Research

INTRODUCTION

Despite progress on designing rules, institutions, and property rights that support sustainable fishing practices, noncompliance continues to be a stumbling block for managers and fishers in many settings (Hauck 2011, Oyanedel et al. 2020a). Noncompliance is commonly linked to resource overexploitation, ecosystem decline, conflict, and poverty traps (Nahuelhual et al. 2020, Spencer et al. 2021). Noncompliance has often been framed as thwarting effective fisheries management, particularly in small-scale fisheries, which are often managed by a medley of overlapping formal regulations and informal social norms (Chuenpagdee and Song 2012, Pellowe and Leslie 2020). In these fisheries, it is a challenge to even measure noncompliance, let alone manage it (Mackay et al. 2020, Nahuelhual et al. 2023). Collecting quantitative data on noncompliance is challenging because of biases inherent in attempting to measure illicit behavior (Bergseth et al. 2015, Dev et al. 2022). This has led to a research gap in the application of tools to understand and diagnose compliance, particularly in cases where formal and informal rules do not align (de Mattos Vieira et al. 2015, García-Quijano et al. 2015, Pellowe and Leslie 2020).

Fisheries compliance is usually summarized through numbers (like fines and dollars or tons of “illegal” catch). A highly cited study has estimated annual illegal catch at 11–26 million tons, worth US$10–24 billion (Agnew et al. 2009). The framing around illegal fishing at the international level often lumps it with unreported and unregulated fishing as “IUU” (Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated fishing), which the United Nations declared as “one of the most severe problems affecting world fisheries” (UNGA 1999) with an annual International Day for the Fight Against IUU Fishing (FAO 2024). IUU fishing plays a large role in Sustainable Development Goal 14, which exhorts countries to address IUU through national legislation and state control (Haas et al. 2019). A study on industrial fisheries noncompliance in Indonesia concluded that an aggressive crackdown on IUU fishing alone could restore global fisheries to sustainable levels without additional reduction in legal fishing effort (Cabral et al. 2018). Calls to end IUU fishing have led to the emergence of groups like Global Fishing Watch, often with a focus on reducing illegal fishing in industrial fisheries by tracking and monitoring vessels (Welch et al. 2022).

However, the framing of “IUU” may cause unintended consequences when applied to small-scale fisheries (Song et al. 2020, Welch et al. 2022). Small-scale fisheries are a hard-to-define and diverse classification of fishing activities including subsistence and commercial fish harvesting and processing (Smith and Basurto 2019). They are collectively larger than their name indicates, accounting for 86% of motorized fishing vessels, 90% of the fisheries workforce, and two-thirds of catches destined for direct human consumption (FAO 2020). Song et al. (2020) argue that small-scale fisheries have been marginalized through the hunt against IUU fishing. Small-scale fishers often operate on the fringe of legality, sometimes guided more by norms or custom than by law. Laws are often patchy, incomplete, vague, or contradictory, leading to confusion about what precisely is “illegal,” which compounds low capacity for monitoring and enforcement along rural coastlines (Finkbeiner et al. 2017). Additionally, IUU combines “Illegal” with “Unregulated” and “Unreported” fishing, yet the latter two often characterize small-scale fisheries even when they are sustainable (Song et al. 2020). Small-scale fisheries are chronically underreported, excluded from reporting requirements because of weak state capacity to maintain records (Govan 2014) or because of their assumed limited impact (Mahon 1997). By one calculation, 80% of non-industrial fisheries would be considered “IUU,” simply because they have no recoverable record of landings (Watson and Tidd 2018). Nonetheless, even small-scale fishers themselves recognize illegal fishing as a major problem that can deteriorate the legitimacy of institutions aimed at sustaining fisheries, livelihoods, and fishing culture (Oyanedel et al. 2020a). In one example, noncompliance by outsiders within a community-based marine reserve led to a cascade of poaching by the very fishing cooperative members who instituted the reserve in the first place (Cudney-Bueno and Basurto 2009). These limitations of the IUU lens led us to seek more effective and practical ways of diagnosing compliance within small-scale fisheries.

Various compliance theories for small-scale fisheries exist (Fig. 1). Some models focus on identifying patterns in space and time associated with noncompliance, which Oyanedel et al. (2020a) call “opportunity-based approaches.” Noting that crime is not randomly distributed, these approaches identify when and where illegal activity is likely to occur. For example, these models identify enabling features (such as convenience) that characterize noncompliance with rules (Clarke 1980, Clarke and Webb 1999). Meanwhile, actor-based approaches focus on socioeconomic factors to understand individual motivations for breaking rules (Oyanedel et al. 2020a, 2020b). This includes the deterrence or instrumental model, which assumes that rational fishers break rules if benefits outweigh costs (Becker 1968). Because this model is based on the threat of detection and punishment, it has proven inadequate to fully explain noncompliance in complex situations (Tyler 1990). Therefore, other actor-based approaches have added more behavioral and psychological variables, including social norms and perceived legitimacy of authorities and rules (Kuperan and Sutinen 1998, Hatcher et al. 2000, Thomas et al. 2016, Bergseth and Roscher 2018). For example, trust in formal fisheries governance entities (Turner et al. 2016), trust in scientists (Shirley and Gore 2019), and the presence of strong leadership (Gutiérrez et al. 2011) have been found to increase compliance rates.

Even when accounting for many social variables and complexity, both actor-based and opportunity-based models still primarily rely on compliance as a conceptually binary behavior (e.g., Dresdner et al. 2015, Bergseth and Roscher 2018, Mackay et al. 2020). That is, fishers either comply with a given rule, or they do not (Fig. 1a). This maps poorly onto small-scale fishers’ reality. Faced with a tapestry of sometimes contradictory legal rules and informal norms, fishers who consider themselves “responsible” fishers often are technical rule-breakers of some rules (Sundström 2012). This noncompliance may be accidental, when fishers do not know about regulations, or may be a transient behavior (Spencer et al. 2021). For these reasons, scholars and fishers have long pointed out how compliance is not black and white and how the division between illegal and legal behaviors is often arbitrary (Finkbeiner et al. 2017, Nahuelhual et al. 2020). Functionally, this means that categorizing compliance as binary is typically a judgment call, adding further challenges to measuring noncompliance, which already is hidden in daily practices faraway at sea.

