Research

INTRODUCTION

Forests are socially, ecologically, and economically important across the globe. In recent decades, forests have received increased attention because they contribute to food security, livelihoods, energy, culture, biodiversity conservation, and climate regulation (Nasi et al. 2002, Oldekop et al. 2020). Approximately 2.4 billion people, including half a billion Indigenous people, depend on forest ecosystems for their livelihoods, especially for fuelwood (FAO and UNEP 2020). Despite this vital role, there has been a significant decline in forest cover to 30.8% from 32.5% over the last three decades (FAO and UNEP 2020), posing not only threats to the habitat of countless species but also amplifying the impacts of climate change because forests play a crucial role in carbon sequestration (Pinho et al. 2020). This fact underscores the necessity for forest management interventions worldwide.

Although the effect of forest cover decline is alarming, studies hold that the changes around forests as social-ecological systems are mediated by socioeconomic, political, and institutional forces (Malhi et al. 2014, Kimengsi et al. 2023). Therefore, the effective management of forest resources requires a robust and comprehensive approach to public policy, governance, and institutions (Ojha et al. 2019). These facts underscore the pivotal role of institutions encompassing laws, guidelines, norms, religious and customary traditions, and beliefs and values in shaping sustainable forest resource use and management (Ostrom 1990, Agrawal and Ostrom 2001).

Institutions, often described as the "rules of the game," significantly influence individuals’ interests, behaviors, and actions regarding forest resource use and management (North 1990, Ostrom 2005). These institutions can be viewed in two key dimensions: structures and processes (Fleetwood 2008). As structures, forest resource-linked institutions refer to informal arrangements, e.g., priesthood (which connects sacred species, e.g., Ficus spp. or sacred areas with cultural rituals, which in turn determines their protection and use) and formal, such as state forest administration, that enforce rules governing forest resource (FR) use and management. Regarding processes (e.g., rules, norms, customs, traditions), institutions constrain or enable human interactions and reshape FR use and management outcomes (Ostrom 1990, Fleetwood 2008). Based on sources, institutions can be categorized as exogenous or endogenous. Exogenous institutions act as control mechanisms imposed by exogenous actors, such as the state or non-state organizations (Vallino 2014). Endogenous institutions, conversely, are self-enforced, culturally embedded, and often informal (Kimengsi et al. 2022). The specific norms of communities can be challenging for exogenous actors to comprehend (Yeboah-Assiamah et al. 2017). Both endogenous and exogenous institutions exercise varying degrees of formality, i.e., they can be formal and/or informal (Osei-Tutu et al. 2014, Yeboah-Assiamah et al. 2017, Kimengsi et al. 2022). Formal institutions are readily observable as written and codified rules or laws, largely driven by governments. In contrast, informal institutions have rules based on implicit understandings and exist as unwritten or un-codified rules communicated through customs and traditions passed down through generations (Osei-Tutu et al. 2014, Yeboah-Assiamah et al. 2017, Kimengsi et al. 2022).

As a rule-based approach, community forestry has shown promise in achieving sustainable FR management in developing countries, exemplified by Nepal’s experience as a pioneer in community forest management (Agrawal and Ostrom 2001, Kimengsi and Bhusal 2021, Laudari et al. 2024). Nepalese society is characterized by hierarchical and discriminatory social structures rooted in cultural norms, traditions, and values. Traditional forest management practices, particularly in the hills, have a long history in Nepal (Gautam et al. 2004). Scholars such as Arnold and Campbell (1986) and Fisher (1989) have provided insights on how these practices manifest under various institutional arrangements.

Studies have analyzed institutional change with a focus on exogenous institutions, highlighting that comprehensive transformation is crucial in forest governance; however, Nepal’s CFs have yet to attain their full potential in this light (Acharya 2002, Gautam et al. 2004, Banjade and Paudel 2020, Ojha and Hall 2021). Although scholars, including Acharya (2002) and Gautam et al. (2004), explored formal institutional change in forest policies, a joint analysis of formal and informal institutional aspects is missing (Ojha et al. 2014, Laudari et al. 2020, Ojha and Hall 2021). Despite acknowledging the existence and importance of informal/endogenous institutions in CF policy reforms, previous studies did not explicitly incorporate the informal dimensions of institutions linked to forest resource management.

Ostrom (2008) argued that a general theory of institutional change can only be developed when there is a comprehensive understanding of the mechanisms behind the change in multiple and varied settings. Studies in Nepal show that Nepal’s forest policy has been shaped by paradigm shifts (Guthman 1997, Sharma et al. 2010), international actors (Gautam et al. 2004, Ojha et al. 2016), and changes in political and socioeconomic attributes (Baynes et al. 2015, Maryudi et al. 2018, Shrestha et al. 2018). Additionally, although these changes are also explained by outmigration (Banjade and Paudel 2020, Ojha and Hall 2021, Shahi et al. 2022), they mostly focus on policy-level changes. Very limited information exists on the mechanisms of institutional change in FR use and management, and the outcomes they produce in CFs in Nepal. Additionally, given Nepal’s diversity in terms of its physiographic regions, there is a need for the empirical analysis of institutional change, which considers such diverse geographical and temporal variations. Recent comparative studies on forest governance in the context of community forestry in Nepal did not consider such spatio-temporal variations (Kimengsi and Bhusal 2021).

Studies have established that endogenous and exogenous institutions are known to prevail and interact frequently. However, a comprehensive understanding of the changes in FR use and management institutions at the local level across various physiographic regions, their sources, mechanisms of change, and the outcomes they produce still needs to be analyzed. To address these gaps, we explored the intricacies of institutional change, the mechanisms, and the resulting outcomes in the context of Nepal’s community forests. We responded to three central questions: (1) what are the various institutions and their sources associated with FR use and management in CFs? (2) What mechanisms drive the dynamics of institutional change? and (3) What outcomes are associated with these evolving dynamics of institutional change and associated change mechanisms?

We provide answers to these questions drawing from Koning’s (2016) framework, which integrates key components of three main strands of the new institutionalism.

1. Historical institutionalism focuses on how past events and decisions shape institutions, leading to stability in practices over time and emphasizes critical junctures as pivotal moments in institutional development (Thelen 1999).
2. Ideational mechanisms, such as persistence (legitimacy and appropriateness) and change (discourse, norm change), denote the ways institutions interact with social norms, attitudes, and beliefs, and when and how changes in ideas affect institutional change (Schmidt 2008, Campbell 2009) and rational choice.
3. Rational choice institutionalism highlights rational actors pursuing their preferences within political institutions to maximize their interests and utility (Katznelson and Weingast 2005).

Using four physiographic regions of Nepal, our research aims to provide fresh insights into forest use and management institutions; their sources, the mechanisms of institutional change, and the outcomes they produce for over five decades.

MATERIALS AND METHODS

This study focuses on Nepal’s community forests, a pacesetter in community-based forest management (CBFM) in the Asian context (Kimengsi and Bhusal 2021). The analysis offers insights into the intricate interplay and dynamics of institutions and institutional change mechanisms and their outcomes, making it an appealing case for research.

