Research

INTRODUCTION

Lutjanus campechanus (red snapper) is one of the most prized fish in the Gulf of Mexico (“the Gulf”). In 2018, red snapper was the most-landed recreational finfish species in the Gulf at 12.6 million pounds, and it was the third most harvested recreational fish per pound in the United States at 19.1 million pounds (National Marine Fisheries Service 2020). In the 1980s when federal management of the fishery began, red snapper numbers in the Gulf of Mexico were near collapse. From the 1980s to the 2010s, federal management measures greatly increased the red snapper stock. Despite greater numbers of fish, however, federal management quota mechanisms led to increasingly shorter fishing seasons to balance increased landings. Public outcry occurred when the shortest ever (3-day) recreational fishing season occurred in 2017, with anglers angry over the short length and what they deemed unsafe fishing conditions in a race to fish before the season quickly ended. Ultimately, this controversy led to a groundbreaking piece of public policy for United States fisheries: Amendment 50 to the Gulf of Mexico Reef Fish Management Plan by the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council. For a longer discussion of the case context and history of red snapper in the Gulf of Mexico, please see Appendix 1.

Amendment 50A-F: State Management Program for Recreation Red Snapper (or “Amendment 50”) is the amendment to the Gulf of Mexico Reef Fish Fishery Management Plan, that delegated management authority of the recreational red snapper fishery in the federal waters of the Gulf to localized, subnational jurisdictions, or “states” in the U.S., including Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida (Gulf Council 2019). Amendment 50 gives each state authority to autonomously change season length, bag limit, and minimum and maximum size limits for the recreational fishery. Under the plan, red snapper remains a federally managed species, but each state is delegated the authority to manage the fishery. If the state is found to mishandle management, NOAA Fisheries holds the right to restore its own federal guidelines in federal waters (NOAA 2020).

Although political leaders (e.g., Congress), recreational anglers, federal and state fish and wildlife agencies all agreed that recreational anglers were receiving an unacceptably short red snapper season under federal management, the devolution of management to states represented an experimental direction in fisheries management policy in the U.S (S. Palazzo 2017, unpublished manuscript). Proponents for the change argued it would lead to an increased number of fishable days and that states have the appropriate data and capacity to manage the fishery sustainably. Opponents worried state management might lead to overfishing for a variety of reasons. Whichever side a stakeholder argued for, little is known about the perceptions of recreational fishermen and stakeholders more broadly on this recent policy change. Our research question was the following: how do recreational fishing stakeholders, especially recreational fishermen, perceive devolution of fishery management authority from higher levels of governance down to more local levels, and what do these findings say about resilient social-ecological management? Our objective was to use the case of Amendment 50 as a window into these stakeholder perceptions. To approach this question, we used an exploratory case study of recreational red snapper management in the Gulf of Mexico with the objective of distilling key stakeholder messaging themes for analysis.

Better understanding stakeholder perceptions is critical because, according to NOAA, the attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs of the public have a profound impact on the success of policy, serving as a foundation for management because these groups are impacted by management decisions (NOAA Office for Coastal Management 2015). Our case study, though based in United States governance and political systems, offers a reflection point for global fisheries management practitioners at all levels of governance. Co-management strategies, defined as the sharing of management responsibilities between two levels or scales of government or resource-users more generally, have been employed in fisheries across the globe, leading to a greater inclusion of fisheries stakeholders in management processes (Carlsson and Berkes 2005, Pomeroy et al. 2007, Evans et al. 2011, d’Armengol et al. 2018, Whitehouse and Fowler 2018). Our paper contributes to this globally relevant topic by contributing key findings on stakeholder and fishermen perceptions of devolution in fishery management. In the United States context, agencies like NOAA increasingly acknowledge the importance of public knowledge. The Magnuson-Stevens Act requires public participation, stating that it produces better decisions, more support for agencies, brings to light important information on a resource, resolves conflicts among users, and ensures policies are implemented (NOAA Office for Coastal Management 2015). Public participation and stakeholder perceptions are no less important in the global context.

