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Jeangros, L., J. Jacobi, J. Six, and K. Benabderrazik. 2025. From “power over” to “power with”: resilience of the tomato value chain in the Upper East Region of Ghana. Ecology and Society 30(3):26.ABSTRACT
Food systems are increasingly subject to shocks (e.g., climate change, pandemics, financial or political crises), threatening food supply both locally and globally. Transforming food systems is urgent to achieve socially just food for all within planetary boundaries. Here, we integrate the analysis of power relations into the concept of resilience by studying the tomato value chain in northern Ghana, which is characterized by both climate shocks and unequal power relations. We address two questions drawing on critical resilience studies: (1) What are the characteristics of power relations between actors in the tomato value chain? (2) How do extreme weather events (shocks) influence power asymmetries between actors in the tomato value chain? Based on our findings, we argue that resilience studies should increasingly integrate a power lens, understanding resilience as a collective goal of food system actors. Our results shed light on the inherent link between power relations and resilience, especially through positive power such as “power with” used to mitigate the effects of a crisis. We observed asymmetric power dynamics in the Ghanaian tomato value chain, with widespread dependencies on credit and loans for farmers, who are then compelled to sell their produce at low prices. Our findings add nuance to the common discourse of female traders being the only power holders in the system.
INTRODUCTION
As climate change and environmental degradation lead to increasing weather events and sanitary shocks, food systems are moving further away from their multiple goals of providing food and healthy diets for all, decent livelihoods, and protection to ecosystems, among other things (Campbell et al. 2017). Against this backdrop, the resilience of food systems is key to secure the supply of food in times of crisis (Tendall et al. 2015, Nguyen 2018, von Braun et al. 2021). However, resilience approaches have been criticized for neglecting the social in social-ecological systems (SESs) such as food systems, lacking essential questions about who the winners and losers in different SESs are and why (Côte and Nightingale 2011, Dixon and Stringer 2015). By focusing on these systems’ adaptive capacity, this oversight has indirectly favored the status quo of unequal and unsustainable systems configurations instead of transforming them (Côte and Nightingale 2011, Walker and Cooper 2011, Beymer-Farris et al. 2012, Brown 2014). Moreover, power in food systems has been studied mainly from a structural perspective, focusing on how food production systems are intrinsically linked to specific economic orders at different historical moments, so-called food regimes (Friedmann, 2005, 2016, McMichael 2009), or globally by looking at the influence of corporations on the global food system (Clapp and Fuchs 2009). However, the examination of contemporary power relations at different scales, including the relational one, remains incomplete in food systems, even though these dynamics significantly influence resource allocation and access (Jacobi and Llanque 2018, Jacobi et al. 2021).
In Ghana, tomatoes account for 35% of households’ vegetable expenditure, and they are part of nearly all household meals (Van Asselt et al. 2018). Tomatoes are consumed either fresh or in the form of tomato paste. It is estimated that approximately 90,000 farmers are involved in tomato production, and > 300,000 people are linked to the tomato sector nationwide (https://www.wathi.org/debat_id/developpement-de-lagriculture/wathinote-developpement-de-lagriculture/ghanas-tomato-processing-industry-an-attractive-investment-option-in-2016/). Ghana’s imports of tomato paste began to soar in the 1990s (Baba et al. 2013, Britwum 2013, Snels et al. 2018, Frimpong Boamah and Sumberg 2019). The country’s growing dependence on imported paste and the inability of domestic factories to compete have made this case a prominent example of “import surges,” highlighting the inequities of international trade agreements (Frimpong Boamah and Sumberg 2019).
The tomato value chain is understood here as the production, supply chain, and consumption of fresh tomatoes from different parts of Ghana—mainly the Brong-Ahafo and the Upper East regions—and from other adjacent countries. This value chain is influenced by external factors such as tomato paste imports and agricultural and trade-related policies. This tomato value chain has been described as highly unequal because producers have little agency and sellers have restricted access to the market (Robinson and Kolavalli 2010a, van Wesenbeeck et al. 2014, Kolavalli 2019). The supply chain is organized by women traders from the South, known as “market queens,” who are the main intermediaries in the chain and are organized in strong market associations. It has been observed that women-led market associations emerge as culturally acceptable responses to women’s restricted access to land, education, and formal employment, enabling income generation through care-related activities with other women (Scheiterle and Birner 2018). Some authors, however, point to these market queens as exploiting farmers through underpayment (Ngeleza and Robinson 2013, van Wesenbeeck et al. 2014, Amikuzuno et al. 2015, Kolavalli 2019). This market structure, characterized by concentrated and organized intermediaries, has significantly impacted tomato farmers in the Upper East Region (UER), particularly in their efforts to secure supplies for the national market during the dry season from December to April (Quaye 2006, Abdulai et al. 2018, Ghana Statistical Service 2018). Market queens have increasingly sourced fresh tomatoes from Burkina Faso instead of the UER (Awo 2010). During the rainy season, from April to December, the country’s demand is predominantly met by the Brong-Ahafo region in the south, which produces rain-fed tomatoes. Here, we focus on the tomato value chain from the UER.
The UER remains one of the areas in the country most vulnerable to climate change due to its geographical zone and the uneven territorial development that has disadvantaged the northern regions to the benefit of export-oriented industries and crops located in the south (Tambo 2016, Abdulai et al. 2018). Approximately 56% of the land area is classified as arable, with some districts reporting that > 90% of the population is engaged in peasant farming, making agriculture a primary livelihood activity (MOFA 2022, Baffoe et al. 2021). Land tenure ranges from inherited to rental arrangements. However, factors such as deagrarianization, urbanization, migration, land reform, resettlement, and re-peasantization have significantly altered traditional land systems, with ownership increasingly contested (Akolgo-Azupogo et al. 2021). Traditional agroecological knowledge remains the dominant adaptation strategy, supporting diverse cropping systems that range from subsistence staples such as rice, maize, groundnut, and sorghum to fruits and vegetables such as tomato, onion, and pepper (MOFA 2022, Baffoe et al. 2021). The region has received particular attention in the scientific literature over the last decades because it is known to have the highest prevalence of poverty and food insecurity in the country (Abdulai et al. 2018, Adu et al. 2018, Fagariba et al. 2018). In this context, the need to enhance the climate resilience of smallholder farmers has been identified as a priority, especially in vulnerable communities such as in the UER (Tendall et al. 2015, Tambo 2016). Benabderrazik et al. (2022) emphasize the importance of addressing the broader social and power dynamics in their analysis of the resilience of smallholders in the UER, going beyond climate change shocks and adaptations.
