Research

INTRODUCTION

In the face of unprecedented biodiversity loss, a central concern in conservation is achieving sustainable compliance and social acceptability. Though intended for just outcomes, decentralization often creates legitimacy challenges amid multiple disturbances (Andersson and Ostrom 2008), particularly in developing nations where livelihood concerns, social inequity, and elitism fuel resource use conflicts (Kelboro and Stellmacher 2015, De Pourcq et al. 2017, Mutekwa and Gambiza 2017) and may result in adverse impacts on legitimacy (Bennett and Satterfield 2018, Oduor 2020). The legitimacy of protected area governance hinges on its response to social-ecological dynamics, especially conservation promises and illegal resource extraction. Despite extensive literature on legitimacy and illegal extraction separately, their interaction with unfulfilled conservation promises is poorly understood. This paper examines how unfulfilled promises erode legitimacy and drive illegal resource extraction, and how these illicit activities, in turn, further undermine legitimacy and resource extraction in Ethiopia.

Ethiopia, specifically Loka Abaya National Park (LANP), provides a relevant case study for these complex issues. Despite a long history of conservation, initiatives in Ethiopia often fall short because of a lack of political commitment, hindering social-ecological resilience (Tessema 2019). First, promises of compensation or livelihood projects served as a tool to legitimize policies and gain social acceptance (Dires et al. 2021). Second, decentralization, a cornerstone of Ethiopia’s political and economic reforms, significantly interacts with local interests and power dynamics (Maconachie et al. 2009). Notably, LANP’s management was devolved to the regional government as part of this decentralization process, aiming to empower local agencies. Third, the park faces substantial threats from human activities, such as overexploitation, poverty, resettlement, and agricultural expansion, leading to adverse social-ecological consequences, including habitat loss and fragmentation, clearing forests, land degradation, and soil erosion (Temesgen 2017, Demeke et al. 2019, Diriba et al. 2020). All these factors have significant implications for pro-conservation behavior and the legitimacy of park governance.

Conservation behavior is deeply influenced by perceptions of legitimacy (Oyanedel et al. 2020), which in turn depends on factors such as trustworthiness, procedural justice, and performance (Agrawal and Ostrom 2001, Levi et al. 2012, Turner et al. 2016). Earned legitimacy, stemming from tangible benefits and desirable outcomes for local communities, is crucial for incentivizing pro-conservation actions (Lockwood 2010). Specifically within protected areas, the fulfillment of compensation promises is directly linked to relational trust and the perceived legitimacy of protected area governance, significantly impacting compliance decisions (Anthony 2021). These promises constitute an implicit social contract, aimed at offsetting conservation-related opportunity costs; their non-fulfillment can lead to negative behavioral changes (Ostrom 1998) and conflicts (Tufa et al. 2018), underscoring the importance of avoiding unachievable promises in fostering effective community partnerships (Mishra et al. 2017).

Unmet expectations for livelihood benefits pose a significant challenge for protected area governance, often leading to illegal resource extraction (Kelboro and Stellmacher 2015, Estifanos et al. 2020, Habel et al. 2022). Failure to curb these illegal activities not only undermines the performance and legitimacy of governance but also erodes compliance behavior, potentially further illegal practices, and deepens relational mistrust (Arlidge et al. 2023). Although social networks (bonding, linking, and bridging) can positively influence conservation behavior through information sharing and collective action (Bodin and Crona 2009, Dahlberg and Sandström 2024), the beneficial role of social networks is not guaranteed, especially when governance is weak or is perceived as illegitimate.

This paper contributes to the growing literature by examining the intricate link between unfulfilled promises, illegal resource extraction, and governance legitimacy (Anthony 2021). First, it critically examines how discursive promises affect agro-pastoralist communities. We argue that failing to deliver promised livelihood projects in these resource-dependent economies erodes relational trust and the legitimacy of protected area governance, simultaneously increasing rural communities to climate shocks and deepening social-ecological fragility. Second, although previous studies often focus on the drivers of illegal extraction, including selective enforcement, weak institutional capacity, informal networks, and corruption (Johnson 2019, Mbanze et al. 2021), this study uniquely analyzes how unsanctioned resource extraction undermines the park management legitimacy and subsequently fuels further illegal practices, demonstrating that persistent illegal extraction directly contributes to the legitimacy of protected area governance itself.