This introduction has described the relevant context of this case, and the following literature review places this question in the broader conversation of governance and natural resource management separate from any specific state’s context. Using a grounded theory approach, we consolidated stakeholder and recreational fishermen public comments into major themes underlying stakeholder perceptions in support of or opposition to Amendment 50 (Charmaz 2006, Saldaña 2021). Analysis and discussion of these results will offer a globally relevant, stakeholder perspective on fisheries governance at different scales of government. We argue that these perceptions are vital for informing effective future fisheries management.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Scales of governance and devolution of management authority

Our research is focused on resilient management, defined as how well policy systems (i.e., red snapper management and fisheries regulations) reorganize after a disturbance (i.e., shortened recreational fishing seasons and recreational angler discontent with management). Reorganizations of policy systems after disturbances lead to a renewal of communities and political institutions, such as possible changes to recreational fishermen satisfaction and an amended fisheries management plan (Grafton 2010). Previous studies have examined the links between fisheries management strategies and resilient management (Melnychuk et al. 2014); how well current management systems consider emerging threats of climate change for adaptation (Pinsky and Mantua 2014, Creighton et al. 2016, Ojea et al. 2017); and how theoretical management approaches like co-management and adaptive management enable adaptation for resilience (Ogier et al. 2016). Hughes et al. (2005) showed that consideration of scales of management, or what level of government a resource is managed at, is essential for resilience of a social-ecological system, insights linked to the common pool resource literature showing that appropriation of resources like fisheries must be part of a nested system, managed at the scale appropriate for the resource (Ostrom 1990).

Scale is an important concept for our research. Co-management of small-scale fisheries shares responsibility for management across two or more scales of governance, often involving the devolution of management authority to more local entities or communities (Berkes 2009). Co-management of small-scale fisheries has been implemented by governments and supported by international aid across the globe (Evans et al. 2011). In Kenya, Palau, and the Netherlands, inclusion of fishermen and communities in management displays variations of fishery co-management across scales of government (de Vos and van Tatenhove 2011, Gruby and Basurto 2013, Cinner and McClanahan 2015).

The knowledge and information needed to manage a fishery successfully can come from varied scales of governance, including local ecological knowledge that can come from fishermen to inform management and locally manage small-scale fisheries (Martin et al. 2007). Incorporating fishermen and their knowledge into co-management systems, however, can be challenging based on local social-ecological politics, context, and perspectives (Suárez de Vivero et al. 2008, May 2012). Mansfield and Haas (2006) show how different stakeholder groups used the concept of scale to frame the problem of and responsibility for Steller sea lions in the Pacific Northwest, similar to how our research shows how problems with red snapper management in the Gulf of Mexico were framed and talked about differently depending on the stakeholder group. Boucquey (2016) examines how conflicts over red drum management in North Carolina are understood differently by different actors, similar to how our paper explores stakeholder perceptions of a specific red snapper management policy.

Local contexts are essential when defining what makes the social-ecological system of a fishery sustainable and resilient (Espinoza-Tenorio et al. 2011, Ojea et al. 2017). Our research fills this contextual gap, examining in an inductive way how Gulf of Mexico stakeholders, especially recreational fishermen, perceive recreational red snapper management, allowing us to propose a contextual definition of resilient management for one of the most iconic recreational fisheries in the United States in one of its fastest growing regions.

Recreational fisheries management and trust in context

Our research contributes to the understanding of how recreational fishermen and other red snapper stakeholders interact with the management, policy, and resiliency of the red snapper social-ecological system in the Gulf of Mexico. Anglers are vocal about regulations and conditions, and their voices have been used to guide policy decisions and understand compliance or adoption of new rules and tools (Scyphers et al. 2013, Curtis et al. 2019). Studies have been used to examine stakeholder impressions of implemented or proposed limited access programs, spatial management, and general impressions of regional management (Edison et al. 2006, Cullis-Suzuki et al. 2012, Tokotch et al. 2012, Veiga et al. 2013, Brinson and Wallmo 2017, Chan et al. 2018, Crandall et al. 2018, 2019, Ordoñez-Gauger et al. 2018). Because recreational fishermen are part of a broader social-ecological system, understanding angler behaviors is critical for effective management of recreational fisheries (Lyons et al. 2016, Ward et al. 2016).