Here, we aim to address the dual objectives of understanding how to increase resilience and incorporate power analysis in food systems research. By exploring these themes, we aim to foster reflection on the potential for transformation in food systems, emphasizing the importance of moving beyond adaptation in certain contexts. We understand transformation as fundamental shifts that significantly change the interactions and feedback loops between humans and the environment, whereas adaptation refers to adjustments that preserve the system’s core functioning without restructuring its underlying processes (Olsson et al. 2015). Additionally, we aim to fill an empirical gap concerning the reaction of the system’s actors to climate shocks and stresses, focusing on whether and how power relations are modified during such events.
Against this background, we address the following research questions.
- What power relations characteristics influence the climate resilience among actors of a value chain?
- How do shocks such as extreme climatic events influence power asymmetries among actors of a value chain?
To characterize power relations among actors, we build upon Gaventa’s (2005) power cube framework. We integrate the dynamic nature of resilience into this framework by incorporating elements of resilience theory, with the aim of contributing to the nascent literature on power relations and critical resilience in food systems (Hendrickson 2015, Rotz and Fraser 2015, Walsh-Dilley et al. 2016, Boillat and Bottazzi 2020, Haller et al. 2020).
We first present the theoretical framework that integrates power into resilience approaches, followed by the methodological approach and the case study context. We structure the results around the four identified spaces of power in the tomato value chain, followed by an analysis of how these spaces are affected by climate shocks. We conclude by discussing the implications for resilience and the transformation of food systems.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Resilience in social-ecological systems research
The plethora of existing resilience research mostly focuses on the capacity to withstand and to recover from shocks, without addressing the space where decision-making takes place during these critical periods (Kull and Rangan 2016). This oversight has led to resilience studies frequently failing to address the fundamental questions of what resilience is and whom it benefits (Côte and Nightingale 2011), thereby overlooking essential issues of agency and power within SESs (Ifejika Speranza et al. 2014, Mukhovi et al. 2020). Here, agency is understood as the capacity of actors to act and change their environment (VeneKlasen and Miller 2002, Gaventa 2005) and power “in relation to how spaces for engagement are created,” to envision transformative possibilities of citizen action on their environment (Gaventa 2005:6). The application of resilience in research studies and development practices has thus overlooked important causes of vulnerability, which may have led to the promotion of top-down solutions that fail their purpose (Davidson 2010, Walsh-Dilley et al. 2016). In this regard, the current literature has failed to offer a framework that takes power dynamics into account in SES resilience (Côte and Nightingale 2011, Stagner and Mulundano 2024). From this perspective, we integrate power as a critical element to address the resilience of food system stakeholders. For this purpose, we use Gaventa’s (2003, 2005) power cube framework to analyze power and integrate social and power dynamics as important determinants of resilience (Köpke 2021, Benabderrazik et al. 2022, Stagner and Mulundano 2024). The power cube offers a framework for analyzing spaces and forms of power that are found in the value chain, including consideration for spaces of empowerment and transformation. The latter consideration helps us to understand how resilience can be built from an individual and collective power perspective.
Power in the resilience literature: from adaptation toward transformation?
Resilience is defined as the magnitude of disturbance that can be tolerated before an SES moves to a different region of state space controlled by a different set of processes (Carpenter et al. 2001). In other words, it has often been described as the ability of a system to adapt and remain in a desirable state (https://www.resalliance.org/adaptive-cycle) and thus reduce uncertainty (Scoones and Stirling 2020). However, the reality shows a rather wide range of actors with diverse perspectives and interests concerning the supposed desirable state of the SES in play, resulting in unequal outcomes and trade-offs (Côte and Nightingale 2011, Beymer-Farris et al. 2012, Fabinyi et al. 2014). Scoones and Stirling (2020) underline how approaches to sustainability and development often rely on expert-defined solutions, which obscures the very notion of uncertainty, thereby concealing possible futures and whose interests are pursued. Côte and Nightingale (2011:485) argue that it is only by drawing our attention to “issues of power, authority and complex rationalities” that we are able “to ask difficult questions about whose environments and livelihoods we seek to protect and why.” In particular, normative questions such as “resilience of what, to what, for what purpose, and for whom?” help bring a critical understanding of what a desirable state means for the different actors of the system (Lebel et al. 2006, Beymer-Farris et al. 2012, Ingram et al. 2023). Furthermore, the focus on adaptation in resilience studies made critical scholars assess the actual stance of resilience as maintaining the status quo of potential unsustainable systems rather than creating opportunities for transformation (Birkenholtz 2011, Walker and Cooper 2011, Watts 2011, Beymer-Farris et al. 2012, Turner 2013, Brown 2014). They add that this seemingly neutral position is the reason why the concept of resilience has recently often been brought to political arenas and decision-making (Turner 2013, Redman 2014, Kull and Rangan 2016). Birkenholtz (2011:299) summarizes some of these critiques by stating that resilience has “(...) a rationalist view of institutions (...) that leads to a focus on social capital and its derivative ‘adaptive capacity building’, which can be indexed and then addressed in technical and managerial terms (...) rather than leading to the questioning of the structure of resource allocation or issues of social justice, human security, and equity.”