Linking legitimacy and social-ecological outcomes

Research on the sustainability of social-ecological systems highlights the importance of institutional fit with social systems (Ban et al. 2013, Epstein et al. 2015). The extent of coherence with local interests, values, and needs is closely linked to perceptions of legitimacy, which is a critical issue for compliance, trust, and social-ecological outcomes (Turner et al. 2018, Arpin and Cosson 2021). Legitimacy is defined as “the acceptance and justification of shared rule by a community” (Bernstein 2005:142). It is a central feature of normative obligation and voluntary compliance (Scharpf 2009). The formation of legitimacy relies on normative assessments of inclusivity, genuine participation, effectiveness, accountability, transparency, and openness (Schmidt 2013). Behavioral adaptation often emerges in response to such dynamic assessments. For example, overlooking local preferences and livelihood needs within social-ecological contexts fosters non-compliance and conflicts over resource use (Kelboro and Stellmacher 2015).

Lockwood (2010) emphasized that earned or output legitimacy in conservation, which can be secured through producing locally desirable outcomes, is a precondition for legitimacy in protected area governance. Although the source of legitimacy is vast and complex, little is known about the importance of expectation gaps and illegal resource extraction (a proxy for ecological ineffectiveness) in subsistence communities that heavily rely on resources. The former are often embedded in a win-win conservation strategy where promises of compensation, such as livelihood support or development projects, are instrumentalized to gain local acceptance (Benjaminsen and Svarstad 2010, Cheng et al. 2020). In such settings, fulfillment of promises or reciprocity is essential not only for material benefits but also for the moral obligation of future cooperation and collective action (Ostrom 1998). The decision of local communities to legitimize governance depends on the expectation that park governance will deliver on promises of reciprocating benefits. The consequences of unfulfilled promises are thus far reaching, potentially leading to negative behavioral changes and challenges to legitimacy (Anthony 2021). Socially constructed perceptions are crucial for social-ecological outcomes.

The degree of adaptive capacity to respond and adapt to changing conditions or demands is crucial to social-ecological resilience (Carpenter and Brock 2008), which depends on flexibility, assets, agency, effective organizational structure, and learning (Cinner et al. 2018). For example, illegal resource extraction is a typical disturbance that challenges the responsiveness and adaptability of governance systems. The ability of protected area management to mitigate negative social-ecological outcomes shapes the perception of its legitimacy and compliance. Maladaptation or rigidity traps are more likely to occur in the absence of adaptive capacity. We do not aim to provide an in-depth analysis of adaptive capacity. Instead, we analyze how expectation gaps, illegal resource extraction, and legitimacy interact in a regionally administered national park.

METHODS

Study area

Loka Abaya National Park (LANP), established in 2009 in the Sidama Regional State of Ethiopia, spans approximately 500 km² (50,000 hectares) with biodiversity conservation significance. Located approximately 70 km southwest of Hawassa City and 340 km from Addis Ababa, the park is home to three globally threatened species, namely the African wild dog (Lycaon pictus), the “vulnerable” leopard (Panthera pardus), and the hippopotamus (Hippopotamus amphibius; Diriba et al. 2020), alongside other mammals such as the lesser kudu (Tragelaphus imberbis), Defassa waterbuck (Kobus ellipsiprymnus), common bushbuck (Tragelaphus sylvaticus), and lion (Panthera leo). It is also a premier bird watching destination, featuring various bird species, including the endemic Golden-breasted Starling (Lamprotornis regius; Temesgen 2017). LANP’s varied landscape encompasses wooded grassland, hilly scrubland, riverine forest, wetland vegetation, and scenic features such as mountains, valleys and gorges, hot springs, and water bodies (Lake Abaya, Bilate River, and Gidaawo River). The region’s climate experiences a bimodal rainfall pattern (July to September, February to April), with an annual rainfall of 1001–1400 mm and temperatures between 17.6 and 25 °C.

