishers as well as complementary secondary data sources to assess (1) the role of self-governance forms in differentiating exposure, sensitivity, and responses to the multiple emergent and interacting, external drivers characterizing the study period, and (2) self-reported household well-being trajectories.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Fisher livelihood vulnerability

We define fisher livelihood vulnerability as a product of exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity, after Adger (2006) and Bassett et al. (2022). We define exposure as the magnitude, frequency, duration, and spatial extent of an external driver in relation to an actor group and sensitivity as how the actors in that group may be more or less affected by the exposure (ibid.). Actors are sensitive to the degree that they depend on the disrupted system for well-being (Bassett et al. 2022). Finally, adaptive capacity encompasses the learning, flexibility, assets, organization, agency, and socio-cognitive traits that enable actors to respond to challenging external drivers of change (Cinner et al. 2018, Cinner and Barnes 2019). We use a vulnerability framework rather than the risk framework more recently adopted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Parry et al. 2007, IPCC 2014; for differences, see Estoque et al. 2023) because vulnerability explicitly accounts for the adaptive capacity of individuals whereas the focus of the risk framework is on potential system impacts (Nelson 2023).

In this study, we consider assets, flexibility, and agency to measure adaptive capacities at the level of individual fishers. (For reasons of space and scope, we omit analysis of learning and socio-cognitive traits in the present study; see also Append. 1, Section A.3.) Our consideration of agency, in particular, includes organization, but does not break it out as a separate category, as we define self-governance form by organizational characteristics. We define agency as the power to act on one’s will and we focus in particular on agency as an individual capacity that is circumscribed by social structures; in this case, the structure of the fishing self-governance form.

In analyzing fisher livelihoods across self-governance forms, we heed Allison and Ellis’ (2001) call to avoid too narrow a lens on fishing and resource base interactions in contexts where fishing is just one of a series of livelihood strategies that fishers pursue within dynamic social-ecological contexts. The livelihoods approach allows us to explore fisher vulnerability with attention to how different forms of self-governance influence individual and household livelihood strategies both in and beyond fishing, and hence also their vulnerability and responses to the challenges and opportunities posed by external change drivers (Table 1).

There is a longstanding recognition that those who have natural resource-dependent livelihoods experience environmental and climatic change impacts in dynamic interaction with other important drivers of change and the socio-political and economic structures that shape individual vulnerability and response (Hewitt and Burton 1971). For example, climate change adaptation cannot be extricated from the settler-colonialism experienced by Indigenous fisher-hunters in Alaska (Carothers et al. 2014) or the dynamics of aging fisher populations in Oregon (Haugen et al. 2021). Such is the case for fishers in northwest Mexico.

Two major, interacting exogenous change drivers during our study period included the COVID-19 pandemic and federal government austerity measures related to a federal administrative change at the end of 2018. The pandemic influenced fishers primarily through its uneven effect on local and global seafood markets. However, the pandemic also drove changes in fisheries governance related to federal austerity: migrating from in-person to online permit renewal allowed the government to close offices and dismiss staff permanently. Government austerity measures included cuts to fishing subsidies and austerity in other forms of fisheries governance, which, according to some, inadvertently bolstered the influence of criminal organizations in the sector. Regional climatic variability, including meteorological drought and relatively cooler ocean temperatures, constituted an exposure affecting different marine and terrestrial species (e.g., targeted fish species as well as domesticated goats and cattle) that fishers relied on as part of their livelihoods.

Beyond consideration of multiple, interacting exposures, supporting individual and community-scale adaptations to climate change and imagining more resilient social-ecological systems requires identifying which attributes are desired by the different, often antagonistic, groups that make up societies and political formations (O’Brien and Wolf 2010, Chelleri et al. 2016). Identifying vulnerabilities and planning effective and equitable adaptation strategies require attention to the narratives and values of people whose vulnerability is of particular concern to policy makers (McGreavy et al. 2021, IPCC 2023). This study thus examines how different forms of self-governance mediate individual fisher vulnerability and response to multiple interacting exposures, while using local narratives of change to qualitatively explore impacts on livelihoods and well-being.

It bears mention that our focus here is on male fisher vulnerability and adaptation. There is increasing recognition of the role of women in fishery systems, including in Mexico (Torre et al. 2019, Lopez-Ercilla et al. 2021, Solano et al. 2021, Pedroza-Gutierrez et al. 2024). Although commercial fishing with pangas in Baja California Sur is dominated by male fishers, in recent years, women’s cooperatives have formed, introducing new harvest and commercialization models (Peterson 2014). Fishing households are also sites of dynamic gendered labor roles and responsibilities. Although we consider household-level income diversification, including women’s incomes, in our (male) fisher vulnerability framework, the gendered dimensions of vulnerability and adaptation fall beyond the scope of this study.

Self-governance forms in Mexican small-scale fisheries

We compare the livelihood vulnerability and adaptation of male fishers integrated into five different types of cooperative and non-cooperative self-governance forms (Fig. 2). These self-governance forms fundamentally differ in that cooperative self-governance is based on collective action, whereas non-cooperative self-governance is not (Basurto et al. 2013). However, they also differ fundamentally in their relationship to state laws and policies governing resource access and commercialization (Frawley et al. 2019b, 2024). We expect these fundamental differences to yield differentiated individual capacities to respond to the exogenous change drivers that characterized our study period (2018–2023).

The cooperative self-governance forms included in our study were corporate cooperatives (older, large cooperatives that hold area-based resource concessions), family-based cooperatives (newer, generally smaller cooperatives formed among family members as a means to access permits and state subsidies), and externally supported cooperatives (newer, family-based cooperatives that have received support and training on cooperativism from a non-governmental organization (NGO), academic institution, and/or other actors).

The non-cooperative forms of self-governance included small permisionarios where the fisher holds a permit for and operates his own fishing boat (also referred to here as owner-operators); and large permisionarios (organized in patron–client arrangements, where the patron owns fishing permits registered to multiple fishing boats operated by free fishers; also, see Frawley et al. 2024). Free fishers depend on a third party with a permit (or more) to harvest and sell their catch legally. They may own and operate their own boats, or they may work using boats and other gear financed by a permit-holder. However, (and here there is a distinction with the owner-operator, small permisionario category) to legalize their catch, free fishers must sell (sometimes under exclusive contract) to a permit-holder—usually a large permit-holder. The free fishers in our study have in common that they commercialize their catch through a large permit-holder.