Theoretical framework

Institutional theories focus on analyzing how institutions evolve over space and time (Greif and Laitin 2004). However, no single institutional theory exists to comprehensively explain how institutional change occurs; how it functions, and its new directions for sustainable forest management outcomes (Koning 2016, Filho et al. 2018, Ojha and Hall 2021). Understanding institutional change is complex; it can happen implicitly or explicitly. It can occur over varying timeframes and result in incremental change or radical change/transformation in both form and function across different contexts (Walsh 2000, Kimengsi and Balgah 2021). Both radical and incremental changes hold significant consequences for shaping human behavior and influencing FR management outcomes (Micelotta et al. 2017).

Figure 1 illustrates a framework that examines the role of community forest user groups (CFUGs) in forest management, along with the associated FR use and management institutions (e.g., rules, beliefs) in the following four typologies:

• exogenous formal: an institution (structure or process) that originated outside of the community in which it is implemented and has legal recognition from the state or government.
• exogenous informal: an institution (structure and process) that emanates from an entity outside of the community of its implementation and does not have any official or legal recognition from the government.
• endogenous formal: it denotes a locally crafted structure or process (institution) that has garnered legitimacy or recognition by the government.
• endogenous informal: pertaining to unwritten or uncodified and socially embedded structures and processes at the local level that endure across generations.

Over the past five decades, changes in these institutions have been incremental (e.g., reproduction by adaptation) and radical in nature (e.g., breakdown and replacement). This analysis involves institutional formation, potentially with occasional disruptions affecting their forms or functions or both, in relation to FR use and management.

The analysis spanning from 1976 to 2021 explores institutional change and the mechanisms behind these changes. Community forestry was coined in a formal policy document, i.e., the national forestry plan, in 1976 for the first time. Thus, we analyzed institutional change, and its mechanisms specifically for four principal periods related to historical/institutional change (Acharya 2002, Gautam et al. 2004, Ojha et al. 2014, Laudari et al. 2020, Ojha and Hall 2021). We reviewed the history of CF management in the research sites, including CFMP, along four sequential periods with a brief description, which corresponds to CF development pathways, such as pioneering (1978–1990): experimenting and establishing the groundwork for CFs; expansion (1991–2000) characterized by CF formulation and expansion with the necessary policy frameworks; stabilization (2001–2010) in which CFs focused on improving forest management, governance, and its contribution to local livelihoods; and broad-based (2011–2021) describing a period in which CFs face challenges due to changes in the socioeconomic and political landscape, alongside the pressure to meet local/national and global goals.

Our analysis draws from Koning’s (2016) typologies of institutional change mechanisms, including critical junctures, failure of existing ideas, priming/framing, patching up, and economic growth. It also applies endogenous mechanisms such as negative feedback, puzzling and learning, and transposition (Table 1). They are rooted in three sub-types of new institutionalism: historical, ideational, and rational choice, which align with fundamental theoretical assumptions (Katznelson and Weingast 2005, Koning 2016). Historical institutionalism focuses on how past events and decisions shape institutions, ideational theory elucidates the origin of people’s preferences, and rational choice theory helps to understand how people behave given those preferences (Koning 2016).

These mechanisms either transform existing institutions in response to new contexts or involve changes in the functioning of institutions, i.e., gradual erosion and eventual breakdown. Likewise, this study assesses and relates them to forest management outcomes linked to the typology of institutions and their change mechanisms. The outcome typologies as proposed by Kimengsi et al. (2023) and further adopted by Charmakar et al. (2024) were used, incorporating social (+) such as participation and empowerment, social (-) outcomes such as exclusion and conflicts; economic (+) outcomes such as increased income and community infrastructure development, economic (-) such as misuse of funds and illegal logging; ecological (+) such as increased forest cover, natural forest expansion, and biodiversity conservation, and ecological (-) outcomes such as encroachment and degradation.

Study areas throughout Nepal

Nepal is a biodiversity-rich country in South Asia with 126 ethnic groups and 5 distinct physiographic regions including: Terai, Siwalik, Middle Mountain (also referred to as mid-hills), High Mountain, and The High Himalaya. The Terai and Siwalik (a narrow strip of fragile hills extending east-west between the middle hills and the Terai) account for 30% of the country’s forests. This strip also has fertile lands and harbors high-value tropical tree species (DFRS 2015). The High Himalaya and High Mountain regions cover 32% of forests, though accessibility to this area is challenging due to altitude and the difficult terrain (Pokharel et al. 2007). The Middle Mountain, which accounts for 38% of Nepal’s forests (DFRS 2015), is distributed in patches and comprises lower commercial value tree species (Sinha 2011). Over 75% of rural households rely on agriculture and forest ecosystems, which provide the majority of their income and energy needs (Subedi et al. 2014). Despite its long history of Indigenous or traditional FR use and management, the government laid the foundation for CFs only in 1976, making Nepal a front-runner in the CF model (Adhikari 1990, Ojha and Hall 2021). By 2021, 22,519 CFUGs (3.09 million families) managed 2.35 million hectares across the regions of Nepal (MoFE 2020). This study focuses on the Terai, Siwalik (Chure), Middle and High Mountain (Fig. 2) and examines eight CFUGs, two in each region.

We used a multi-stage sampling approach. Districts were chosen from four regions: Kapilbastu (Terai), Chitwan (Siwalik), Dolakha (Middle Mountain), and Jumla (High Mountain). They were selected on the basis of the existence of community forests, the diversity of institutions, and their significant dependence on forest resources. One municipality (local government unit) from each district/region was randomly selected.

Two CFUGs were purposively selected in each municipality (Table 2) based on the existence of both exogenous and endogenous institutions, ethnic diversity and dominance, age of CF (at least 10 years), the significant dependence (more than 50%) of CFUG members on the forest for subsistence, and forest area per households delivering multiple provisioning services, e.g., timber, fuelwood, and non-timber forest products (NTFPs). Purposive sampling was performed to select particular groups or individuals with significant and diverse perspectives or views on the topic (Robinson 2014). This sampling method aimed to capture diverse perspectives to enhance understanding of the issues around community forestry institutions.

Data collection

The study employs the explorative case study approach and mixed-methods research involving the application of participatory rural appraisal tools such as key informant interviews (KII), focus group discussions (FGDs), expert interviews (EIs), and direct observations. Additionally, document reviews, i.e., CF-related policy documents (e.g., forest laws, guidelines), community forest management plans (CFMP), and reports (e.g., meeting minutes, annual CF activities reports) also formed part of the data collection approach. For that, we first prepared three sets of interview guides: one with 16 open-ended questions for KII, another with 16 questions for FGDs, and an 8-question guide for EIs. These guides focused on forest resources of interest, the dynamics of FR-related institutions, their sources, the mechanisms of institutional change (1976–2021), and their implications on CF management outcomes. Data were collected between February and May 2022 (Fig. 3).