The study focused on Loka Abaya district, which consists of five purposively selected kebeles (the lowest administrative unit), Felka, Bukito, Argada, Aldabo, and Abaya Zuria (Fig. 1), all inhabited by the culturally homogeneous Sidama ethnic group. These communities primarily engage in mixed crop-livestock farming, with staples like enset (Ensete ventricosum), maize (Zea mays), tef (Eragrostis tef), wheat (Triticum aestivum), and root crops. The Loka Abaya district is highly vulnerable to climate change shocks, exacerbated by pervasive poverty and food insecurity (Bewket et al. 2015). Consequently, the park remains a vital resource for the surrounding communities, providing for livestock grazing, firewood and charcoal production, new settlements, and farming within and adjacent to its boundaries. These human-induced pressures intensify resource use conflicts and pose a severe threat to the park’s ecosystem (Temesgen 2017, Diriba et al. 2020).

Data collection

Our study utilized a mixed-methods approach to deeply understand the complex social-ecological dynamics of a regionally administered national park. As part of a larger research project, we drew on multiple data sources, including household surveys, focus group discussions, and key informant interviews. We conducted four settlement-based focus group discussions, one in each of the four kebeles, Falka, Abaya Zuria, Argeda, and Aldabo, to capture settlement-specific perspectives. We reached out to key community members to inform and mobilize participants based on their experience and expertise with park-related issues. Participants, varying from 7 to 15 per kebele, composed of local people from various social strata, including elders, youth, and farmers. It is important to note that no women participated in the group discussions. This was due to the prevailing patriarchal system, which often limits women’s participation in decision making (Gebrehiwot et al. 2018). Logistical constraints also prevented women-only discussions. Although women were underrepresented, it aligns with the reality that men often serve as primary decision makers in these communities, as reflected by the 96% male household heads in our survey. To prevent potential information bias and allow free local stakeholder participation in the discussion, we excluded park managers and higher local officials from the group discussions.

The study employed semi-structured questions (Appendix 1) to explore perceptions, resource-use conflicts, unfulfilled compensation promises, illegal resource extraction, and park management legitimacy, focusing on these key themes to infer legitimacy attributes shaped by promises and illicit activities. This qualitative data was supported by 13 key informant interviews, providing deeper insights into institutional and financial constraints at Loka Abaya National Park. Key informants included two park officials, two local administrators, one regional official, two local teachers, three community elders, and three local agro-pastoralists.

Quantitative data were collected via household surveys from 346 randomly sampled households out of 5508. Five kebeles were purposively chosen based on proximity and resource dependence, with households then randomly surveyed proportionally to their kebele populations. To capture spatial variations, respondents were stratified as inside, adjacent, or outside the park. Face-to-face interviews yielded 336 usable questionnaires, primarily from male household heads (as key decision makers). Four local, first-degree holding enumerators translated the questionnaire into Sidaamu Afoo and administered surveys from March to May 2022, after extensive training and pretesting. Data collection was supervised by the first author and one supervisor. Oral informed consent was obtained from all participants, with written consent from Hawassa University and the regional authority.

Data analysis

We employed a combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis methods. First, thematic analysis was used to identify and gain insights into relevant themes that best captured the local context and stakeholders’ perspectives on the relationship between unfulfilled promises, illegal resource extraction, and the legitimacy of park management. Focus group discussions and key informant interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed in the local language, and then translated into English. After thorough engagement with the data, the important phase involved coding the data into meaningful and coherent patterns (Braun and Clarke 2006). Subsequently, similar codes were collated into themes related mainly to resource-use conflicts, unmet promises, illegal resource extraction, and governance legitimacy. These themes offer a structured lens through which we analyze their interrelationships and implications for social-ecological outcomes.

Second, we applied a binary probit model to test whether embeddedness in pro-extraction networks reinforces illegal resource extraction. We further supplement the qualitative analysis by modelling the effect of perceived unfulfilled promises. The dependent variable is illegal resource extraction, coded as a dummy variable, taking a value of 1 if the household engaged in resource extraction within the last 12 months, and 0 otherwise. The primary variable of interest is social networks which was coded 1 if the household head has direct ties to individuals (relatives, friends, neighbors, or rangers) involved in illegal extraction and 0 otherwise. The other key variable, perceived unfulfilled promises, was coded as 1 if the household head perceived unfulfilled compensation promises and 0 otherwise, based solely on the survey data collected from households that participated in the consultation stage. Control variables included age, education level, farm size, livelihood diversification index, non-farm employment, conservation experience, and livestock holdings (Tropical Livestock Unit [TLU] per capita), with livestock serving as a proxy for wealth in these agro-pastoralist communities (Yetera et al. 2018). The Simpson Diversity Index (SDI) was used to calculate the extent of livelihood diversification, which involved subtracting the sum of the squares of the income share of each livelihood source from one. The summary statistics are attached in Appendix 2. STATA version 18 was used for inferential analyses, and R for visualization.