How and why fishermen do or do not trust management authorities is an important area of social-ecological research. Trust between fishermen, fisheries managers, and scientists has been found to be a key element of successful governance in social-ecological systems (Holm and Soma 2016). Although projects such as cooperative fisheries research initiatives, which connect the fishing industry and scientists for research, have been implemented and help generate trust between fishermen, fishery managers, and scientists, simple inclusion in research processes does not necessarily generate trust (Kaplan and McCay 2004, Silver and Campbell 2005, Ebel et al. 2018). The opposite, however, has also been found. Recently, Scyphers et al.’s research utilizing the Great Red Snapper Count, a United States Congress-funded project designed to independently assess the population count of red snapper in the Gulf of Mexico, found that knowledge of the Great Red Snapper Count and its scientific methods and goals was positively correlated with recreational angler satisfaction, supporting other findings that stakeholder participation and inclusion improves satisfaction with management (Gray et al. 2012, Crandall et al. 2019, Scyphers et al. 2021).

Social-ecological systems and resilience

National-scale fisheries management, when it is handed down or devolved to a more localized scale of government, has been shown to enhance resilient management (Dunning 2018). Resilient management is defined as management that adapts to social and ecological change (Woods et al. 2022). Social-ecological systems thinking can be applied as a lens to better understand resilience in fisheries. On the ecological side, resilient fisheries management reduces anthropogenic stressors, protects key habitat, and maintains diversity (Woods et al. 2022). On the social side, resilient management can refer to the policy system itself (as in, can the management system change to accommodate stressors) or social resilience, which can include a wide range of societal capacities such as capacities for transitioning out of a fishery, disaster relief, diversifying livelihoods, education, investing in new gear, and property rights to fisheries (Woods et al. 2022).

When decision makers consider both social-ecological systems and local policy adoption while creating management plans, studies have shown that the resulting management system is more customized, better scaled, and fits better with the social-ecological system (Carpenter and Folke 2006, McClanahan et al. 2009). When a government shares decision-making power over fisheries with local communities, social and ecological benefits are enhanced (Cinner et al. 2012), albeit with the ecological benefits more difficult to document definitively (McClanahan et al. 2009).

Our research addresses a gap in our understanding of (1) devolving management of recreational fisheries in the United States to more localized scales and (2) devolved management in the context of the North American model of fish and wildlife conservation, a philosophy that views recreational sportfish as a public trust with every citizen (and future generations) holding the right to fish for. In the North American model, subnational or state agencies (fish, wildlife, and game agencies) have management authority over recreational fisheries in state waters, issuing regulations treating wildlife as a public trust, managed for the benefit of the public and future generations, with state agencies serving as trustees. Limited attention has been paid to stakeholder perceptions on devolving federal recreational fisheries management to state agencies under the North American Model. Although our case uses a U.S. policy event for analysis, its implications for resilient social-ecological fisheries management have global relevance because we examine a common factor: how do stakeholders, especially the fishermen themselves, understand and frame this significant management devolution?

METHODS

This research was designed as an exploratory case study that examines the social and political context surrounding the passage of Amendment 50 as a way to help explain its passage into fisheries management policy. Case study research examines past and contemporary variables that cannot be manipulated by the researcher, making it a logical method for studying Amendment 50 (Yin 2018). At the time of writing, Amendment 50 was in place, making case study methodology effective for examining past statements and comments about state management to create a window through which to analyze that discussion.

For this case, we collected secondary data from stakeholders essential to the creation of Amendment 50. These included recreational anglers, commercial fishermen, lawmakers, and management officials. We used stakeholder data that included public comments from the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council’s online open comment submissions for Amendments 39 and 50 to the Gulf of Mexico Reef Fish Fishery Management Plan. Amendment 39 to the Gulf of Mexico Reef Fish Fishery Management Plan was the Gulf Council’s first, unsuccessful attempt to pass management of red snapper to the state level in 2015. We also used public comments submitted to a 2015 Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries survey on attitudes toward state control of red snapper. These data sources gave voice to several local level stakeholder groups, including the important voices of many recreational fishermen who served to gain or lose the most from state management of red snapper. Newspaper articles and Congressional transcripts from hearings and committees were used to develop the problem framing at federal and inter-state discussions.