The research used the recall method (Hoinville 1980) to gather information on FR use and management experiences from 1976 to 2021. Prior to the interviews, verbal consent was obtained, allowing participants to share their insights. In total, 45 KIIs were conducted across the research sites. Mostly, individuals with substantial knowledge and experience in forest resource management, such as village elders, natural healers, political leaders, forest guards, local resource appropriators, and members of previous executive or advisory committees were interviewed, and their views were noted. Likewise, 21 FGDs were organized with 5–12 participants each, including the CF executive committee (EC), Dalits, Braman-Chhetri (BC), men/women groups, and Indigenous groups involved in harvesting NTFPs and mountain-cow/goat/sheep herding. On average, the FGDs lasted for 120 minutes. During the KIIs and FGDs, FR uses and management institutions were categorized as exogenous or endogenous and formal or informal, focusing on their evolution and mechanisms of change and outcomes. These typologies guided the discussions with key informants, experts, and focus groups, leading to the identification of both positive and negative dimensions of social, economic, and ecological outcomes associated with FR use and management institutions. The opinions were recorded, along with the outcome category presented in the theoretical framework section and coded as 0 for negative and 1 for positive.

We also reviewed the CFUG-level policy documents, e.g., the constitution and community forest management plan (CFMP), CFUG’s report, national policies, international standards, and religious scriptures to identify and validate the sources and changes in institutions linked to FR use and management. We contextualized the relevance of policy documents and religious scriptures to specific community forests by analyzing their influence on local norms and practices regarding forest resource management. The authors also made use of direct observations. In this light, the lead author visited all the study sites and had first-hand observation of the FR management practices, such as protection around sacred places, species harvesting, the tools and methods used in harvesting, and the use of forest products for household energy and ethnobotanical use, committee meetings, and the committee selection process. Furthermore, 37 EIs were conducted. Experts contacted were either directly involved or were observers and executors of the CFMP and the CF policy-making process at local, provincial, and national levels. The discussions centered on institutional typology, sources, change mechanisms, and forest management outcomes in CFs. Field notes and recorders were used to collect the data during KIIs, FGDs, and EIs.

Data analysis

Guided by Figure 1, we employed the directed content analysis (Hsieh and Shannon 2005) to gather empirical evidence on institutional sources, change mechanisms, and their implications in CF management outcomes. We examined the dataset and identified major themes, which were grouped according to predefined categories. We examined the data set and gleaned its most important messages (Appendix 1: FGDs, KI, and EIs). After reading through the transcribed material, the major topics were underlined and grouped under the pre-determined themes. The texts that did not fit the specified themes were read again to find additional related themes with fresh quotes attached. Additional related themes that did not align with the specified themes were identified from the texts. Texts not fitting these themes were revisited, uncovering related ones with fresh quotes. Institutions are named exogenous formal, endogenous formal, endogenous informal, or exogenous informal.

The mechanisms of institutional change along the CF development pathways were structured into four sequential periods (Fig. 1): pioneering (1978–1990), expansion (1991–2000), stabilization (2001–2010, focusing on sustainable forest management, governance and local livelihoods), and broad-based (2011–2021, addressing local, national, and global goals). Changes were noted in institutions’ forms and functions, including linear, incremental, and radical changes in response to shocks and other changes. Throughout the CF development pathway, mechanisms of change, such as critical juncture, failure of existing ideas, priming/framing, puzzling and learning, feedback, norms change (exogenous), and economic growth (Koning 2016), were observed.

Likewise, we noted the implications of institutional change on CF management outcomes as positive-negative social, economic, and ecological outcomes (Fig. 1). We tabulated the institutional typology, mechanisms of institutional change, and outcomes linked to CF resource management. We then used descriptive statistics to report on the spatio-temporal variations in institutional typologies, institutional change mechanisms, and associated forest management outcomes. Narratives were employed to further explain the descriptive statistics.

RESULTS

Formal and informal institutions and their sources

Community forestry in Nepal traces its origin to 1976, rooted in traditional forest management practices. Endogenous institutions play a significant role in managing and using forest resources. However, exogenous institutions hold dominance at all research sites, at varying degrees, which are introduced exogenously by state actors or non-state actors, e.g., donors, civil society organizations (CSOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), or market actors, as well as with different alliances (Table 3).

Local communities rely on informal institutions to preserve and use forest resources crucial for their subsistence (Table 4 and see Appendix 2 for details). These informal institutions, shaped by social hierarchies, economic needs (like collective resource management), and religious beliefs, have endured for generations. Male participants in FGDs in the Siwalik, Middle, and High Mountain regions highlighted various institutional practices, such as the use of specific tree species (Ficus religiosa and F. bengalensis trees) for cultural rituals (e.g., worshipping), and safeguarding trees near sacred sites and water sources. These practices are deeply rooted in local traditions. In the discussion, a local priest affirmed as follows: “These rituals and customs stem from Hindu Veda-religious scriptures, transmitted through generations by priests and elders.” Additionally, a male key informant from the High Mountain region held that “elderly people and women collect and use medicinal herbs for healing ailments, with Jhakri (Shamans), natural healers (Baidhya), and grandparents serving as primary sources of traditional healing knowledge.” A female Dalit FGD participant also noted that “Masta-Dhami/shamans in the Himalayas enforce taboos, such as prohibiting menstruating women, and Dalits from collecting herbs in certain parts of the Himalayas, as they are considered impure.”

Traditional caste groups, e.g., blacksmiths, have their methods of collecting wood and producing charcoal for blacksmithing. This practice exists in all sites and is sourced from their grandparents. The research reveals other examples from Siwalik, such as Chiuri (Diplokenma butyracea or butter trees), a culturally important species for Chepang groups, serving as dowry during marriage. It is also a source of vegetable oil and family income. Local farmers employ specific tree species, e.g., Shorea and Sandan (Ougeinia dalbergioides) in the Terai, Schima spp. in the Middle Mountain, and Quercus spp. in the High Mountain for traditional practices like the making of plough sets. In the Nibuwatar CF, groups of five households from the Chepang Indigenous group venture into the forest together, select and harvest a suitable Sandan tree to meet their needs, following practices passed down by village elders.

Local communities using systems like Parswa (entering the forest together after a decision of the village head or community) in the Middle and High Mountain regions and Parma (labor exchange within a group) in the Middle Mountain for harvesting and transporting fuelwood. In contrast, regular collection and usage practices prevail in the Terai and Siwalik regions. Likewise, Jhara (voluntary labor contribution) contributes to the conservation and management of CFs across all sites.

From 1976 to 1990, the focus was on establishing plantations and combating illegal timber harvesting. International donors assisted village Panchayats in the Middle and High Mountain regions and worked with local entities like Badghar (village head) and local functionaries in Terai and Siwalik. Between 1991 and 2000, endogenous informal institutions exerted significant influence over forest resource use and management in the Terai and Siwalik regions, while a more balanced combination of endogenous and exogenous institutions emerged in the Middle and High Mountain regions. The CFMP introduced rules relating to FR use and management and constitutions for group management, emphasizing the roles and responsibilities of CFUGs, ECs, group member/forest users and the decision-making process. After 2000, formal exogenous institutions, originating nationally and internationally, gained dominance, followed by endogenous informal and endogenous formal institutions across all study sites (Fig. 4). Exogenous institutions, largely stemming from national-level policies and regulations such as the Forest Act, regulations, and community forestry guidelines, took center stage. Nonetheless, endogenous formal institutions were most pronounced in the Middle Mountain and less in other regions.