RESULTS

Unfulfilled promises as a driver of illegal resource extraction

The results of this study show that pro-conservation behavior is subject to change depending on how well park management meets livelihood expectations. Respondents across the four kebeles noted that, prior to the establishment of the park, the community operated under a well-established traditional system that conserved the landscape effectively. They had a strong sense of social responsibility and knew that any violation of the rules could lead to social exclusion. This created a strong incentive for communities to adhere to traditional conservation rules. Although the negotiation process was participatory, at least in terms of consultation, the shift to national park status transformed the landscape for social and ecological interdependencies.

Elderly respondents noted that local communities were initially supportive and willing to accept conservation rules. The government pledged to provide compensatory benefits in return, including alternative livelihoods, job opportunities, infrastructure, ecotourism development, and local devolution of power. Looking at the reason, officials from the Ethiopian Wildlife Conservation Authority (EWCA) and the regional government persuaded local communities to picture the proposition as lucrative because of its perceived economic and ecological spillovers. Although the transformation weakened their autonomous traditions, nearly all participants viewed promised livelihood benefits as a key reason that initially kept communities committed to the conservation contract.

Institutionally, a decentralization system was established, and the regional government, the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region (now under the Sidama Culture, Tourism, and Sport Bureau), took on the responsibility of managing the park and set up the park governance structure consisting of technical staff and rangers. However, this process remains rhetorical where local communities are often summoned for meetings or sit on committees, but are systematically excluded and powerless to shape policies. Interviewees noted that park actors are often appointed by regional authorities, not for their capacity to voice local interests, but for their loyalty and submissiveness to higher officials. They label this situation as the administrative extension of the central government, as described by Ribot et al. (2006), where local and park officials are assigned based on political patronage without discretionary powers. Other studies (e.g., Maconachie et al. 2009, Woldesenbet 2025) highlight the symbolic nature of decentralization, as political intervention and loyalist local officials often hinder local autonomy. A teacher informant noted:

Such structural misfit disrupted long-standing local stewardship and caused dissatisfaction due to their underrepresentation in management and lack of authentic discretion amid negative social-ecological outcomes.

Although there appear to be win-win conservation policies, their implementation often falls short at the local level. The promises of compensation have become mere rhetoric, and none have been delivered to date. The overwhelming majority of respondents (including elderly people, teachers, farmers, and kebele administrators) revealed that expectations for reciprocating livelihood benefits remained unmet. There is widespread resentment and perceptions that officials deceived them by using rhetorical promises as a political tool to legitimize the proposition at the cost of resource use restrictions. A youth interviewee stated the following:

We did not perceive any livelihood benefit that could make up for forgone opportunity costs. Local officials often try to fool us with empty promises. Compounded by limited local development and livelihood vulnerability, I no longer comply with rules that abandon our traditional right to use resources until they keep their promises.

With a shortage of arable land and jobs for youth, such unfulfilled promises for compensation triggered informal resistance and pushed local communities toward strategies that conflict with conservation goals. According to the survey, 57% of respondents turned to non-timber forest products to support their subsistence livelihood. Figure 2 shows that grazing and livestock fodder are the most frequently extracted resources (52.1%), followed by firewood (40.5%), farming within the park (27.4%), and poles for construction (25.6%). Charcoal production is the least reported resource used by households. Such underreporting may arise from fear factors and the challenges in tracking informal actors, such as individuals from nearby towns or villages involved in charcoal production.

The vulnerability of the study area to climatic and economic shocks presents significant livelihood challenges that further fuel illegal resource extraction. A respondent noted, “Without viable options for livelihood, we continue relying on resources as an adaptation strategy to cope with shocks.” This is closely associated with the failure of the government to deliver on development interventions. Respondents expressed concerns about the lack of development facilities, such as tourism infrastructure, veterinary services, irrigation, education facilities, and health centers. For example, the distance to high school and limited facilities were key factors in pushing youth to drop out and engage in illegal activities. According to group discussants, lack of access to alternative energy sources, such as electricity, is the main reason why fuelwood collection and charcoal production, the traditional energy sources for cooking and heating in the case study, are prevalent in the park.