The five self-governance forms also differ according to ownership of the means of production for fishing (Basurto et al. 2020), such as boats and gear. Corporate cooperatives are the only self-governance category that owns and maintains boats and gear collectively. In externally supported and family-based cooperative fishing arrangements, formal members of the cooperative tend to own their own boats and gear individually. However, permits for these boats are registered to the cooperative entity. Under large permisionario-free fisher arrangements, there is a range of individual ownership arrangements. Sometimes, the large permisionario provides the boats and gear, and sometimes, it is the fisher. Sometimes, the large permisionario provides loans for free fishers to acquire these means of production, and sometimes, they go in on a gear expense together (e.g., half-and-half for a new fishing net). Under the owner-operator self-governance form, the individual permisionario owns his own boat and gear.

METHODS

Choosing study sites

To study the importance of different forms of self-governance as a mediating factor in fisher vulnerability, we selected five rural communities in Baja California Sur based on two criteria: (1) commercial fishing be the primary economic activity in the community (as determined through a combination of 2010 census data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI) and two rapid field assessments that we conducted in 2016 and 2017); and (2) the sites reflect the diversity in self-governance characteristics of fishing entities prevailing in the state (Basurto et al. 2013, Leslie et al. 2015, Gonzalez-Mon et al. 2019, Frawley et al. 2024). Thus, although the generalities of our argument are applicable beyond our case study—and our experience certainly suggests these are relevant elsewhere—the specifics of our findings may only be externally valid to northwest Mexico (Fig. 3).

We selected these communities using a hierarchical clustering approach that considered the following variables: (1) cooperative size (membership), (2) permisionario size (registered boats), (3) fish buyer characteristics (local vs. exporters), (4) presence of fishing and/or beach concessions, (5) existence of fisheries infrastructure (docks, processing, and ice plants), and (6) organizational nestedness. The analysis arranged the 23 fishing communities into six clusters, although three of them consisted of a single member. We selected two communities from the biggest cluster, one from each of the smaller ones, and one from the remaining three “single” clusters, taking into account the existence of relevant ecological data within the community’s fishing area as well as the research team’s knowledge of the local conditions.

Table 1 presents key demographic and fishing characteristics of the study sites. Bahía Tortugas is the largest community; both cooperative and non-cooperative self-governance forms can be found there. With few exceptions, the fishing cooperatives in Bahía Tortugas are corporate cooperatives that hold long-standing concessions for high-value resources. This contributes to the low socio-economic marginalization and higher material wealth indices in Bahía Tortugas than all other communities, despite significant geographic isolation. The first destination for catch from Bahía Tortugas is Ensenada, in the state of Baja California.

Agua Verde and San Evaristo share in common higher socio-economic marginalization and comparatively lower material wealth indices, including fewer homes connected to public water and electric and internet service infrastructure as of the 2020 census. Family-based cooperative forms of self-governance predominate in Ensenada Blanca and Ligüí, which showcase lower socio-economic marginalization than Agua Verde and San Evaristo but higher than Bahía Tortugas. Externally supported cooperatives predominate in Agua Verde, whereas San Evaristo fishing effort is almost entirely by individual permit and patron–client relationships (and, in our study, accounting for the owner-operator category). Ensenada Blanca and Ligüí are situated along the principal north–south highway in the state near the small city of Loreto (home to most of their fish buyers). Agua Verde and San Evaristo are accessed over land by winding, unimproved mountain roads. Agua Verde fishers generally sell to buyers in Ciudad Constitución and San Evaristo fishers to markets in La Paz.

Data sources

We relied on two main data sources: (1) a standardized survey, deployed in October 2018, and (2) subsequent, follow-up interviews with fishers in November 2022 and April 2023. In addition, we used supplementary, secondary sources of data to contextualize our findings, as described in the analysis section below. Questions in the 2018 standardized surveys focused on assessing adaptive capacities of fishers associated with different self-governance forms. Follow-up interviews in 2022 and 2023 were designed to assess how the fishers actually experienced and responded to recent external drivers of livelihood change. Our analysis thus spans three periods of interest: (1) Baseline (before 2019): the baseline state of SSF actor livelihoods, their households, and self-governing fishing businesses in 2017–2018. This period captures the status quo before the pandemic, and the government transformations driven by President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s administration began in 2019. (2) Change (2019–2022): fishers’ memories of exposures, sensitivities, and responses to external drivers of livelihood change spanning ca. 2019 to 2022, with an emphasis on the pandemic beginning in 2020 and national policy changes impacting the fishing sector beginning in 2019. (3) Outcomes (2022–2023): fishers’ self-assessments of livelihood outcomes, once global trade and tourism had rebounded from the pandemic (Table 2). We grouped data from family-based cooperative fishers in Ensenada Blanca and Ligüí given their proximity and shared characteristics.

Baseline (2017–2018): individual adaptive capacities

Individual adaptive capacities were addressed through the question: how did self-governance form influence the baseline adaptive capacities of small-scale fishers (2017–2018)? To do so, we surveyed individual fishers in different self-governance forms to elucidate potential differences in adaptive capacity among fishers organized into different self-governance forms.

We developed the sampling frame for each community based on the information from the National Commission for Aquaculture and Fishing (CONAPESCA) and scoping fieldwork. Data from CONAPESCA contained information on all registered fishing entities (cooperatives and permisionarios) by community, including their size in terms of membership and registered boats. The scoping fieldwork, which we conducted in each of the five communities before implementing the surveys, enabled us to develop a membership list for each fishing entity. We used this information to determine a sampling frame based on the following parameters: (1) a minimum of 50% of active boat captains for each fishing entity, (2) for cooperatives, at least two of the administrators, and (3) for permisionarios, the owner of the permits. Once we determined the sampling frame for each community, we employed a convenience sampling approach to maximize efficiency and avoid delays in data collection due to the dynamic nature of fishing operations in this region.