The dominance of exogenous formal institutions further increased in 2011–2021 period. Various programs, such as the Siwalik conservation program sanctioned annual allowable harvest (AAH) on steep-slopes (above 50 degrees) in Siwalik. The REDD+ pilot projects in two CFs of Siwalik and one in the Middle Mountain, sustainable management of forest resources, especially non-timber forest products in the Middle Mountain, wild harvesting of CITES-listed NTFP species in the High Mountain, and silviculture-based forest management (SBFM) in the Terai CFs were introduced. These exogenous formal institutions were promoted by government agencies, NGOs, international governments, and private sector entities. Comparing the 2011–2021 period to 1976–1990, there was a relative decline in the functioning of endogenous informal institutions; however, this is embedded in their everyday life and still contributes to improve forest conservation and management. Endogenous formal institutions expanded in the CFs of the Middle and High Mountain areas but declined in the Terai.

Mechanisms of institutional change

Between 1976 and 2021, Nepal’s forest management and governance underwent a significant transformation. The Private Forest Nationalization Act (1957), the Forest Act (2061), and the Special Forest Act (1967) laws, which were intended to regulate forest activities, resulted in a shift in the dynamics between the state and local communities. However, it is noted that implementing these laws led to tensions because the local communities perceived that these disregarded their longstanding role as stewards of the forests (Kanel 2006, Ojha and Hall 2021). After 1976, the institutions linked to FR use and management, i.e., exogenous and endogenous, experienced (de)incremental and radical changes, presented below in four phases. Several mechanisms steered institutional change in each phase to reshape FR use and management practices in CFs (Appendix 3, mechanisms of institutional change).

Phase 1: pioneering of community forest (CF; 1976–1990)

Before 1950, all sampled CFs had traditional forest management, which was ignored in favor of state-centric management. According to an elderly key informant in the Terai region,

Mukhiya or Jimmawal [previous local functionaries] and Katwal [assistance of Mukhiya to communicate his decisions] were informally functioning in the Middle and High Mountain regions. Badghar [village head] and Zamindar [local functionaries] collaborated to coordinate with forest administration. They regulated forest resources among villagers in the selected CF in Terai.

Experts (e.g., forest officials) in the Middle Mountain stated:

there was a significant shift in forest governance, i.e., devolution of state-centric forest management to village Panchayats [A village Panchayat was the lowest politico-administrative unit during the party-less Panchayat system of government. It is currently named a rural municipality after promulgating new constitutions in 2015 to address the new political governance, i.e., a federal democratic system.] as Panchayat Forests (PF) and Panchayat Protected Forests (PPF), which changed the functions of forest administration, forest management regimes, and forest management authority (S. Charmakar, field notes 2022).

These laws officially instituted the participation of local communities in forest protection and usage for the first time in history, with management rights transferred to the local government (Panchayat). From the documents reviewed and the KIIs and FGDs, it is clear that the enforcement of PF regulations in the Middle Mountain, High Mountain, and Siwalik regions was noticeable, yet notably absent in the Terai region (see Figs. 5 and 6).

Critical juncture: was the key mechanism of institutional change in most research sites except for the CFs in Terai. An elderly respondent in the Siwalik region corroborated with this:

The nationalization of forests resulted in green hills turning into denuded and grey hills, causing a severe shortage of forest resources, particularly fuelwood. Massive floods, and mass migration from the hills to Siwalik and Terai during the 1960s–1980s were common challenges (S. Charmakar, field notes 2022).

State-centric forest management aimed to protect forests and restore degraded areas. However, the failure of this approach led to the tragedy of the commons. Recognizing the futility of forest protection without community involvement, local elites (i.e., typically wealthy, high-caste males who wield decision-making power that primarily caters to their interests and potentially neglects the broader interests of the society [Putnam 1976]), leaders, forest officers, and independent and project researchers began discussing community-based forest management in the Middle Mountains. An expert stated that these discussions materialized only when Eckholm (1976) popularized the "Theory of Himalayan Environmental Degradation." This theory emphasized how population pressure, forest clearing for cultivation, deforestation, soil erosion, and land degradation in the hills and mountains significantly impacted downstream communities and ecosystems in Siwalik and Terai. All research sites except in Terai adopted the PF/PPF. Key informants and experts witnessed "priming/framing" by international actors, particularly evident in the Integrated Hill Development Project (IHDP) in the Middle Mountain. The IHDP strategically used the theory of Himalayan degradation and its potential impacts as an agenda to influence public opinion, government actions, and elite behavior. This led to the establishment of participatory plantation in the Suspa CF in the Middle Mountain, although local people were not involved in decision making (S. Charmakar, field notes 2022). Male key informants from the Middle and High Mountain highlighted that:

local elites, recognizing direct and indirect benefits, readily embraced the participatory approach, i.e., PF and PPF.

However, in Terai, a male participant in a FGD revealed concerns about forest authorities as such:

The Timber Corporation in Nepal extracted valuable timber to generate income for the nation, political parties encouraged forest conversion for agriculture to gather votes, and Badghar (i.e., village head) used incentives to secure 5–6 timber harvesting permits to supply timber to the village people; these resulted in de facto open access (S. Charmakar, field notes 2022).

Nonetheless, PF and PPF regulations still stood as the primary framework.

Phase 2: community forest expansion phase (1991–2000)

This phase witnessed a radical/transformation (formal change), particularly in the Middle and High Mountain regions, where CFs replaced PF and PPF. An expert in the Middle Mountain stated that:

the Forest Act (1993) and Regulation (1995) formally recognized community forest user groups (CFUGs) as self-governing institutions and redefined the government’s role as a facilitator rather than the traditional role of protecting forests from local people.

This transformation was triggered by various mechanisms, such as critical juncture, puzzling and learning, priming/framing, negative and positive feedback, and transposition. For instance, during the 1990 People’s Revolution, severe FR scarcity due to extensive deforestation and land degradation, and the failure of PF and PPF to address people’s needs and preferences led to transformational change. The promulgation of the new Forest Act (1993) and Regulation (1995) and external support facilitated these changes. Experts highlighted that:

NGOs played a pivotal role in establishing FUC in the Siwalik, Middle and High Mountain.

As an example, a female elderly FGD respondent in the Suspa CF (Middle Mountain region) stated that:

notable events, such as large-scale forest fires in Suspa in 1988/89 and continuous overgrazing, over and unsustainable harvesting and frequent forest fires in other CFs in the Middle and High Mountain regions, shifted the preferences and behavior of local elites regarding the utilization and conservation of forests. These events led to institutional change.

A male key informant in the Middle Mountain stated:

local elites led the formulation of forest user committees (FUCs), an informal entity responsible for safeguarding and harvesting forest resources for subsistence. This was closely monitored by forest authorities in the early 1990s (S. Charmakar, field notes 2022).

Political change and other crisis brought formal and radical change mostly to exogenous formal institutions, particularly in the Middle and High Mountain that fully recognized rights to access, use, and manage FR, and provided 100% of the benefits to the local people. On the contrary, informal changes occurred at the end of the decade, formulating forest user committees in Siwalik and Terai. The CFUGs began making decisions on forest resource management based on constitutions and the CFMP, including collective action and selection felling methods (removal of 4D, i.e., dead, dying, diseased, and deformed trees) for FR protection and management. Several mechanisms drove these changes. For example, the Nepal Swiss Community Forestry Project (NSCFP) in the Middle Mountain and the Karnali Technical School (KTS) in the High Mountain employed priming/framing, involving local elites, local partners, and forest authorities (S. Charmakar, field notes 2022). Donors communicated that the CF is crucial to ensure local autonomy and provided technical and financial support to enforce it. “Puzzling and learning” were also evident in the Middle Mountain as local communities drew lessons from implementing PF and PPF and small-scale CF initiatives piloted in nearby districts.