Traditional livestock-rearing practices are widespread, with a high incidence of diseases and insufficient veterinary and marketing services. These factors combined contribute to the low productivity of dairy farming in the district. Additionally, inaccessible drainage infrastructure in flooding-prone areas is linked to overgrazing and ecological degradation. The key informants in Abaya Zuria expressed their concern that the threat of recurrent flooding forced them to relocate inside the park during the rainy season. Another unfulfilled development facility was rainwater harvesting and river irrigation facilities. Semi-arid conditions with erratic rainfall patterns characterize these kebeles; therefore, the absence of such facilities is a significant challenge for local farmers.

Unfulfilled promises and the legitimacy of PA management

In assessing the effects of unfulfilled promises on perceived legitimacy, we employed two implied dimensions of legitimacy: trustworthiness and distributive justice. Although there was initially social acceptance with reciprocity promises, most respondents now felt dissatisfied with the park management because of rhetorical promises of compensation. They hold negative perceptions where 54% perceived that park management is weak and lacks trust from affected communities. Such perception was accompanied by, as noted by group discussants across the four kebeles, continued disregard for information and initiatives from the park management. For instance, park officials initiated a community-based conservation task force to combat illegal resource use and create conservation awareness. It is reported that the initiative was ineffective in garnering local support and mitigating anthropogenic pressures. Only 10% of respondents were found to be “passive” members of the task force. This was mainly due to broken relational trust between local communities and park officials owing to the lack of promised livelihood benefits. An elderly respondent noted the following:

There were no genuine efforts to redress injustice and widen the space for adaptive co-management. They never kept what they promised us. While they occasionally held meetings, we do not have trust in park management and accept their imposed regulations.

The importance of fulfilling promises in shaping relational trust is emphasized by respondents as deeply embedded in cultural values and social relations, citing a traditional proverb, “Better to lose a child than to break a promise.” A key informant noted that a conservation contract could have worked effectively when both actors mutually upheld their obligations. In a community that values honesty with utmost importance, failure to deliver on promises is a serious breach of trust.

Unsurprisingly, nearly all respondents reported that their strong value for honesty, coupled with livelihood vulnerability, has made local communities highly responsive to the performance of park managers. However, the park governance was alleged to be nominal and incompetent in acting upon the promises made. A respondent stated:

It appeared that the governing body lacks total ingenuity, mainly focusing on the political process rather than socially conscious rural development initiatives, like poverty reduction interventions, tourism and infrastructure development. We are pessimistic about their ineffective and exclusive governance.

It is evident that the lack of competence and performance, coupled with inaction to provide what local people needed, undermines the trustworthiness of park management. A key informant from the park officials shared the concerns of the local community and ascribed the poor performance to external factors. Of particular importance are reasons related to chronic under-resourcing and lack of political commitment from the regional and central government.

Furthermore, there is a sense of injustice in the absence of compensation for the costs of resource restrictions. Respondents consistently expressed their grievances: “Without tangible benefits and development interventions, the social costs of restrictions were disproportionately borne by vulnerable farmers and jobless youth.” This contributes to local communities’ negative assessment of the park governance as less legitimate.

Illegal resource extraction and the legitimacy of PA management

Although a lack of reciprocating benefits triggers initial rule-breaking, it is evident in the case study that illegal practices further weaken the legitimacy of PA management and fuel resource extraction. Key informants from park officials noted that local communities did not share the same level of knowledge, resentment, or responsiveness to conservation concerns. Until recently, some of them adopted pro-conservation practices, while others refrained from engaging in illegal practices. However, because of illicit resource extraction, local communities started questioning the legitimacy of park governance and maintaining access to informal extraction. As one elderly respondent put it:

We were supportive at first and informally exercised our traditional authorities, although undermined, to control illegal resource users. The observed illegalities and leniency have gradually changed our perception of the seriousness of park management.

For the community, persistent anthropogenic pressure and ecological degradation are a testament to systemic failure in park governance. A farmer respondent noted, “Such dysfunctions manifested in failure to contain illegal activities led to growing distrust in park authorities.”