In response to the limitations of a binary categorization of compliance, a novel typology was explicitly designed for categorizing and conceptualizing dispositions toward compliance in a small-scale fishing context (Boonstra et al. 2017; Fig. 1b). This typology emerged from qualitative work conducted in Swedish small-scale fisheries, combining inductive and deductive reasoning. Instead of judging individual actions as compliant or not, this typology categorizes the broader compliance postures (attitudes) that fishers have toward the rules they operate under. The typology includes four ideal-types across two axes. One axis speaks to the perceived legitimacy of the rules, ranging from defiance to acceptance. The other axis is about empowerment and is defined by engagement with the rule-making process. The resultant four types are commitment, reluctance, resistance, and creativity (Fig. 1b). The most apparent types are commitment, where fishers willingly endorse and accept personal responsibility for the rules, and resistance, where fishers dismiss and disengage from fisheries regulations. The less obvious types are reluctance, where fishers agree with the goals of regulation but find issue with the process and may engage in foot-dragging or other weapons of the weak (Scott 1985), and creativity, where fishers disagree with regulations but pay close attention to the rules to find loopholes (Boonstra et al. 2017). Boonstra and colleagues argue that the committed posture is associated with high levels of regulatory compliance; indeed, these fishers deeply internalize the rules and enforce them, resulting in a highly compliant fishery. Resistant fishers generally characterize a noncompliant fishery. The other two types have a less predictable effect on compliance, measured in a binary way. Creative and reluctant fishers comply sometimes, and their noncompliance is often hidden or unexpected when it does occur. This typology thus has the potential to serve as a more nuanced diagnostic of compliance tailored for small-scale fishing. However, this typology has not been examined empirically for small-scale fisheries in the Global South, which holds 97% of the world’s small-scale fisheries jobs (World Bank 2012). Here we evaluate the analytical advantages of this nonbinary typology of compliance by drawing on empirical results from four distinct small-scale fisheries in Latin America.

METHODS

Methodological approach

To evaluate the utility of the nonbinary compliance model in small-scale fisheries, we drew on four well-studied case studies from Latin America (Fig. 2), a region facing weak fisheries governance and low compliance (de Oliveira Leis et al. 2019). This is comparable to many parts of the Global South. To identify the advantages and limitations of different compliance models, we compared four case studies with clear fisheries rules, yet different social and institutional settings (Table A1.1). We relied on qualitative methods applied to gain insights from applying this analytical lens in several contexts, leveraging their ability to identify context-specific, causal patterns (Lindkvist et al. 2022).

The cases offered variation in small-scale fisheries characteristics, such as the types of rules being complied with, the types of fishing activity, the diversity of actors, and the effectiveness of formal regulations (Table A1.2). However, each case study analyzed a specific and clear fisheries regulation. For each case study, we applied the two-dimensional model to understand compliance outcomes and motivational postures to the chosen fishery rule. To do this, we compiled data from surveys, interviews, and field observations as detailed in the Data Collection section. This data was complemented with existing literature.

Because we accept that compliance/noncompliance is not a binary division, we use the term “noncompliance” throughout this paper to include a fuzzy set of behaviors that deviate from those prescribed by rules (Ragin 2000). The authors applied the nonbinary, two-dimensional typology to the same case study. Through group discussion and analysis, we examined behaviors and attitudes, categorizing them according to their alignment with the ideal types outlined in the two-dimensional model. As a group, the four authors discussed each other’s case studies to validate interpretations and agree on insights for each case study from each analytical model.

Description of case studies

Costa Rica

The Gulf of Nicoya accounts for about 27% of Costa Rica’s annual landings (Vargas 1995) and supports thousands of artisanal fishers who target multiple species (Trujillo et al. 2012). Some of the most valuable species are croakers (Sciaenidae) and white shrimp (Penaeus occidentalis; Trujillo et al. 2012). Most fishers use 3–4-meter boats with outboard motors and use handline, gillnets, or longlines as gear. The agency in charge of fisheries management is the Costa Rican Institute of Fisheries and Aquaculture (INCOPESCA). The National Coast Guard Service supports INCOPESCA with the enforcement of fisheries regulations along with other security issues such as drug trafficking, which has become their main priority in recent years (Chavez-Carrillo et al. 2019). Some fishers are organized into local cooperatives and associations that have played an active role in managing fishery activities (García-Lozano and Heinen 2016). Others are independent fishers, some of whom do not hold fishing licenses.

Catches in the Gulf of Nicoya peaked by volume in the early 2000s and have since declined (Trujillo et al. 2012). There has been a simultaneous transition toward species of low economic value leading to an almost 50% reduction in fisheries profits (Alms and Wolff 2020). Several efforts have been implemented to reverse overfishing without success (Marín and Vásquez 2010, Marín et al. 2013, Marín 2015, Chavez-Carrillo et al. 2019). The most important strategies have been the establishment of fishing licenses, gear restrictions, co-managed areas, and a three-month seasonal closure of the major fishing grounds in the Gulf. We examine the seasonal closure in this case study.

The seasonal closure started in 1985 as an effort to protect the reproductive peak of white shrimp, typically from July to September (Executive Decree N° 16804-MAG). More recently, INCOPESCA has presented evidence that the closure also protects the reproductive peak of croakers (Marín and Alfaro 2019). To economically support fishers during the closure, the government provided subsidies that were below the minimum salary (Fernández-Carvajal 2013). To receive these subsidies, fishers were required to possess a fishing license, enroll in social security, and perform community work, limiting their possibilities to engage in alternative livelihoods. Reports from INCOPESCA have consistently stated that the closures have not achieved their social and ecological goals mainly because of low compliance and enforcement (Marín and Vasquez 2010, Marín et al. 2013, Marín 2015).