Negative and positive feedback: played a crucial role in preparing the CFMP through an endogenous, i.e., bottom-up approach, implementing measures against overgrazing, forest fire, illegal logging, and poaching. The meeting minutes and annual reports show that Devithan, Suspa, and Nibuwatar CFUGs began voluntarily guarding their forests by arranging Lauri Palo, i.e., rotating the responsibility of guarding forests among forest users by passing a stick. In contrast, forest watchers used funds from sanctions and penalties or grain collection from members in the mountains. They employed collective action to establish plantations, bush cleaning, and forest fire control in Siwalik, Middle and High Mountain. Positive feedback converted some of the endogenous informal to formal institutions. For instance, the collection and use of leaf litter, fodder, grasses, and dried and fallen wood year-round free of cost. However, all sampled CFs-banned livestock grazing in the Middle and High Mountain. “Transposition” was also observed as another mechanism in the Middle and High Mountain regions. Both male and female participants in the FGDs indicated that:

they carried out inventory to determine AAH for timber, fuelwood, and three NTFP species in the Suspa and Devithan CFs in the Middle Mountain, with the technical support of donor organizations, e.g., NSCFP in the 1990s.

However, the remaining research sites followed the traditional methods to set quotas of timber and fuelwood for each household (S. Charmakar, field notes 2022).

In 1999, amendments to the 1993 Forest Act led to the banning of green tree harvesting except for tending operations. The government mandated the allocation of at least 25% of CF funds for forestry development. However, challenges persisted, notably in Terai and Siwalik regions, where the Timber Corporation in Nepal (TCN) extracted large-sized Shorea trees, thereby hindering the establishment of CFs. An expert working in an NGO stated:

the government introduced block (scientific) forest management with the pretext that Indigenous users would be excluded if the government handed over the Terai Forest as CF to those living adjacent to the forests (mostly migrants). The expert further explained that: a number of NGOs and the Federation of Community Forest Users Nepal (FECOFUN) emerged to enhance the capacity of CFUGs in managing forest resources. An alliance of civil society organizations, including the FECOFUN, persistently opposed the policy until it was eventually withdrawn.

After a long struggle, the ward chair, with the support of NGOs and FECOFUN, formulated FUC in Baijalpur and Lalmatiya in the Terai region.

Phase 3: community forests for sustainable forest management and local livelihoods (2001–2010)

Incremental change was prevalent during this period. For instance, the FUC was formally registered as a CFUG in Terai and Siwalik and began managing forest resources and distributing benefits according to CF policy documents, i.e., CFUG’s constitution and CFMP. All selected CFs engaged in sustainable forest yield management extracting AAH, determined through forest inventory, promoted social equity and poverty reduction functions, including 33% of women in decision-making bodies, and 35% of the CF income for livelihoods improvement of poor households in the Suspa CF. However, other CFs only included it after revising the CF guidelines in 2008 (Figs. 5 and 6).

Mechanisms facilitating these changes include priming/framing, patching up, feedback, transposition, and economic growth mainly linked to exogenous formal institutions across all sites. However, critical juncture was not reported. The Suspa CFUG amended the CFMP in 2003–2004 and adopted FSC certification standards. The CSOs set the environment by stating that sustainable forest management and FSC certification are key to conserving their resources for their offspring and for accessing the international market for NTFPs at a premium price. Such narration helped to change the preferences, FR use practices, and the priorities of elites and entrepreneurs.

Then, the CSOs provided technical and facilitation support to revise and enforce the CFMPs, which received the FSC certificate for NTFPs in 2005, supported by international organizations (e.g., donor CSOs) and the district forest authority. Various institutions were patched up. For instance, forest users were categorized into rich, medium, and poor by using a participatory well-being ranking. They formed six sub-groups of poor, Dalit, women, and other forest dependents living adjacent to the forests to protect and generate livelihoods in the Suspa CF. Donors and market actors played a dominant role in patching up these institutions.

Feedback and transposition: they were the key mechanisms of exogenous formal institutional change in Terai and Siwalik regions. Despite the provision to hand over all accessible forests to the locals, the government delayed the handover process. The participants in the FGD in the Baijalpur CF explained:

the government introduced conflicting ideas of collaborative forest management to generate income for local communities and the government; this accelerated the degradation and fragmentation of forests. Lengthy negotiations between FECOFUN, including CSOs and the government, led to distant user provisions in CF guidelines, followed by FUC as a registered CFUG in the research sites in Tera (S. Charmakar, field notes 2022).

With the condition of selling surplus timber, sawmill owners financed the CF development process in Terai, whereas NGOs provided support with grants and capacity-building activities in Siwalik. Feedback and transposition were also noted in Suspa. For instance, participants of FGDs in Suspa CFUG highlighted that:

responding to feedback from concerned groups, Suspa CFUG lifted the grazing ban and implemented rotational grazing with control and sanction mechanisms to manage local and transhumance herding practices (S. Charmakar, field notes 2022).

Economic growth: it was recorded as another driving mechanism to change both exogenous and endogenous institutions, mostly endogenous informal institutions. Participants in a FGD in the Middle Mountain stated:

youths are gradually migrating out for employment; this has increased remittance inflow in the village thereby facilitating market access for their family leading to changes in interests and preferences of some forest users.

On the contrary, an elite key informant quoted:

increased price and market influenced the interests and preferences of elites and entrepreneurs regarding NTFPs and timber harvesting and trade, resulting in adjustments in CFMP, including alterations in species, total stock, AAH, harvesting methods for 7 NTFP species in the Baghjale and PhurkiSalla CFs in High Mountain and 16 NTFP species in the Suspa CF of Middle Mountain (S. Charmakar, field notes 2022).

Female and elderly informants across the sites, on the other hand, highlighted that:

ethno-medicinal herb usage and species/habitat taboos and beliefs decreased gradually, albeit minimally, in Nibuwatar CF in Siwalik and Baghjale and PhurkiSalla CF in High Mountain (S. Charmakar, field notes 2022).

An elder in the Nibuwatar CF in Siwalik stated:

though Chiuri (butter tree) was culturally significant to the Chepang group as an asset for dowry until the 1990s, and functions as a source of vegetable oil and income till date, its demand deceased after 2000 due to the presence of nearby income opportunities and markets (S. Charmakar, field notes 2022).

Phase 4: community forestry for meeting broad-based objectives (2011–2021)

Community forest user groups transitioned their goal from focusing solely on the supply of FR to meeting the global goals of climate mitigation and sustainable development by introducing various exogenous formal institutions. For instance, the donors, government, and NGOs employed priming/framing mechanisms to pilot REDD+ in the CFs of Siwalik and Middle Mountain regions. Participants in FGDs in the Siwalik and Middle Mountain disclosed that:

NGOs, including FECOFUN, promoted the concept of REDD+ through workshops and knowledge dissemination. They effectively engaged state actors, NGOs, local elites, and CFUGs, which led to the assessment of forest carbon and the adoption of activities aimed at reducing emission and enhancing carbon sequestration while also respecting Indigenous rights.