Interviewees (including farmers, elderly people, and local teachers) expressed that weak park governance allowed certain individuals with informal networks to extract resources or engage in quarry activities. Such irregularities eroded moral obligation among local communities to comply with regulations and report illegal resource users. Over time, local communities developed a sense of mistrust in park managers and increasingly became complicit in illegal resource use after witnessing widespread resource extraction. A respondent noted:

We often faced warnings from the park officials to stop causing pressure, but it did not work and may not even be effective in the future. They are part of the problem too: some rangers used park resources for their benefit and cooperated with illegal resource users.

Sometimes park officials resort to burning houses inside the park, but enforcement is inconsistent, and farming and settlement within the park persist. Such negative experiences generate a sense of illegitimacy of regulations and non-compliance. With growing uncertainty in park management, local communities adjacent to the park began hosting illegal resource users from neighboring villages or towns in exchange for in-kind benefits. A village administrator noted, “Informal networking with illegal resource users, coupled with weak enforcement, spreads illegalities and normalizes resource extraction.”

Illegal resource extraction is also associated with poor enforcement. The survey results show that 66% of respondents perceive law enforcement as weak and susceptible to clientelism. In such settings, illicit resource users often act with impunity by leveraging personal connections or offering bribes to evade penalties. There was a lack of transparency and accountability in the legal system for prosecuting those who engage in illegal resource use. A farmer respondent stated:

Why should I refrain from accessing low-value forest products to complement my limited income when the system allows others to exploit without penalty? I don’t believe my participation in conservation is possible unless the legal system and institutions are restructured in such a way that shapes our interaction with the resources and park management for good.

These practices not only undermine institutional legitimacy but also foster informal networks to access resources and evade enforcement.

Probit estimation of illegal resource extraction

Table 1 presents results from a probit model of illegal resource use. This offers valuable insights into the significance of social networks, perceived unfulfilled promises, livestock wealth, non-farm activities, and spatial factors in driving informal extraction. Of particular interest is the statistically insignificant effect of conservation experience. This is perhaps because the dominant negative social-ecological outcomes and unmet expectations may counterbalance the experience effect. In such settings, conservation experience has not translated into pro-conservation behavior; 68% of households with such experiences in our sample engaged in illegal resource use.

We found that social networks are positively associated with resource use (p < 0.01). The results show that social bonding with illegal resource users or rangers increases the probability of households engaging in illegal extraction by 28.9 percentage points. The coefficient for perceived unfulfilled promises is positive and statistically significant. Households perceiving unmet promises of compensation are more likely to engage in resource extraction. Livestock wealth, measured in terms of the number of livestock holdings per capita, is also a key determinant of resource use behaviors. The coefficient for TLU per capita is positively and significantly correlated with resource use (p < 0.01). This suggests that households with larger livestock holdings are more likely to engage in illegal resource extraction, such as fodder and grazing, from the park.

The other intriguing factor is non-farm employment, which is negatively associated with illegal resource use. Other factors being equal, non-farm activities decrease the likelihood of informal extraction by 21.8 percentage points (p < 0.05). Furthermore, the results show spatial differences where inside and adjacent areas have positive and significant effects on resource extraction compared to villages outside the park. Households living within and adjacent to the park are 42.6 and 16.2 percentage points more likely to engage in resource extraction, respectively, compared to those residing outside the park. Illegal resource users are also more likely to live near national parks relative to remote villages (Shova and Hubacek 2011).

DISCUSSION

This paper presents a case for exploring how unfulfilled promises of compensation shape legitimacy and patterns of resource extraction in the context of a regionally administered national park that exemplifies a decentralization reform. Using primary data collected through household surveys, group discussions, and semi-structured interviews, we find that unfulfilled conservation promises undermine the legitimacy of decentralized governance, fueling illegal resource extraction and reinforcing cycles of mistrust and vulnerability among agro-pastoralist communities.

The failure to deliver on commitments disrupts the social contracts between local communities and park authorities. First, local communities expected to receive promised livelihood benefits in exchange for accepting restrictions on resource use. The absence of material benefits fosters negative perceptions of conservation regulations and park governance that translate into detachment. This is consistent with broader evidence indicating that failure to address the immediate livelihood needs of affected communities fuels discontent, perceptions of injustice, and non-compliance (Mariki 2013, Kelboro and Stellmacher 2015). Second, unfulfilled promises represent a breach of deeply held social and ethical values regarding the importance of honoring commitments (Woldemedihin 2018). Such breaches undermine reciprocity and erode the trust initially established in park governance, prompting local communities to adopt a tit-for-tat strategy in response to perceived violations of social contracts (Ostrom 1998).