A field team consisting of five members was responsible for data collection. Before the initiation of the fieldwork, we conducted an intensive 4-d training in La Paz, during which the field team got acquainted with best practices in structured data collection, became familiarized with survey instruments and data storage, and learned about administrative and safety protocols related to fieldwork. Overall, we conducted 233 surveys with fishers associated with 13 cooperatives and 14 permisionarios, as well as seven fish buyers. This corresponds to approximately 44% of fishers within these communities and some 82% of fish captains. Twenty-five fishers (ca. 11%) refused to participate in the survey. A total of 113 fisher surveys yielded self-reported income data. Hence, we included only these surveys for the present study. Details about the questionnaire used are in Table 2 and Append. 1, Table A.1.

Change (2019–2022) and outcomes (2022–2023): livelihood exposure, sensitivity, response, and well-being trajectories

To address the questions “How did self-governance form influence (1) fisher livelihood exposure, sensitivity, and responses to external drivers of change and (2) fisher perceptions of their well-being trajectories over the study period?”, we conducted semi-structured follow-up interviews in 2022–2023 with fishers from the same self-governance units sampled in 2018 in a purposive sampling frame. For at least two of each type of fishing organizations that formed a part of the original survey effort, we sought interviews with at least one fisher involved in the leadership structure of the fishing entity and at least two fishers not within the leadership structure, reaching out directly to the individuals who had participated in the 2018 survey effort at in-person events that we organized to return results of the 2018 survey.

Where we were unable to complete our sampling goals with previously surveyed fishers, we snowball-sampled to find new participants who fit the roles and self-governance forms of the sampling frame. Twenty-five (86%) of these actors also participated in the 2018 surveys, with the addition of four new fishers in our later fieldwork to enable a more complete representation of each of the self-governance forms.

We thus relied on a small sample size of fishers (n = 29, across 14 self-governance units) to address how fishers in different self-governance forms experienced exposure and sensitivity and responded to the external drivers of livelihood change in this study period. A general rule of thumb in sampling is to consider the anticipated effect size—whereby the larger the difference between groups under study, the smaller the required sample size (Burmeister and Aitken 2012). In this case, significant differences between groups under study were known to the researchers. The estimated fisher population size for certain self-governance categories was also small (e.g., small permisionarios/owner-operators in San Evaristo), allowing for smaller sampling frames. Finally, we followed the saturation principle of “no new data” whereby we felt satisfied with our sample size after registering only repeated or similar answers to the questions posed to fishers from the same self-governance form (Guest et al. 2006, Fusch and Ness 2015).

We chose the semi-structured interview format principally because we sought qualitative data that would help us not only assess the “what” of changes in certain indicators (e.g., incomes from commercial fishing, targeted taxa), but also the “why” and “how” of fisher vulnerability and adaptation to external drivers of livelihood change (Caggiano and Weber 2023). Our interview guide focused on how fishers experienced livelihood exposure and sensitivity to COVID-19 in its initial impact (the first 6 mo. to 1 yr), how COVID-19 compared with other, emergent, external drivers of change during the study period, and any actions (or lack thereof) taken in response to emergent exposures and sensitivities. These interview questions allowed us to pursue an inductive approach in naming and analyzing external drivers of livelihood change during the 2018–2023 study period.

The interview closed with asking each fisher to rate their household’s well-being trajectory over the study period in terms of economy, food security, physical health, and perceptions of any change in local natural resource protection (see Table 1 and Append., Table A.1 for survey and interview questions). We defined well-being trajectories solely in these four material terms (economic livelihood, food security, health, and environmental protection), leaving aside the psychological and social forms of well-being, given their complexity. We include environmental protection despite our focus on individual fisher households because we follow Folke et al. (2016) in considering the biosphere as the basis for all other aspects of well-being.

Analysis

To analyze the 2018 survey responses, we grouped all individual fisher data by self-governance form and used Microsoft Excel (Microsoft Corporation 2018) to perform descriptive statistical analysis on adaptive capacity metrics (see additional methods in Append. 1, Section A.1 and Table A.3). These included species caught and value, fishing incomes (average fishing incomes for fishers in a self-governance category), fisher income diversification (average number of income activities), household income diversification, remittances, and fisher agency as measured by perceptions of democratic decision making and financial transparency, satisfaction with self-governance form, and perceptions of quality-of-life trajectories for the 2008–2018 period (e.g., the percentages who responded to survey questions in a given way) (Table 1; Append. 1, Table A.3).

For analysis of the 2022–2023 semi-structured interviews, we again grouped individual fisher data by self-governance form and used Microsoft Excel to perform descriptive statistical analysis on findings. Details of exactly how responses were aggregated is provided in Append. 1, Table A.3. For example, we took averages among fishers’ recollections of exposure and sensitivity to exogenous social-ecological drivers of livelihood change during the study period; any livelihood response actions by the fisher or household members and, finally, fishermen’s perceptions of their household well-being trajectories as defined by economy (income), food security, health, and environmental resource protection (Table 1). Our measurement of exposure considered fisher perceptions of the magnitude of different livelihood change drivers by asking fishers to name and describe all external drivers affecting their lives and livelihoods in the 5-yr study period and to rank them in order of perceived impact. Sensitivity is necessarily a component of these perceptions of how impactful external drivers were for fishers integrated into different self-governance forms. However, we measure sensitivity in our framework only by how fishing incomes were affected by the COVID-19 pandemic from March to September 2020, which encompasses the first “shock” period of the pandemic.

In addition, we coded transcripts from the 2022–2023 interviews inductively in MAXQDA qualitative analysis software (VERBI Software 2021) for narrative themes and illustrative cases, following a grounded theory approach (Strauss and Corbin 1997). This analysis focused on interpreting the quantitative findings in light of fisher narratives that surpassed precise responses to interview questions. For example, a review of detailed fisher narratives regarding their experience of federal taxation and governance changes, paired with secondary data sources as discussed below, provided insight into precisely how the pandemic and federal austerity measures combined to create specific exposures, sensitivities, and responses.