Thus, resilience is seen by various authors as a technocratic and top-down understanding of SESs because of its approach considering SESs as manageable and predictable (Birkenholtz 2011, Côte and Nightingale 2011, Beymer-Farris et al. 2012, Brown 2012, Turner 2013), and as “artificially apolitical” because of its lack of consideration of the different interests present in SESs and the politics in which they are embedded (Zurek et al. 2022, Ingram et al. 2023). This critique echoes long-standing concerns in development studies about the framing of deeply political processes into technical ones: Although resilience has been portrayed as a “will to design” (Grove 2018), Côte (2019) argues that it is better understood as a “will to adapt.” This “will to adapt” is then closer to Li’s (2007) critical understanding of development as a “will to improve,” both of which are fundamentally political in nature. However, a more nuanced perspective highlights that resilience can be emancipatory and transformative when politicized. Grove and Chandler (2017) show how feminist and decolonial approaches can help politicize resilience by understanding it as relational and situated, thus overcoming its top-down technical attributes.
The power cube framework
Power has been conceptualized and explained in many different forms by many different authors. For example, Foucault (1982) considers power to be pervasive, diffusing itself through discourse and shaping or “producing” regimes of truth and knowledge and thus being productive. It has been criticized for leaving little space for individuals’ agency (Ahlborg and Nightingale 2018). By contrast, Bourdieu (1989) considers that power is embedded in social structures and everyday practices (habitus), reproducing and legitimizing social hierarchies through symbolic means. Individuals do have some agency to adapt or subvert, but they are bounded by societal structure. Lukes’ (2004) understanding of power offers a combination of views through a three-dimensional understanding of power, distinguishing a visible “first” dimension related to who can shape concrete decisions, a “second” dimension related to who sets political agendas, and a more subtle “third” dimension wherein power shapes people’s perceptions and preferences (close to Bourdieu’s understanding of symbolic power and Foucault’s productivity of power). His understanding of power therefore allows us to understand social life as an interplay between both structural determinism and individual agency (Lukes 2004).
Overall power is an “essentially contested concept” (Gallie 1955), with scholars continuously debating its definition, scope, and appropriate application across disciplines. The goal is therefore to mobilize a definition of power that is best suited to the study’s analytical purpose. Here we use the power cube, a tool developed by Gaventa (2005) that has been used to characterize power in food systems (Nelson et al. 2014, Jacobi and Llanque 2018). Gaventa (2005) builds upon Lukes’ (2004) three dimensions of power, understanding power as relational (created between individuals), contingent (specific to the context and relation), and, to some extent, productive (creating knowledge and discourses, along Foucault’s line). The focus of the power cube is to understand how different actors influence decision-making in different spaces, i.e., arenas, which can be either physical or virtual, where interactions, negotiation, and decision-making take place (Gaventa 2003). This focus formulates a response to a general concern, also in food systems (Jacobi and Llanque 2018), about whether participation and inclusion mechanisms create real shifts of power toward more democratic spaces or, on the contrary, maintain unequal status quos (Jacobi et al. 2021). Levels of power (from local to global), as well as different forms of power (along Lukes’ three dimensions of power), are addressed (Gaventa 2005). Spaces, levels, and forms of power represent the three dimensions of the power cube developed by Gaventa (2005; Fig. 1, Table 1).
The power cube is thus more than a descriptive framework because it can help to identify possible pathways for citizen empowerment by the creation of new democratic spaces (Gaventa 2005). However, these actions are also achieved using other forms of power, described by some scholars (VeneKlasen and Miller 2002, Pantazidou 2012) as positive power, i.e., the “capacity and agency to be wielded for positive action” (Gaventa 2005:9), or “power to,” “power with,” and “power within” (VeneKlasen and Miller 2002).
Overall, Gaventa’s (2005) approach to power acknowledges individuals’ agency and understands power as a resource that is unequally distributed (Ahlborg and Nightingale 2018). Here, we use the power cube in a first step to analyze the power relations within the tomato value chain of Ghana. We then use the positive power typology in a second step to analyze whether spaces are created or claimed through “power with” (the capacity to work collectively towards a certain goal), “power within” (the individual’s awareness about their agency to bring positive change in society), or “power to” (the individual’s capacity to influence their own life). The rationale taken here is that to reach a more sustainable and equal food system, all actors involved in it should be able to participate in its governance and define its norms and rules (Walsh-Dilley et al. 2016).
METHODS
Geographical scope and historical context: the tomato system in the Upper East Region of Ghana
The UER is a savanna zone in the northeast of Ghana, bordered by both Togo and Burkina Faso (Armah et al. 2011). The region is characterized by a unimodal rainfall pattern starting in May and ending in September. Most of the households (76.4%) are located in rural areas (Antwi-Agyei 2012), and agriculture, mostly rain-fed, is their predominant economic activity (Kumasi et al. 2019). During the rainy season, farmers produce staple grains such as maize, millet, sorghum, and rice, mostly for their own consumption and to sell on the local market (Antwi-Agyei et al. 2012, Fagariba et al. 2018). In the dry season, farmers with access to irrigation (estimated ~50%) grow high-value vegetables such as tomatoes, onions, and peppers for the local and national markets, representing their main source of cash income (MOFA 2011, Fagariba et al. 2018).
The UER has historically been sidelined in national development policies because of the high-value economic activities in the South such as cocoa production, timber harvesting, and gold mining, which have attracted political attention and have used, since colonial times, cheap labor mainly coming from the North (Konadu-Agyemang 2000, Abdulai et al. 2018). However, the region managed to thrive economically from the 1960s until the mid-2000s, mainly due to tomato production. It supplied dry-season (December to April) tomatoes for both national demand and a tomato paste factory located in the UER (Awo 2010, Robinson and Kolavalli 2010b, Britwum 2013). The Pwalugu Tomato Factory in the UER was established in 1967 by the first Ghanaian government and its Prime Minister Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, an iconic figure who fought for the country’s independence through import substitution, among other policies (Frimpong Boamah and Sumberg 2019). The factory closed in the late 1980s due to structural reforms and operational challenges. In recent years, it has seen multiple failed attempts at reopening, including refurbishments and collaborations with private firms (Robinson and Kolavalli 2010b).