The deficit in output legitimacy marks a critical juncture where local communities begin to neglect conservation initiatives and challenge the underlying social-ecological interdependencies. Despite the implementation of a community-based conservation initiative, we find that the initiative remains ineffective and lacks social acceptance because of the loss of initial trust in park managers and perceptions of unfairness regarding compensatory benefits. This finding is consistent with the evidence from Kruger National Park, where the failure to deliver compensation as expected perpetuated a cycle of institutional mistrust and negative conservation behavior, whereas effective compensation rebuilds trust and mitigates adverse outcomes (Anthony 2021). Therefore, perceptions of unfulfilled promises are associated with a lower level of trust toward protected area management (Stern 2008).

Although output legitimacy is particularly important in the case of LANP, legitimacy depends on input legitimacy grounded in inclusivity and meaningful participation (Lockwood 2010, Scharpf 1999). In our case, input deficiency is evident across all stages of the conservation process, driven by substantial external influences and the lack of genuine co-decision making. Although local communities initially supported the new institutional arrangements, expecting equal stakes in management, efforts to integrate local knowledge and share power remain limited, constraining trust-building (Mishra et al. 2017). The marginalization of long-standing traditional practices that once ensured access and stewardship further erodes legitimacy and can lead to negative social outcomes and ineffectiveness (Dawson et al. 2021).

Conservation interventions often fall short despite participatory rhetoric, leading to community disempowerment (Dressler et al. 2010, Kelboro and Stellmacher 2015). In our case, park governance, though framed as decentralization, remains exclusionary and lacks downward accountability. This is problematic given structural constraints that hinder fulfilling conservation promises. First, local power is devolved without meaningful discretion, often influenced by political loyalty and obedience (Woldesenbet 2025), which stifles the development of strong local institutions because of political interference (Maconachie et al. 2009, Mohammed and Inoue 2012). Second, chronic underfunding and limited resources severely restrict the capacity to meet conservation commitments (Mawutor and Hajjar 2022, Scholte et al. 2025). This weak institutional landscape contributes to poor performance, where park managers lack the competence and resources to address local needs effectively. These findings align with Ribot et al. (2006), who argue that decentralization in developing countries is often symbolic and fails to deliver promised gains in effectiveness and equity, thereby undermining community trust and legitimacy (Lockwood 2010, Turner et al. 2016).

Our case reveals that unfulfilled contracts drive illegal resource extraction by eroding the perceived legitimacy of conservation regulations. Induced illegitimacy becomes both a cause and a consequence of such illegalities. Unmet expectations of economic incentives undermine intrinsic motivations and foster non-compliance (Arias 2015). Regardless of wealth status, many households extract resources, poor households for survival, wealthier ones for accumulation. In Ethiopia, resource use conflict occurs frequently, especially with an increasing lack of jobs for youth and vulnerable people. This exacerbates the situation, as many engage in illegal activities (e.g., production and marketing of charcoal) and provide shelter to illegal users, sometimes facilitated by leniency in enforcing regulations by some park scouts. The growing prevalence of illegal extraction indicates that pro-conservation behavior depends more on current legitimacy and commitment than on past motivations (Rohe et al. 2017).

We find that illegal extraction creates ripple effects on social-ecological systems, weakening institutional legitimacy and reinforcing informal extraction networks. It weakens trust in park governance (Turner et al. 2016) and highlights how poor performance damages perceived legitimacy (Birnbaum 2016). Ineffective enforcement, patronage, and corruption contribute to widespread resource access with little consequence (Nunan et al. 2018). These conditions create a dual deficit: corruption and elitism limit genuine participation (input illegitimacy), while weak enforcement leads to ineffective outcomes (output illegitimacy). Local communities rationally engage in illegal practices when they witness others extract resources with impunity (Bragagnolo et al. 2017, MacKeracher et al. 2021). This is due to lower costs of rule-breaking, such as a low likelihood of being caught or punished.