We synthesized our findings to facilitate comparison across self-governance forms by creating ranked classifications of vulnerability and response that summarized fisher responses in each self-governance form. Based on the sample sizes and initial review of all answers given by fishers, we created different and response-appropriate scales for different indicators of fisher adaptive capacity, livelihood exposure, sensitivity, and response as well as livelihood outcomes (e.g., high, medium, or low, and yes vs. no) (See Append. 1, Table A.3 for detailed explanations of these summary classifications).

Further analysis with secondary data sources allowed us to build a more contextualized understanding of baseline vulnerabilities, change drivers, fishing income sensitivities, and fisher responses. World Bank data on inflation in Mexico and National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social (CONEVAL)) poverty-level calculations for three benchmarks during our study period provided context for understanding incomes from fishing in terms of purchasing power and inflation trends (World Bank 2023, CONEVAL 2023). To understand fisher self-declared incomes from fishing in 2018 (and changes to these incomes in March–September 2020) in real economic terms, we used the CONEVAL individual rural income poverty threshold statistic for the time period that coincided with fishers’ self-reported data. This involved multiplying available monthly poverty statistics from July 2018, August 2020, and December 2022 by 12 (to create equivalence with fisher self-estimates of their 12-mo. fishing incomes), and again by four, given the average fisher household size of four. Data analysis and visualizations created by the civil society organization, Causa Natura (2023), allowed us to examine the nature and magnitude of changes in fisheries subsidies across the 2011–2019 period (Append. 1, Fig. A.2.a). This offered corroborating evidence of fishers’ perceptions regarding major changes to fishery subsidies in 2019.

We discuss some of the limitations of the study beyond the aforementioned gender bias in Append. 1, Section A.2.

RESULTS

We found that, by structuring access to marine resources and fisher agency, self-governance mediated adaptive capacities among fishers and differentiated exposures, sensitivities, and responses to exogenous drivers of change. Self-governance differentially structured fishers’ adaptive capacities by shaping their legal access to marine resources of different abundances and values, influencing fisher incomes, assets, and livelihood flexibilities. Additionally, self-governance forms shaped fisher agency: those self-governance forms that gave fishers greater access to resources, information, and influence were associated with higher levels of satisfaction with their self-governance form.

The role of self-governance form in structuring legal access to marine resources of different abundances was also pivotal in outcomes of differentiated exposure and sensitivity to the global market changes associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, the loss of state subsidies to the small-scale fishing sector, and climatic variability associated with the El Niño Southern Oscillation. Fishers’ livelihood responses to these exogenous drivers of change reflected several differences, including the importance of higher incomes, assets, and agency in the corporate cooperative sector and higher levels of flexibility among other self-governance forms. We also found that self-governance form was relatively less important for fisher perceptions of their well-being trajectories at the end of the study period. We offer a global summary of findings on fisher vulnerability and adaptation by self-governance form in Table 3 and include a more detailed description of our findings in the rest of this section.

Adaptive capacity

Differentiated access to resource concessions and permits by different self-governance forms were pivotal in shaping fishers’ adaptive capacities in the form of incomes, assets, and livelihood flexibility. Corporate cooperatives enjoyed the highest incomes but relatively lower diversification in fishing and livelihoods. In comparison, other governance forms demonstrated lower incomes but more diversification in both fishing and alternative incomes, as well as additional sources of food security (except in the case of free fishers). Self-governance form also shaped fisher agency, in the form of democratic decision making and financial transparency (especially in corporate cooperatives). We relate this to corporate cooperative fishers being satisfied with their self-governance form (i.e., they would not change if they had the opportunity). Alternatively, satisfaction was expressed by the owner-operators who did not engage in democratic decision making but rather enjoyed agency in being their own boss.

Access as manifested in fishing portfolios, fishing incomes, and associated livelihood diversification

Corporate cooperative fishers enjoyed privileged access to high-value marine resources (e.g., abalone, lobster) inaccessible to other self-governance forms. Relying on a combination of area-based resource concessions, fleet modernization, and resource co-management subsidies from the government, corporate cooperatives specialized in certain high-value species (88% of landed value in Pacific red lobster) (Fig. 4; Append. 1, Table A.3). By contrast, free fishers, family-based cooperative members, externally supported cooperative members, and owner-operator fishers all lacked area-based concessions. Accordingly, high-value benthic species accounted for less than 1% of the value of the harvest portfolios relied upon by these self-governance forms (ibid.). Although the fishing portfolios of these four self-governance forms were more diverse than those of corporate cooperatives, corporate cooperatives’ revenues in lobster and other high value, benthic species harvested with exclusive concessions—combined with transparent collective action institutions for fair sharing of revenues—granted corporate cooperative members much higher fishing incomes and associated assets. Corporate cooperative members earned above three times the income poverty level for a family of four, followed by free fishers earning income from fishing at twice the rural income poverty level (Fig. 5).

Fishers organized into family-based, externally supported, and owner-operator (small permisionario) forms reported fishing incomes below the federal poverty level (Fig. 5). Yet, these fishers also showed higher livelihood flexibility compared with corporate cooperative and free fishers, complementing diversified fishing portfolios with ranching, tourism, research services, and/or household-level income diversification (Append. 1, Table A.4). Ranching and other direct food production activities by fishers in externally supported and family-supported cooperative forms lent a source of flexibility, food security, and savings (i.e., animals as assets that provided food and an alternative source of income if sold) (Append. 1, Fig. A.1). A majority of fishers surveyed across the self-governance forms (from 70–100% of fishers in each) also described “bringing food home” as one of the most important aspects of their fishing activity (an exception being just over 40% of externally supported cooperative fishers who described subsistence as an important aspect of their fishing). Tourism and conservation developments near family-based and externally supported fishing cooperatives provided fishers alternative labor opportunities. However, fishers also expressed concerns that these developments encroached on areas available for ranching and fishing and/or drew heavily on scarce freshwater resources.