In addition, in the mid-2000s, market queens increasingly began sourcing their tomatoes from Burkina Faso. The main reasons behind this shift are not clear but might be a combination of crop failure in UER (due to pests and diseases); the good quality of Burkinabe tomatoes, reducing transport losses; the high quantity of tomatoes produced in Burkina Faso, ensuring availability; and the possible interest of crossing the border allowing for trade in both directions (Awo 2010, Robinson and Kolavalli 2010a,c).
This market loss led to an economic decline in the UER, where farmers now cultivate less profitable crops such as peppers or onions (Awo 2010). The region is further characterized by high levels of poverty and food insecurity, with often up to six months of food shortages annually (MOFA 2010, Ghana Statistical Service 2018). It is also considered one of the most vulnerable regions of the country to climate change (Wossen and Berger 2015, Tambo 2016). Drought and flood events, referred to here as “climate shocks,” are forecasted to increase in both frequency and intensity (UNEP and UNDP 2012, Samaddar et al. 2015). In addition to climate shocks, farmers are exposed to market disturbance and shocks such as price volatility (Benabderrazik et al. 2022). Farmers’ strategies to mitigate these stressors usually encompass changing the timing of planting and diversifying their crops (Laube et al. 2012, Antwi-Agyei et al. 2015, Tambo 2016, Kumasi et al. 2019).
Data collection
We took a qualitative research approach because power relations form social structures, which are best approached through qualitative means (Winchester and Rofe 2016). Data collection took place in five locations (Fig. 2) with the help of two research assistants from October to December 2019. It was complemented by a literature review, including local newspaper articles.
We conducted 34 semi-structured interviews in the UER using a purposeful, stratified sampling strategy (Patton 2015). The goal was to ensure representation from each type of actor in the system to capture diverse perspectives. Initially, we conducted at least one interview with each actor type. Following this, a snowball sampling technique was employed, targeting a minimum of two individuals per actor group to explore the diversity of experiences. When interviews within the same actor group revealed a wide range of responses, additional interviews were planned to understand better the sources of this diversity and the commonalities in their experiences (Table 2). These interviews were supplemented by four expert interviews and one focus group comprising one representative from each actor category involved in the tomato value chain in the UER. The interviews were transcribed in English together with the research assistant present at the interview, speaking both English and the language spoken by the interviewee.
Data gathered through the literature review was instrumental in contextualizing the interviews. In particular, it helped to identify how certain narratives reflected broader discourses present in the community. Local newspapers, for example, offered valuable insight into, for example, the role of the tomato processing factory in local political rhetoric during election periods. More broadly, the triangulation of diverse sources proved essential for analyzing power dynamics because power is not only enacted through structures and relations but also articulated through discourses.
Data processing
The transcriptions of interviews and the focus group were analyzed using Atlas.ti 8.4.4 software (ATLAS.ti Scientific Software Development, Berlin, Germany) through qualitative content analysis, following Bengtsson’s (2016) four steps to minimize researcher bias and draw realistic conclusions. First, data decontextualization was achieved by screening all transcriptions and coding in the smallest meaning units possible. The codes were chosen both deductively, based on the questions raised in the interview guides and the research questions, and inductively, by identifying emergent themes across interviews (see Appendix 1 for the codes created). Second, recontextualization was performed by revisiting the transcriptions with the finalized codes to ensure that no relevant data were overlooked, especially in uncoded sections, and by verifying their alignment with the research questions. Third, categorization was carried out by assembling codes around domains that were taken from the theoretical framework (e.g., spaces of power or strategies put in place to react to shocks; see Appendix 1 for the groups created). Fourth, the compilation balanced both manifest (surface-level, explicit interpretations of informants’ words) and latent (in-depth exploration of underlying meanings) approaches. This dual-layered analysis sought to capture both explicit statements and nuanced, implicit patterns, which are key in power relations analyses. The iterative coding process and emerging categories were continuously discussed and validated within the research team to ensure consistency and accuracy in interpretation.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Spaces and forms of power
We found four spaces of power in the UER tomato value chain (Fig. 3): production, selling, processing, and consumption. The production space is influenced by the production of tomatoes in Burkina Faso, which has decreased market access for UER farmers to major cities in the southern part of Ghana. According to our data, no UER tomatoes were sent to supply the southern part of Ghana, confirming the loss of market opportunities for UER farmers. However, farmers still cultivate tomatoes to a smaller extent and sell them on the local market. Additionally, a defunct processing plant was identified as still influencing the tomato value chain through political discourses and speculative promises. Lastly, the Ghanaian consumption encompasses both consumers in the UER and in the southern Ghanian marketplaces to acknowledge the historical link between both geographical regions through tomato production and consumption.
Space 1: production in the UER
The production space mainly comprises the elements necessary to grow tomatoes: access to land, seeds, inputs, water, and knowledge. Farmers need to invest to produce tomatoes, with the highest costs for inputs being seeds and irrigation (Robinson and Kolavalli 2010b). Most farmers purchase tomato seeds, mostly of local varieties and some of improved varieties, with a small proportion of farmers recycling seeds (Robinson and Kolavalli 2010b). It has been shown that tomato production in Ghana, including small-scale production, was relying heavily on pesticides to avoid losses and meet demands for blemish-free tomato fruits. It has been found that tomato farmers in Ghana use various pesticides, including several unregistered products such as DDT or heptachlor accessed through local input retailers, which pose health and environmental hazards (Bandanaa et al. 2016, Mbatchou et al. 2024).
Our results indicate that this space is mainly influenced by official governance systems, most importantly, the government and traditional authorities such as traditional village chiefs (Table 3). An element that emerged frequently in the interviews was the distribution of inputs linked to political interests. One farmer described the distribution of inputs from the flagship policy “Planting for Food and Jobs” launched by the political party in power at the time:
The government helps us. It is us that are not ready to support ourselves. For example, the water we have—we have six bottles—I’ll remove three and ask my friend [member of the same political party] to also take three to them. My friend too will also remove one and give the rest to them [members of the same political party] and their leader too will also take one. So, at the end of the day, only one is available [for everyone] instead of six. (Farmer in the UER, Navrongo).