Important limitations of our dataset are that data are limited to (1) comments from individuals who chose to respond to and comment on the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources 2015 survey, (2) comments from individuals who chose to submit comments to the Gulf Council’s online public comment portal for Amendments 50 and 39, and (3) sources that were publicly available. Analysis and results should be interpreted in this context. Our paper does not answer the question of who chooses to submit comments to the Fisheries Councils nor who chooses to comment on surveys about devolution of fisheries management. It does, however, examine the voices of those who care about these policy actions as a way to understand how these same individuals think about and understand the management of this important recreational fishery.

The use of public comments to assess natural resource management, policies, and institutions is not new. Across global fisheries, online comments offer a unique avenue for assessment of recreational fisheries and fishermen (Shiffman et al. 2017, Billing 2018, Lennox et al. 2022). In the United States, researchers have used interviews, meeting transcripts, memos, online posts of recreational fishermen, and analysis of open-ended survey questions to discuss mistrust and perceptions of “participation” (Wilson and McCay 1998, Hartley and Robertson 2008). We performed an extensive review of publicly available sources, including news articles, stakeholder comments, and web pages from involved agencies (i.e., NOAA Fisheries and the Gulf Council). In total, we collected 2206 usable data points, including 47 from Nexis Uni and 41 from Google searches. The framing provided by these was complemented by 28 open comments from Regulations.gov on Amendments 50 and 39, 236 from the Gulf Council’s Amendment 50 online open comments sheet, 301 from the Gulf Council’s Amendment 39 online open comments sheet, 1552 from the Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries 2015 survey on state control of red snapper, and from 1 Gulf Council video. Table 1 provides a breakdown by speaker of the secondary data collected and used in our research. Table 2 provides a timeline to see which years comments came from.

We coded n = 2206 stakeholder comments and documents that were found using Google, Nexis Uni, and snowball methodology where additional data sources mentioned in the statement would be sought out and analyzed. Demographic data was collected from these sources when clearly stated or inferred with certainty to identify the speaker. These data were coded iteratively using a first cycle of an in vivo grounded theory approach followed by a second cycle in which these codes were distilled into themes (Saldaña 2021). In vivo coding was utilized for the first cycle because it utilizes the speaker’s own words, thereby ensuring that the researcher remains true to the speaker’s intent and sentiment. Grounded theory is an inductive analysis of qualitative research, data, and cases in which the researcher’s process of analysis allows for theories and concepts to emerge from the codes and cases themselves (Charmaz 2006). As patterns emerged, these codes were collapsed or split iteratively. Choices on how to categorize codes were based on analytic memo writing and observation. We left analytic memos on the data files that discussed and explained any changes or additions we made to our codes, columns, or to the data in any way.

After taking note of similar and reoccurring in vivo codes, a second cycle of thematic coding was performed. These codes were then utilized to input each comment into the database. Eventually, repetition and recurrence of similarly worded comments allowed for us to code new comments only utilizing the thematic codes. We coded statements for positive or negative framing of topics presented in their comments. Essentially, these codes constituted the main idea or the narrative that the speaker used when talking about red snapper management. All codes were defined in a codebook that operationalized each theme and detailed the inclusion criteria for each theme so that the qualitative data gathered from comments and articles could be included in the dataset with consistency (DeCuir-Gunby et al. 2011).

Because this is exploratory, qualitative research, we used expectations instead of hypotheses. We expected that the problem of red snapper management would be shaped and narrated differently by different stakeholders varying according to whether they supported or opposed Amendment 50. To test these expectations, we analyzed the data using descriptive statistics broken down by type of speaker and where the stakeholder fell in the positive-negative category. These statistics were then used to show what the primary positives, negatives, and hesitations toward state control of red snapper were by category of speaker. In our Results, we detail the perspectives of each type of stakeholder and show how they form the problem of red snapper management, leading to the passage of Amendment 50 as the policy solution.