Mexico

Mexico’s Gulf of California is an inland sea with diverse artisanal fisheries that support 56,000 people (Azuz-Adeath and Cortés-Ruiz 2017). Mounting evidence suggests that these fisheries are in decline (Sala et al. 2004), jeopardizing the future of fishers and their communities. Many factors have caused this decline, notably ineffective fisheries management (Finkbeiner and Basurto 2015). Fishing is legally managed by the National Fisheries Commission (CONAPESCA) through fishing permits held individually or by fishing cooperatives, but CONAPESCA has limited capacity to monitor, enforce, or even design fisheries regulations. Declining fish populations intersect with growing socioeconomic challenges like narcotrafficking and poverty, and fishers often feel powerless to prevent decline (Giron-Nava et al. 2019). The pattern of overfishing and decline is reflected in El Corredor San Cosme to Punta Coyote (the “Corredor”), a remote region of Baja California Sur with 13 small fishing towns that is economically dependent on fishing (Finkbeiner and Basurto 2015, Quintana et al. 2020).

The rule we explored was a network of temporary fisheries closures in the Corredor called Zonas de Refugio Pesquero or “fishing refugia”: areas where fishing is banned for usually five years with the option of renewal (DOF 2014). Fishing refugia are emerging “bright spots” of fisheries co-management in Mexico and are typically proposed by fishers and implemented by CONAPESCA, often with facilitation from nonprofit organizations (Quintana and Basurto 2021). The refugia in the Corredor established in 2012 were the first ones in Mexico, facilitated by the nonprofit organization Niparajá (CONAPESCA 2019). Although fishing refugia are ostensibly designed by fishers themselves, whose interests they ultimately reflect depends on engagement from diverse communities of fishers in the design process. In this paper, we distinguish between outcomes in three areas: Town A, Town B, and Region C. Town A has three fishing cooperatives and the strongest leaders and proposed the largest refugia in 2012. Town B has two cooperatives and proposed four smaller refugia in 2012. Region C includes 10 small fishing towns with overlapping fishing areas, so they coordinated their proposals, and ultimately proposed six areas (Quintana 2020).

Overall, the story is told as a social-ecological success (Niparajá 2017a). In 2012, a majority of Corredor fishers signed the initial proposal. From 2012 to 2017, fish biomass increased 30% more in refugia compared to control sites, and catch data showed an average size increase for several important fishes (Niparaja 2017b). When the refugia expired in 2017, 90% (156 of 173) of Corredor fishers signed an expanded proposal for another 5 years, doubling one refugia and adding another even larger. However, these trends mask regional differences within the Corredor. Much of the average biomass increase was driven by dramatic increases in Town A’s refugia, while other refugia had smaller or no improvement compared to control sites (Quintana et al. 2021). In Town A, refugia meetings were well-attended. In Town B, the two cooperatives conflicted, while Region C had widespread apathy toward the refugia, although there were a few strong individual supporters. Fishers identified enforcement as a major issue. When asked whether the refugia were “working,” a common response was that the refugia worked for fish but not for people, because of high rates of poaching (Appendix 1 Quote 1). Generally, fishers report high compliance with the refugia by fishers from within the Corredor. Part of the compliance problem is overlapping access rights, which leads to confusion over the no-fishing rule, a confusion that certain actors took advantage of (Quintana and Basurto 2021).

Honduras

Laguna de los Micos on Honduras’s Caribbean coast is a lagoon with extensive mangrove forests and rich biodiversity. Thirteen fishing villages surround the lagoon, including four indigenous (Garífuna) villages (Rivera 2018). For this study, we focus on two villages that we call “A” and “B” to preserve anonymity. Both villages have small populations (~100 people) and depend on fishing in the lagoon for their income. Most fishers are men, while women commercialize the catch. The fishers mainly target róbalo (Centropomus sp.), caguacha (Eugerres plumieri), copetona (Paraneetroplus maculicauda), and jaiba (Callinectes sp.). They use gillnets, hook-and-line, and netes (a traditional trap used to catch jaiba). Fishers from Village A use fiberglass boats (~25 feet), allowing them to fish in the open ocean as well as the lagoon, as well as conduct some tourism activities as an economic alternative. Village A has a reputation for exerting influence on authorities using their economic power (i.e., ownership of boats and fishing gear) and political connections. In contrast, fishers from Village B only fish in the lagoon because they use small wooden boats called “cayucos” (~20 feet) that lack the capacity to fish in the open ocean.

Because of the importance of the lagoon, the Honduran government in 2017 approved a formal law that grants exclusive fishing rights to fishers who live around the lagoon, as well as manages effort through several controls. The process for the establishment of this law was done alongside the different resource users (i.e., fishers, the state agencies, and local nonprofit organizations). For this study we focused on two rules from the law: (1) a maximum of 600 meters of gillnet of mesh size 3” or greater is allowed per boat, and (2) gillnets are prohibited during May and June. These rules were approved by both Village A and B. This occurred through a series of meetings with fishers from all the villages and representatives of Honduran government and local nonprofit organizations. In these meetings, a majority of votes from community members determined which rule was accepted. Fishers from Village A and B were present in a large meeting where high-ranking government agency representatives asked fishers’ approval on the rules. Fishers from both villages voted in favor and the law was signed.

Puerto Rico

Puerto Rico is a colonial territory of the United States whose fishing governance has been marked by inconsistent policies, some aimed at development and others aimed at limiting fishing effort (Suárez-Caabro 1979, Pérez 2005). This is reflected in the progression of catch reporting for its commercial small-scale fisheries. In 1971, commercial fishers started reporting landings voluntarily. These reports indicated a decline in fish stocks (Appeldoorn et al. 2016). By the 1980s, this decline caused a shift in public policy priorities from modernizing the fleet to conserving fish stocks (Pérez 2005), which in turn created demand for more accurate catch reporting to measure fishing pressure and conduct stock assessments. In 1998, Law 278 (12 L.P.R.A.§ 25g) made it compulsory to report landings to the Department of Natural and Environmental Resources (DNER). This law got teeth in 2004 through DNER regulation 6768, which authorized revoking licenses of fishers who did not report catch, and additionally restricted fishing effort through size limits, seasonal closures, and gear restrictions. Fishers fought for reforms, which elicited an amendment in 2010, but the amendment also added a fine for not reporting catch. Since then, Puerto Rico has faced systemic shocks. In 2017, Hurricane María crippled Puerto Rico’s fishing operations by damaging fishing boats, destroying coastal infrastructure, and causing long power outages. In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic eliminated market chains and constrained fishing activity.