Four other farmers and one input supplier mentioned that subsidized inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides are often distributed by the local ruling political party to its members, leaving politically unaffiliated farmers with the leftovers.
You know they are their own power, so when they give to the party executive, you know when the MP [Member of Parliament] comes, he gives something [referring to farm inputs] to the party executives. So they share among themselves. So when you have a relative who is executive, then he can offer you something. (Farmer in the UER, Navrongo).
From a land-tenure perspective, few claimed spaces were found. For instance, women, who traditionally cannot own land in the UER (Antwi-Agyei et al. 2018), accessed land with the help of a nongovernmental organization (NGO) and by negotiating with the chiefs. However, situations of “tutorat,” a patronage relationship providing land-use rights to landless farmers or migrants (see Colin 2013), were widespread, leading to forms of non-monetary payment for access to land, leaving producers with informal and insecure land access.
I begged for the land from people to farm. And after harvesting, I can give them some of the food and the following year, they will allow me to farm (...). (Female farmer in the UER).
During peak agricultural periods such as harvesting or weeding, farm labor was frequently carried out by young individuals, including school-aged children. This result points to a structural reliance on low-cost labor within the agricultural sector, which eventually limits education and opportunities for rural youth.
All farmers were members of various farmers’ groups that functioned as social support systems. Some of these groups operated as “tontines,” a collective saving system prevalent in West Africa, where members contribute a set amount of money regularly. This system enables members to access the collective savings during times of crisis or need, with the expectation of repaying the group when able. Other groups were established to facilitate the receipt of support such as grants or inputs from NGOs.
Finally, a previous study shows that farmers do not have access to sufficient external inputs, which underlines the importance of this issue for their work (Benabderrazik et al. 2022). This insufficiency makes farmers largely unable to shape and shift their position in the system, shedding light on an important system lock-in. Apart from a women’s group, farmers in our sample depended largely on government subsidy schemes and on loans provided by input suppliers to access inputs. Even though Ghanaian farmers were often part of a farmers’ association, these associations were not used to empower them in their commercial activities, such as by setting a common price or establishing contracts with buyers. Awo (2010) already observed how this poor level of organization among farmers puts them in unfavorable positions in their commercial relations.
Altogether, this space of production displays “hidden” power of political agendas at regional and national levels and is rather “closed,” with few possibilities for women to access land, for example. Solidarity systems in the form of tontine create “claimed” spaces through “power with” for farmers to access necessary external inputs for their production.
Space 2: selling in the UER
Marketplaces are the spaces of exchange among various actors, operating as an arena where farmers, market queens, middlemen, and consumers meet (Table 3). They shed light on the multidimensional dynamics unfolding within this single space.
The selling space was “claimed” and “visible” at the local level: the women’s sellers, organizing the market in the UER, did not control or restrict access to the selling space. Anyone (farmers, sellers, etc.) wanting to sell products on the market could do so, which is in stark contrast to how southern marketplaces are managed. The selling spaces were mostly organized as “tontines,” similar to farmers in the production space (see Space 1). Higher authorities had limited influence on the market. It was reported that the district assembly collected tax on the marketplace, but this would not significantly influence the work of the sellers on the market.
Although the marketplace is described as a claimed, visible space, it is contrasted with the southern marketplace, where some tomatoes historically bought from the UER are now sourced from Burkina Faso (see Fig. 3, grey box). Interviews revealed the significant risks faced by market queens, leaders, and loaders in fetching tomatoes from Burkina Faso, including frequent truck accidents, poor road conditions, and armed robbery. Market queens also reported lending money to farmers for inputs, assuming the financial risk if the crops failed. Interviews revealed that the market queens’ association was also working as a tontine, and was controlling access to the major marketplaces in Accra or Kumasi to control the prices of various products, including tomatoes.
Public discourses from both the government and newspapers blame market queens for the exploitative relationships they hold with farmers by providing loans and then requiring farmers to sell their products at a low price (Lyon 2003, Kokutse 2009, Britwum 2013). Newspapers even hold market queens as responsible for tomato farmers suicides in UER, after farmers lost their market to Burkina Faso in the 2010s (Akapule 2009). However, there is also a more nuanced literature that underlines their crucial role in the supply chain and their efficiency in conducting a highly risky activity, both in their practices (e.g., road accidents, rotten tomatoes) and by providing loans to farmers that may experience shocks, without access to formal credit (Lyon 2003, Awo 2010, Scheiterle and Birner 2018). This nuance is echoed by our observations, which demonstrate the high levels of risk that market queens face in their activities due to accidents and robberies on the road, resulting in losses of tomatoes and money. As such, the strong market associations of market queens appear here to be, first and foremost, a necessity to de-risk activities, allowing them to supply the market through mutual empowerment—the so-called “power with.” Here, it seems that this “power with” is partly built upon the ability to exclude members from their association.
We are under the Queen and we have authority from Asantehene [king]. So, if you are not part of our group, you can’t come with your load to sell. There are rules that govern us. (Market queen, Kumasi).
This structure thus empowers the limited group of individuals who form the market queens, a role primarily inherited from their mothers (as indicated in interviews). This finding raises questions about the extent to which “power with,” based on exclusion, can genuinely be considered mutual empowerment and found in “closed” spaces.
At the same time, government interventions aimed at “formalizing” the sector were on the rise, and marketplaces in Kumasi and Accra were targeted. However, interviews revealed that these initiatives often seemed to have hidden agendas, frequently acting as covert real estate projects disguised as efforts to improve the conditions of market workers. In this regard, such dynamics were articulated by a representative from an informal workers’ union.
They [Accra Metropolitan Assembly] built a new market, and then those who were occupying the base earlier, they promised them that after the building, they were going to reallocate a place for them, but unfortunately, since the authorities, even before building, they have already allocated their own people. And then, even those who end up getting some of the space, the amount [taxed] is too high. (Union representative of informal workers, Accra).