RESULTS

Of all coded comments, n = 875 or 40% were in support of devolved state management, with recreational anglers (89% of supportive comments), national political leaders (e.g., senators; 3%), and interest groups (3%) constituting the majority of these comments (see Table 3). Statements that opposed Amendment 50 were at n = 70 or 3% of all our data, with most non-supportive comments also coming from recreational anglers (n = 30 or 43% of non-supportive comments). A large portion of the comments (57%) were coded as “Other” in our data because the language did not clearly support or oppose state management. Even if these comments expressed frustration with current regulations or possessed negative language toward federal management, they were not coded as supporting state management because we could not assume that was the commenter’s stance on red snapper management. For this paper, we only analyze those comments that clearly supported or opposed state management. Importantly, our data was not a random sample, so these percentages are not meant to be generalized to the population. Instead, they are meant to characterize relative frequency of key stakeholder concepts that we describe in more detail below, and to characterize those stakeholders engaged in recreational red snapper management.

Rationale for support of Amendment 50 or state management of red snapper

The main reason that stakeholders supported Amendment 50 was a preference for state management of recreational fisheries. The four main reasons for this preference included (1) a belief that state management provides essential flexibility for recreational fisheries management, (2) a greater perceived trustworthiness of states, (3) a belief that state management would entail better access for recreational fishing for anglers, and (4) a belief that states have the capacity to conduct more accurate science. These four reasons are contained in Table 4 with definitions, examples, and quantitative data. In total, 19 themes were identified characterizing stakeholder support for Amendment 50. In our manuscript, we focus on the rationale for support or opposition to Amendment 50 that stakeholders discussed most frequently. These are reviewed in the following subsections.

Flexibility and timely management

Among statements that supported Amendment 50, 18% of statements noted that state management is better equipped to adjust to occurrences that require quick management changes, such as variability in seasonal weather patterns or fishing conditions. These localized management considerations vary between states, as does the abundance of red snapper. This quick response of state managers was often presented in contrast to federal managers, who were perceived to act with a delay, as expressed in the following representative statement from a recreational angler, “State management is more nimble than the Fed[s] (sic). Keep states [in] control over our fish.”

Stakeholders perceived state governments as more efficient given their geographical closeness to the communities in the Gulf that fish for snapper. Two stakeholder statements are representative of this view: “Most everything can be done better and more efficiently by a government that is closer to the resource, so let the States do this on a permanent basis”; and the following: “State managers inherently have better insight into what works best for the anglers of their state and will ultimately produce more and better opportunities both for private boat anglers and the charter/for-hire fleet.”

Trustworthiness of states

Stakeholders argued that states are more trustworthy than the federal government because states have similar responsibility for the management of other game species (e.g., white-tailed deer). In the U.S., state-level fish, wildlife, and game agencies manage many seasonal, recreational game species within their political boundaries. The following statement from a recreational fisherman is representative of stakeholders who prefer state management: “The Federal Government has NO BUSINESS (sic) in regulating State fisheries in States with waters bordering the Gulf of Mexico; their governance of our State resources is fundamentally wrong and flawed and should end IMMEDIATELY (sic); the [Federal government] [does] not manage our deer herds and they should not manage (mismanage) our fisheries; Red snapper are NOT pelagic or migratory and are resident fish and should be treated as such.”

It is important to note that the federal government has decades of experience in the sustainable management of fish stocks, bringing many back from the brink of collapse including the red snapper fishery that is the subject of this paper. That said, the perception is widely held that state level decision makers have the requisite sportfish management experience to better manage this fishery.

Better access

Recreational fishermen perceived state management as guaranteeing better access to the red snapper recreational fishery. Generally, these statements focused on how state management, in the eyes of stakeholders, meant a longer season so that anglers would not have to choose between fishing and taking a trip in bad weather. The perception that state management leads to longer periods of angler access vs. their federal counterparts was common sentiment in the data.