This case study examines the commercial fisher’s responsibility to report landed catch (“trip landing tickets”) from 2004 to 2020, through the two major shocks of Hurricane María and COVID-19. Fishers are required to submit reports after each trip, or notify DNER within 60 days, or are subject to license revocation and a fine. We chose this rule because of its dual importance for accurate stock assessments and symbolism of cooperation between fishers and managers.

Data collection and analysis

Data collection for each case study varied and included diverse qualitative and quantitative techniques such as semi-structured interviews, ethnography, participant observation, and questionnaires. These data were collected for other studies and projects (i.e., Flores et al. 2017, Quintana and Basurto 2021, Gómez-Andújar et al. 2022) but have been repurposed for this analysis. The identity of the fishing communities has been kept confidential to direct attention toward the processes, not the specific actors themselves. Our methodological approach broadly involved data collection (surveys, interviews, observation, field notes, document analysis) and preliminary analysis (transcription, thematic coding, reflection, memo-writing) at the time of the original project, with ex-post further iterative analysis, writing, and discussion among our team to identify stabilized types and write case studies for this collaborative paper (Fig. 3).

The first case study examined compliance in relation to seasonal closures in the Gulf of Nicoya, Costa Rica, drawing on interviews by M. I. Rivera-Hechem and colleagues of 12 key informants, as well as 88 surveys of fishers conducted in person by Rivera-Hechem and colleagues between July and September of 2016. The survey included questions about demographics, fishing methods, perceived compliance and enforcement, and open-ended questions about the potential outcomes of new interventions and reasons for noncompliance with the closure. Data were collected as part of a larger project on the economic potential of the Corvina fishery in the Gulf of Nicoya (Flores et al. 2017). In this study, Rivera-Hechem reviewed official documents and academic literature, cross-referencing this information with insights from interview transcripts and survey results. Particular focus was placed on identifying compliance postures through open-ended responses to a survey question about reasons for non-compliance with the closure.

The second case study drew from ethnographic research by A. Quintana in several fishing communities in Baja California Sur, Mexico, examining compliance with temporary marine reserves. Quintana conducted 68 in-depth, semi-structured interviews, participant observation, and document analysis intermittently from 2016 to 2018, including 6 total months in the field. Quintana conducted fieldwork primarily in the largest town of the study region with short visits (4–14 days) for in-depth interviews in three of the other towns; Quintana also spent 2 months in the state’s capital city (La Paz, Mexico) where she interviewed and observed government officials involved in the creation and evaluation of the reserves, university professors involved in data collection, fishing sector leaders who have sought to replicate the reserves elsewhere, and staff members of Niparajá, a nonprofit organization that supported creation of the reserves. Quintana transcribed all recorded interviews (n = 54 of 68 total) and coded these, as well as notes about non-recorded interviews. In the ex-post analysis used for this paper, Quintana reviewed both codes and interview transcripts directly, as well as coding five reports published about the case pertaining to compliance by a civil society organization, Niparajá.

The third case study examined compliance with a nationally designated protected area in a coastal lagoon in the province of Tela, Honduras, based on fieldwork conducted by L. Sierra Castillo in two villages bordering the lagoon. Sierra Castillo lived in this region for 3 years, during which she conducted informal interviews and participant observation about fishing activities in the lagoon including compliance as a key research topic, recorded in a field notebook. At the time, Sierra Castillo worked for the Coral Reef Alliance as a program coordinator, which gave her access to relevant community meetings. As a member of the staff of this organization, the perspectives that Sierra Castillo was exposed to through participant observations and interviews had a notable risk of bias (more notable than the other case studies in this paper where research was conducted by students; a discussion of positionality and how bias was managed in the other case studies can be found in Flores et al. 2017, Quintana 2020, and Gómez-Andújar et al. 2022). Sierra Castillo reduced the risk of this bias by separately observing fishers’ behavior from the different villages, asking the same question several times during an interview using different jargon and clarifying language, repeating interviews about governance, fishing activities, and compliance with key informants through time, participating in many meetings, and building trust by participating in their fishing activities and helping them collect data about their own catches. Qualitative data was analyzed by thematically coding relevant parts of the field notebook, writing memos about emergent themes, and iteratively conducting interviews about emergent topics. During analysis, Sierra Castillo further managed bias through skepticism and questioning of conclusions.

The fourth case study examined catch report compliance in Puerto Rico, utilizing data from 40 in-depth, semi-structured interviews administered by N. X. Gómez-Andújar from April to December 2020. These included fisheries managers with federal and local roles (n = 11) and commercial fishers (n = 29) of varying gear types in five landing sites across eastern Puerto Rico. Because of COVID-19 health concerns, 67% of interviews were performed through web-based platforms or phone calls, while the remaining were carried out face-to-face following social distance procedures. Informed consent and assurance of confidentiality was acknowledged verbally prior to beginning the interview and after explaining the purpose and objectives of the research. Audio was recorded, transcribed, and coded using NVivo software. Emergent themes included fisher’s attitudes toward regulations, totaling 35 codes by 16 fishers. Exemplary quotes were translated into English (Brislin 1970). Catch report data were collected from reports by fisheries management agencies and shared with N. X. Gómez-Andújar. As with the other cases, analysis was iterative with writing, reviewing interviews and codes, and discussion with the team.