Forest officials in Terai highlighted that:

in 2016, a significant shift occurred with the adoption of the irregular shelter wood system. This was, initiated by state and donor representatives who narrated its positive impact on natural regeneration, productivity, and the local economy. The SBFM guideline (2014) played a crucial role in this transition, complemented by insights gained from the puzzling and learning process in neighboring collaborative forests.

Political change, including the transition to federalism, led to the enactment of new forest legislation at both federal and provincial levels, resulting in the adjustment of the governance and benefit-sharing model across the sites. External events like the earthquake (8.1 M) and its aftershocks above 6 M in 2015 caused widespread destruction in the sampled CF in the Middle Mountain, resulting in the loss of numerous lives and homes. Additionally, the COVID-19 pandemic disrupted CF activities across all sites, prompting incremental changes in institutional arrangements. However, these contingent events did not function as critical turning points; instead, they helped to patch up some institutions with certain incremental changes in exogenous formal and endogenous informal institutions. For instance, the political change introduced a new benefit-sharing model involving local/provincial government. In the post-earthquake period, the timber harvesting quota rose from 50 to 150 cubic feet per household, with 50 free of charge, and financial assistance was extended to families affected by the pandemic.

Feedback (negative and positive) mechanism: it is crucial for institutional change and the enhancement of CF conditions. The CF chairperson in the High Mountain region stated:

the IEE, for CF areas ranging from 500 to 750 hectares, and the EIA, for areas exceeding 750 hectares, in 2013 posed challenges for large sized CFs due to associated costs, leading to informal operation for a few years in PhurkiSalla and Baghjale CFs.

In 2016, the Suspa CF in the Middle Mountain carried out IEE with donor support. Meanwhile, during executive committee meetings in the Baghjale and Phurkisalla CFs, it was cited that:

the federation of CFUGs, in alliance with CSOs and the private sector, consistently provided negative feedback about government regulations, which ultimately convinced the government to lift the provision in CF areas.

Transposition: it was another mechanism recorded in most of the research sites. The SBFM switched off the silvicultural system from selection (4D-approach) to an irregular shelter-wood system in Terai. In the irregular shelter-wood system, trees are felled based on exploitative diameter (above 30 cm DBH) leaving few seed trees (10–25 trees/ha). Annual felling is done in relatively small areas or felling coupes determined by the rotation age of species (e.g., the Sal has a physical rotation age of 80, this is done in 1/80th of the forests). These changes led CFUGs to conduct detailed forest inventories, prepare thinning plans, construct forest fire lines, and engage in bush cleaning and thinning. The SBFM increased the AAH of timber and fuelwood, leading to a transition from collective harvesting to a labor-paid or contract system, thereby increasing private sector involvement. Private sector entities involved in forestry, such as chainsaw owners, furniture companies, sawmill enterprises, forest technicians, and consulting firms, became more engaged in activities like CFMP formulation and preparation of thinning and harvesting plans.

Forest certification for ecosystem services was another exogenous institution in the Suspa and Devithan CFs in the Middle Mountain, in which environmental NGOs (e.g., ANSAB Nepal), Federation of Community Forest Users Nepal (FECOFUN), and the private sector (e.g., Himalayan Bio-Trade Limited, an NTFP processing and exporting enterprise) played a key role. They portrayed certification as a rewarding mechanism for sustainable forest management practices. The program also helped assess and quantify water, carbon, timber, NTFPs, and biodiversity, which led to payment for preserving forests for water services in the Suspa CFUG.

Economic growth: it either constrained or expanded endogenous institutions by altering individual preferences and behaviors. For instance, Chepang key informants noted:

the use of plough set slightly decreased in Siwalik and the Middle Mountain while they adopted tractor.

Key informants in the High Mountain stated:

there is no change in applying plough for ploughing field.

Likewise, key informants in Terai and Siwalik highlighted that:

the preferred tree species for making plough sets shifted from Sandan (Ougenia dalbergioides), Satisal (Dalbergia latifolia) and, Bijayasal (Pterocapus marsupium) to Sal (Shorea robusta) due to their availability in the forests.

Transhumance herding has witnessed a decrease (16–20 families to 7) in the Middle and High Mountain regions. Participants in FGDs noted:

a shift with increased income in CFs, such as transitioning from traditional "Lauri Palo" methods to deploying forest guards across five CFs in the Terai, Siwalik, and High Mountain areas. Additionally, three CFUGs encountered operational challenges for 1.5 years, attributed to delays in CFMP revision, issues of leadership, transparency, and fund misappropriation. Forest users are reluctant to participate voluntarily in CF management due to changing needs, preferences, and opportunities. Migration, driven by factors like seeking alternative employment and exposure to modern lifestyles, has further affected these practices (S. Charmakar, field notes 2022).

Worshipping nature and trees is a ritual among Tharu, an Indigenous group in Terai, but reduced direct involvement in tree felling has been observed due to the distribution of timber from the CF depot. In a FGD in the High Mountain, women and Dalit participants cited that:

healthcare preferences shifted from traditional herbal medicine to allopathy medicine and hospital treatments, particularly among low-income groups, Dalits and, women due to increased availability and accessibility of modern healthcare services.

Outcomes linked to institutional change

Changes in both exogenous and endogenous institutions had varying effects on CF management outcomes (Table 5). Endogenous institutions generally yield positive ecological, social and economic outcomes with minimal negative outcomes, whereas exogenous institutions produce mixed results. Exogenous formal institutions had varied outcomes in CF across the regions.

In the Middle Mountain region, collaboration between local communities and external actors led to positive ecological outcomes. One CF achieved FSC certification for timber and NTFPs. Improved forest conditions, increased greenery, natural regeneration, soil conservation, and carbon enhancement are positive ecological outcomes in the region. However, around one-fourth of the key informants in the High Mountain, Terai, and Siwalik regions reported negative ecological outcomes, such as illegal logging and encroachment. Despite these challenges, 71% of respondents in Terai, 40% in Siwalik, and 37% in High Mountain acknowledged the positive contribution of exogenous formal institutions to ecological aspects. Such a fact indicates that effective enforcement of CFMP and participatory mechanisms aided in generating positive ecological outcomes.

Formal exogenous institutions showed mixed social and economic outcomes, with higher positive economic outcomes noted in the Middle Mountain (40%) and Terai (36%), attributed to FSC certification and irregular shelter-wood systems. Conversely, in the High Mountain region, positive and negative economic outcomes were equally reported. Socially, negative outcomes were prominent in Terai (79%), Siwalik (70%), High Mountain (47%), but lower in the Middle Mountain (13%). These were linked to factors such as political interferences and reduced community participation with emphasis on mujura (paid wage labor) and contractual arrangement, and shifts in decision-making authority from CF to forest authorities. Institutional changes regarding CITES-Appendix II listed species centralized harvesting and trading practices in High Mountain, while taxation on surplus forest resources reduced CFUG income in Terai and Siwalik. Concerns were expressed by male informants in Baijalpur and Lalmatiya CFs regarding the gradual alienation of forest users due to the CF executive committee’s use of mujura or contractors (S. Charmakar, field notes 2022). In contrast, a majority of respondents (67%) reported positive social outcomes in the Middle Mountain, which was lower than negative outcomes in the other regions.