Beyond influencing fisher livelihood diversification, the relative proximity of family-based cooperative members in our study to the urban center of Loreto and associated tourism developments offered more opportunities for fisher household members and, hence, greater flexibility (Append. 1, Table A.4). Well over a third of cooperative fishers in these communities relied on income from at least one other household member. Although some of these incomes were also derived from fishing, other non-fishing employment for household members included retail, temporary employment programs, hotel housekeeping, working at the regional hospital or prison, local political office, and seamstressing. (Where additional household income is drawn from fishing, this diversification may not create flexibility in the face of a significant market or climatic change driver.) We found low levels of remittances, although free fishers were most likely to report they could count on financial support from family members outside of the immediate household.

Household-level savings varied, with many fishers reporting no savings at all (46% of corporate cooperative members; 11% of externally supported cooperative members; 47% family-based cooperative members; 45% of free fishers; and 17% of owner-operators). Externally supported cooperative members’ households allocated the most, at 12% (Append. 1, Table A.4). Savings were relatively low among corporate cooperative members, with an average of 5% (lower than free fishers in the same community at 7%), possibly because their self-governance form involves significant fisher contributions to retirement pensions. Free fishers reported the highest level of counting on economic support from family members living outside the community and/or abroad in times of crisis, at 25%.

Agency as manifested in decision making, financial transparency, satisfaction with self-governance form, and quality-of-life trajectories

We found owner-operators and corporate cooperative members to hold the highest levels of agency within their fishing businesses. Free fishers, family-based cooperative members, and externally supported cooperative members appeared to hold intermediate levels of agency within their fishing businesses. However, free fishers stood out as expressing the greatest desire to change their self-governance form.

Corporate cooperative members gave the highest ratings of democratic decision making and financial transparency within their organizations. Among corporate cooperative members, 56% disagreed with the statement that there was one person who made decisions for the organization, whereas 95% rated the finances of their organization as transparent or very transparent. These were followed by free fishers (43% shared decision making and 50% transparent finances), family-based cooperative members (29% shared decision making and 71% transparent finances), and externally supported cooperative members (34% shared decision making and 31% transparent finances). These organizational aspects of agency did not apply to owner-operators, as these fishers held sole capacity to make decisions and manage the finances of their business.

Despite their intermediate perceptions of decision-making access and financial transparency (Table 3), and relatively high individual fishing income (Fig. 5), free fishers expressed universal dissatisfaction with their self-governance status, with 100% stating they would prefer to be individual permit holders (55%) or cooperative members (45%), given the opportunity. Corporate cooperative members showed satisfaction with their fishing self-governance form, with only 5% expressing a desire to switch (to individual permit holder). By contrast, 56% of externally supported cooperative members and 47% of family-based cooperative members stated they would change to a non-cooperative self-governance status if given the opportunity. Among the four externally supported cooperative members who specified what status they would prefer, half stated they would prefer to be a permit holder and half that they would prefer to be a free fisher. Reasons given included to avoid the hassle and conflicts involved in cooperative organization (75%) and to earn more money (25%). Among the 15 family-based cooperative members who stated they would change, 40% expressed a desire to become an individual permit holder, 27 % to work as a free fisher, and 20% to work in tourism (13% did not specify). Among these family-based cooperative members, a third thought they would earn more money if they changed to one of these, and another third focused more on agency, stating “I would be my own boss.” Owner-operators (individual permit holders) expressed satisfaction with their self-governance form, although some said they would prefer to dedicate themselves to tourism or conservation. These findings suggest that the quality of collective action influences fisher agency; working together with others can be seen as either a hindrance to individual agency or a pathway to it. Likewise, they suggest that being in a role to earn more money bolsters perceptions of agency.

Asked to rate how their living conditions had changed over the previous 10-yr period (2008–2018), owner-operators and fishers integrated into cooperative self-governance forms generally perceived improvement. Only among family-based cooperative members did 44% state their living conditions had remained the same, and 16% state that these had worsened. In contrast, half of free fishers indicated that their living conditions had not changed, with an even split among those who reported improving (25%) and worsening (25%) living conditions.

Exposure and sensitivity

We found that self-governance form influenced fishers’ exposure and sensitivity to external drivers of livelihood change in two important ways. First, by differentially structuring access to marine resources, self-governance form influenced fishers’ exposure and sensitivity to exogenous drivers shaping local changes in resource availability, price, and accordingly, incomes from fishing. Second, because self-governance form structured fisher access to fishing subsidies, the removal of these subsidies as part of government austerity policies disproportionately affected cooperative fishers.

Multiple, interacting exposures

We found differentiated impacts of declining government support, climatic variability and change, and global market trends (following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic) for fishers in different self-governance forms. Additional narratives of exposure can be found in Append. 1, Section A.3.1.

Declining government support:

A high proportion of fishers across self-governance forms (84% of cooperative fishers and 40% of noncooperative fishers) felt that the austerity changes that the federal government made during and in response to the pandemic eclipsed the pandemic in terms of impact on their livelihoods. Austerity measures applied to the fisheries sector dramatically reduced the fleet modernization subsidies previously accessible to cooperatives as a new program called “Bienpesca,” designed to offer support to individual fishers (i.e., an annual one-time payment of $7200 MXN, ca. $425 U.S. dollars), became the primary policy tool (Append. 1, Fig. A.2.a). As one Bahía Tortugas cooperative member described, “The new national government reduced all support… now there is just Bienpesca and a subsidy of 50% of the electricity needed for aquaculture projects.” Cooperative members and leaders complained of the loss of subsidies for the purchase of fishing equipment (i.e., boat motors) with only a few mentioning the Bienpesca support favorably. By contrast, free fishers in Bahía Tortugas commended the expanded coverage of the individual Bienpesca grant, saying it was previously allocated by lottery and now almost all fishers receive it.