RESULTS

Mixed compliance types with a seasonal closure in Costa Rica

During our fieldwork in 2016, fishers perceived compliance with the closure in the Gulf of Nicoya to be extremely low. We found that 93% (n = 82) of fishers believed the closure was frequently violated, similar to previous observations (Marín et al. 2013). The analysis of the context, behaviors, and the fishers’ statements under a two-dimensional model of compliance revealed that fishers’ postures mostly fell into three distinct types of compliance postures: reluctance, resistance, and creativity (Fig. 4). In general, expressions of commitment to the closure were rare during our key informant interviews and fishers’ surveys. Reluctance was the most salient with frequent signs of disengagement from the closure rule process, but acceptance in relation to its objectives. There were several examples of mistrust and disengagement between fishers and authorities. Fishers raised doubts about the scientific basis and effectiveness of the closure through statements like “if there were better scientific evidence supporting the closure, fishers would comply with it” or “the closure is neither well studied nor planned.” Others critiqued the closure’s inadequate attention to gear, commenting that violating the closure with hook-and-line gear is not as bad as doing so with a gillnet. Their logic was that fishing lines only target finfish and do not affect shrimp populations directly. Some fishers repeated rumors that authorities were going to extend licenses for shrimp trawlers that were supposed to be banned in the Gulf after their expiration. Finally, several fishers were especially critical of enforcement, reporting that offenders were caught then released without punishment, though they did not see roles for themselves for engaging with authorities. These views reveal that many fishers accept the goal of protecting marine resources in the Gulf but do not agree with the ways in which the closure is designed and implemented and are disengaged from authorities, characteristic of the reluctant category.

Another dominant posture in the Gulf of Nicoya was resistance (low rule acceptance and low engagement with authorities), expressed by fishers who disengaged from the rules and justified rule-breaking as legitimate, showing a lack of acceptance of the rules (Boonstra et al. 2017). When asked about the reasons for noncompliance, the most recurrent topic was economic need. Statements like “people fish out of need” and “the subsidy is not enough” were common when fishers were asked about lack of compliance in our surveys. This parallels observations from other scholars (Fernández-Carvajal 2013, Chavez-Carrillo et al. 2019). Fishers also highlighted that many of them cannot benefit from the subsidy because they do not hold official permits despite having applied for them for years. In many instances, marginalization and lack of recognition lead fishers to disengage from and defy official regulations, which ultimately fall into postures of resistance. A further sign of resistance appears in statements that show little acknowledgement of the role fishers play as resource stewards, placing full responsibility on authorities, outsiders, and other sectors. Several fishers highlighted the lack of enforcement as the main reason for noncompliance. Others questioned the objectives behind the closure by saying that “authorities did not establish the closure to protect the resources in the Gulf.” Some fishers even believed that the real goal was to eradicate small-scale fishers from the Gulf to open it up for large-scale tourism.

We also detected postures of creativity that reflect engagement with the rule and its implementation, but a defiance of its objectives. For instance, some fishers talked about communication networks between fishers to alert violators when coastguards were patrolling the area. Fishers also mentioned that a common strategy to increase their household income during the closure was to register family members as part of their crew, so they could receive the subsidy. Similar responses by fishers have been documented in the region, where fishers learn the rules closely so they can circumvent their aim (Fernández-Carvajal 2013). Overall, there are widespread sentiments of low compliance with the closure (93% reporting frequent violations, as mentioned above, n = 82). The nonbinary lens revealed not just one monolithic group, but rather the coexistence of three compliance postures with distinct attitudes toward the seasonal closure in the Gulf of Nicoya.

Divergent marine reserve compliance in Mexico

In Mexico, a survey question implemented in 2016 about fishers’ perceptions of compliance found that fishers perceived moderate levels of noncompliance (about half reported some poaching from fishers from their own communities) but answers to this survey question showed no regional differences across the Corredor region (Niparajá 2017a). This was surprising because there have been strong differences in the social-ecological outcomes of the refugia between three regions that we will call Town A, Town B, and Region C (Quintana et al. 2021). After five years of conducting ecological transects and counting fish catch, Niparajá’s analysis indicated that Town A’s refugia had the greatest ecological benefits by far, including number of fish inside the refugia and fish size increase in commercial catches outside (Niparajá 2017b). Town B established the greatest number of refugia but these showed mixed ecological benefits, and the refugia of Region C have had the least ecological benefits over five years.

In contrast to the survey question, the two-dimensional typology of compliance revealed substantial regional differences (Fig. 5). We assigned the “commitment” posture to Town A, the largest town in the region. In our in-depth interviews from Town A (n = 31), fishers generally endorsed and supported the refugia, demonstrating personal responsibility for their establishment and maintenance. Two fishing cooperatives contributed money to buy a fiberglass boat dedicated to enforcement, and each cooperative has one member who regularly monitors the refugia. There has been high overall attendance at refugia governance meetings, and in 2017, over 100 inhabitants (33.33% of the population), including fishers and their families, attended a meeting 5 hours away by car to decide whether or not to re-establish the refugia. By demonstrating both acceptance and engagement, we thus categorized these fishers as largely expressing the “commitment” posture.

In the second-biggest town, Town B, our in-depth interviews (n = 7) suggested the coexistence of two dominant postures: “creativity” and “commitment.” In this town in 2017 there were two fishing cooperatives. One cooperative was deeply involved in designing and proposing the refugia from the beginning. The president was a “Buzo Monitor,” trained in ecological monitoring techniques to conduct annual monitoring of the refugia alongside Niparajá and government staff (Quintana et al. 2020). Members of this cooperative attended meetings and expressed support for the refugia. Members of the other cooperative engaged in the foot-dragging behaviors, avoiding meetings to discuss the refugia, and expressing discontentment with both the process of refugia design and the NGO involved, Niparajá. In our interviews, they disparaged even Niparajá’s attempts to survey them to ask their opinions, saying that Niparajá had ignored their perspectives, listening only to the fishers that they agreed with. However, they still agreed to implement the refugia rule, ultimately proposing several refugia. Between the two cooperatives, they proposed four refugia, more than any other town. We thus categorize the two dominant postures as “commitment” and “reluctance,” respectively. The coexistence of commitment with reluctance (associated with fishers trying to keep rules at bay) could explain mixed ecological results in the four refugia that Town B established: although one seems to provide effective protection of critical fish larval stages as planned, there is no evidence of any ecological benefits in the other three refugia (Quintana et al. 2021).