The space was thus undergoing a potential transformation, with a top-down desire to formalize the sector, showcasing the enactment of hidden power.
Space 3: processing space
We identified a processing space, referring to a defunct factory, that was still present in the collective imagination. Many people viewed it as a failure of the government to support the region. Politicians regularly used the promise of revamping the factory during elections to gain votes.
Revamp it? Ha, that was last year’s issue, I don’t know politicians, all you know [is] when they do it, that it is, I don’t think [they will revamp the factory], they keep on talking about it. (Extension officer, Navrongo).
An extension officer specified that even if the factory were to resume operations, it would not become competitive, even at maximum production, due to imports of low-priced tomato paste. Ghana’s trade policies, characterized by the country’s membership in the World Trade Organization, the Economic Community of West African States, and the Economic Partnership Agreement signed with Europe, set a low tariff on imported tomato paste in the region. Currently, all tomato paste consumed in Ghana is imported, mainly from China (FAOSTAT 2024).
Thus, this space is shaped by international trade agreements and used by political actors at national and regional levels to gain votes, thereby displaying hidden power. The space is predominantly closed, as the primary beneficiaries, namely tomato farmers, have limited means to influence it. In the past, farmers attempted to create a claimed space by blocking roads to prevent trucks from going to Burkina Faso to buy tomatoes. However, the police intervened, enforcing the trade agreements with Burkina Faso (Awo 2010). These trade agreements represent visible power.
Space 4: Ghanaian consumers
Consumers in the UER have limited influence on supply due to their relatively small market size compared to the larger markets in the southern part of the country, such as Kumasi and Accra. All vegetables are purchased at the local marketplace, where we observed varying prices from different sellers, primarily due to differences in tomato quality.
The southern cities of Accra and Kumasi, the two largest cities in Ghana, were witnessing changing consumption patterns of both fresh and processed tomatoes. A rising middle class is increasingly aware and interested in the nutritional content and the effects of pesticide use on the health and safety of fresh and transformed tomatoes. Tomato paste imported from China has been assessed as having a lower quality because of a lower concentration of nutrients, as well as additives such as fiber, starch, dextrose, and colorants that are not advertised on the label (Malet 2017; interviews). This can be viewed as a claimed space where access to knowledge and decent livelihoods transform the goals of the tomato value chain, shifting the focus from merely taste and calorie intake to nutritional value. Some interviewees saw this trend as an opportunity to relocate tomato production and processing in Ghana during the dry season, with shorter supply chains allowing for more transparency. However, a technical difficulty arises because tomatoes for processing and fresh tomatoes do not have the same properties. Processing tomatoes need to have high liquid content and soft skin, whereas tomatoes for fresh use need strong skin and a lower liquid content so that they can be transported.
Overall, spaces of consumption are ambivalent. From a consumer’s perspective, it has been shown that consumers are increasingly eating tomatoes, be it processed or fresh (MOFA and IFPRI 2020). The agency of consumers is thus mainly expressed through the increase in tomato consumption. The choice of origin and production practices has been driven by other structures at the global level, such as trade agreements, and at the national level, with the type of agriculture pushed by the government. In this regard, we understand this space of decision as closed and invisible in the eye of the consumers. Although the interviews revealed some space claimed by consumers for increased information on safety and nutritional content, it remains marginal.
Effects of climate shocks on spaces and forms of power
With the increasing frequency of climate shocks such as droughts and heavy rainfall, it is crucial to reassess how spaces and forms of power operate in response to these events. Although the above analysis provides an overview of power dynamics in the tomato sector, it mainly offers historical and current perspectives. The projected increase in extreme weather events in Ghana leads us to question: How will these spaces and forms of power respond to a climate shock in the future? We first analyze how actors respond to shocks, mainly through mutual support, and then discuss the implications for resilience studies.
Mutual trust and support among market chain actors
From a value-chain perspective, interviews revealed that all actors were negatively affected by shocks in their activities (Table 1), with varying degrees of intensity (Table 4). Actors with economic activities in both Ghana and Burkina Faso, such as market queens, leaders, loaders, sorters, and drivers, were less vulnerable because they could work in either the UER or Burkina Faso. Conversely, the most affected individuals were those who had no alternative income source to compensate or overcome this lack of income, regardless of the type of actor. In general, farmers were the most reliant on other actors, through credits to overcome the shocks.
At the individual level, our results show that actors used different strategies to overcome stress and shocks such as diversifying work, selling animals, etc. In addition, all interviewees relied on help from within their social circles, exhibiting strong ties within their communities. The interviews and the focus group revealed two main types of support: one internal to the tomato value chain (e.g., a credit from an input supplier to a farmer) and one external to it (e.g., families, neighbors’ associations, tontine).
They [farmers] sell their animals, to settle [their debts with me]. If they didn’t settle, it means my business would collapse. (Example of internal support; male input supplier in UER, Navrongo).
We the farmers have that group to always sit together to talk together and also make little contribution [money](...). If there’s anyone in need, we can use that money to help the person and the person will pay back later so that we can continue our work. (Example of external support; female farmer in UER, Navrongo).
In general, actors were rather seeking help from their peers than from other actors, showing that levels of trust are higher within the same groups of actors than between two different actor groups. Similarly, trust relations between two members of the same geographical community, for example, local input suppliers and farmers, were stronger (farmers were stated to always pay back) than between farmers and traders (the latter complaining about not being paid back). A trader from the south explained that she was financing farmers through credits and loans in nearby regions of Ghana, but not in Burkina Faso, because they were not trustworthy.
I give them [Ghanaian farmers from Southern regions] money to do the work. When it’s ready, they bring it to me to sell. (....) [In] Burkina is not the same (...) they don’t get good harvest and we run at a loss. And you would have to give them new money to cultivate again and when they get profits, you would pay for the loss. (Market queen from Kumasi).
Mutual support was thus widespread within both geographically and activity-based connected communities, demonstrating “power with” mainly at the local level.