We found significant variations in CF management outcomes influenced by endogenous informal institutions across regions. Positive ecological outcomes were prevalent, rooted in beliefs, customs, traditions, and norms, aiding species and habitat conservation and at the same time, a quarter of the respondents in the Middle and High Mountain regions expressed positive economic outcomes, only 5% in Terai, with no reported negative ecological or economic outcomes. Key informants in the Baghjale CF highlighted practices such as

local people preserve the Dhupi plants for cultural rituals, avoiding the felling of mature Deodar (Cedrus deodara) trees with the belief that the person who planted it, will die, if they fell the tree in the High Mountain (S. Charmakar, field notes 2022).

Key informants in the Middle Mountain, Siwalik, and Terai held that:

Ficus religiosa, Ficus benghalensis, and Ficus benjamina in the Middle Mountains, Siwalik, and Terai, were revered and worshipped as goddesses, aiding in forest and landscape restoration (S. Charmakar, field notes 2022).

Social outcomes varied. In the High Mountain, 74% reported positive outcomes like unity, while 21% cited negative social outcomes (Table 5), excluding menstruating women from collecting Himalayan herbs. Conversely, other regions had mixed social outcomes, with examples like Badghar in the Lalmatiya CF; Terai fostered unity and conflict resolution among forest users; and association with the federation of CF users in Nepal enhanced their capacity to tackle unwanted change due to external actors. In High Mountain, belief in the Masta God helped identify and control illegal loggers and poachers via the Masta priest’s bell visits (S. Charmakar, field notes 2022).

Community forest management outcomes linked to endogenous formal institutions have positive ecological, economic, and social outcome variations with physiographic regions (Table 4). For instance, the Middle Mountain CFs adopted a sub-group model, empowering small groups of marginalized households to manage specific forest areas formally, addressing the forest dependency and restoring degraded areas. The CF in Siwalik allowed Chepang communities to formally gather NTFPs like Dioscorea spp. for subsistence and cultural use. The CF in High Mountain facilitated legal and formal trade of NTFPs, expanding access and benefits for local people compared with arduous treks for selling NTFPs till the 1980s.

DISCUSSION

Institutions linked to forest resource use and management and their sources

Our research established the co-existence of exogenous and endogenous institutions in Nepal’s four geographical regions. Forest use practices focusing on commercial products (e.g., timber and NTFPs) are significantly shaped by exogenously rooted processes of institutional change stemming from exogenous formal institutions such as forest regulations and international conventions or standards and economic growth. This perspective challenges the conventional belief that local communities primarily engage in bottom-up resource management processes, creatively blending endogenous and exogenous institutions within CFs (Adhikari 1990, Agrawal and Ostrom 2001, Banjade and Paudel 2020).

A complementary interaction between exogenous and endogenous institutions was observed in the Middle and High Mountain regions. For instance, formal exogenous institutions prohibited the cutting of green trees and unauthorized tree extraction, enforced formal sanctions, and controlled such illicit acts. Likewise, endogenous institutions do not allow the cutting down of sacred species and trees around sacred places. Both institutions contribute to the overall protection of species, forests, and habitats. This perspective aligns with previous studies in Asia and around the globe (Nagendra and Gokhale 2008, Osei-Tutu et al. 2014, Yeboah-Assiamah et al. 2017, Kumar et al. 2022) that highlight the mutually reinforcing nature of both exogenous and endogenous institutions in catalyzing resource governance. However, there were notable variations in the dominance and application of these endogenous institutions, with higher prominence observed in the High Mountain, Lalmatiya CF in Terai, the Nibuwatar CF in Siwalik, and the Suspa CF in the Middle Mountain. These variations were linked to factors such as social and cultural aspects (e.g., ethnicity and customs), economic drivers (e.g., traditional healing, collective action, and labor sharing), and geographic remoteness, which influenced access to modern facilities and systems (Bhagwat and Rutte 2006, Kimengsi et al. 2021).

Endogenous institutions are primarily perennial (perennial relates to streams that flow all through, i.e., analogous to more long-term, enduring institutions), exemplified by sub-groups within CFs, as seen in the case of the Suspa CF. Socially embedded rules, norms, customs, traditional practices, and beliefs also tend to exhibit perennial characteristics and contribute to the conservation of species and forests. However, several endogenous institutions informally weakened or declined over the past decade, such as those related to the use of herbs for ethno-medicine. Furthermore, exogenous and endogenous institutions may persist, eventually becoming socially embedded, if they align with the daily livelihoods of communities. Exogenous institutions may exhibit ephemeral (refers to short-term stream movements, i.e., institutional arrangements), intermittent (analogous to medium-term/seasonal streams, i.e., medium-term institutional arrangements, see Kimengsi et al. 2021), or perennial behavior depending on the interests and preferences of forest authorities or in response to resistance or negative feedback from civil society and local communities. Similarly, endogenous institutions may assume intermittent or ephemeral characteristics when formal institutions disregard, replace, or subject them to modernization and medical care or in response to altered socioeconomic conditions that render them obsolete. Numerous scholars, including Coulibaly-Lingani et al. (2009), Tesfaye et al. (2012), Kimengsi and Balgah (2021), and Kimengsi et al. (2021), concur with these insights.

Mechanisms of institutional change

We observed radical changes or transformations in forest management institutions in Nepal, focusing on critical juncture, priming/framing, and feedback mechanisms driving change. Two pivotal moments stand out: severe land degradation with the fuelwood crisis of the 1970s and the shift from monarchy to multi-party democracy in the 1990s. These junctures triggered a shift from state-centric management to community-based forest management. Support from national experts, environmental activists, innovative foresters, and development partners played a pivotal role in this transition at the local level. This observation does not contradict other studies (Gautam et al. 2004, Adhikari and Dhungana 2009, Banjade and Paudel 2020, Kimengsi and Bhusal 2021, Ojha and Hall 2021).

Continuous feedback (negative/positive) mechanisms at local and national levels promoted learning and adjustment. However, these mechanisms proved more effective in Nepal’s Middle and High Mountain regions compared to the Siwalik and Terai regions. It was also established that out of 22,519 CFUGs, fewer than 2500 CFUGs were formulated in the Terai and Siwalik regions (MoFE 2020). The study underscores that crises and external shocks do not always or automatically lead to institutional change; this will depend on the interest of the powerful actors who lead the post-crisis phase. Mahoney and Thelen (2010) have backed up the claims, arguing that institutional change depends on how this external shock affects the system as one of the factors determining which institutions are in the pool for reform and who is in charge of choosing the institutions. Similarly, Coral et al. (2021) contended that institutional change occurs when powerful individuals have the interests and ability to alter these institutions.

A single mechanism cannot completely explain institutional change. The 2000s witnessed the emergence of mechanisms such as feedback, transposition, and patch-up in Terai and Siwalik. Continuous negative feedback and resistance by forest user groups and civil society organizations against contradictory policies of the government led to incremental and transformational institutional change at both the national and CF levels. For instance, the government revised the CF guidelines and incorporated the provision of handing over the national forests as CFs to the near and distant users in Terai and Siwalik. This expanded the CF program across Terai; CSOs and the private sector inserted FSC forest certification in the Suspa CF, sustainable harvesting of NTFP species listed in CITES-II in the Baghjale CF, and the government exerted SBFM in Terai. For this, the actors used priming/framing, puzzling and learning, and feedback as mechanisms for such institutional change. Previous studies (e.g., Charmakar et al. 2014, 2021, Aryal et al. 2021, 2022, Laudari et al. 2020) agree with this finding. However, we argue that these mechanisms complement others (such as critical juncture, failure of existing ideas, transposition, or patching up) to engender institutional change.