Finally, in Region C, our in-depth interviews (n = 9) suggested motivational postures fitting the “resistance” and “reluctance” categories. Although a few individuals had actively supported the refugia, most fishers were disengaged in the region, whether they agreed with the idea of refugia or not. There is a widespread sentiment that their “best” refugia (the largest one in Region C, established in a once-productive reef hoping to recover it) had been a failure, and the response has been disenchantment, disengagement, and defiance. This refugia is far from any town, so it is difficult to monitor and enforce. As a result, it is exposed to frequent poaching, including from “outside” fishers from across the Gulf of California and the capital city of La Paz, leading fishers from Region C to lament giving up a productive fishing ground for its exploitation by “outsiders.” Fishers from Region C have used this to justify why some of them fish inside the refugia. Several fishers are particularly against the refugia; for example, fishers from one of these towns opposed and effectively dismantled a new refugia proposal in 2017 (Quintana et al. 2021). The combination of reluctance (foot-dragging) and resistance (outright rejection of the rules) could explain the minimal ecological benefits in the refugia of Region C.

Hidden noncompliance in Honduras

In the implementation of a seasonal closure near two villages in Honduras, although both villages were included in the formal process of designing and implementing the rules, our ethnographic fieldwork over three years indicates that implementation has led to different compliance postures. Village B fishers felt that the rules had no ecological basis, and felt powerless against Village A’s influence on authorities. Simultaneously, fishers from Village A seemed to be following the rules, but frequently found loopholes in these rules to keep fishing effort high.

Analysis using the two-dimensional compliance model provides some insight into this complex situation, particularly on differences in engagement with the rules (Fig. 6). Rules were passed by a simple majority of individual votes from village members. However, this voting system was vulnerable to fishers’ unequal access to decision-making spaces. Fishers from Village A were always present in meetings to establish the seasonal closure, and they overwhelmingly voted in favor of it. Fishers from Village B were also invited to the full process of designing the law, but frequently had less representation. To get from Village B to the meeting space took an hour by boat and approximately 2 hours by car on a dirt road. Fishers from Village B often did not have money for fuel to travel to these meetings. As a result, Village A usually had more representation than Village B and thus more decision-making power in voting.

The fishers in Village A also exploited a legal loophole in the rule that undermined the rule’s conservation purpose. With robust seafaring boats, Village A fishers usually fished in the open ocean and only fished in the lagoon right when the seasonal closure ended, when there were more fish to catch. During this time, they fished in the lagoon using several boats, each with the legally established length (600 m) of gillnet per boat. However, the most powerful Village A fishers owned 3–5 boats each with up to 5 fishers working each boat, meaning up to effectively 3000 meters of gillnet and many hands to work it. Village A seemed to be complying with the established rules, and they were highly engaged and accepted them, but they exploited them for their own benefit. This “bending of the law” is characteristic of the “creativity” posture, where fishers are engaged with the rules so they can find ways around them (Fig. 6a).

In contrast, fishers from Village B felt hopeless, driven to occasional noncompliance by need, with little access to either formal governance or alternative livelihoods. Seeing how fishers from Village A exploited the rules by using multiple boats to use more gillnet, fishers from Village B perceived the seasonal closure as especially unfair. Without access to the open ocean or alternative livelihoods, they occasionally broke the seasonal closure rule and fished in the lagoon during the closed season despite the risk of getting caught. In our informal interviews, they justified their behavior by citing the need to provide for their families, as well as perceiving unfairness of the rules and law. Ultimately, fishers from Village B felt that there was no other option but to resign to both the established law and to how Village A seemed to always win. We defined Village B’s compliance posture as reluctance (Fig. 6b) because they did not reject the goals of the established rules but found issues with how the rule was made and how it was enforced.

Catch reporting compliance and false resilience in Puerto Rico

In the case from Puerto Rico, the two-dimensional model was able to capture transformational shifts in compliance attitudes through time toward catch-reporting policies (Fig. 7). After 2004 when DNER imposed new restrictions punishing non-reporting, fishers protested by boycotting catch reporting, which has been well-documented (Griffith et al. 2007, Matos-Caraballo et al. 2008, Matos-Caraballo and Agar 2011). Because of their direct opposition, we categorized commercial fishers during this time with the posture of resistance to the 2004 regulations (Fig. 7a). Following the 2010 reforms (including the threat of fines for not reporting catch), official catch reports increased steadily. Yet, the amount of active commercial fishers continued to decline until 2012. The decreases in active fishers have been mainly attributed to the global economic recession (Matos-Caraballo 2018). Combined with increased catch reporting, this camouflaged the discontent caused by regulations without meaningful fisher participation or buy-in. Recognizing this gap, DNER implemented an educational program to promote compliance in 2012, which marginally increased trust and catch reporting. However, most fishers in Puerto Rico continued to believe that decisions about fishing regulations are unfair (Partelow et al. 2020). Thus, fishers describing their behaviors with the rule between 2012 and 2016 displayed predominantly the reluctance posture (Fig. 7b), given their agreement with the objectives of fishing regulations, but not the ways they were developed and enforced. For example, some fishers understood the need to monitor fishing effort to prevent overfishing, yet were themselves unmotivated to contribute toward this (Appendix 1 Quote 2).

After Hurricane María, motivational postures toward catch reports shifted toward resistance and creativity (Fig. 7c). Many fishers self-organized to renew licenses and report catch in order to meet the requirements for aid programs. Managers mentioned a surge in reported catch statistics after the hurricane by fishers who did not previously report (even if they just reported “did not fish”), and attributed this to opportunism rather than commitment to the reporting rule (Matos-Caraballo 2018, Gómez-Andújar 2021). A post-hurricane catch landings study recommended understanding if fishers were over-reporting to meet license requirements (Gedamke et al. 2020). Despite the increased reporting, it took three years for the disbursement of aid, and fishers’ frustration further increased. Fishers’ frustration was visible in media coverage and even a successful lawsuit by fishing associations (Velázquez 2020). As a result, outwardly compliant fishers manifested their resentment by lying in catch reports, as confessed through interviews.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, postures toward the rule continued to be predominantly creative and resistant (Appendix 1 Quotes 3–5). When the pandemic started in 2020, DNER recognized commercial fishers as essential workers and excluded them from a recreational boating ban from March to September 2020, as long as they were registered with a commercial fishing license. The need for a license to fish at all incentivized subsistence and recreational fishers to apply for commercial licenses. This not only led to a surge in applications and an increase in managers’ administrative burden, but a simultaneous increase in catch reporting to keep benefitting from a commercial license despite not operating commercially. This behavior did indicate strong engagement with the catch reporting rule, and we classified it as creative. At the same time, illegal fishing increased across Puerto Rico (Agar et al. 2022). Some already resistant fishers now defied the rule, betting on low enforcement capacity as they fished with expired licenses and without submitting catch reports. Ultimately, the two crises of Hurricane María and COVID-19 made catch reporting increasingly unreliable. On one hand, over-reporting occurred from fear of missing out on disaster aid or loss of fishing licenses. On the other hand, under-reporting or misreporting occurred from mistrust about how the data would be used, for example, to further restrict fishing.