Respondents also argued that better access via longer seasons made for a more inclusive fishery where more young anglers were able to go fishing, as was said in the following representative statement: “The longer season has allowed a safer and enjoyable red snapper fishing season. There was not a push to try and catch snapper within a 7 or 10 day window when the weather may be terrible. By knowing the season would be open for a couple months, it helped the recreational anglers plan a safe trip and get new and younger anglers more involved in fishing. Nobody wants to take a young adult/teenager on a boat when it is rough. As an active recreational angler, I fully support a permanent amendment to allow states to manage the fisheries within their own waters.”

Stronger science

Twenty-two percent of stakeholders statements (n = 257) made arguments about science and scientific management in support of Amendment 50, arguments that typically focused on habitat and population estimates. For example, stakeholders argued that because red snapper habitat includes rocky bottoms and reefs rather than a more open ocean or Gulf-wide habitat, this trait makes red snapper more suitable to be managed locally by states. One respondent noted that because habitat varies state to state, Amendment 50 makes more sense: “Circumstances are different regionally, why shouldn’t management be also? Does coastal Florida have as many offshore structures, both natural and man-made as Alabama, Texas, Louisiana, nope.”

A large part of the management conversation revolved around the following question: who has a better idea of how many red snapper are in federal waters? Many stakeholder statements (n = 125) believed that there were more red snapper in the Gulf of Mexico than the numbers contained within federal scientific population assessments. Many recreational fishermen felt that red snapper regulations in the 2010s did not match the large number of red snapper they saw on their personal fishing trips. They perceived a frustrating mismatch in observed experience and the limited federal fishing season, a mismatch that ultimately led to the public frustration that started the adoption of Amendment 50. The following quote from the data from a Georgia-based recreational fisherman in 2019 is representative: “Yes, the state should manage their water. Also, they should open red snapper in early April and for many months. There are so many snapper you can’t get down to catch many other species, and for the last four years we have killed more snapper trying to catch grouper and seabass than we could have kept and gone in ...”

As seen in this quote, recreational fishermen sometimes felt that red snapper were actually overabundant. This led to the inability to catch other target fish when red snapper were not in season and could not be kept, thus resulting in a frustrating amount of red snapper dying after being thrown back. The following quote is representative of the perception that this mismatch resulted in wasted bycatch: “The current rules are not consistent with the catches I have observed on several trips out of Panama City FL. Throwing the fish back and watching the dolphins have a “field day” was very disappointing to say the least.”

Rationale for those who prefer federal management of red snapper

Because only 3% of our data opposed Amendment 50, this section will only briefly summarize the core reasons elaborated in Table 5. Mistrust of state management was the main reason respondents opposed Amendment 50, with respondents arguing that state-level decision making was potentially disastrous, citing an era before the federal government took control of the fishery and stating that the fishery was nearly fished to extinction. In the words of one representative recreational fishing captain, “[Keep] the status quo please. NOAA, NMFS and Gulf Council have worked as professionals to rebuild the fishery along with sports and commercial fisherman alike with great success. No reason to change a working system ...” Twenty-one percent of opposition comments cited the federal government as the more trustworthy actor, saying they can better collect scientific data and better divide catch quotas among competing groups. Fifteen percent of opposition statements argued that federal management is the only way to ensure overfishing does not occur, with one representative comment recognizing the stable growth and management that federal management has brought, saying, “I’d like a little more local control without giving up the large scale [federal] fisheries management benefits of the current system.” Fifteen percent of opposition statements noted that losing federal management would ensure that some groups (e.g., commercial fishermen) would receive unfair benefits over recreational fishermen.

DISCUSSION

Our data show that among red snapper stakeholders, preference for state fish, wildlife, and game agencies to manage the fishery (vs. federal agency management) can be broken down into four different rationales: (1) stakeholders believed state fish, wildlife, and game agencies provide the flexible management required in a fishery spanning five states in the Gulf of Mexico, all with heterogeneous habitats and oceanographic features; (2) stakeholders trusted state fish, wildlife, and game agencies; (3) stakeholders believed state agencies afford better access to the fishery; and (4) stakeholders believed state agencies produce more accurate science. Using Hardin’s (2002) definition of trust, where an entity trusts another entity to do an action; it can be argued that all four of the beliefs held by stakeholders in support of state agency management can be described as some form of trust. Whether stakeholders trusted state agencies to manage in general, manage flexibly, create opportunities for better access, or conduct scientific assessments, all beliefs that we found evidence for in our data can be construed as a form of trust.