As mentioned earlier, however, the pandemic spurred key fisheries governance changes at the federal level, which dovetailed with the focus on austerity and may have also contributed to an increasing presence of organized crime (see Append. 1, Section A.3.1). Closure of regional permitting offices and the shift to online permit renewals, changes in tax law, and integrated online tax filing regimes most acutely impacted cooperatives and especially, cooperatives practicing formal income diversification. Family-based cooperative leaders were frustrated with changes to tax regimes, new administrative requirements, and increasing costs associated with online permit renewal. One cooperative leader holding permits for tourism activities (blue whale and sportfishing) as well as commercial fishing for finfish explained that their tax rate had risen from 5% to 33% with these shifts in policy. Another leader explained that they lost money from (ultimately unsuccessful) efforts to renew and obtain permits from CONAPESCA during the pandemic, given office closures in La Paz, onerous new document requirements, and an online filing system. Family-based cooperative leaders argued that free fishers are doing better than cooperative members because they don’t bear any of the heightened administrative costs and penalties associated with governance changes in the sector. One reported that fewer and fewer cooperatives are reporting their catch, and a growing number are declaring the cooperative’s income as zero, so as to avoid paying taxes, even if doing so restricts their ability to maintain their permits as active. We speculate that family-based cooperative fishers could end up fishing illegally or exiting out of fishing as a result of these drivers.

Climatic variability and change:

Fisher narratives about the impacts of climatic and environmental change also revealed sensitivities differentiated by self-governance form. Because self-governance form structures access to permits for marine species with different evolutionary adaptations and needs—and because these taxa occur in differing abundances and with diverse market values—warm and cool ocean temperature cycles benefit fishers organized within one self-governance form at the same time that they diminish the livelihoods of fishers within another. In addition, those fishers with lower fishing incomes who depend on ranching as a livelihood diversification tend to be more affected by drought.

For example, in Bahía Tortugas, non-cooperative and cooperative fishers have access to different marine taxa (Fig. 4). Free fishers and permisionarios reported relatively lower pelagic finfish catch in the study period due to the cold water associated with the recent La Niña event. In contrast, these conditions were favorable for the benthic species targeted by corporate cooperative fishers on the Pacific side of the Baja California peninsula. A free fisher in Bahía Tortugas told us, “here we wait for El Niño like a child waits for Christmas,” whereas corporate cooperative fishers dread the warm waters that create deadly conditions for benthic species like abalone and sea snails.

In addition, externally supported and family-based fishers (all on the Gulf side of the peninsula) described drought influencing both ranching and fisheries, stronger and less predictable wind and ocean current patterns, improved year-round habitat for Pacific red snapper, more extreme air and water temperatures, and the disappearance of the regionally iconic chocolate clam. In particular, drought appears to have severely reduced the ranching–fishing combination that was the most common livelihood diversification in our 2018 survey, with the consequence that any cattle sold before they died offered short-term income but likely contributed to fishers seeking alternative livelihood diversification strategies in hotel construction and tourism services. In association with drought and reduced viability of ranching, family-based cooperative members also mentioned loss of rangelands and foliage due to the enclosure of communal lands by the growing hotel development in Ensenada Blanca and its heavy use of water resources (Append. 1, Fig. A.5).

Global market trends:

In contrast to the cooperative fishers who rated the loss of government support as the most significant external driver of change in the 2018–2022 period, free fishers and permisionarios large and small (in our sample, limited to Bahía Tortugas and San Evaristo) considered the pandemic as having the most significant impact on their lives. This was due to changes in the market value of their catch, rather than government restriction on fishing activity. However, it is important to note that the global market trends associated with the pandemic also interacted with pandemic-related inflation of basic goods (Append. 1, Fig. A.2.b), as described in the next section on income sensitivity.

Non-cooperative fishers experienced greater value chain exposures than cooperative fishers. For example, prices for finfish taxa targeted by free fishers in Bahía Tortugas (largely destined for U.S. markets) dropped precipitously in spring 2020. Prices for flounder (Paralichthys spp.) at the first point of sale allegedly dropped from $70 to $20 MXN/kilo ($3.26 to $0.93 USD), and recovered slowly. A buyer and large permisionario in Bahía Tortugas described losing over $200,000 MXN ($9,317 USD) in expected export revenue in flounder and inshore sand perch (Diplectrum pacificum). He reoriented sales to the domestic market at prices that were generally half of those paid by exporters to the USA. Permisionarios and free fishers reported in 2023 that the export market to the USA has only recently returned to pre-pandemic levels, with additional value shocks coinciding with the emergence of the COVID-19 omicron variant in 2021. Owner-operators and some family-based cooperative fishers reliant on domestic markets for finfish and shark likewise reported severe reductions in demand, as local restaurants serving such products were closed for over 2 yrs due to government mandates intended to reduce disease transmission.

In contrast, exports of Pacific red snapper (Lutjanus peru) to the USA remained open after a brief 2- to 3-wk closure, sustaining externally supported and family-based cooperative fishers throughout the study period. (This finding also counters recent accounts describing local and regional markets as supporting fisher resilience in the early phase of the pandemic (Love et al. 2021, Comunidad y Biodiversidad (COBI) 2021, Stoll et al. 2021).) Corporate cooperative members reported minimal exposure to market changes in the early phases of the pandemic, largely because the emergence of COVID-19 coincided with the lobster fishing off-season and a price increase of 20% when it reopened in September 2020. Although these fishers reported periodic closures of Chinese exports as new variants were discovered and significant regional markets inside China closed temporarily, the general observation was that prices had risen significantly and that the pandemic had, ironically, served them economically. Hence, export markets were critical to cooperative fishers’ livelihoods throughout the pandemic.

Income sensitivity

Cooperative fishers showed generally lower sensitivity to the initial value-chain impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic between March and September 2020 than non-cooperative fishers (Append. 1, Fig. A.3). Corporate cooperative and externally supported cooperative members reported being able to retain from 92% to 94% of pre-pandemic incomes from a combination of their export market orientations and collective action institutions—with the latter essential for savings and redistribution of fishing income (see Append. 1, Section 4.2). Free fishers and owner-operators reported greater income losses (51% and 67%, respectively) both due to a lack of a safety net (free fishers universally responded that they had not been offered any support from large permisionarios) and the greater impact upon the markets and value chains in which they were embedded. Among family-based cooperatives, the average income lost was 24%, where those primarily reliant upon domestic finfish markets suffered the most substantial income drops. These sensitivities and the baseline income differences between cooperative and non-cooperative fishers described earlier are consistent with analyses from other regions of the country, where fishers working under non-cooperative structures were more indebted than cooperative fishers (Basurto et al. 2020).