DISCUSSION

Co-developing solutions with fishing communities to address urgent fisheries problems often hinges on managing compliance (Oyanedel et al. 2020a, Nahuelhual at al. 2023). Approaches focusing on whether people do or do not comply are helpful for identifying whether illegality is a primary concern. However, these approaches overlook the diversity embedded in how people comply or not (Cepić and Nunan 2017). This often leads to simplistic management recommendations calling for increased monitoring and punishment (Arías et al. 2016, Sumaila et al. 2016, Atuo et al. 2020). When noncompliance is hidden through exploiting technical loopholes (common for creative-type fishers) or small acts of foot-dragging (common for reluctant-type fishers), enforcement is a poor fit to solve the problem. Additionally, for ethical and practical reasons, there is a need for more nuance and attention to environmental justice issues in fisheries compliance than has been called for by the Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated fishing (IUU) discourse (Song et al. 2020, Welch et al. 2022, Nahuelhual et al. 2023). In this study, we identified advantages of moving beyond a binary evaluation of compliance and applying a two-dimensional model to diagnose compliance attitudes in four cases from Latin America.

Like seeing in color versus black and white, the two-dimensional model revealed important insights that are often invisible to a binary lens. As a result, this approach allowed us to distinguish between different types of apparent (non)compliance, link fishers’ intentions to their behavior, and link compliance to social-ecological resilience. Additionally, the two-dimensional assessment of compliance allowed us to capture differences between the case studies that could be leverage points for tailored policy solutions.

Management and policy implications

Based on our analyses, we argue that this nonbinary assessment of compliance based on Boonstra and colleagues (2017) can be useful to inform interventions to improve fisheries management and governance, particularly when noncompliance is high. This tool provides a diagnosis of the motivations that determine compliance behavior, inviting a more holistic approach to address poor compliance in small-scale fisheries. So far, most recommendations emanating from assessments under the binary model involve increasing enforcement and deterrence (i.e., more patrolling, more surveillance; Agnew et al. 2009, Marín 2015, Cabral et al. 2018). On the contrary, the analysis of our case studies through a nonbinary model of compliance postures invites a combined set of approaches and solutions to improve fisheries management and governance, including the need to consider the processes and motivations behind rule-making, address power imbalances, and be aware of misaligned incentives.

In the Costa Rican case study where 93% of fishers reported frequent rule violations, we differentiated mainly three distinct types of fishers. The coexistence of different postures highlights the need for a portfolio of interventions to tackle overfishing in this case. The two most predominant attitudes, resistance and reluctance, reflected disengagement with the closure rule. However, while deterrence may be the best option for resistant fishers, different interventions could leverage higher rule acceptance amongst reluctant fishers to support engagement through improving trust between stakeholders and increasing fishers’ participation in decision making (Hauck 2011, Chuenpagdee and Song 2012). Instances of creativity that reflect high engagement with the rule can point to opportunities to transform governance in another way, aligning incentives or increasing fishers’ acceptance of the rules to increase legitimacy (Chuenpagdee and Jentoft 2018).

The case study from Mexico highlights how a nonbinary compliance analysis helped explain opposite social-ecological outcomes between sites. Committed fishers were a majority in the site considered most “successful,” while resistant and reluctant fishers dominated in sites without ecological improvement and with opposition to the fisheries closures. What is still missing from the compliance posture model is the relationship between the specific rule being complied with and the broader aim of the rule. The specific rule of the closures did aim to replenish fish stocks by preventing fishing within their borders, but also had the more ambitious aim to increase government enforcement in the entire Corredor. The nuances of why fishers complain about high levels of noncompliance cannot be captured in binary models, but are still challenging to capture in the nonbinary model, which is a limitation.

Applying the nonbinary model of compliance in Honduras revealed that addressing local power relations in the creation and enforcement of rules is critical to improve fisheries compliance management. This case involved a wealthy town and a poor town sharing a single lagoon’s fish resources. The nonbinary approach revealed that seemingly compliant fishers from the more politically powerful town actually used the rules to their advantage, ultimately leading to a larger impact on the lagoon’s fishery resources. Meanwhile the seemingly noncompliant fishers from the other, less politically powerful town were usually excluded from rulemaking, and while their ecological impacts were lower, tended to “illegally” fish more often. Overall, understanding how the power relations and their dynamics affect the creation of a rule can influence how fishers decide to follow the rule or not and ultimately affect their compliance.

Finally, a nonbinary look at compliance in the case study from Puerto Rico showcases the importance of a deeper look at seeming resilience to understand fishers’ underlying attitudes and behaviors. Although the number of catch reports rebounded after both the aftermath of Hurricane María and the pandemic, these crises in fact increased distrust of formal governance institutions (Méndez-Tejeda et al. 2021, Straub 2021). The nonbinary lens revealed that increased reporting was based on self-preservation (i.e., access to fisheries aid) rooted in resentment rather than commitment to the rule. This distrust toward fisheries management can explain hidden noncompliance, including misreporting (Arías et al. 2021). Addressing this apparent resistance with compliance can involve countering misinformation with incentives for legitimate reporting. In general, the use of a two-dimensional model provides a structured first step to gain an in-depth understanding of social drivers of fisheries noncompliance when designing behavioral interventions to reduce illegal fishing (Battista et al. 2018).