Climate shocks and actors’ resilience building
Our results show that climate shocks triggered a certain level of resilience in the actor configuration. However, they did not unleash a structural transformation of the power relations in the value chain or of solidarity across the value chain’s actors. Rather, resilience was sought at the individual level within the same group of actors or at the household level. The impacts of droughts or heavy rainfalls affected actors that were in an unfavorable power position, such as farmers or individuals without multiple jobs, more severely than those in favorable power positions, such as loaders being able to be employed within other commodities’ value chains. However, it seemed that no groups of actors managed to take advantage of the situation to change the relations to their advantage. All were suffering losses after extreme climatic events, with varying levels of intensity proportional to their adaptation strategies and resources. In other words, opportunities for transformation were constrained, as the system only permitted adaptation rather than deeper change.
Taking a systems perspective, shocks were strengthening social ties both locally (e.g., communities) and within actors’ groups (e.g., market queens) that can be characterized as “power with” (Fig. 4). This mutual support was provided mostly among geographically close actors, revealing that they were shared among members of the same community. Distrust between geographically remote actors such as southern traders and farmers were expressed in the interviews by both parties, and they were partly loaded by past events (shift to Burkinabe production) and public discourses (newspapers, etc.).
Who would you get to help you? They [market queens] will not help you to succeed. I fight myself and say that God should help me. You won’t get anybody to help you. (Female farmer in UER, Gia).
This finding contributes to the debate about whether the sociocultural context constitutes a barrier to communities’ abilities to adapt and transform (Antwi-Agyei et al. 2015) or not (Laube et al. 2012). Our results indicate that the sociocultural context is key and provides social security to the actors during a shock. However, these social ties can help actors adapt to a shock but not transform the power relations across the tomato value chain. It could also be argued that the dry-season tomato value chain, which is subject to regular climate shocks, “internalized” a certain magnitude of shock in its functioning, experiencing it as a long-term stress by developing adaptive strategies.
Adopting a more critical perspective, we observe a gap between the level at which resilience is officially theorized and addressed at governmental levels (Appendix 2), and the level at which resilience is implemented at the very local, interpersonal level. Very few interviewees mentioned institutions such as the government or NGOs as pillars for helping to cope after shocks. Structural transformations such as the discussed revamp of the Pwalugu tomato factory are similarly hampered by international trade agreements that allow for imports of artificially cheap tomato paste from China. This situation aligns with Nightingale’s (2015) critique of how resilience policies often misconceive scale, failing to recognize that resilience is pursued through dynamic, networked, and multiscalar realities of local communities.
Lastly, various actors, including extension officers and farmers in the UER, saw climate shocks as an opportunity to recover tomato production in Ghana. They explained that due to intensifying armed conflicts in Burkina Faso and heavy rains affecting different regions of Burkina Faso, it could be an opportunity for UER farmers to regain the attention of southern traders. The option of having the tomato processing factory revamped was also seen as an opportunity, even though it would require strong support from farmers to relaunch large-scale production of tomatoes in the region to ensure sufficient volumes for the factory and thus its competitiveness vs. international imported tomato paste.
Conceptually, the focus has shifted toward viewing the resilience of food system value chain actors as a collective goal, rather than an individual pursuit. In this sense, the methodology we used (Gaventa’s [2005] power cube) to distinguish visible, hidden, and invisible power proved useful to establish and understand the status quo of power relations in the tomato system. However, we found some limitations when analyzing the short-, middle-, and long-term changes in the face of shocks. The power cube could be enhanced by defining more forms and spaces of power to capture more nuanced changes. It could further differentiate, for example, “desirable” from “undesirable” spaces of power by better integrating the expression of power by VeneKlasen and Miller (2002). Lastly, more research on the link between “power with” and exclusion or inclusion in food systems would allow us to shed light on whether it is solely a positive expression of power or not.
CONCLUSION
Regarding power dynamics in the tomato value chain, we observed significant power imbalances in the dry-season tomato value chain, where relations of loans and credits are widespread, and tomato production in the North symbolizes past support from the government to the region. Discourses often portray market queens as exploitative and holding disproportionate power in the value chain. Our findings add nuance to this discourse by reflecting on the high risks of market queens’ activities (road accidents, robberies, food loss), their relationship with the leaders, and their role (together with leaders and input suppliers) in enabling production through providing loans and credits.
We also show how actors react to shocks through “power with,” mainly among communities, significantly contributing to their resilience, but without fostering transformation. The magnitude of shocks observed, and the system lock-ins, did not trigger transformative change in the system’s power relations. Shocks and stresses negatively affected all actors, but those already in unfavorable power positions, such as farmers, suffered the most. A discourse emerged considering shocks as an opportunity to return production to Ghana, partly due to increasing political instabilities and other climate shocks in Burkina Faso at the time.
In conclusion, in the current context in which the need to transform food systems is increasingly recognized, we stress the importance of systematically recognizing and integrating the link between resilience and power in food systems. An approach to the resilience of food systems that takes account of power dynamics sheds light on issues of inequality and scale because stakeholders are affected differently by shocks, and top-down policies aiming at improving resilience lack understanding of how resilience is operationalized by communities. It also allows us to consider resilience as a common objective rather than an individual effort. Strengthening the resilience of the tomato value chain in the UER could therefore mean a concerted and coordinated effort at local, regional, and national levels and across scales to support farmers and share risks, for example, by reestablishing a tomato processing plant.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We are deeply grateful to all those who generously contributed their presence, knowledge, and lived experiences, sharing them with benevolence and helping to shape this research. These valuable insights and perspectives have significantly shaped and deepened our understanding and informed the findings of this study. We sincerely thank Turkson Alichimah for support throughout the research process, particularly in translating and facilitating discussions with some of the individuals we met in Navrongo. This work stands as a reflection of the collaborative effort and shared commitment to advancing knowledge and perspectives in this field.
Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and AI-assisted Tools
ChatGPT was used as a tool to support the editing process, primarily serving as an English grammar checker to help prevent awkward mistakes on our part.