Reduced incomes during the pandemic put free fishers, on average, at near the income poverty level and family-based cooperative and owner-operator fishers even further below it than they were in 2018 (see Fig. 4 and Append. 1, Fig. A.3). However, inflation of food, gas, and other inputs for fishing soared in the 2020–2022 period (Append. 1, Fig. A.2.b). Consequently, the rural income poverty level in Mexico—i.e., the cost of a basket of food and other basic needs—rose 30% between July 2018 and December 2022 (Fig. 4; CONEVAL 2023), and these fisher income drops became more significant. We interpret this sensitivity as significant for the fisher responses, including changes in livelihood and self-governance form, described in the next section.

Responses

Fishers’ livelihood responses to the aforementioned external drivers of change reflected differences in access and agency mediated by self-governance form. In particular, the greater access conditions in the corporate cooperative sector, and lower access conditions associated with higher levels of flexibility among other self-governance forms, influenced their actions. Among fisher responses to the suite of external change drivers described above, we found actions to: (1) reorient fishing portfolios to higher value species (both cooperative and noncooperative fishers); (2) buffer short-term market closures through collective savings redistribution (cooperative fishers only); (3) diversify income through additional employments, including leaving fishing and adopting (where available) more remunerative alternative employment (externally supported and family-based cooperative fishers); and (4) form new relationships with better-paying permit holders and buyers (across self-governance types) (Append. 1, Table A.6). We explain findings supporting (1) and (2) below, whereas more detail on (3) and (4) can be found in the Append. 1, Section A.3.2.

Change in target species portfolios

Among externally supported and family-based cooperatives, improved prices for export-bound, “first” quality Pacific red snapper present an example of how fishers are adapting to exogenous change. Prior to a recent increase in year-round ocean temperatures, informants told us, red snapper was most abundant during the summer months (see also Sievanen 2014, Pellowe and Leslie 2017). With these climatic changes, along with increased bait sources, Pacific red snapper has now become a year-round fishery. As one cooperative leader explained, “now, wherever you look there is red snapper.” However, fishers also described the unpredictable movement of the resource with changing currents patterns, consistent with findings of other researchers (Frawley et al. 2019a). This has also influenced the informal rules and practices around fishing in the region, where fishers from different communities used to enforce informal territorial user rights fisheries that are no longer viable as fish movement has become irregular and fisher range has increased. Prices for Pacific red snapper improved dramatically over the study period due to improvements in handling, processing, and storage that conserve product quality which pre-date the pandemic (to 2018 according to one informant), and an increase in buyers courting fishers for this product, which has bolstered fisher bargaining power.

During the early pandemic, Pacific red snapper export channels offered a lifeline to fishers, who in some cases shifted their overall fisheries portfolio to specialize in this resource. One cooperative leader in Ensenada Blanca explained “practically, red snapper was the pillar (sostén) of the pandemic for us.” He explained that his cooperative ceased fishing all “second”-tier fish that were destined for the regional markets of La Paz and Los Cabos, and focused almost exclusively on red snapper. These are changes that have persisted long term. Similarly, an owner-operator small permisionario in San Evaristo reported, “We haven’t been fishing for triggerfish because of its low price. We are more focused on leopard grouper, yellowtail, red snapper.” It is important to note that price differences may reflect differences in buyers or differences in the way cooperative leadership negotiates prices with buyers. In cooperatives where fishers expressed concern about their leadership, they tended to also report greater price reductions for fish during the pandemic, suggesting correlations among good governance in the fishing entity, relationships with fair buyers, and equitable sharing of value with fishers.

Cooperative savings redistribution

Strong collective action and leadership in corporate and externally supported cooperatives enabled redistribution of savings that shored up potential or real income shortfalls during the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. Cooperative savings have long been formalized in corporate cooperatives. Throughout the year, members receive a salary advance every 2 wks, the amount of which depends on the fisher’s role on the boat/crew and the fishery he/she participates in. The salary advance does not change during the off-season (veda). At the end of the year, each member receives a salary adjustment (ajuste) that accounts for their boat/crew’s production over the year and price of the product. Externally supported cooperatives in our study also practiced collective savings, for example, where the cooperative discounts 2 pesos per kilo from payment to the fisher for a given day’s haul, and that fee to the cooperative accumulates in a collective fund to be redistributed at the year’s end or in times of need. During the early months of the pandemic, the yellowtail (Seriola lalalandi) season came and went for one of the externally supported cooperatives in Agua Verde, which accordingly reallocated collective savings equivalent to 2 mos. of salary for members, totaling $10,000 MXN ($466 USD) per fisher. The family-based cooperatives in our study did not practice collective savings. Free fishers universally responded that they had not gained any additional support or loans from permisionarios or buyers during the pandemic, but rather had spent down individual or household-level savings (when they had them) to weather the period of much-reduced income.

Outcomes

Our third and final question was, how did self-governance form influence fisher perceptions of their well-being trajectories? Contrary to our expectations, fishers across self-governance categories described generally positive and/or neutral trajectories of change in their lives and household earnings compared with 4 yrs earlier (before the pandemic and other concurrent and compounding stressors, including the federal government transformation) (Fig. 6). Trajectories in food and nutrition, health, and natural resource protection were more mixed, and the latter differentiated by self-governance form, with a lack of positive responses for natural resources and health among non-cooperative fishers, in contrast with cooperative fishers (ibid.).