Methodological insights

Classifying systems using four compliance archetypes developed from small-scale fisheries was analytically feasible, with the nonbinary lens accommodating a variety of mixed methods. The methods used in our four case studies varied from in-depth ethnography with a decade of lived experience in the system to a semi-structured survey implemented during the course of one month. Ideally, application of the nonbinary model would rely on several lines of evidence including qualitative and quantitative data. We identified that more in-depth qualitative interviews are particularly informative when applying the nonbinary model. Despite this, the Costa Rica case study shows that even short periods of time spent in the field can produce new insights when we switch from a binary to a more nuanced model to represent compliance.

Despite the multiple advantages of a nonbinary analysis, binary metrics remain dominant when assessing compliance with fishing rules (for example: Arías et al. 2015, Bergseth et al. 2015, Bisack and Das 2015). Binary interpretations of compliance can be easily represented in quantitative terms (each person as 1 or 0, added to estimate a percentage of “compliant” people) to parameterize models that simplify inherently complex systems. For example, when compliance is included in fisheries models at all, it is simplest to include it as a percentage of adherence to a rule (Bisack and Das 2015), though models like agent-based models can accommodate more complex compliance behaviors (Lindkvist et al. 2020). This tempts researchers and managers to over-rely on what could be an artificial construct. Furthermore, a binary approach allows for quick comparisons across time and space, as well as real-time measurements. Another appeal of a binary approach is its familiarity to practitioners and scientists, thus representing the path of least resistance to document noncompliance. Fisheries—consisting of interwoven webs of fishers, fishes, and invertebrates, predators and prey, larvae that move hundreds of miles in open ocean currents, informal agreements of capital and debt, eroding cultural norms and labor malpractices, long supply chains, and highly internationalized products that must be kept cold—are highly complex systems that are already hard to understand, and many managers lack time, training, capacity, and funding to evaluate the social dimensions of fisheries. Measuring noncompliance in a binary way can be readily justified and is often the only documentation of a social outcome of a fisheries regulation (Solomon et al. 2015). Finally, our cases suggest that a binary approach can detect certain key patterns in fisheries, such as perceptions of widespread noncompliance with the seasonal closure in Costa Rica or frequent poaching of reserves by “outsiders” (according to fishers living locally) in Mexico. In both cases, the binary assessment served as an indicator or red flag and could help direct resources to ensuring effectiveness of the conservation rules.

Nonetheless, even where a binary approach reveals some patterns, these can be misleading. For example, in Costa Rica, many fishers voiced the need for better enforcement, which sidesteps responsibility for supporting the rules themselves. In Mexico, the reporting of higher noncompliance from outsiders may be an artifact of the survey rather than reality. Fishers may be more willing to report compliance behaviors by people they do not have personal relationships with (i.e., people from outside), or fishers may seek to label outsiders’ behavior as “noncompliant” as a political decision (Ballesteros and Rodríguez-Rodríguez 2018). In the cases from Honduras and Puerto Rico, a binary approach is misleading and could lead to misdiagnosing the problem, and even creating bigger problems (i.e., affecting the ecosystem more, making communities more marginalized and vulnerable). An oversimplified measurement of compliance misses or impoverishes the understanding of compliance itself. The worst-case scenario is the overreliance on “measure-mentality,” a positive feedback between overreliance on a binary indicator of compliance, a myopic focus on the indicator rather than the broader aim of management, and basing policies on that measurement (Turnhout et al. 2014).

Further research gaps

A challenge that arises with measuring non-compliance through a binary lens is how it is easily treated as an outcome, rather than a symptom of societal or governance systems (Nahuelhual et al. 2023). Compliance is not just an outcome, it is a constant and layered element of fisheries governance (Nahuelhual et al. 2020). Treating compliance as a binary outcome runs the risk of missing analytical insights on the quality of compliance.

Moving forward, research on compliance in small-scale fisheries should consider ways to incorporate analysis that go beyond measuring compliance as a behavior, and consider the underlying attitudes. Our cases revealed how any model of compliance, by focusing on compliance with rules (i.e., letter of the law), may miss the broader aim of the rule. For example, in Honduras, a focus on compliance misses the ecological consequences, which the rules are ultimately about. The end goal of establishing the lagoon closure was to improve the fish abundance. By working around the law to use extensively more gillnet, the compliant behavior of fishers of Village A impacted the lagoon’s fisheries much more than fishers of Village B despite their illegal behavior. Analyzing it further, the fishers of Village B were reluctant to follow the rule, precisely because they perceived that the rule was not benefiting the ecosystem as it was intended. Nowhere do we see this tension as clearly as with fishers’ postures of creativity. When assuming this motivational posture, fishers are trying to use the rule to their advantage or find ways around the rule, and technically follow the rule but not the aim. This reveals the challenge of measuring noncompliance through a single indicator, and whether just one is enough. We should ask ourselves during the analysis if the model used is capturing whether the aim the rule is being achieved, or if the model only reveals whether the rules are being followed. Following the letter of the law, but not the aim, is likely a broader phenomenon in small-scale fisheries and impossible to detect using a binary analysis, because fishers are following what the rule mandates. For this reason, we stress that careful attention should be given to not confuse compliance, or rule-following, as the goal of fisheries management. Indeed, the mismatch between fisheries rules and the broader aim is often a reason that fishers see these rules to be illegitimate and/or why they do not comply (Boonstra et al. 2017, Cepić and Nunan 2017, Finkbeiner et al. 2017).

CONCLUSION

Evaluations of fisheries compliance often reveal low levels of compliance and conclude that more enforcement is necessary. This tends to ignore the root causes of noncompliance and exacerbate problems of mistrust and illegitimate rulemaking. A deeper look at fishers’ attitudes toward the rules, their acceptance of and engagement with rules, produces a useful diagnosis of compliance types that can be used to generate more effective and just interventions. Adopting a nonbinary lens to analyze fisheries noncompliance is able to provide useful knowledge of motivations behind behaviors and management legitimacy and complement the traditional binary approach. These insights have potential to improve compliance interventions, and thus improve the quality of compliance.

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