Understanding why stakeholders place trust in an agency and how to restore trust once lost is important because it relates to the willingness of stakeholders to comply and accept management regulations (Needham et al. 2004, Schroeder et al. 2014). Mayer et al. (1995) argue that stakeholder perceptions of trustworthiness of an agency can be explained by the agency’s ability to carry out its mission (e.g., managing the red snapper fishery), its integrity and adherence to a set of principles valued by stakeholders (e.g., ensuring access and ensuring flexible management), and its benevolence, or if stakeholders feeling positively toward the managing agency. Schroeder and Fulton (2017) add that the concept of voice, or the opportunity to express opinions in decision making, is an essential explainer of stakeholder trust in agencies and leads stakeholders to support limits on harvests. When stakeholders believe they have a voice, they are more likely to perceive fairness, and trust an agency to manage wildlife (de Vos and van Tatenhove 2011). There was ample evidence in our data that red snapper stakeholders, especially recreational fishermen, perceived state agencies as having suitable ability, integrity, and benevolence. Likewise, the close proximity of state agencies and the way that state managers were said to better understand local needs compared to more remote decision makers suggests concepts of voice, ability, integrity, and benevolence explain greater trust for state managers.

Our findings show that this same trust is a key aspect of resilient management for the social-ecological red snapper system. Leading up to the passage of Amendment 50, the recreational red snapper management system was faltering in social resilience for recreational fishermen because of how regulations led to lack of opportunity to fish for red snapper. This led to diminished trust in federal management from recreational fishermen, further eroding the resiliency of the red snapper social-ecological system. State management was perceived to be more flexible and was trusted to lead to more fishable days, both important factors of resilient social-ecological fishery management (Melnychuk et al. 2014). This concept of better understanding local needs and being closer to the resource aligns with existing work on scales of management and applies to fisheries managers across the globe (Ostrom 1990, McClanahan et al. 2009, Dunning 2018). In the United Kingdom, national fishery management institutions had less trust from fishermen than their regional counterparts, though trust for both was low, and these fishermen voiced similar concerns toward fisheries management and managers as found in our data (Dixon et al. 2024). Our research builds on existing work that demonstrates the social benefits of devolved management (Cinner et al. 2012, Dunning 2018) by suggesting that management at more local scales might improve social-ecological management not only through being a more appropriate scale, but also through being perceived by stakeholders as being the more appropriate scale. Federal fisheries managers returned a near-collapse stock of red snapper through their management strategies, but this history might be less important if stakeholders trust that state management is now the more appropriate scale of management for red snapper.

What could explain the differing trust placed in federal versus state managers? In one of the most comprehensive overviews of the concept of trust in natural resources, Stern and Coleman (2015) describe the idea of affinitive trust, where stakeholders may place more trust in an agency that they perceive to have shared concerns, or common perceptions of the most important issues at hand (issue salience). Affinitive trust may come from repeated face to face meetings, where relationships develop, and shared values and intentions emerge with mutual understandings of problems and solutions. As seen in the Netherlands, when stakeholder input and concerns are included in co-management systems, trust in governance can be increased (de Vos and van Tatenhove 2011). It could be that state-level red snapper management, enacted by decision makers living and working in the coastal communities where red snapper is fished, has led to more affinitive trust, leading in turn to greater social resilience of the social-ecological system (Hughes et. al 2005). Considering the importance of social-ecological context for understanding components of resilient management (Espinoza-Tenorio et al. 2011, Ojea et al. 2017), enduring and increasing anti-federal government sentiments in parts of United States culture may increase affinitive trust in state agencies (Nye et al. 1997, Agnew 2023).