Explanations for positive household economic trajectories included improved prices for fish associated with new permisionarios and buyers—including turnover that appears in some cases to have been catalyzed by the pandemic—and the growth of opportunities to work in tourism services for better pay and lower economic risk. Those describing positive food and nutrition changes for their household related these to improved incomes. Negative health reports were generally described in relationship to the aging of some fishers or weight gain and chronic non-communicable illnesses (e.g., “we all emerged [from the pandemic] diabetic, hypertensive” / todos salimos diabeticos, hipertensos—some fishers explained that staying at home led them to overeat unhealthy foods and beverages, leading to weight gain and associated health problems). Reports of degradation in environmental resource protections were higher among non-cooperative fishers than cooperative fishers. Owner-operators (all in San Evaristo) cast the blame on illegal fishers (la pesca furtiva) whereas free fishers (all in Bahía Tortugas) blamed large-scale shrimp and tuna fishing boats.

DISCUSSION

Our analysis of individual fisher and fisher household vulnerability and adaptation in Baja California Sur’s small-scale fisheries demonstrates that, by structuring access to resources and fisher agency, self-governance forms mediate the opportunities and challenges that fishers face in making a living in a dynamic and globalized world. Below, we describe three key contributions to understanding of small-scale fishers’ vulnerability and adaptation to external drivers of livelihood change. These are that self-governance forms mediate (1) fishers’ access to fisheries and state resources, (2) fishers’ temporal exposures and sensitivities to environmental change, and (3) fishers’ agency in adapting livelihoods to changing external conditions.

Self-governance forms mediate access to key, high-value fisheries and state resources

Our study documents for the first time the very different incomes from fishing in this region and their association with heterogeneous self-governance forms. On the Pacific side of Baja California Sur, corporate cooperatives—which exhibit the highest mean incomes—enjoy exclusive access to specific high-value fisheries (i.e., abalone and lobster) through state-sanctioned marine territorial concessions that exist only for these corporate cooperatives (McCay et al. 2014, Zetina-Rejon et al. 2020). In the face of external drivers affecting their livelihoods, corporate cooperatives like those in Bahía Tortugas respond by redistributing savings to members (Vilalta-Navas 2023). The accumulation of savings is at least partly attributable to their unique access to concession-protected fishing grounds for high-value species. In contrast, the non-cooperative fishers in this region (known as Pacífico Norte) access only shark and finfish species, with comparatively much lower market values.

Self-governance forms mediate temporal exposures and sensitivities to environmental change

Uneven access to fishing permits produces highly differentiated sensitivities among cooperative and non-cooperative fishers to the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) cycle and other environmental drivers of variability and change. The benthic species targeted by corporate cooperative fishers are most productive during cooler ocean conditions, whereas the pelagic species targeted by non-cooperative fishers in the same community (Bahía Tortugas) thrive in warmer waters. Our study period coincided with La Niña conditions, and several free fishers described cold waters as lowering production and hurting their livelihoods. At the same time, these conditions enabled sustained, high-value production of red lobster and other benthic species targeted by corporate cooperatives. Corporate cooperatives hold permits for shark and finfish species, but invest in them to a much lesser degree than the benthic resources given the former species’ lower value. In other words, diversifying fishing portfolios into shark and finfish species is an accessible, legal option for corporate cooperatives whereas the reverse—diversifying into high-value benthic species—would only be an option for free fishers and permisionarios interested in the costs and risks of fishing for them illegally. To our knowledge, this differentiated temporal vulnerability to climatic drivers by self-governance form, mediated primarily by state-enforced resource concessions and permits, has not been documented before.

Relatedly, as the households of fishers integrated into family-based and externally supported cooperative forms—both with fishing incomes below the poverty level—pursue diversified livelihoods including other natural resource-dependent activities (ranching and other direct food production activities that offer flexibility), meteorological drought impacts their vulnerability more than it does the corporate cooperative and free fishers who lack this orientation.

Self-governance forms mediate fisher agency in adapting livelihoods to changing external conditions

Finally, self-governance shapes how fishers can express agency in adapting to change by offering different bases for democratic decision making and financial transparency. Where fishers do not have the power to influence decisions for the fishing entity that shape their livelihoods, either due to a reluctant boss or a dysfunctional cooperative, the suite of response actions to adversity narrows. The collective action in corporate cooperatives, including transparent management of finances, combined with higher incomes for fishers associated with access to high-value resource concessions, facilitates redistribution to support the fishers in the cooperative through times of crisis. The absence of collective action available to free fishers working under large permisionarios was particularly notable, as they experienced the greatest livelihood sensitivity to the pandemic, but received no emergency grants or loans from their permisionarios. However, by the time of our follow-up interviews, many were fishing for a new permisionario, and others had formed a new cooperative (Append. 1, Section A.3.2.2). Hence, some were not only “getting by” but also “getting organized” (Lister 2004, Coulthard 2012)—obtaining new permits and developing relationships with new buyers so as to carry out their fishing livelihoods on better terms of trade.

CONCLUSION

We find that self-governance form mediates fisher livelihood vulnerability and adaptation to external changes primarily by structuring conditions of access and agency. In Mexico, self-governance forms dictate fisher access to different marine resources via permits and concessions. These marine resources are, in turn, differentially affected by changing markets and climatic variabilities. Moreover, the incomes fishers count on from fishing under these different conditions of access shape their diversification strategies, and the vulnerabilities that derive from these (e.g., ranching, tourism services). Relatedly, self-governance forms shape the agency fishers can express in times of external change—whether their responses to adversity are based primarily on individual/household-level actions or on collective actions by their fishing business.

Attention by policy makers to our findings that self-governance forms structure fishers’ vulnerabilities and adaptations to exogenous change drivers could inform efforts toward social equity in the multiple policy spheres (fisheries, social, economic development, environmental protection, among others) that interact to shape this study system, its sustainability, and the livelihoods and well-being of the fishing households within it. Mexico’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic notoriously lacked targeted subsidies to low-income families most affected by market changes and stay-at-home orders (Arza et al. 2022, Bloefield et al. 2023). Should the government follow other countries’ example in mitigating the economic adversities of such an event with targeted subsidies in the future, it would be relevant to consider the very different incomes and sources of income associated with fishing livelihoods within different self-governance forms. Beyond guidance on targeting emergency subsidies, the findings of this study offer a basis for considering how fisheries policy could be reimagined to promote small-scale fisher access and agency in ways that take into account the constraints and opportunities of diverse cooperative and non-cooperative self-governance forms.

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