DATA AVAILABILITY
The data and code supporting the findings of this study are available upon request from the corresponding author, Dr. Kenza Benabderrazik. These materials are not publicly accessible due to restrictions such as the potential compromise of research participants’ privacy. Ethical approval for this research was granted by ETH Zurich.
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Fig. 1

Fig. 1. Visualization of the power cube with the three types of spaces, forms, and levels. Based on Gaventa (2005:12).

Fig. 2

Fig. 2. Map of Ghana, with circles showing the locations of data collection.

Fig. 3

Fig. 3. The spaces of power in the Upper East Region (UER) tomato value chain represented in a value chain form.

Fig. 4

Fig. 4. The spaces of power when subjected to shocks. Arrows show the direction of movement observed in the levels, forms, and spaces of power used by actors to overcome a shock.

Table 1
Table 1. Description of the three dimensions developed in Gaventa’s (2005) power cube concept.
Dimension | Description |
Spaces of power | Define where and how actors can shape and access their food system, i.e., access to resources and market. Gaventa identifies three spaces: Closed (spaces of decision-making closed to participation), invited (spaces opened up, inclusively or exclusively, to enhance participation), claimed or created (spaces claimed or created by less powerful actors). |
Forms of power | A typology of power based on Lukes’ (2004) three dimensions of power, explaining the degree of visibility of a conflict or actor’s voice. Three forms of power are found: visible power (openly visible, such as formal rules, authorities), hidden power (hidden agenda of powerful actors, based on the exclusion of certain groups), and invisible power (most subtle form of power, which shapes psychological and ideological boundaries for participation, similar to Foucault’s [1982] discursive power). |
Levels of power | The geographical tiers at which social, economic, and political authority are situated, typically encompassing local, regional, and national governance levels, which are often interconnected and can exist on a continuum. As Nightingale (2015) emphasizes, levels refer to fixed positions within hierarchical governance structures (e.g., national, regional, local), whereas scales are socially constructed, relational, and dynamic, emerging from how actors, knowledge, and resources are organized and experienced across space. |
Table 2
Table 2. Summary of interviews and focus group participation. F = female, M = male.
Type of actor | Number of people interviewed | Presence at the focus group |
Farmer | 4 M, 2 F | 1 F, 2 M |
Hired farm laborer | 2 M | – |
Extension officer | 1 M | 1 M |
Nongovernmental organization agent | 1 M | 1 M |
Input supplier: retailer | 3 M | 1 M |
Input supplier: national level | 1 F | – |
Market queen from UER | 2 F | 1 F |
Market queen from the South | 3 F | – |
Loader | 2 M | 1 M |
Sorter | 1 F | 1 F |
Leader | 2 M | 1 M |
Market seller | 4 F | 2 F |
Sellers’ union representative | 1 F | 1 F |
Expert: professor, ministry representative | 3 M, 2 F | – |
Table 3
Table 3. Description of different actors in the tomato value chain and the space(s) in which they engage.
Actor | Description | Spaces in which they are active |
Upper East Region (UER) farmers | Produce and harvest tomatoes, mainly selling at regional markets in UER or to bulk traders at the farm gate | Production space and selling space (S1, S2) |
Extension officers | Provide agricultural advice and support to farmers, helping them improve practices and adapt to changes | Production space (S1) |
Input suppliers | Provide seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and other agricultural inputs to farmers; some inputs are subsidized as part of a governmental policy, whereas others are not | Production space (S1) |
Market queens | Women traders from southern markets such as Accra and Kumasi who work in market associations around horticultural products, including tomatoes, organizing the purchase, transport, and sale of tomatoes from Burkina Faso and other regions of Ghana; a “Mother Queen” represents them at the national level, close to the King. Market queens coordinate market activities by limiting access to the market and setting selling prices | Production and selling space (S1, S2) |
Leaders | Interpreters and leaders who guide market queens‛ trucks to farms in Burkina Faso and facilitate bargaining between traders and farmers | Production space (S2) |
Sellers | Individuals who sell tomatoes at the marketplace, receiving products from offloaders (in the southern marketplaces) or from farmers directly (in the UER) | Selling space (S2) |
Sorters | Mainly women who sort tomatoes by quality at the farm gate, optimizing crate content for profit; they embark on trucks with leaders and market queens | Production space (S1) |
Loaders | Responsible for loading crates onto trucks, paid per crate by market queens | Production space (S1) |
Offloaders | Responsible for unloading crates at the marketplace, paid per crate by buyers or traders | Selling space (S2) |
Truck drivers | Paid half before and half after the trip, responsible for transporting tomatoes from farms to marketplaces | Production and selling space (S1, S2) |
Consumers | Ghanaian consumers, both from the UER and from southern cities such as Accra or Kumasi | Consumption and selling space (S4, S2) |
District Assembly | Second-level administrative subdivisions after regions; local government bodies that create and implement policies | Production and selling space (S1, S2) |
Traditional Chiefs | Local leaders who have influence over land allocation and community decisions | Production space (S1) |
Political parties | Political entities that influence agricultural policies and practices through flagship policies, legislation, and governance | Farm to marketplace (S1–S4) |
Table 4
Table 4. Consequences of climate shocks for different actors in the dry-season tomato system.
Type of actor | Consequences during a shock |
Local input supplier | Financial loss due to a lack of cash flow during the stress event and by not receiving their credits back from farmers |
Farmer | Financial and food stock losses if not able to replant their tomato crops or an alternative cash crop at a suitable time in the season; they have to pay back their creditors and face the lack of cash and food for a whole season |
Trader | Financial losses by not receiving their credits back from the farmers, by sometimes having to provide them with a second credit to replant, and by failing in supplying their market and thus collecting their margin on the tomatoes |
Sorter | Financial losses through unemployment |
Loader | Financial losses through unemployment, yet they can work with other non-food products |
Leader | Financial losses from credits given to farmers or traders and from the margin they would usually gain on tomatoes |
Seller | Reduced tomato quantity, at higher price, eventually leading to losses and reduced income |
Consumer | Higher prices for tomatoes and increased reliance on imported tomato paste |