Riley et al. (2018) have tested two theories that explain why stakeholders trust state-level fish, wildlife, and game agencies: (1) perceptions of procedural fairness (e.g., stakeholders believe that managers listen, allow stakeholders to influence management, and communicate), and (2) technical competency (e.g., state management is enacted by qualified people with expertise and awareness). They found that perceptions of procedural fairness were four times as likely to explain trust in state managers, although both were significant. If resilient management for red snapper is defined by how well the Gulf Council recognizes and responds to disrupted fishing seasons per Grafton’s definition (2010), then it is clear that the trust of recreational fishermen is a crucial component of resiliency and the Gulf Council’s ability to successfully respond to future fisheries disruptions.

As of 2024, Amendment 50 is finalized and the new active management strategy for recreational red snapper in the Gulf of Mexico. In 2023, Alabama’s recreational red snapper season ran from 26 May to 4 September from Friday to Monday for 4-day weekend fishing (Outdoor Alabama 2024). Louisiana in 2023 was able to start their season on 26 May and end it on 30 December with a 4 fish per day per person bag limit and a 7-day fishing week (LeBreton 2023, Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries 2023). Although this shift to state management seems to have stabilized and increased the length of recreational red snapper seasons, conversation continues about data and the total number of red snapper in the Gulf of Mexico (Congressional Sportsmen’s Foundation 2024). As mentioned previously, the Great Red Snapper Count found that there were many more red snapper in the Gulf of Mexico than previously thought. However, this discovery of more red snapper did not lead to substantially longer fishing seasons and more access like many recreational fishermen had hoped, raising questions about whose data collection programs, the state or the federal government’s, are closer to the actual number of red snapper, and which data should be used to set season length and fishing regulations for this fishery.

LIMITATIONS

An important limitation of our study is that our data primarily comprised the voices of recreational fishermen. This is due to sampling the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources survey that was sent to recreational license holders as well as recreational fishermen being the primary respondents in the Gulf Council’s online comment forum for Amendment’s 50 and 39. Although recreational fishermen have a large and impactful presence in the red snapper social-ecological system, missing from this case study is a large sample of commercial red snapper fishermen, fisheries managers, marina owners, fisheries scientists, and other participants. These participants in the fishery might have different perspectives on state management and the broader social-ecological system than recreational fishermen.

If a response bias is present in our data, we would expect that the most vocal individuals are those who would be most impacted by a shift to state management, at least based on perception of gain or loss from that shift. Specifically, because this is an Amendment that significantly alters the management of the recreational red snapper fishery, we would expect that recreational red snapper fishermen would be most likely to express their thoughts and opinions. In the event that our research allowed us to do our own survey, we would expect similar responses amongst federal saltwater recreational fishing license holders who fish in the Gulf of Mexico. This is because, as shown in our research, one of the primary problems leading to short recreational fishing seasons for red snapper was pinned on the federal managers, with the states being perceived as the management solution that would lead to longer fishing seasons. We expect that this perspective of recreational red snapper fishermen would not change. Performing a survey that incorporates more fisheries stakeholders such as commercial fishermen, shrimp fishermen, Gulf Council members, and others would extend the contribution of this paper by adding the perspectives of other participants in the red snapper social-ecological system, and furthering our understanding of the federal-state devolved policy system would be a worthwhile future subject of research.

CONCLUSION

Our research suggests that there is a need to better understand how stakeholders can increase their trust in federal fisheries. It may be that state managers can leverage some of the trust that stakeholders have in them, using the demonstrated potential of communication (Lauricella et al. 2017), to emphasize that Amendment 50 is a shared policy change initiated by federal fisheries managers and state fisheries managers collaboratively. In fact, this is not an adversarial process, but an innovative solution to manage a large fishery spanning 5 states. What is certain is that there is a need to understand what motivates trust in government agencies among fisheries stakeholders in the United States, something that future research grounded in human dimensions theories of trust can enhance and use to inform management of other fish and wildlife species.

The literature on resilient management of social-ecological systems suggests that such definitions are context specific, with the relative importance of criteria for resilient management varying from case to case (Ojea et al. 2017). Our research suggests that, for the Gulf of Mexico’s most important recreational fishery, trust in government, specifically in fish and wildlife agency managers, is a core component of resilient fisheries management.

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