Economic growth and national and international policy changes led to (de)incremental changes within endogenous-informal institutions governing FR use and management. These changes were particularly higher in those CFs located in accessible regions dominated by migrants and rich people. Another dimension of local economic growth is linked to youth outmigration and the corresponding inflow of remittances. Many youths have migrated to the Gulf states in search of jobs (Sunam et al. 2021); this has led to an increase in remittances that has further raised the income levels of households. Consequently, market access for families has been facilitated leading to changes in interests and preferences of some forest users. This aligns with prior research highlighting the influence of social-demographic factors, religion, modernization, and external institutions on institutional compliance and change, not only in Nepal but also in various regions around the globe (Adhikari 1990, Ensminger 1997, Adhikari and Dhungana 2009, Coulibaly-Lingani et al. 2009, Tesfaye et al. 2012, Buchenrieder and Balgah 2013, Atreya et al. 2018, Kimengsi et al. 2021).

Mixed outcomes of institutional change in community forest management

We observed mostly positive ecological outcomes associated with various exogenous and endogenous institutional changes. Stable institutions, particularly linked to endogenous informal institutions in High Mountain regions, contribute to positive ecological outcomes. Most importantly, the occurrence of critical juncture and the interest of powerful actors, driving alterations in exogenous formal institutions through mechanisms such as transposition, patching up, either through puzzling and learning or feedback, has been pivotal in yielding positive outcomes. Such influence is substantiated by the prioritization of protection and conservation over sustainable utilization of FR by both endogenous and exogenous institutions.

For instance, Indigenous knowledge of traditional healers (Baidhya) conserves species for ethno-medicinal use, and Masta-Dhami and secret societies safeguard sacred species and sites. The CF-executive committees implemented conservation-focused CFMP, prohibiting forest conversion and excessive harvesting and emphasizing a selection system based on a 4D approach. Studies conducted in Nepal and around the world support this finding (Gautam et al. 2004, Tesfaye et al. 2012, Baynes et al. 2015, Gilmour 2016, Banjade and Paudel 2020, Charmakar et al. 2021). Gilmour (2016) contended that bureaucracy imposes greater limitations and frequently focuses on the community’ responsibility for protection. Charmakar et al. (2021) advocated for effective forest preservation in the Middle Mountain through a robust community-based approach, blending endogenous and exogenous institutions.

Institutional change in CFs led to uneven social and economic outcomes, which is consistent with existing research (Nagendra et al. 2005, Bennett et al. 2006, Adhikari and Di Falco 2009, Poudyal et al. 2013, Lund et al. 2014, Persha and Andersson 2014, Luintel et al. 2017, Piabuo et al. 2018). Positive social outcomes were more pronounced in CFs, mostly in the Middle Mountain and one in the Terai regions. This result highlights that exogenous institutional changes do not uniformly produce positive or negative outcomes; they rather produce mixed outcomes depending on site-specific dynamics. Positive social outcomes in the Middle Mountain can partly be attributed to continuous external support and the incorporation of traditional and Indigenous systems/practices. As a result, some endogenous institutions were formalized, and some served as a foundation for creating new institutions. In contrast, the Terai, Siwalik, and High Mountain experienced relatively greater negative social outcomes as a result of elite capture, conflicts, and inequity in benefit sharing.

The positive economic outcomes are linked to both exogenous and endogenous change that adheres to sustainable practices, along with increased value of the products. Conversely, negative economic outcomes stem from illicit actions, unauthorized resource use, mismanagement of funds, and the exploitation of resources by elites. It was noted that the interests and preferences of elites, rational forest users, and powerful actors heavily influenced economic outcomes. Mechanisms, such as puzzling learning, feedback, and patch up, were strongly connected to positive economic outcomes. However, the role of other aspects like geography and changing socioeconomic and political contexts could not be swept under the carpet.

CONCLUSION

We analyzed the dynamics of institutional change mechanisms and associated outcomes, looking at the case of Nepal’s community forests. Based on the analysis, this research draws the following conclusions:

• Exogenous formal institutions pre-dominate FR use and management in CFs, often stemming from formal national laws and international agreements. In contrast, endogenous formal and informal institutions are deeply rooted in religious scriptures, customs, or traditions. Particularly, endogenous formal and informal institutions (socially embedded) are important in shaping behavior change relating to forest resource protection, management, and use.
• Critical juncture, e.g., Himalayan degradation and crisis in the Mountain and mass migration (1970s), fuelwood crisis, and political change (1990s), contributed to transforming FR management from state-centric to community-managed forests. These crises and changes do not always form critical juncture and transform the institutions; rather, they trigger change. The outcome hinges on the interests of powerful actors and the effectiveness of mechanisms such as priming/framing, puzzling-learning, negative/positive feedback, patch up, and transposition. Between 2011 and 2021, FR use and management institutions in CFs were increasingly aligned with the global agenda. External actors employed various mechanisms, including priming/framing, feedback, and transposition and patching up, to induce changes in exogenous (formal) institutions.
• Finally, endogenous formal and informal institutions lead to positive social, economic, and ecological outcomes, while exogenous formal institutions produce mixed social and economic outcomes, and positive ecological ones. Hence, these results unpack the importance of endogenous linked institutions in fostering local ownership, participation, increased benefits, and ecological conservation. As an implication for policy, CF management strategies must harmonize formal institutions with informal/endogenous institutions (e.g., belief, norms, values), allowing for flexibility to accommodate local variations. It is crucial to prioritize inclusive decision-making processes, thereby addressing social and economic inequalities and ensuring the equitable distribution of benefits among all CF members.

Studies on deliberative politics and the transformational change of forest policy in CF development (Ojha et al. 2014, Ojha and Hall 2021) and forest policy dynamics through discursive institutionalism (Laudari et al. 2020) mainly address aspects of formal institutional change. Despite acknowledging the existence and importance of informal/endogenous institutions in CF policy reform, previous studies did not explicitly incorporate the informal dimensions of institutions linked to forest resource management. We provide novel and complementary evidence through the joint analysis of five decades of formal and informal institutional change in the context of the diverse geographical regions of Nepal. The geographical and temporal variations form an essential component of policy and institutional reform in Nepal. From a theoretical standpoint, the empirical evidence derived from the four physiographic regions of Nepal enhances the appreciation of the applicability and relevance of Koning’s framework in explaining institutional change mechanisms linked to exogenous and endogenous institutions of CF resource use and management. Because this study acknowledges that actors and their power resources could shape FR management institutions and outcomes, it is imperative that future studies prioritize an in-depth analysis of this question. Furthermore, the actor constellations could potentially engender a process of institutional bricolage in which resource users draw from formal and informal institutional provisions to navigate their daily forest resource use. Future studies on the less visible actor’s power dimensions are required to advance theory development in this regard.

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