The quantitative results also add to the growing literature on the diffusion effects of social networks on illegal resource extraction (Collins et al. 2021). Informal social networks become a viable pathway to access and extract resources in the context of illegitimate park management. This can facilitate information sharing to extract resources without getting caught and reinforce norms among illicit resource users (Collins et al. 2021). Barnes et al. (2016) highlight the negative effect of homophily-driven networks on the diffusion of sustainable behaviors. This suggests that the incentive to rule-breaking is strong when a lack of livelihood projects and governance illegitimacy coincide with informal social connections (including illegal resource users or corrupt park rangers).

In such settings, the effect of conservation experience on illegal resource extraction is inconclusive. This may not always translate into pro-conservation behavior, especially when such experience meets with negative social-ecological outcomes. The meddling factors, such as trust and legitimacy perception, may crowd out the potential positive effects of conservation experience. Local support for conservation is often associated with perceptions of good governance, social impacts, and ecological effectiveness (Bennett et al. 2019). The lack of these enabling conditions may explain why conservation experience alone does not significantly deter illegal extraction. We also found that non-farm employment decreases the likelihood of engaging in illegal resource extraction. Sustainable livelihood options could improve compliance and conservation behavior in resource-dependent communities (MacKeracher et al. 2021, Charnley 2023). Yet, such options are not automatic in our case, constrained by limited livelihood projects and climatic shocks.

Unfulfilled promises of viable alternatives further contribute to heightened economic vulnerability. This reinforces impoverishment and perpetuates conflicts over resource use (Seifu and Beyene 2014, De Pourcq et al. 2017). During economic hardship, communities often resort to using forest products as a survival strategy, which is unsustainable, precarious, and a threat to biodiversity conservation (Gidebo 2023). This is especially evident among unemployed youth, for whom informal networks provide a route to access resources. Although non-timber forest products may offer safety nets or adaptation mechanisms (Mugido and Shackleton 2017, Shackleton et al. 2024), they are more likely to limit the ability of communities to break out of a cycle of poverty because of their low returns (FAO 2003) although evidence on the poverty implications of reliance on non-timber forest products was not established in the case study. This reinforces a poverty-environment trap, where poverty and environmental degradation mutually reinforce each other in a vicious cycle (Barrett et al. 2011). Such interlinked dynamics not only perpetuate illegalities but also undermine the adaptive capacity of social-ecological systems.

CONCLUSION

This paper reveals the adverse consequences of unfulfilled promises spreading through the social-ecological system. One pathway is the delegitimization of governance that triggers community detachment and resistance. Unfulfilled promises not only deprive local communities of material benefits but, more importantly, erode the foundations of trust that underpin social contracts. This adds to the literature on protected area management, where expectation gaps bring about non-compliant behavior by fostering a sense of mistrust and injustice, even in the presence of past intrinsic motivation. This suggests that current conservation actions largely depend on perceived governance legitimacy rather than past motivation.

Our findings further highlight that the prevalence of unsanctioned resource extraction can erode trust and normalize illegal practices. When expectation gaps meet with illegalities, local communities shift trust toward informal networks that facilitate illegal practices. With growing shocks, unfulfilled promised livelihood projects compound livelihood vulnerability in subsistence economies, leading to the use of natural resources as a buffer that often undermines long-term sustainability and deepens poverty (Kelboro and Stellmacher 2015). These disruptions to trust entrench rigidity traps that threaten the resilience of social-ecological systems (Stern and Baird 2015).

Our study carries significant policy implications for protected area management in developing countries where conservation promises are often instrumentalized. Poorly delivered or tokenistic promises can potentially cause more harm to conservation efforts. Our results thus suggest the need to fulfill promises of livelihood projects for restoring the legitimacy of park governance and addressing livelihood vulnerability. Material expectations are central to sustaining mutual commitments, relational trust, and social support (Matseketsa et al. 2019, Habel et al. 2022). Future studies should emphasize the range of attributes of legitimacy and further explore how illegalities interact with informal networks in the context of perceived illegitimacy and unfulfilled promises. Although the simple probit estimation intends to show the effect of informal social networks, the model has certain limitations, including the omission of pertinent variables such as perceptions of governance legitimacy. Further study can quantify the causality of illegal resource extraction, unfulfilled promises, and legitimacy.

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